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Abstract 
Agricultural production and market participation by smallholder farmers in Kenya continues to 
dscline despite the market reforms undertaken in the last one decade. This study examines the 
factors behind this decline. The objectives of the study are to evaluate agricultural price 
eyolution and volatility, institutional changes, smallholder farmer's resource allocation and 
productivity as well as their efficiency in the advent of market reforms. The study focuses on 
smallholder coffee farms in Central Kenya province. 
Four separate but related analytical models are applied in this study. Various time series 
sutistical methods including an ARCH (M) model are applied to analyse the price evolution 
aid volatility for the period 1985 to 1999. Institutional changes are analysed using an exchange 
configuration framework, which is theoretically founded on new institutional economics. A 
bivariate probit selectivity model that relates household's credit and land constraints to 
resource allocation and farm productivity is also applied. Finally, a stochastic translog cost 
frontier model is applied to measure cost efficiency. 
The study shows that market reforms in Kenya, although of the priciest type, did not 
c-eate sufficient conditions to completely reverse the decline in agricultural sector terms of 
tríade and producer prices in the previous years. Nevertheless, market reforms reversed the 
negative trends in prices which were prevalent during the pre-reform period. The reforms are 
also associated with higher price volatility with attendant increases in price volatility costs to 
smallholder farmers. Institutional reforms lagged behind the market reforms, a situation that 
constrained access to agricultural services, supply of agricultural credit, private sector 
participation, while increasing transaction costs to agricultural producers. The study also shows 
that constraints in factor markets, high transaction costs and risks tempered resource allocation 
towards subsistence production with consequent declines in productivity and market 
participation. Smallholder farmers in Kenya are shown to have medium to high level of 
production efficiency that is comparable to efficiency levels in other developing countries. The 
sludy consequently concludes that smallholder-based development strategy is still an efficient 
nlode of organising agricultural production. While there is still room for improving smallholder 
farmer levels of efficiency through better resource allocation and re-allocation, the highest 
source of growth is likely to come from technology development that shifts the production 
frontier outward. 
The conclusions points to the need for policy interventions that mainly focuses on 
c-eating institutional frameworks necessary for reducing transaction and production costs, price 
aid institutional performance risks, increasing access to production resources, services and 
markets by smallholder farmers. The study also identifies and recommends specific policies to 
eihance private sector participation as well as the social capital of smallholder farmers. This 
sludy views these as the main challenges to be tackled in the second-generation reform 
programs for agricultural development, prosperity and poverty alleviation in Kenya and Sub-
S^haran Africa in general. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.(1 Agriculture and development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Much emphasis in development economics, both in historical and theoretical perspective, has 
been laid on identifying the role agriculture plays in the process of development. In the 
majority of developing countries, agriculture is the dominant sector accounting for a major 
share of GNP as well as employing more than half of the labour force. This contrasts strongly 
wth developed economies where less that 10% of GDP and employment can be attributed to 
agricultural activity (Hayami & Ruttan, 1985). Developing countries are, therefore, heavily 
dependent on agriculture for the investment resources necessary for economic growth. The 
generation of increased agricultural surplus requires raising the productivity of agriculture 
resources. This can only be achieved through technological, market and institutional changes 
that enhance resource allocation and productivity in agriculture. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agriculture accounts for 35% of the region's GNP, 40% 
of exports and 70% of employment (World Bank, 1998). While agriculture needs to be the 
engine of growth in these economies, its performance in the last two decades has been 
disappointing with the sector's growth being exceeded by increases in population. This poor 
growth in the agricultural sector coupled by a heavy external debt burden led to an economic 
crisis in the region with massive poverty, hunger and decline in general welfare of the region's 
630 million people. To address the economic crisis and to rejuvenate development in the 
renon, the international community led by multilateral financial institutions mainly World 
Bank and IMF, in collaboration with governments in the region, introduced Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the early 1980's. The programmes were intended to 
accelerate economic growth through economic liberalisation and structural reforms. The SAPs 
wore premised upon new ideas about the roles of government and the private sector both in 
national economies and society in general (Stiglitz, 1998; Moll, 2000). 
After more than a decade of structural adjustment, economic growth in SSA has started 
to pick up. GDP grew at an average rate of 3.3% between 1993-1997 compared to 1.3% in the 
period 1988-1992. Nevertheless, despite these recent gains, per capita GDP in 1996 was 
estimated to be below that realised in 1990 and poverty was increasing (ADB, 1997; World 
Bank, 2000a). This evidence is supported by Collier & Gunning (1999), who indicate that per 
capita GDP in Africa declined by 1.8 % per annum between 1990-1994 as compared to a 
decline of 1.3 % per annum in 1980s. These facts have made the question of how far SAPs 
contribute to economic growth, development and poverty reduction one of the most contested 
developmental issue in recent years (Raikes, 1997; Mosley et al, 1995). 
Although the direction of policy in most SSA countries has generally been towards 
liberalisation, implementation has often been slow, inconsistent, erratic, untimely and 
sometimes half-hearted. This has meant that results are not always clearly visible. However, 
consensus is emerging that structural adjustments policies have mainly concentrated on market 
reforms aimed at 'getting the prices right', while other reinforcing measures, policies and 
imstitutional frameworks have lagged behind (Thorbecke, 2000; Kuvyenhoven, et al, 2000). 
However, there is no doubt that the liberalised market systems emerging from structural 
adjustment have fundamentally changed the economic landscape across SSA. These changes 
an; mainly visible in emerging market and non-market exchange configurations and contractual 
arrangements between market participants. Changes in relative prices, access to both factor and 
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Source: World Bank: World development report, 2000/2001 
Figure 1.1 Number and percentage ofpeople living in extreme poverty in various regions of 
the world, 1998 
At the micro-level, there is also need to evaluate how smallholder farmers, who form 
the bulk of producers in SSA economies, are adjusting their portfolio choice to meet their food 
and income needs. Such an evaluation will clarify the direction that agricultural development 
policy needs to take and specifically the role that the smallholder farmer can be expected to 
play. It will also provide an insight into the trade-offs likely at household level. This is hoped 
to contribute towards policy formulation aimed at enhancing resource productivity while 
addressing the emerging issue of identifying the roles of various institutions and their relevance 
to the noble goal of poverty alleviation. 
commodity markets as well as institutional changes have been the driving forces behind the 
changes in economic and social environment in which farmers and other participants operate. 
Farmers and other market participants are therefore being forced to re-order their priorities to 
conform with the new economic environment. Therefore, there is a clear need to evaluate the 
effects of these policy changes on agricultural development. 
Agriculture development in most SSA states centres mainly on smallholder farmers 
who are engaged in subsistence and export commodity production. At the macro economic 
level, most LDC economies are highly dependent on the revenues derived from the export of 
agricultural commodities for a large proportion of their annual budget. As can be seen from 
Appendix 1.1, for example, the export of agricultural commodities account for over 50% of 
total merchandise exports in 32 African countries in 1997 (World Bank, 1999). The viability of 
the agricultural commodity sector is therefore inextricably linked to future prospects for 
growth, employment generation and poverty reduction of most LDCs, and SSA countries in 
particular. In 1998 (see Fig. 1.1), 291 million people or 46% of the entire SSA population were 
living in extreme poverty on less than one US dollar a day (World Bank, 2000a). The majority 
of these poor people live in rural areas and are mainly engaged in agriculture. Thus, if the 
World Bank's set goal of reducing poverty levels in the region to 24% by the year 2015 is to be 
met agriculture has to play a major and central role. The challenge is, therefore, to place the 
production and marketing of agricultural commodities centre stage in order to ensure economic 
growth and poverty reduction in a liberalised market environment. 
In Production 3 
The issues identified above have far-reaching policy implications both at the macro and 
micro-economic level. For this reason they form the focal point of the present study and will be 
examined in the context of smallholder farming in Kenya. Because coffee is not only a major 
export crop in Kenya but also elsewhere in SSA, this thesis deals specifically with the smallholder 
coffee farmers. 
1.2 Review of structural adjustments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The SAPs have their theoretical underpins in the neo-classical school of thought, with its 
intellectual roots in Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'. This is as opposed to the structuralist 
peradigm that encouraged elaborate central government planning and participation in 
development, particularly through investments in commercial enterprises and strong 
actoinistrative structures. The philosophy of SAPs emphasises the advantages of encouraging 
the free play of market forces (laissez-faire principle) and the reduction of government 
participation in economic activities. It is argued that such an approach will help developing 
countries overcome their excessive dependence on a few export commodities and stimulate 
sqlf-reliant growth and development. In addition it can open the way to tackling such problems 
as, large and growing government deficits, balance of payments dis-equilibrium, low 
productivity, stagflation, unemployment, and external debt. 
The term 'Structural Adjustment' came into common use in the early 1980s1. The 
policies associated with it are mainly directed to the supply side of the economy and the 
removal of market distortions are emphasised as a way of promoting economic growth (Corbo 
& Fischer, 1995, Mosley et al, 1995). Stabilisation policies on their part are directed at the 
demand side of the economy, with the purpose of improving balance of payments position and 
reducing inflation (Mosley et al, 1995). 
The term structural adjustment has commonly been taken to be almost synonymous 
with the term liberalisation. However, in its broadest sense, structural adjustments has been 
usied as a catch word emphasising trade liberalisation policies (for instance devaluation, 
reduction and harmonisation of tariffs) as well as institutional (structural) changes mainly with 
rejgard to the roles of state and private sector (Thorbecke, 2000). Trade liberalisation policies 
ar|e mainly geared towards 'getting the prices right' with a view to allowing the market (price) 
system to play its rightful role in efficiently allocating resources, rationing of goods and 
services and determining the final mix of output in an economy. The structural changes are 
rimarily concerned with reducing the role of the public sector while enhancing the private 
sector role in the economy, or what Lipton (1990) terms as the 'market relaxation-state 
compression hypothesis'. However, even with structural changes, the leading role of 
government in the development process can hardly be contested (Moll, 2000; Stiglitz, 1998)2. 
1 Kccording to O'Brien & Ryan (1999), the then World Bank President McNamara announced the Bank's 
intention to launch a new program of lending in support of structural adjustment at Manila UNCTAD 
conference in April, 1979. 
2 The term "Washington Consensus" has also been used to describe the lowest common denominator of policy 
acvice being addressed by the Washington institutions ( mainly World Bank and IMF), initially to Latin 
American countries but later extended to other developing countries ( Williamson, 1990, 2000). The term has 
also come to be associated with free markets with minimalist role of the governments or what Soros (1998) calls 
'market fundamentalism'. Stiglitz (1998) has argued that the Washington consensus was limited in as far as the 
role of the government was concerned. He argued that the task of making the state more effective is 
considerably more complex than just shrinking its size. In this regard he calls for a post-Washington consensus 
wtuch among other things recognises the role of governments as a key institution in development. 
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In 1984 the World Bank in its influential report on Accelerated Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (the Berg Report) drew attention to the fact that living 
standards across the African continent and more so SSA, have been declining for most part of 
the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1982 agricultural production per capita rose in only five out of 
46 countries in the region (Ghai & Smith, 1987). This decline was attributed to the vagaries of 
the weather, political conflicts, world demand and also mistakes made in policy making. To 
revitalise economic growth the report recommended three major policy actions: more suitable 
trade and exchange rate policies, a more efficient use of resources in the public sector, and 
finally improved agricultural policies. Thus, according to Corbo & Fischer (1995) the 
adjustment programs focus primarily on trade regimes and the operations of the public sector. 
In sector terms reforms have focused on agriculture, trade and finance. 
The prominence given to financial sector reforms can be explained by the perception 
that efficiency in the financial sector is crucial to economic growth and the fact that there was a 
widespread failure of financial institutions during the debt crisis (World Bank, 1989). The 
agricultural sector has featured prominently in the SAPs in most SSA countries not only 
because it plays a dominant role in these counties' economies, but also because of the extensive 
government interventions that were prevalent in the sector (Commander, 1989). According to 
Krueger et al (1992), these government interventions in the agricultural sector were responsible 
for the slow economic growth in the region. 
Evaluations of structural adjustment programs in the developing countries and in SSA 
in particular have been inconclusive and often extremely controversial. As reviewed by Corbo 
and Fischer (1995) the evaluations of SAPs have been bedevilled by various complications. 
These include the quality of data available, issues of cross country comparability, appropriate 
time frames, the selection of performance indicators and the isolation of the marginal 
contribution made by SAPs in a counterfactual analysis. Alternative approaches have also been 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of SAPs, thereby bringing in the issue of comparability of 
results. 
The World Bank has undertaken several evaluations on the effectiveness of SAPs in 
SSA (World Bank, 1988, 1994). Earlier evaluations covering the period 1985-1989 indicated 
that the region's economic growth rate- as measured by real growth in GDP - had taken an 
upward turn. Mosley et al (1991) in their econometric evaluation of adjustment policies came 
to the conclusion that for the period 1980-1986 the World Bank SAPs had a weak positive 
effect on GDP growth. The authors also find a significant and negative effect of the SAPs on 
investment rates. 
Conway (1990) undertook a 76 cross-country evaluation of the SAPs. He concludes that 
there is a significant association between World Bank structural adjustment programs and 
growth in real GDP, and a lower ratio of domestic investment to GNP. In 1994, the World 
Bank issued another evaluation report assessing the progress and prospects that set the agenda 
for recovery in Africa. The report highlighted a policy shift from one that had emphasised 
structural adjustment to one that advocated for stabilisation. Reports from the World Bank 
indicate that it believes SAPs have achieved their objective of increasing efficiency and 
economic growth. As Figure 1.2 shows, the negative annual growth in real GDP that typified 
SSA between 1979 andl985 had been turned to positive growth by the latel980s. The growth 
in real GDP accelerated in the 1990s reaching an annual rate of about 5.8% in 1999. 
Source: World Bank development report (various) 
Figure 1.2 Annual growth in real GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1979 to 1999 
However, the role played by SAPs in this positive turn of events is not entirely clear. 
Fhrthermore, the sustainability of the benefits derived from this growth and their distribution 
remains a source of concern, particularly because of the growing numbers of households in 
SSA that live in poverty (ADB, 1997; World Bank, 2000a). Indeed, the World Bank evaluation 
report of 1994 concedes as much by stating: 
" Current growth rates among the best African performers are still too low to reduce poverty 
much in the next two or three decades. So far the rebounds have merely brought countries to 
their historical trend of low growth, and it is not clear whether they are shifting onto a higher 
growth path. Without further substantial increase in agricultural, investment, export and GDP 
growth, Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to lag behind other developing regions" World Bank 
(1994p.l32). 
These concerns have been used as basis for criticising the effects of SAPs in the region. 
One such critique of the World Bank's evaluation of the SAPs in SSA region is provided by 
Mosley et al (1995). The authors acknowledge that the SAPs have mainly been effective in the 
area of real exchange rate devaluation and reducing the taxation imposed via marketing boards 
ahd other mechanisms. It was subsequently supposed that such changes at the macroeconomic 
leVel have resulted in an improvement in the prices paid to farmers. However, there is dearth of 
analytical work to verify this assertion, a gap that needs to be filled. The way forward 
emphasises stabilisation policies (World Bank, 1994), the enhancement of industrial 
capabilities to enhance investments, technical innovations and agricultural diversification 
(Mosley et al, 1995). A more recent report from the World Bank suggests a more holistic 
approach should be adopted in elaborating Africa's development agenda (World Bank, 2000b). 
Tie report proposes strategies for ushering in a self-reinforcing process of economic, political 
and social development that focuses on four core areas: improving governance and resolving 
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conflicts, investing in people, increasing competition and the diversification of economies 
while reducing the dependency on aid and strengthening internal and local co-operation. 
The effect of SAPs on agricultural production in SSA has also not been impressive. 
There is no evidence that per capita decline in agricultural output evident in the region since 
1970 has been arrested (Mosley & Smith, 1995; Raikes, 1997). As shown in Figure 1.3, the per 
capita food production and agricultural production in the region declined by an annual average 
rate of 0.5 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively between 1990 to 1999. 
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Figure 1.3 Agricultural production and food production per capita in SSA in 1980 as 
compared to 1986 to 1999 
The policies recommended by the Breton Woods institutions- mainly with regard to 
pricing policy, interest and exchange rates and reduction in budget deficit- remain, in most 
cases, only partially implemented owing to various political and institutional constraints. One 
major area of concern has been the decline in government development spending particularly 
as far as agricultural services such as research, rural infrastructure, extension and credit are 
concerned. This can directly and adversely affect the fragile momentum of smallholder 
agricultural development. Although an attempt to increase agricultural production through 
price-based incentives is a good strategy, there is also a need to give more emphasis to changes 
in agricultural technologies and the institutional framework to support the price incentives. 
Technology development and dissemination and other production and marketing institutional 
arrangements happen to have a 'public good' component. This limits the amount of 
investments the profit-motivated private sector is prepared to make. Dorward et al (1998) have 
argued that relatively little attention has been given to the capacity of the private sector to 
provide agricultural services or to what these services might be given the economic, political 
and social conditions prevailing in most SSA states. Indeed, the disappointing response to 
market liberalisation can be attributed to the unduly optimistic view held by liberalisation 
enthusiasts on the potential of privatisation in SSA settings. 
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Despite the less than appealing impact of SAPs at both the macro and sector level, there 
is documented evidence that, in the short term, market reforms increased the mean and 
variance of agricultural prices in SSA (Barrett, 1997; Krueger et al, 1988; Lapp & Smith, 
1992). As far as the welfare of agricultural producers are concerned, these price changes have 
been differential in their impact (Baffes & Gautan, 1996). An equally important conclusion is 
tha: reforms have increased the scope for enhancing efficiency gains by removing market 
distortions thereby allowing a more efficient allocation and re-allocation of resources by 
smallholder producers. The impact of the institutional framework emerging to supporting 
smallholder agriculture is, however, not well understood. Equally, most of the studies 
undertaken in SSA to evaluate the impact of market reforms are concentrated at macro-
economic and sector levels. There are few studies that link macro-economic and sector 
performance to the micro-economic level. This is despite the importance of household 
responses in determining aggregate sector and national responses and the insights such 
evaluations can bring to policy formulation. As in most SSA countries agricultural 
development policies are based on the promotion of smallholder agriculture, there is a need for 
a better understanding of the way in which these important production entities have been 
affected by market reforms. The current study hopes to contribute towards bridging this 
empirical gap. 
1.3 Kenya's economy and the role of agriculture 
Like most of other developing countries, Kenya's economy is agriculturally based with 80 % of 
the population living in rural areas mainly engaged in agriculture related activities. In 1999, 
agriculture sector accounted for approximately one quarter of Kenya's GDP as shown in Figure 
1.4. The sector also employs more than two thirds of the Kenyan labour force and accounts for 
about 70 percent of total export revenue. In addition, the sector produces almost all of the 
coijintry's food requirements and provides significant proportions of raw materials used in agro-
based industries, thus forming crucial forward and backward linkages with the rest of the 
economy. Smallholder sub-sector contributes about 75 per cent of the county's total value of 
agricultural output, 55 per cent of the marketed agricultural output and over 85 per cent of the 
tottil employment within the agricultural sector (Republic of Kenya, 1998). 
Coffee, tea and horticultural crops are the main agricultural exports. In 1999, for 
example, these three commodities had an export value of Ksh 45 billion (US $ 596 million) 
equivalent to 45% of total export earnings (Republic of Kenya, 2000). In terms of foreign 
exchange earnings, the coffee sub-sector, which is the main focus of this study, was ranked 
forth in 1999 after tea, tourism and horticulture, contributing 11 % of the total foreign 
exchange earnings. In 1997/98 production year coffee exports were valued at Ksh 15 billion 
(US $ 260 million) that was equivalent to 10 per cent of agricultural GDP or 2.7 percent of 
national GDP. 
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* includes forestry, fishing, mining & quarrying, building & construction, 
domestic services and non-monetary sector 
Source: Kenya economic survey, 2000. 
Figure 1.4 Structure of Kenya's economy, 1999 
During the first two decades after political independence in 1963, Kenya's development 
had registered a remarkable performance. The development strategy rested on promotion of 
agricultural production, particularly smallholder agriculture. This strategy helped the country's 
GDP to grow at a rate of 6.6% per annum during the 1960s (Table 1.1) with the annual growth 
rate within the agricultural sector running at almost 5%. Although the oil crisis resulted in 
growth slowing to about 4% per annum in the 1970s, GDP continued to grow at a rate that was 
above average for comparable low-income countries. Public and private investments yielded 
education and social indicators well above the average social indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Swamy, 1994). The investments in social amenities, mainly health and education, and high 
economic growth buoyed population growth. By the late 1970s, Kenya - with an increase of 
3.8% per annum - had one of the highest population growth rates in the world. By the 1980s, 
the effects of strong population increase combined with poor economic management were 
starting to take their toll on economic growth and development (Table 1.1). The poor economic 
growth and deteriorating balance of payment position acted as the precursor for initial 
introduction of SAPs in the riid 1980's. As Swamy (1994) and Ng'ethe & Owino (1997) 
concede, lack of political goodwill thwarted initial attempts to reform the Kenyan economy. It 
was not until 1991 that SAPs began to be consistently implementation in Kenya. 
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i rates,1963 to 1999 
Year Real GDP Growth (%) Real per capita GDP Growth (%) 
1963-1973 6.6 3.0 
1974-1979 4.0 2.0 
1980-1985 3.8 -0.5 
1986-1990 4.9 0.8 
1991 2.3 -0.7 
1992 0.4 -2.8 
1993 0.2 -2.8 
1994 3.0 0.2 
1995 4.8 1.9 
1996 4.6 1.8 
1997 2.3 -0.6 
1998 1.8 -1.1 
1999* 1.4 -1.5 
•Provisional estimate 
Source: Statistical abstracts and Kenya economic surveys (various) 
At the macro-economic level the structural reforms have focused, inter alia, on 
utilisation of foreign exchange and interest rates, input and commodity prices, rationalisation of 
government budget and the divestiture of state owned corporations. The overall objective has been 
to jncrease market competition and efficiency. In turn this is expected to enhance economic growth 
thrbugh private sector led initiatives. Nevertheless, the economic results during the reform period 
are, to say the least, disappointing. Except for the periods 1986-1990 and 1994-1996 when there 
was a respectable level of growth in GDP growth, overall performance has been poor (Table 1.1). 
Per capita GDP growth was negative for most of the 1990s. As might be expected from such 
economic trends, poverty levels have increased while social indicators such as life expectancy, 
child mortality and school enrolments have deteriorated (Republic of Kenya, 2000). Underlying 
the record of poor economic growth in the 1990s was the failure of structural adjustments to 
promote either the sustained recovery of private investments or export growth. According to 
O'Brien and Ryan (1999) this finding holds for both domestic and foreign investments. Direct 
for3ign investments in Kenya, for example, declined from an annual average of US$ 38 million in 
1980-84 to just US$11 million in the period 1992-96. The poor track record in implementing SAPs 
and deficiencies in creating the essential prerequisites for higher investment such as political 
stability, good governance and physical infrastructure could account for this slow down in Kenya's 
economic growth. 
In a restructured economy, the government is expected to remain a key participant, but 
with its role being confined to creating a legal and economic environment conducive to private 
sector growth. Macro economic reforms were also expected to improve the terms of trade and 
grc wth in the agricultural sector. The extent to which this has been achieved, especially within the 
dominant agricultural sector has not been well documented. This is a clear oversight and the 
present study hopes to make a contribution to bridging this gap. 
The devaluation's of the Kenyan currency has reduced the heavy implicit tax arising from 
an bver-valued currency thereby benefiting exporters like coffee farmers. However, trade in export 
commodity - mainly tea and coffee - is conducted in US dollars and farmers are paid in the same 
cuiirency. The floating exchange rate has introduced the risks associated with fluctuation in foreign 
exchange to farmers and their agents whose knowledge of currency hedging mechanisms are very 
limited. As a result wide variations can occur in farmers' revenues even during the course of the 
same season. High interest rates and government deficit financing have tended to crowd out private 
sector access to formal institutional finance. This has severely constrained agriculture sector credit 
10 Chapter 1 
0 -I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
Year 
—©— Cereals —•— Export Crops & Gross mkt production 
Source: Kenya, economic surveys (various) 
Figure 1.5 Output index of agricultural commodities marketed in Kenya, 1982 to 1999 
in general and smallholder farmers access in particular. The situation has been made worse by 
short-term limitations imposed on credit access when most government and donor subsidised 
credit schemes were abolished. 
Agriculture sector reforms on their part have mainly been geared towards creating market 
competition through encouraging more private sector investments and participation. Price controls 
for agricultural produce and inputs have been abolished while most marketing boards have been 
restructured and their roles confined to regulation and promotion. Agricultural services with 
potential appeal to private sector have been privatised while government continues to provide 
services with large public goods component such as research and extension. 
Thus, it is assumed that economic reforms, both at macro and sector level have improved 
the terms of trade in the agricultural sector, the pricing system and access to both factor and 
commodity markets especially for smallholder farmers. At the institutional level, it was hoped that 
market reforms would lower transaction costs and give smallholder farmers a more participatory 
role in control and governance. These changes were further expected to result in a rise in 
smallholder farm productivity, production efficiency and general welfare. 
Despite these reforms and their worthy objectives, the volume of agricultural 
production marketed has not increased as expected. As Figure 1.5 shows, the amount of 
marketed food crops and gross marketed production continued to decline despite the market 
reforms introduced in 1991. The increases registered by export crops were buoyed by increases 
in tea exports and conceal the 55% decline in production that occurred in the coffee sector 
during the reform period (Karanja, 1998). The decline in marketed agricultural production 
indicated that production and farmers' market participation might have declined with the 
advent of market reforms. If this was the case, why then would a declining agricultural 
production continue unabated despite introduction of market reforms which were expected to 
offer more competitive prices and better institutional set-ups necessary for increased 
production and market participation? This study attempts to answer this question by focusing 
on smallholder coffee farms in Kenya 
200 -, , 
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1.4 Role and trend of coffee production in Kenya 
Approximately 600,000 smallholder farmers and 1,300 large-scale farmers produce coffee in 
Kenya. The smallholder farmers process and market their coffee through 330 co-operative 
societies while the estate farmers process their coffee in their own farms. Coffee production 
takes place mainly in high to medium potential land. These areas account for only 20% of 
country's arable land but accommodate 80% of the population (CBS, 1994). The rapidly 
increasing population (current population growth rate estimated at 2.9 % per annum) and the 
increase in food demand will call for intensified and sustainable land use practices especially in 
cofjfee growing areas. 
Coffee production history is closely intertwined with Kenya's economic development, 
as coffee has been the number one foreign exchange earner since independence in 1963 until 
1989 when it was surpassed by tourism. Apart from its role as a foreign exchange earner, 
government has relied on coffee for taxes to finance recurrent and development expenditure. 
Due to the large number of smallholder farmers directly engaged in coffee production, coffee 
also served an important equity role, one that could not be matched by capital intensive service 
sectors like tourism. At the household level, income from coffee accounts for a major 
proportion of total farm income in the coffee growing areas. These incomes have important 
multiplier effects in the national economy and more so in rural development. Rural financial 
markets which offer credit to farmers are also highly intertwined with coffee marketing 
systems in the coffee growing areas. Coffee, therefore, plays a major development role in 
Keiya and its performance has far-reaching socio-economic implications. 
Smallholder coffee production has declined persistently in the last decade. Smallholder 
production declined by 61% from 84,300 metric tonnes in 1987 to only 32,900 metric tonnes in 
1997/98 as shown in Figure 1.6. During the same period, estimated yield has also declined from 
68(1 kg to 340 kg per hectare (CBK, 1998). Indeed, the 1997/98 production and yields were the 
lowest ever recorded from smallholder farms for the last 25 years. Large-scale farms, however, 
we:-e able to maintain an average annual production at around 32,000 metric tonnes during the 
same period despite slight decline in yield (Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6 Coffee production by small and large farms in Kenya, 1987/88 to 1997/98 
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Some of this decline could have been accounted for by the depressed coffee prices that 
followed the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in July 1989. However, 
both international and domestic coffee prices began to increase after 1992/93 as can be seen 
from Figure 1.7. Nevertheless, price increases did little to arrest declining smallholder 
production. During the same period larger farms faced with these price trends maintained 
almost steady production. This seems to indicate that smallholder coffee farmers were 
confronted with a unique and unfavourable set of economic and non-economic conditions that 
affected their supply response. One such economic factor is the high volatility of coffee prices 
witnessed after the collapse of ICA and the liberalisation of foreign exchange markets in some 
producer countries. Studies carried out by the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) and 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) indicate that, as far as 
prices are concerned, coffee is one of the most volatile of the tropical beverages. This was even 
more so after the suspension of the ICA in 1989 (ICO, 1997; UNCTAD, 1995). The extent to 
which this increased volatility in prices has affected risk-averse smallholder coffee producers 
globally and particularly in Kenya is not well documented. 
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Figure 1.7 Average coffee prices in the Nairobi Coffee Exchange (NCE) and New York Coffee, 
Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE), 1986 to June 1999* 
Studies done elsewhere in SSA also clearly indicate that both small and large scale farmers 
in the region are as price responsive as farmers in other regions (Bond, 1983; Binswanger, 1989; 
Jaeger, 1992). In Kenya, Kirori & Gitu (1991) have estimated that both small and large scale 
coffee producers have a short term supply response elasticity ranging from 0.13 to 0.39 as 
compared to long term elasticity of between 0.33 and 0.98. Thus, the persistent decline in 
smallholder coffee production in the last decade- and more so after 1993- are not only unexpected 
and may have originated from price distortion factors and other non-price factors facing 
smallholder farmers. 
The decline in smallholder coffee production accelerated with the onset of market reforms. 
This decline in production amidst market reforms that aimed to improve the terms of agricultural 
trade and of export commodities in particular seems to be both unexpected and a major 
contradiction. According to Lele and Agarwal (1989), smallholder coffee farmers in Kenya have a 
comparative advantage (as measured by domestic resource cost) over large-scale coffee producers. 
3 For long term trend in international coffee prices, see Appendix 1.2. 
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Furthermore, as Jaeger (1992) has shown total agricultural production, food production and staple 
food production responds positively to increases in the prices of export crops in SSA countries. 
The study therefore suggests a positive correlation between growth in export crops, such as coffee 
and that of food crops. The study goes further and suggests a number of reasons for this 
conelation. First, food crops do benefit from the availability and actual application of inputs 
secured through the sale of export crops. Secondly, higher incomes from export crops can lead to 
higher investments in food crops. In addition, as the income from export crops increase farmers 
may devote less time to off-farm employment in order to supplement their income and, therefore, 
have more time to allocate to food production. Finally, the study points out that a better policy 
environment as proxied by higher export crop prices and more competitive exchange rates may 
help1 promote the growth of both export and food crops. Thus, the decline in smallholder coffee 
production could also have adversely affected food crop production and have a major and adverse 
affect on food security at national and household level. However, there is little empirical evidence 
to clarify the linkage of the effects of market reforms on commodity prices, price risks and 
smallholder farmers' decision-making in these new institutional settings. 
Given, the major economic role coffee plays in the SSA countries and Kenya in particular, 
the issues identified above have far-reaching policy implications both at the macro- and micro-
economic level. It is for these reasons that this study focuses on these issues and uses smallholder 
farmers in Kenya as its central reference point. 
1.5 Study objectives and research questions 
1.5.1 Study objectives 
The study has three objectives: 
(i) Determination of the effects of market reforms on the agricultural sector terms of 
trade, evolution of smallholder farmers' commodity prices and price risks in Kenya. 
(ii) Assessment of the institutional changes brought about by market reforms and then-
impact on smallholder farmers' transaction costs, access to factors of production and 
inputs and the attendant changes in market co-ordination and control4 in various 
commodity systems. 
(iii) Assessment of the effects of economic, institutional and household factors on 
smallholder farmers resource allocation decisions and their subsequent effects on farm 
productivity and efficiency in a liberalised economy. 
1.5.2 Research questions 
SAI's both at macroeconomic and sectorial level are hypothesised to have fundamentally 
changed the price policy and institutional environments in which smallholder agricultural 
production takes place in Kenya. These changes have not only affected the level and volatility 
of ppices paid to smallholder farmers but also the level of transactions costs. In their endeavour 
to cppe with the emerging economic and institutional arrangements, the risk-averse smallholder 
farmers were forced to review their resource allocation decisions as well as their level of 
market participation. The land-constrained environment within which the smallholder coffee 
4 Market co-ordination and control are important determinants of market structure, which in turn affects market 
performance. Co-ordination refers to the arrangement of independent market activities in a bid to match supply 
and demand conditions. Control refers to the ability of market participants to exercise influence on key variables 
in a Mmmodity system with an aim of influencing scale economies and exchange of property rights. (Jaffee & 
Morton, 1995). 
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farmers in the study region operate has also played a significant role in determining nature and 
level of market participation, resource reallocation decisions and efficiency of agricultural 
production. In making these decisions smallholder farmers have endeavoured to minimise price 
risks, production costs and transaction costs in order to maximise economic welfare. 
This synopsis leads to the following research questions: 
(i) Have the market reforms introduced as part of SAPs improved the agricultural sector 
terms of trade as envisaged? How have changes in agricultural sector terms of trade 
affected the general level of input and commodity prices paid to/by smallholder 
farmers? 
(ii) Has the market driven pricing system adopted after market reforms introduced 
higher price risks to the risk-averse smallholder farmers? 
(iii) How have market reforms affected smallholder farmers' market institutions and 
how have these institutional changes affected farmers access to factor and commodity 
markets, levels of transaction costs and farmers decisions on market participation? 
(iv) To what extent do the prevailing economic, institutional and natural factors in the 
study region influence smallholder farmers' resource allocation decisions and their farm 
productivity? Specifically, what role do land constraints and access to credit play in 
determining the resource allocation behaviour and farm productivity? 
(v) Are there major differences in production efficiency among smallholder households 
in the study region and what factors determine the level of efficiency? 
(vi) Which policy instruments can be applied to enhance smallholder agriculture pricing 
policies, farm productivity and efficiency for a sustainable smallholder agricultural 
development and improvement of general welfare in Central Kenya region? 
1.6 Demography and agricultural production in the study area 
Kenya is situated along the East African coast and stretches from 4° South and 4° North of the 
equator. Kenya is divided into eight provinces (Figure 1.8). In 1999 Kenya had an estimated 
population of 28.9 million people. The country has in total 44.6 million hectares of land, of 
which 8.6 million hectares (20 %) is of medium to high potential (Republic of Kenya, 1986). This 
20 % accommodates 80% of the population with the remaining 80% living primarily on semi-arid 
or arid land. Kenya has one of the world's fastest growing populations, having witnessed a 40% 
increase in the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1989 the annual growth rate was 3.4%: today estimates 
run at 2.9% (Republic of Kenya, 2000). In the last couple of years per capita income has declined 
and in 1998 was estimated at US $ 281. Poverty levels have also been increasing from 30% of 
total population in 1977 to about 52% in 1997 (Republic of Kenya, 2000). 
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Figure 1.8 Kenya's administrative boundaries and the location of the study region 
Central Province, which is the study area, is one of the provinces with high agricultural 
potential in the country. The Province borders Nairobi City in the south and Mt. Kenya and 
Ablerdare ranges in the north and eastern side. The province is divided into five districts; 
Kiambu/Thika, Murang'a, Nyeri, Kirinyaga and Nyandarua (Figure 1.8).The first four districts 
in the province are the main coffee growing areas accounting for over 50% of the national 
coffee production of which smallholder farmers produce 35 percent. According to the 1989 
population census, the four districts had a population of 2.8 million people, with 1999 
provisional estimates of 3.3 million people (Republic of Kenya, 1994, 2000). The districts are 
highly populated with densities of up to 342 inhabitants per square km as compared to the 
naional average of 49 persons per square km (Table 1.2). According to 1992 Kenya 
demographic and health survey and 1994 welfare monitoring survey undertaken by the Kenya 
overnment, there were a total of 683,066 households in the province, 27% of which could be 
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categorised as poor5 (Republic of Kenya, 1998). By 1997, the number of households had 
increased to 754,601 and 26% of these were identified as living in absolute poverty6 (Republic 
of Kenya, 2000). However, the region maintains the lead as being the least poor in the country. 
Table 1.2 Summary of Kenya's and study area's demography in 1989 and 1999* 
Population Agricultural Household Agricultural 
( '000' inhabitants') land size in 1989 land/household (ha) 
1989 1999 (ha) 1989 1999 
Kenya 21,443 28,679 8,600,000 4.92 2.5 1.7 
(37) (49) 
Central Kenya 
Kiambu District 914 1213 142,200 4.3 0.67 0.51 
(353) (469) 
Kirinyaga District 391 455 95,500 4.9 1.19 1.11 
(264) (307) 
Muranga District 858 1,019 180,800 4.9 1.03 0.96 
(340) (403) 
Nyeri District 607 655 158,900 4.6 1.20 1.11 
(186) (201) 
Total/Average 2,770 3,342 577,400 4.8 1.02 0.92 
(285) (342) 
•Projections based on provisional results of the 1999 Kenya population and housing census. Figures in 
parenthesis represent population density in persons per km2 
Source: CBS statistical abstracts (various) 
Land holdings in the province are small, averaging 1.5 ha per household with 
agricultural incomes accounting for 26 per cent of total household income in 1994 (de Graaff, 
1986; Republic of Kenya, 1994). The region has a bi-modal rainfall pattern and two cropping 
seasons with long rain season from March to August and the short rain season from October to 
mid February. Cash crops in the region are coffee, tea and horticultural crops such as 
vegetables and cut flowers. Maize; beans and bananas are the dominate and staple food crops 
while dairy and small ruminants are the dominant livestock activities (de Graaff, 1986; Burger 
1994). Coffee growing is spread over three ecological zones in the Upper Midland zone (UM1, 
UM2 and UM3). These zones are classified according to climatic conditions (temperature, 
rainfall) soil types and crop suitability. UMI is the coffee/tea zone, UM2 is the main coffee 
zone while UM3 is the marginal coffee zone (Jaetzold & Schmidt, 1982). 
Smallholder farmers in the region, like many of their counterparts in other developing 
countries, practice intensive polyculture farming systems and rely on a diversity of crop and 
livestock enterprises for their livelihoods. Depending on the agro-ecological zone, it is also 
3 An absolute poverty line derived from monetary value of the consumption of food and non-food items was 
used to distinguish between the poor and non-poor households. In 1994, the poor household in rural areas had 
an income of Ksh 978 (US $ 22) per month per adult equivalent as compared to an income of Ksh 1,490 (US$ 
33) for urban households. 
6 The 1997 absolute poverty line for rural households was Ksh 1,239 (US$ 21) per adult equivalent per month 
as compared to Ksh 2,648 (US$ 45) for urban households. 
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coitamon practice for most smallholder farmers to inter-crop especially where food crops are 
being grown. An earlier study undertaken in the region identified 27 different crop 
combinations (Burger, 1994). Thus, although this study focuses on smallholder coffee farmers, 
these farmers also have other farm enterprises with coffee being the main common farm 
enterprise. 
1.7 Thesis outline 
This thesis follows an outline consistent with objectives set out in section 1.5. Chapter two 
reviews the theoretical considerations and econometric specifications of the analytical 
procedures applied in this study. The data collection methods and types of data collected for 
empirical estimation of the analytical models are also detailed in this chapter. Chapter three 
reviews Kenya's agricultural development strategies and policies that culminated in the 
implementation of the SAPs. Emphasis is placed on market reforms implemented in the 
agricultural sector and specifically those affecting the smallholder commodity marketing 
systems relevant to this study. 
Chapters four, five, six and seven form the core of this thesis. Chapter four analyses and 
documents the effects of market reforms on the general level of producer price, changes in 
relative prices and price volatility. Further this chapter also analyses the cost of price volatility 
to smallholder coffee farmers under various policy scenarios. Chapter five reviews the 
insiitutional changes that have resulted from market reforms and both the direct and indirect 
changes in market institutions that impact on marketing, transaction costs and returns of 
various commodity exchanges are analysed. Household resource allocation decisions across 
farm enterprises and factors determining allocation decisions as well as farm productivity is 
considered and documented in Chapter six while the efficiency of resource allocation and 
conditioning factors are analysed in Chapter seven. 
Chapter eight discusses the results and draws conclusions from the study. Various 
policy interventions towards enhancing smallholder commodity pricing systems, market 
participation, resource use, farm productivity and production efficiency in the study region and 
Kenya in general are also identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
Tlds chapter develops a conceptual framework that is based on the theoretical foundations of 
new institutional economics (NTE) and emphasises the transaction costs approach. In line with 
the objectives of this study (see section 1.5), this framework focuses on the inter-relationships 
between macro-economic and agricultural sector reforms and the commodity prices and 
institutional arrangements that affect smallholders. At the household level, this conceptual 
framework also relates market reforms to smallholder farmer's productivity and efficiency. 
Details of this framework are given in section 2.2. 
Section 2.3 of this chapter elaborates the descriptive and econometric models applied in 
this study. The analytical models developed analyse the four main issues central to this study. 
These models have considerable inter-dependency and complementarity. The description of 
each analytical method is preceded by a review of its theoretical foundations and empirical 
applications. 
First, however, agricultural sector development policies and their effects on the sector's 
performance are reviewed from an historical perspective. The agricultural development and 
pricing policies pursued by the Kenyan government are evaluated and the nature of the market 
reforms described. The review covers the period 1963-1999 and focuses primarily on five 
commodities - coffee, tea, maize, milk and horticultural crops. 
Subsequently an analysis is made of the effects of market reforms on the terms of trade 
in the agricultural sector and the evolution and volatility of selected agricultural commodity 
prices in Kenya including those for coffee, tea, maize and milk. This analysis is based on time-
series data for the period 1985-1999. An estimation of the costs of price volatility to 
smallholder coffee producers has also been made and simulations have been undertaken in 
order to quantify the cost implications of various possible policy interventions. 
The second model is based on the exchange configuration analytical framework, which 
is rooted in the NIE. The model analyses the institutional changes occasioned by market 
reforms as they affect smallholder farmers' level of transaction costs and their access to 
markets and services. The model also analyses changes in trade contracts and the extent to 
which farmers' control and co-ordination roles has been altered as a result of these emerging 
market institutions. 
The third and fourth analytical models described in this chapter focus on the micro-
economic level. The first micro-economic model analyses smallholder household resource 
allocation and productivity. The model takes into consideration the land constraints confronting 
smallholder farmers in the study region. As shown elsewhere in this study, credit constraints 
faced by smallholder farmers have tended to increase in the era of market reforms. The model 
has been formulated to take these credit constraints into account. Finally, the forth model has 
been formulated to estimate the production efficiency of smallholder farms and factors that 
determine levels of efficiency. 
Section 2.4 describes the sources from which data has been drawn and the way this data 
wfts collected. Finally, in the last section of this chapter the inter-relationships between the 
analytical models developed are highlighted and their usefulness in answering the research 
questions posed by this study discussed. 
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2.2 Conceptual framework 
In the neo-classical economic model formalised by Arrow and Debreu (1954), the market 
system performs the role of rationing goods and services while determining both allocation of 
resources in production and final mix of output. In essence this has been the rationale behind 
market liberalisation and structural adjustment reforms aimed at getting the 'prices right'. The 
decentralised mode of operations of a private sector based market system, emphasised in 
market liberalisation, is expected to be more flexible and therefore more responsive to changes 
in supply and demand conditions as opposed to a regulated market system. 
Pricing and marketing policies undoubtedly have the most important affect agricultural 
commodity production. This is due to the direct impact they exert on the economic incentives 
that elicit immediate producer response. Thus, macro-economic and agricultural sector reforms 
are conceptualised in this study as having induced a shift in internal terms of trade in favour of 
agriculture by enhancing the commodity prices received by farmers. Nevertheless, concerns 
have been raised about the effects of market reforms on variance in agricultural prices and how 
this might affect the supply response of risk-averse smallholder producers (Krueger et at, 
1988; Barrett, 1997). The present study focuses on the impact of market reforms on the price 
system that confronts smallholders and price levels and risks, resource demand, farm 
productivity and production efficiency in particular. 
The standard neo-classical model assumes existence of factor, commodity and risks 
markets as well as a free flow of information. Recent economic literature has argued that due to 
existence of incomplete or thin markets, imperfect information, non-market contracts and 
transaction costs there is need to have a different conceptual framework that can take into 
consideration these market imperfections (Hoff et at, 1993). In this new conceptual 
framework, institutions play a major role as responses to missing markets and missing 
information. Attention is increasingly focused on aspects of household income and enterprise 
diversification to reduce land and capital market failures, non-market contracts and household 
risk-coping and risk- sharing strategies. As shown in Figure 2.1, the institutional framework 
within which farmers make their production and consumption decisions is taken as a crucial 
determinant of market prices, transaction costs and access to social amenities. Furthermore, the 
institutional framework is intricately related to household's property rights on factors of 
production and the nature of trade contracts. These factors are crucial and significant in 
determining household's resource allocation behaviour, productivity, efficiency as well as level 
of market participation. 
Apart from their effects on prices, the market reforms introduced in Kenya can also be 
expected to have had a fundamental affect on the institutional arrangements in which 
smallholder producers make trade and production decisions. Institutional changes have affected 
market co-ordination and control as well as transaction costs in most agricultural commodity 
systems. In an effort to analyse the effects of these changes, the NIE approach has been widely 
applied. According to Delgado (1998), the application of NTE concepts to smallholder 
agriculture in Africa has provided a seminal breakthrough in understanding how structural 
constraints operate to hinder a farmer's market participation. With this in mind, the present 
study analyses the institutional changes heralded by market reforms in order to understand their 
effects on the level of transaction costs and hence the efficiency of smallholder farmers. In this 
study, the NTE framework is used in an attempt to analyse the effects of market reforms on the 
exchange and non-exchange institutions in which smallholder farmers in the study region 
participate. 
In an effort to arrive at a better understanding of how households are trying to cope 
with the changes brought about by market reforms, the present study also focuses on factors 
that influence resource allocation, productivity and efficiency at the micro economic 
(household) level. In order to gain an analytical entry point at this level, the concept of 
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household' has been employed widely in empirical work Ellis (1993), for example, has 
defined the household7 as 'a social unit sharing the same abode or hearth'. 
In neo-classical theory, farm households form the basic decision-making units as far as 
production and consumption are concerned. In their attempt to understand the decision-making 
process within farm households - especially with regard to resource allocation - researchers 
have proposed a number of hypotheses. Schultz (1964) hypothesised that farm families in 
developing countries were 'efficient but poor'. This hypothesis has continued to generate 
inlerest in farm household economics. Lipton (1968, 1986) hypothesised the farm household as 
a utility maximizer. A number of empirical studies have been carried out in India (Hopper, 
1965; Chenareddy, 1967; Saini, 1969), Nigeria (Norman, 1974) and Kenya (Wolgin, 1975) to 
test these hypotheses. Although results have been mixed and varied, the profit and utility 
maximisation hypothesis continues to provide a basis for the economic analysis of the farm 
household with modifications to suite different sets of assumptions. 
Ellis (1993) summarises the theories used to understand peasant behaviour under 
different sets of assumptions. In doing so he defines several categories of peasant: "profit 
maximising peasants", "risk averse peasant", "drudgery- adverse peasant", "farm household 
peasant" and the "share-cropping peasant". Meanwhile a growing body of literature on intra-
household resource allocation under conditions of uncertainty continues to stimulate interest in 
the dynamics present within households (Doss, 1996a, 1996b; McElroy & Horney, 1981). In 
thèse studies, household risk management decisions are treated as the contribution made by 
eafch individual household member and the decisions eventually made by a household are 
explained by collective bargaining models (Doss, 1996b; Quinsubing, 1996). The development 
these models challenge the widely held assumption that individuals within a household 
maximise a single utility function. The result, as Doss (1996b) makes clear, questions the 
validity of using the household as a unit of analysis while simultaneously encouraging theories 
that conceptualise the individual as the main actor. However, as indicated by Haddad et al 
(1997), the use of intra-household economic approaches based on bargaining theories do not 
cessarily yield different predictions about a household's resource allocation behaviour. It is 
for this reason that the present study maintains the concept of the consensual household as the 
main, micro-economic study unit. 
—! 
7 The term 'farm household' is often interchanged with the term 'peasant household'. However, in this study the 
term peasant is not used as it has a connotation of a distinct social group and also suggests the existence of 
"non- peasant groups" in the rural areas. 
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Figure 2.1 Structure of the conceptual and analytical framework 
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A consensual household is defined by a common abode, a resource-pooling strategy and 
common decision-making process that cross cuts generations and use of income (Ellis, 
1993,1998). The consensual household assumption avoids problems related to the intra-
household distribution of income. Furthermore, it can be argued that a household in which 
individual members pool risks can act as an avenue for risk management. 
Farm households are conceptualised in this study as utility maximizers, a goal that is 
achieved through the minimisation of both production and transactions costs. Because of 
imperfect markets and other distortions, household decisions are taken in the light of farm-gate 
prices rather than observed market prices. The household objectives are taken to be realised 
tlirough allocation of resources to farm production activities (both crops and livestock), off-
farm activities and leisure in a two-step decision process. The first decision, which is discrete 
hi nature, involves selecting appropriate farm enterprises. On a priori basis expectations are 
that households will choose different off- and on-farm enterprises (off-farm activities include 
participation in labour markets). Plausible explanation being that different household face 
different resource constraints and transaction costs thereby realising different benefits of 
choosing different enterprises depending on their resource endowment and risk perception. The 
second decision faced by the household is of continuous nature where available resources are 
allocated to the chosen enterprises. This thesis focuses on the analyses of factors that condition 
this second decision and efficiency of production within a context of imperfect markets. 
The conceptual framework, developed in this study (see Figure 2.1) is, therefore 
intended to determine the effects of government policies and imperfect markets characterised 
by transaction costs and binding credit constraints, on optimal production response across 
different categories of households. Transaction costs, capital (credit) and land constraints 
arising from imperfect markets are assumed to make producers face low and differentiated 
effective farm gate prices (decision prices) depending on each household equilibrium trading 
position: net buyer, net seller or non-participant (Goetz, 1992, Janvry & Sadoulet, 1994). 
Expending on the equilibrium trading position, transaction costs are hypothesised to reduce the 
expected optimal supply response and also to induce a higher subsistence orientation in 
resource allocation. This implies that an enterprise like coffee, that is essentially produced for 
the market, is less likely to be allocated production resources than food-related enterprises such 
as maize and dairy that have greater subsistence orientation. Imperfect financial and land 
markets that constrain access to and availability of credit both for investment and consumption 
also induce households to add or deduct a premium or a discount to the price of the credit 
constraining and credit generating activities, respectively (Janvry & Sadoulet, 1994). Thus, 
faced by credit constraints, households will engage their resources in enterprises or exchange 
contracts that have more liquidity such as dairy (where weekly payments are possible) and off-
farm employment. This contrasts sharply with an enterprise like coffee where the exchange 
contract can take months before it is settled. Thus, the differences in transaction costs, liquidity 
aid land constraints across households can be used, inter alia, to account for differences in 
resource allocation and farm productivity. This theoretical position is adopted in this study. 
The implicit implication of sub-optimal production response arising from transaction 
cbsts, credit and land constraints, is that supply response, resource-use efficiency and incomes 
are lowered. This occurs because households tend not to choose enterprises based on the 
highest returns per unit of input in accordance with neo-classical profit-maximisation and cost-
minimisation model. 
The rest of this chapter details the specific theoretical considerations and analytical 
methods adopted to test these broad conceptual considerations. The analytical modules as 
indicated in Figure 2.1 follow closely production and market participation decisions made by 
the household. Although household's consumption decisions are important and inseparable 
from production decisions, this study has chosen to focus mainly on production. Nevertheless, 
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where need arises, and with data allowing, the effects of household's consumption decisions 
are integrated into the analysis. 
2.3 Research methodologies 
2.3.1 Review of agricultural development in Kenya 
This section analyses development policies implemented in the agricultural sector by both the 
colonial (before 1963) and independent (1963 to present) Kenyan governments. The review 
summarises the major strategies and policy instruments applied in the agricultural sector in 
general and the smallholder sub-sector in particular. Prominence is given to policies related to 
agricultural output pricing, marketing and those affecting to factors of production. Apart from 
reviewing general agricultural development policies, relevant policy changes implemented in 
various commodity systems (coffee, tea, dairy, maize and horticulture) are also summarised. 
For convenience purposes, the review is sub-divided into two parts: the era of 
government controls which spans from pre-independence days up to early 1980's and the 
liberalisation era that covers the period from late 1980's up to 1999. In both periods the review 
uses time-series data to highlight the performance of the agricultural sector, smallholder sub-
sector and the five commodities under study. 
2.3.2 Analysis of commodity price evolution, volatility and terms of trade 
2.3.2.1 Theoretical considerations 
One of the stated objectives of SAPs is to enhance growth and net exports from the agricultural 
sector. This was to be achieved through market reforms aimed at improving the internal terms 
of trade for agricultural products as well as through measures that enhance productivity and 
efficiency in agriculture (Kuvyenhoven et al, 2000). This section is focussed on the 
agricultural terms of trade and price policies with issues of productivity and efficiency being 
dwelt with in latter sections. 
Market reforms were envisaged to improve the terms of trade in the agricultural sector 
by correcting the macro-policy bias against the sector. Measures that were expected to enhance 
the terms of trade and prices for agricultural products included: exchange rate devaluation; 
trade and tax reforms; the abolition of price controls; a better targeting of subsidies; the 
enhancement of market competition through the abolition or reduction of public monopoly and 
tariff reforms. As pointed out by Kuyvenhoven et al (2000), the SAPs sought to turnaround the 
agricultural sector performance by restoring equilibrium and enhancing supply response from 
agricultural producers. 
The micro-economic theory of the firm under uncertainty (Sandmo, 1971) presupposes 
that output increases as mean prices rise while output decreases with increase in variance of 
product price. Thus, ceteris peribus, liberalisation policies that increase the mean of 
commodity prices are expected to elicit positive supply response from producers. It is therefore 
the hypothesis of this study that market liberalisation has benefited smallholder producers 
through increasing the agricultural terms of trade and real commodity prices paid to producers. 
Nevertheless, there are bound to be inter-commodity differences depending on whether the 
commodity in question is tradable, non-tradable or potentially tradable . 
8 A tradable commodity is one which is traded internationally (unless government policy prevents or hinders 
such trade). The domestic price paid to such a commodity is thus expected to equal or closely approximate the 
export parity price in case of an export. For instance, coffee and tea in Kenya. A non-tradable commodity has 
its price formed wholly by domestic variables as there are no international markets for the commodity. A 
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Market reforms also advocated the removal of farm-input subsidies as well as the 
privatisation of input markets in order to enhance input supply and create competition. It was 
hoped that this would eventually enhance the availability of inputs at lower prices. However, 
the removal or reduction of State monopolies in the acquisition and distribution of inputs may 
aho lead to loss of economies of scale especially in the thin and geographically dispersed 
markets that typify most developing countries. This loss of economies of scale may outweigh 
the benefits arising from competition and thereby lead to higher input prices. Furthermore, the 
exchange rate devaluation may increase the prices of inputs, many of which are imported. 
Nevertheless, the generally held view is one that associates market reforms with low-input 
prices especially in the long term. The price level of inputs does not only affect their usage but 
aho the output to input price ratios and hence the profitability of input use. Moreover, as 
Heerink (2000) has pointed out, changes in monetary and exchange rate policies may change 
the price ratios of traded versus non-traded outputs and imported inputs versus, output prices. 
Tims, from a theoretical point of view, market reforms have an ambiguous effect on relative 
prices. Although the current study focuses primarily on output prices, it also attempts to 
determine the effect of market reforms on output to input ratio and relative prices. 
Apart from real and relative prices, removal of price controls may also affect the price 
variability, both over time and across regions in a country. Despite the importance of 
interregional price differences and their implication to trading and supply management 
strategies, this study will focus on temporal price variability arising from market reforms. 
Two opposing factors govern producers' reactions to commodity price risks. Risk 
aversion implies that producers will be willing to pay an insurance premium to reduce or 
eliminate the variability of revenues on their consumption expenditures (Newbery & Stiglitz, 
1981). In a perfectly competitive market, price variability can also allow producers to benefit 
reallocation of resources to production of risky commodity in periods in which prices are 
exjpected to be high (Oi, 1961). As pointed out by Gilbert (1998) and Barrett (1997), when the 
producer is also a consumer, the effects of price variability from a theoretical context become 
ambiguous. In practice however, the last decade has brought widespread empirical evidence 
that many smallholder producers are net buyers of food crops they grow (Deaton, 1989, Weber 
et al, 1988, Barrett & Dorosh, 1996) and at the same time they are price risk averse 
(Filkelshstain & Chalfant, 1991). Equally, most commodity producers in developing countries 
operate in markets that are far from perfect thereby substantially reducing the gains they can 
derive from resource re-allocation as postulated by Oi (1961). Thus, the supply response and 
resource allocation of smallholder farmers will depend on household level of risk aversion, 
income elasticity and level of food self-sufficiency (Fafchamps, 1992). It is also generally 
supposed that smallholder risk aversion is high and supply elasticity is low with the implication 
that price variability has a negative impact on producer welfare (Newbery & Stiglitz, 1981). 
Thus, in the context of incomplete price hedging mechanisms and credit markets, expectations 
ar; that the price distributions- increased means and variances - brought about by market 
reforms (Krueger et al, 1988), can cause shifts in enterprise choice and resource allocation by 
risk averse smallholder farmers. 
Gilbert (1998) argues, that except in situations where farmers are highly specialised or 
very risk averse, the costs of price exposure are relatively modest and are likely to be out-
weighed by the benefits accruing from market reforms. It is nevertheless important to have an 
indication of the price exposure which has resulted from reforms in an effort to decipher further 
indications on resource allocation at household level. In this respect, this study hypotheses that 
market reforms in Kenya differentially increased price volatility of agricultural commodities, 
by 
potentially tradable commodity has an existing world market but due to domestic demand and supply factors or 
government intervention the commodity is not generally traded e.g., maize and milk in Kenya. For the latter 
two commodities, changes in world market prices do not necessarily affect domestic price. 
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thereby affecting enterprise choice and resource use efficiently of majority of smallholder 
producers, many of whom are risk averse and net food buyers. 
2.3.2.2 Analytical methods 
Agricultural terms of trade 
To get a general perspective on the evolution of agricultural commodity prices, the trend in the 
real composite price indices among the various crops and livestock categories are analysed and 
compared during and after market reforms. In this study, 1985-1991 is referred to as the period 
of pre-liberalisation and 1992-1999 as the period of liberalisation9. The general trend in 
commodity prices is compared to the trend in agricultural input prices. This ratio is referred to 
as output to input price ratio (O/I ratio). The O/I ratio is derived by dividing the agricultural 
output price index by the agricultural input price index. A increasing O/I ratio indicates an 
increasing margin between output and input prices, an indication of improved gross margins 
while the vice versa is true. To evaluate the effects of market reforms on the agricultural sector 
terms of trade (AgrToT), a comparison is made between the agricultural output price index and 
the rural non-agricultural consumer goods price index for the period 1985 to 1999. Thus, the 
agricultural sector terms of trade index is calculated: 
Agricultural terms of trade index = index of agricultural output prices X100 
(AgrToT) Index rural non-agricultural consumer goods 
The rural non-agricultural consumer goods index is constructed using the prices of 
manufactured goods used by rural households. As such the index offers a good indicator of the 
trends in non-agricultural output prices. Furthermore, as the index is focused on rural areas, it 
is free from urban-related consumption trends which are in most cases unrelated to actual 
consumption trends in rural areas where agricultural production takes place. An AgrToT index 
below 100, indicates deterioration of agricultural sector terms of trade as the change of non-
agricultural prices outweigh the change of output prices, while the converse also holds true. 
The trends in AgrToT are compared to the general economy terms of trade (ToT) which is 
derived as the ratio of export to import prices. 
Evolution of nominal, real and relative commodity prices 
A detailed price analysis of eornmodity prices paid to smallholder farmers is undertaken. The 
nominal market prices for coffee, tea, maize and milk are compared before (1985 to 1991) and 
during (1992 to 1999) liberalisation. To arrive at the real commodity prices, the nominal prices 
are deflated by the Nairobi middle income consumer index. The rural consumer price index 
would have been preferred, but data on the index is not available for the entire 15-year period. 
The trends in real commodity prices are contrasted with the trends in real prices of inputs and 
production factors. Considering the importance of the various inputs and factors of production 
in smallholder agriculture and the availability of consistent time series data, only fertiliser and 
labour prices are used in the analysis to represent input and factors used in production. 
To assess the changes in relative prices among the four commodities, the real 
commodity prices are expressed as a ratio of real maize and fertiliser prices. Maize is the staple 
food of most Kenyans and therefore is considered an ideal reference against which to compare 
changes that have taken place in the value of other commodities. Fertiliser, a major agricultural 
input used extensively by many farmers, is also regarded as a good reference value. 
9 As shown elsewhere (section 3.3) in this study, the initial attempts to reform the Kenyan economy in the early 
1980s were a total failure and it is only after 1991 that consistent reforms were implemented. Furthermore, 
complete set of data for the period before 1985 was not readily available. 
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Volatility of commodity prices 
Piice volatility is a measure of price variability. Volatility can be a good indicator of the price 
risks faced by a commodity producer, in any given period. According to Gilbert & Brunnet 
(1998), volatility can be measured in a number of ways: 
(i) Historical volatility can be measured by calculating the coefficient of variation 
(CV)of weekly or monthly prices. As the name suggests, historical volatility 
reflects on what happened in the past. 
(ii) In- trading volatility can be measured as the standard deviation between the low 
and high price quotations within every trading day. 
(iii) Implied volatility can be calculated for futures and options price quotations and 
can be used to project on expected price volatility in terminal markets. 
For the purposes of this study and considering the available data set, a modified form of 
historical volatility measure is applied. The CV of monthly prices for the four commodities at 
the Nairobi consumer markets for the period January 1985 to December 1999 is adjusted by a 
coefficient of determination of the trend function with the best goodness of fit to arrive at a 
price instability index as derived by Cuddy & Delia Valle (1978): 
V*= vVfl-R2) (2.1) 
Where, 
V* = The corrected coefficient of variation 
V = Coefficient of variation of the price time-series (based on monthly prices) 
R2 = The coefficient of determination of the trend function with the best 
goodness of fit, also based on monthly prices.. 
Most price time series tends to have a cyclical nature. In most cases they rally in the 
sa|me direction over a given period of time. This calls for de-trending of the time series to 
separate the trend and actual variability. This is the idea behind the Cuddy and Delia Valle 
formulation in equation 2.1. The index has been empirically applied by Hermann, Burger & 
Smit (1990) to analyse the instability effects of compensatory financing schemes on the world 
commodity markets. A more recent application has been by Badiane (2000) on the study on 
liberalisation on food markets in Africa. The index is simple to apply but it does not take into 
account other non-trend factors that might be a source of price volatility, thereby tending to 
overestimate price volatility. 
Analysis of factors determining price means and variance 
In an effort to gain more empirical insight into the macroeconomic and specific commodity 
factors responsible for the movements in price means and variance, the data is subjected to 
further analysis using the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskadastic (ARCH) regression 
model. This model allows for simultaneous estimation of conditional means and variances of a 
dependent variable over time (Engle, 1982). Bollerslev et al (1992) provides a theoretical and 
empirical review of the application of the model in finance. Bera & Higgins (1995) provide a 
mjore recent review. The original model was proposed by Engle (1982) and generalised by 
Bollerslev (1986). One recent empirical application of the model in agricultural price analysis 
is by Shively (1996), in the analysis of maize prices variability in Ghana. The study indicated 
that economic reforms in Ghana were accompanied by higher maize prices and a reduction in 
volatility of maize prices. Another recent application is by Barrett (1997), who analysed the 
effects of liberalisation on food prices in Madagascar. The study indicated that the short-term 
effects of liberalisation on the mean and variance of food prices varied substantially by 
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commodity, region and season. However, the long-term effects of liberalisation were to 
increase both the mean and variance of food prices. 
The ARCH model assumes an error structure in which the sign of the disturbance is not 
predictable, but in which the size of the forecast error is. Thus, the unconditional variance is 
homoskadastic but the variance at any time t, conditional on prior period information, is 
heteroskadastic. With the assumption that the mean and variance move in the same direction, 
the ARCH-in-Mean-(ARCH-M) variant is applied in this study. The ARCH-M(p) form 
developed by Engle et al (1987) allows price modelling with time varying risk premium, i.e., 
the increase in expected rate of return (mean price) is associated with an increased risk in rate 
of return (variance). The econometric details of the model are as shown in Appendix 2.1. 
A crucial assumption underlying ARCH models is that current prices affect next 
periods mean price (Shively, 1996; Bera & Higgins, 1995). This assumption is mainly satisfied 
in situations where hedging and stockholding play an important role in price determination in 
any two consecutive periods. As such, the model is more applicable to non-perishable 
commodities like cereals in an environment where stockholding is important. This could 
explain why the two recent empirical applications by Shively (1996) and Barrett (1997) 
concentrated on food items that, in most cases, are non-traded or potentially tradable. No 
attempt has been made to apply the model on traded commodities like coffee and tea. This is 
despite earlier studies by Cuddington (1992) and Deaton & Loroque (1992) that indicated that 
most agricultural commodity prices-especially the traded ones- tend to show high first-order 
autocorrelation and persistence of price shocks. Furthermore, farmers and marketing agents 
engage in substantial stockholding of coffee and tea in an effort to regulate supply and benefit 
from possible price movements. In Kenya, for example, co-operatives, plantations, marketing 
agents, the Coffee Board of Kenya and coffee exporters all engage in stockholding. In the same 
way, in the tea marketing chain, there is stockholding by tea factories, Kenya Tea Development 
Authority (KTDA), plantations and tea exporters. It is for these reasons that this study attempts 
to expand the application of the ARCH model to these important agricultural commodities. 
The ARCH model used in this study is as summarised in equation (2.2) and (2.3): 
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) describe the conditional mean price (Pt) and price variance 
(ht) over time (t = l....n) and among commodities (i = 1,..4), respectively. Xt denotes a matrix 
of pre-determined variables that typically contain time-subscribed information influencing the 
mean, likewise Zt matrix contains pre-determined variables that condition residual variance; f}0 
and Oo are constants, while a,, and ¡5' are estimation coefficients; X is an estimation 
coefficient which reflects a risk premium with respect to the conditional standard deviation. 
In this study, the dependent variable, monthly real price of each commodity (Pit), is 
treated as a first-order autoregressive process around the time trend (T), real exchange rate 
(RER)10 and border parity price (BP)11. A dummy variable (L) is defined with the period 
1 0 Real Exchange Rate (RER) is defined as the index of monthly average Ksh exchange rate adjusted by the ratio 
of Nairobi middle income consumer price index (CPI) to the U.S .A. wholesale price index (WPI) obtained from 
IMF international financial statistics. 
it (2.2) 
(2.3) 
1 1 The New York Coffee futures (2nd and 3rd) position price was used as the coffee parity price as it is used as 
a reference price at the Nairobi coffee auction. The London tea auction prices were used as the parity price for 
tea. 
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coincident with liberalisation (L = 1) and (L = 0) for pre-liberalisation period. A positive 
coefficient for L in both the mean and variance regression is taken to indicate higher mean 
price and higher price volatility during the reform period. Conversely, a negative coefficient 
for £ in the variance equation indicates decrease of price volatility with implementation of the 
market reforms. 
To capture the effects of the price regulation mechanisms under the International 
Coffee Agreement (ICA) on price evolution and volatility, a dummy variable (ICA) is defined 
to coincide with the time the ICA price regulatory system was in place. Thus, in the coffee 
model, ICA = 1 for the periods, January 1985 to February 1986 and October 1987 to June 1987 
when the regulation was in place and ICA = 0, elsewhere. Appendix 2.1 also details the 
variables included in each of the ARCH models estimated for each commodity. 
Two-equation model is estimated for each of the four commodity (coffee, tea, milk and 
niaize) price series for the entire period (both before and after reform) as univariate models. 
The univariate model is preferred over the multivariate system due to differences in data 
availability for different commodities and the differences in regressors in each model, factors 
which would have required sacrifice of a great portion of the data with fewer degrees of 
freedom. The estimation of the model is preceded by diagnostic tests to verify the suitability of 
the heteroskadicity conditional variance as well as the order of autoregressive process (lag 
slructure) of the dependent variable. The LaGrange12 multiplier test statistic is used to test the 
p-esence of the ARCH process (Engle, 1982). The lag structure is evaluated through inspection 
of partial autocorrelation coefficients. The model is estimated using LIMDEP Computer 
Sbftware (Green, 1995) which uses the maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) approach. 
Estimation of cost ofprice volatility to smallholder farmers 
A^ postulated by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), the cost to a producer of a commodity whose 
pjice is volatile will depend on the following factors: 
(a) Relative risk aversion of the producer 
(b) Magnitude of the variability of the commodity price 
(c) Level of serial correlation of the commodity price i.e. the level of price forecastability 
(d) Share of income derived from the commodity by the producer 
On his part Oi (1963) had earlier postulated that a firm (farm) can benefit from price 
volatility through re-allocation of resources to production of the risky commodity in periods 
when prices are expected to be high. Nevertheless, these benefits can only be maximised in a 
perfect market environment which allows free flow of market information to the firms. Using 
both these postulates, Newbery & Stiglitz (1981); Newbery (1996) and Gilbert (1998, 2001) 
have gone ahead and derived expressions to estimate the cost of price volatility that face a 
commodity producer: 
C = ro \(a./s), (l.a)ß(l.r2) 
02 
a , with ß= — (2.4) er 
Wfhere, 
C is the cost of price volatility to a commodity producer (expressed as % of total annual 
income) 
co is the share of the farmer's income derived from the production of the commodity, hence, 
1-co is the extent to which the farmer is diversified. 
a is the farmer's coefficient of partial risk aversion that is linked to the coefficient of 
1 2 The LaGrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic was computed as nR2, where n equals the number of observations 
pdr sample, and R2 is the coefficient of multiple determination obtained from least squares regression of squared 
residuals (e<) on a constant and lagged squared residuals ( ¿-1 and e2,^). 
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relative risk aversion (p) by a =a>p. 
r 2 is the extent to which the commodity price is forecastable over the recent period, 
e is the elasticity of commodity supply over the relevant period. 
a is the extent of price variability (measured as standard deviation of the log price shocks) 
A is the extent of output variability (measured as standard deviation of the log of production 
shocks) and 9 is the correlation coefficient linking production and price shocks, P may 
therefore be interpreted as simple regression coefficient of production shocks on price 
shocks. 
From equation (2.4), the first term, 'Acoacf = 'Aafpcf, is the standard risk aversion term 
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). This term is quadratic with production share (»). As such, it is 
expected to decline as farmers become more diversified. The second term, 'Aaxxr2^, which is 
negative in the cost equation (2.4), is the potential benefit a farmer can get through enhanced 
profitability as a result of being able to respond to prices. This is referred to as the Oi (1963) 
term and is quadratic to both the price forecastability and variance. This means the higher the 
price variance and forecastability, the higher the profitability. The final term, co(l-a) pjl-r2)^, 
shows the covariance between the farmer's production and the price received. The covariance 
is likely to be negative and as such will tend to offset the risk costs of price variability. 
Significant negative covariance may arise due to weather related shocks which affects all 
farmers in a country or region. This may also arise in cases where production shocks (from any 
source) affect the price, a case mainly possible for a country responsible for a significant share 
of the world market e.g. Brazil in coffee, Cote dTvoire in cocoa and maybe Kenya in black tea. 
The cost equation 2.4 represents a special case where the commodity under consideration is 
not also a food item for the household. When the commodity whose price is variable also 
happens to be a food item, the cost of price volatility has also to take into account the share of 
the commodity to households' total consumption (Finkelstain & Chalfant, 1991; 
Fafchamps,1992; Janvry & Sadoulet, 1994). This is over and above the other variables 
considered in equation 2.4. Thus, the cost of price volatility for food crop producers will 
depend on each household's equilibrium trading position i.e. seller, buyer and self-sufficiency. 
This further complicates the cost estimation especially where there is no clear distinction 
between buyers and sellers. Taking into account these considerations and the available data, 
this study estimates the cost of price volatility for only the coffee enterprise. Consideration is 
also made to the fact that coffee is the main commodity grown by all the households in the 
study region. Furthermore, coffee is a 'traded' commodity per excellence as it is traded in 
international terminal markets and has in the past been subject to an international agreement 
that regulated its price. These characteristics offer wide-ranging possibilities of policy 
intervention and distinguish coffee from the other four commodities considered in this study. 
Equation (2.4) is used in this study to estimate the cost of price volatility for smallholder 
coffee farmers in the study region. The cost is estimated for three categories of smallholder 
farmers based on their coffee income concentration (co) i.e. the % of total household income 
accounted for by coffee income. The changes in the cost are also simulated in scenarios to 
evaluate the effects of various policy options on the cost of price volatility to farmers. The cost 
of price volatility in each scenario is broken down to the three components i.e. risk aversion, 
the Oi and covariance terms. The assumptions made under each scenario are detailed in the 
relevant section. 
The elasticity of coffee supply (e) is estimated by simple regression of the production and 
price (with lags) over the last 15 years. The extent of price variability (cr) is estimated as earlier 
defined equation 2.1. The output variability (P) is estimated as defined in equation 2.4 above 
based on secondary coffee production and price data for the period 1985 to 1999. 
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2.3.3 Institutional analysis 
2.3.3.1 Theoretical considerations 
It is important to point out that, in the NIE literature, institutions are defined in a variety of 
ways depending on the author. Basically, institutions have been defined and understood from 
two different perspectives, the sociological and the economic. Sociologically, any behavioural 
regularity is taken as an institution (Bates, 1995) and as such these institutions have also been 
referred to as non-market institutions. Families constitute the most striking example of such an 
institution. While recognising the importance of non-market institutions, the objectives of this 
thesis and the need for analytical tractability means that this study has confined itself to 
ecjonomic institutions. 
According to North (1990) institutions are rules of the game in a society or the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human behaviour. Hayami and Ruttan (1985, p.94) define 
institutions as "the rules of a society or organisations that facilitate co-ordination among people 
by helping them form expectations which each person can reasonably hold in dealing with 
others". Nabli and Nurgent (1989) view institutions as "a set of constraints that govern 
behavioural relations among individuals or groups". NIE is thus concerned with organisational 
issues that seek to extend the applicability of neo-classical theory by considering how property-
rights structures and transaction costs affect incentives and economic behaviour. 
Two broad approaches are salient in NIE literature. They concern the concept of 
transaction costs and the theory of collective action. The main concern of collective action 
theory is the analysis and explanation of collective outcomes in terms of individual motivation 
aqd the elimination of the "free-rider" problem (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). Collective action is, 
therefore, concerned with issues such as use of public or common goods and the resultant 
"tragedy of the commons" as well as the relationship between interest groups and the state. 
Despite the importance of collective action in determining access to and use of resources, this 
study does not focus on collective action issues. Rather emphasis is placed on transaction costs 
be cause they have a direct bearing on resource allocation. 
Studies into transaction costs and their role in economic organisation have been 
stimulated by the work of Williamson (1979) who combined the concepts of bounded 
rationality and opportunistic behaviour. In real-world situations, individuals (agents) have 
limited ability to acquire and process the information necessary to make decisions. This state of 
affairs is referred to as bounded rationality (Simon, 1961; Eggertsson, 1990). Thus, bounded 
rationality is associated with imperfect information. Equally, imperfect information may create 
room for an economic agent involved in a contractual arrangement to be dishonest and in so 
doing increase his or her benefits at the expense of the other party. This dishonest behaviour 
creates room for opportunism or what Williamson refers to as "self-seeking with guile". In 
order to overcome the bounded rationality and opportunism in contractual arrangements, agents 
incur transaction costs in their endeavour to maximise their benefits. This leads to the general 
hypothesis that institutions are transaction cost-minimising arrangements that may change and 
evolve with changes in the nature and sources of transaction costs. Transaction costs include 
the cost of searching for a trade partner; screening; bargaining with potential trading partners to 
reich an exchange contract; product transfer involving the transport, processing, packaging and 
change of title to goods; monitoring the contract to ensure conditions are fulfilled, and finally 
enforcing the exchange contract to ensure compliance (Bardhan, 1989). In an agricultural 
commodity system, therefore, transaction costs are those costs associated with buying, selling 
arjd transferring the ownership of goods and services. Transaction cost economics centres on 
the theme of property rights and incomplete and asymmetrical information that affect 
contractual arrangements. 
The notion that the cost of arranging and carrying out exchange may reduce or even 
prevent exchange from occurring is now widely documented (Williamson, 1985; Bardhan, 
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1989, Janvry et al, 1991; Hoff et al, 1995). Important productivity gains can be achieved 
through implementing policies that aim to reduce transaction costs and thereby allow a greater 
degree of specialisation and exchange. According to Anderson (1988) and Williamson (1991), 
the level of transaction costs can be associated with three dimensions of the trading 
environment (exchange configuration): (i) asset-specificity; (ii) uncertainty and frequency of 
transaction and (iii) the market structure. 
In any particular production and trading operation, producers may undertake general or 
specialised investments. Making investments in specialised assets exposes the producer or 
trader to potentially severe bargaining and contractual enforcement problems because such 
investments are likely to be 'locked- in' a particular production or trading activity, both in the 
short and in the medium term. Investments in coffee, tea, dairy and other perennial crops, 
specialised processing and post-harvest facilities, use of highly specialised production inputs 
and technical knowledge are only a few of the examples of asset-specific investments 
smallholder farmers and traders can make. 
Apart from asset-specificity, the level of transaction costs will also be highly influenced 
by uncertainty and frequency of transactions. Uncertainty is related to lack of information, 
bounded rationality and the scope of opportunism by parties in a transaction (Williamson, 
1991). Uncertainty can therefore manifest itself as uncertainty in prices, volumes traded and 
product quality. According to Jaffee & Morton (1995), uncertainty will vary with the physical, 
institutional and socio-economic characteristics of the environment, production system, the 
perishability of a commodity and market structure. 
Uncertainty alone does not necessarily lead to actual financial loss in a transaction, as 
such a loss can only be incurred if a farm has invested in specific assets which cannot be 
recovered if the transaction fails. Uncertainty and asset-specificity thus combine to form a key 
determinant of the characteristics of a transaction. In turn this affects producers' and traders' 
contractual arrangements and can be used to reduce transaction costs. 
Transaction costs will also be influenced by the prevailing market structure, especially 
the number of alternative buyers and sellers (Jaffee, 1993). The existence of a few alternative 
buyers or sellers can be expected to result into higher search costs, low screening costs and 
considerably higher bargaining and enforcement costs. Where relatively few alternative trading 
partners exists one would expect (i) less complete disclosure of interests in trade and product 
information (ii) better opportunities for strategic bargaining and (iii) more transaction 
enforcement problems since threats to terminate trade and deals with competitors would be less 
credible. 
These three attributes of the trading environment must be combined with the nature of 
the commodity (product) traded to determine the most efficient and transactions cost 
minimising institutional arrangements. For the commodities which have high perishability and 
differentiation and that require a high level of asset specificity in production and processing, 
the most theoretically efficient institutional arrangement will be one dominated by vertically-
integrated systems and long-term contracts. In contrast, for commodities with less demanding 
quality differentiation, low degree of perishability and asset specificity, the ideal institutional 
arrangement will be one that is mainly decentralised with trade relationships dominated by spot 
market or short-term contracts. 
In keeping with these theoretical considerations the present study hypotheses that: 
• Different smallholder commodity systems in the study region have differentiated 
levels of transaction costs depending on the nature of the product traded and their 
trading environment. 
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as 
• Market reforms have created an enabling environment for the most efficient and 
transaction costs minimising institutional arrangements to prevail, given the product 
characteristics of the commodities considered in this study. 
• Given that smallholder households face technology and market information rational 
boundaries at any one-production period, they will choose to participate in 
institutional arrangements that minimise their sum of transaction and production 
costs. 
The enabling trade environment is evaluated using the concept of exchange configuration 
developed by Thorbecke (2000) and which is expounded below. 
2:3.3.2 Analytical framework and procedures 
As pointed out by Thorbecke (2000) 'an initial necessary step towards understanding the 
process of exchange in developing countries is to identify the most important specific 
characteristics of elements that influence the items exchanged, the behaviour of the actors, the 
properties of the environment and the form of transactions that take place'. It is in line with 
this need that Thorbecke and Cornelisse (1991) developed the concept of exchange 
configurations. These can be thought of as channels through which specific transactions are 
effected along a commodity system. Both market and non-market (informal) exchange 
configurations are deemed to exist in any commodity marketing system. 
As the central focus of the institutional analysis undertaken in this study is to determine 
the effects of market reforms on transaction costs faced by smallholder farmers, the concept of 
exchange configurations is considered to be the most suitable and has therefore been adopted 
as the main analytical framework. Each commodity system is thus analysed in terms of the 
products traded, product characteristics and types of contracts involved. The actors who take 
part in each exchange configuration along each commodity system are characterised in terms of 
their market co-ordination and control functions. The institutional environment in which 
production and exchange takes place is analysed at two levels. Firstly, an analysis is made of 
the availability and provision of production and marketing services to smallholder farmers. The 
services considered are extension, research, livestock services, market information and access 
to roads. Secondly, the prevailing situation in the factor markets evaluated. The factor markets 
considered here are credit, land and labour. 
Although various exchange configurations are analysed along the hierarchy of each of 
the five commodity systems, the thrust of the analysis is the farm household configuration i.e. 
the beginning of the marketing chain. According to Thorbecke (2000), the farm household 
configuration combines a hybrid of market transactions that makes it a fascinating organisation 
to study, a view shared by this study. 
Analysis of the production and trading environment 
Public and other services provided by the government and other agents to facilitate production 
ar d marketing are important institutional factors that influence transaction costs and incentives. 
In; recognition of this fact, this study analyses the institutional changes that have arisen from 
market reforms in the provision of agricultural services and rural financial markets. 
Smallholder farmers' access to factor markets, physical infrastructure and market information 
arc also analysed. 
Government expenditure on the provision of agricultural services, including extension, 
research and livestock services is used as an indicator of the changes that have occurred 
because of market reforms. Farmers access to technical information is analysed using data 
collected during household surveys and information on the number of contacts the household 
head has had with extension workers. 
34 Chapter 2 
The amounts and proportion of agricultural credit advanced to the agricultural sector by 
formal financial institutions such as banks during the highly subsidised situation prevailing 
before market reforms is contrasted with the situation prevailing under market reforms. Farm-
level data is also used to analyse the sources, types and amounts of agricultural credit given to 
smallholder farmers in the study region. 
The distance to the nearest physical market and access to an all-weather road is used as 
an indicator of each household's access to a physical market. The expectation is that the 
distance to a physical market and all-weather road has great influence on the farmer's 
participation in labour, product and input exchanges as it has direct bearing on transport cost. 
Indeed, Ahmed & Rugtagi (1984) have shown that transport costs are a major transaction cost 
for most agricultural households in Sub-Saharan Africa. The potential effects of transport costs 
on cropping choices, market participation and hence resource-use efficiency have also been 
empirically demonstrated by Goetz (1992) in Senegal, Jayne (1994) in Zimbabwe and Omamo 
(1998) in Kenya. Access to market information is analysed according to source of information 
i.e. mass media and public agencies (least asymmetric), neighbours, traders and none at all 
(most asymmetric condition). 
Market co-ordination and control (market actors) 
The analysis of the actors involved in agricultural markets has traditionally focused on 
assessing the market structure and has drawn heavily on the industrial organisation model. This 
model emphasises analysing market structures as important determinants of market conduct 
and performance (Bian, 1968; Koch 1980). Conduct that primarily involves the analysis of 
human behaviour is not readily quantifiable. Market performance that refers to the impact of 
structure and conduct can be quantified in terms of prices, costs and output (Furguson & 
Furguson, 1985). The industrial organisation model, while emphasising the concepts of market 
integration, competition and efficiency, has a number of limitations as Harris (1993) has 
documented. These limitations have led to the current focus on NTE as a more robust approach 
to the analysis of agricultural markets particularly those in developing countries. 
Within the NTE framework, emphasis is placed on analysing market co-ordination and 
control as important aspects of market structure (Jaffee & Morton, 1995). Co-ordination is 
arranging interdependent activities that require linking the decisions and actions of different 
production, technical and marketing aspects and ownership units. A major challenge in 
agricultural commodity systems is enhancing vertical co-ordination that can reduce the risks 
associated with transactions. Vertical co-ordination, therefore, involves a process of 
harmonising the decisions and actions of farmers, input suppliers, processors and traders in an 
effort to match conditions of supply and demand. The process may also facilitate the flow of 
information and other resources necessary to define and shift the incentives of various market 
participants. The absence of an effective vertical co-ordination process in any commodity 
system is therefore likely to result in resource mis-allocation, economic inefficiencies and the 
enhancement of production and marketing risks. 
The ability to exercise influence over key variables in a commodity system, be it in 
production, processing or marketing, is also an important institutional issue usually referred to 
as market control (Jaffee & Morton, 1995). Both vertical and horizontal controls are important 
factors and influence the scale economies as well as exchange of property rights of market 
participants. Vertical control mainly deals with the right or ability to make strategic decisions 
that influence the activities and welfare of participants at different stages in a commodity 
system. Horizontal control is mainly the ability to influence prices, incomes and other results in 
a particular market that arise from one's market share and/or product differentiation. 
In this study, market co-ordination and control in each commodity system is analysed 
through identification of institutions involved in production, processing and marketing 
activities before and after market reforms. A subjective rating of each commodity system co-
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farmers, traders and government agencies. Published information on the various commodity 
systems is also used. 
In market co-ordination analysis, the co-ordinating role played by respective 
government regulatory agencies before market reforms were introduced is contrasted with the 
current situation. Market control analysis focuses mainly on the control exercised by 
smallholder farmers before and after reforms in production, processing and marketing activities 
of each commodity system. The ultimate objective of analysing market co-ordination and 
control is to identify factors that may hinder the development of efficient and equitable 
institutional arrangements for each commodity. The changes in co-ordination and control 
dispensation as they affect information flow and transaction costs are also highlighted. 
Analysis of the products traded, their contracts and trade margins 
The objective of this analysis is to gain a broad understanding of the products traded at the 
farm level as a pre-requisite towards characterising their prices, contracts and transaction costs. 
Commodity production systems are analysed for their asset specificity using qualitative 
judgement based on the need of smallholder farmers to specialise in production, processing and 
other post-harvest activities. The Asset Specificity Index (ASI) for each commodity system is 
based on the need for smallholder producers for general and specialised investments as shown 
in Table 2.1. The higher the costs or level of farmer investment of the items in Table 2.1, the 
higher the level of asset specificity. 
Table 2.1 Variables used to arrive at ASI for each commodity system 
Production level Post-harvest level Marketing level 
Establishment cost / ha • N e e d for machinery • Ownership o f marketing 
Cost o f a dairy an imal * and process ing facilities agency e.g. shareholding 
Presence o f permanent/ temporary 
structures • N e e d for own • N e e d and ownership o f 
N e e d for special ised kits and transport warehouses 
equipment 
• N e e d for other marketing 
facilities 
While appreciating that dairy ariimals are used by farmers to smooth their consumption through sale 
ar d purchase of the animals, the cost of the dairy animals is nevertheless regarded as an investment in 
ths short-run which indicates a farmer's commitment to dairy production. 
Commodity systems are also distinguished and contrasted based on each commodity's 
differentiation (grades), perishability and seasonality of trade and the relationship between 
these commodity attributes and their prices. These product attributes together with the analysis 
of the frequency of trade is then used to form a basis of analysing the expected forms of 
contracts. 
Contracts are important in an exchange as property rights which are central focal point 
in NTE are transferred by contractual agreements when transaction costs permit. Contracts have 
been defined as a two-sided legal transactions in which two parties agree on certain mutual 
tr^de obligations including enforcement of the obligations (Williamson, 1985; Furubotn & 
Richter, 1991). In an effort to characterise contracts, Williamson (1979, 1985) classifies them 
along a dimension that ranges from the 'classical' to the 'relational' or incomplete contracts. 
Tie classical is a comprehensive contract with provisions fixed ex ante for all eventualities and 
within the duration of the contract. The relational contract, by contrast, allows for gaps in the 
a|preement, as it is recognised that bounded rationality and high transactions costs make it 
impossible to agree ex ante on all future eventualities that may affect the trade relationship. 
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The structure and nature of the contract will to a large extent be determined by the nature of 
transactions. Where asset specificity is high, such as in coffee production, the expectation 
would be that a long-term contract would be preferred. This may lead to a foreclosed kind of 
classical contact. However, the uncertainty brought about by market reforms might put such 
contracts under severe pressure as producers try to move towards a more relational type of 
contract. 
The analysis of contracts concentrates on the terms and conditions of the exchange 
contracts with regard to their specificity, uncertainty and frequency. A subjective rating of the 
types of contracts expected to prevail in each commodity system is derived from product and 
trade attributes. These expected forms of contract are compared to the contracts that prevail in 
each commodity system before and after reforms. 
A comparison of the changes in marketing margins across four13 commodity systems is 
undertaken as a simple measure of the efficiency of marketing institutions before and after 
market reforms. According to Mendoza (1995) a marketing margin can be used as a measure of 
the final selling price (consumer price) that is captured by a particular agent in a marketing 
chain. In this study, interest centres on the proportion of the consumer price paid to the farmer. 
As market reforms aim to get prices right by removing distortions and marketing inefficiencies, 
it follows that, in a situation where market efficiency is improving, the farmers should be able 
to get a higher proportion of the consumer price if there were no price subsidies before market 
reforms were introduced. 
In calculating the farmers' margin, the farm gate prices paid to milk producers is 
expressed as a percentage of the price paid per unit by consumers in Nairobi. Time-series 
consumer milk prices for Nairobi are readily available as they are used in computing consumer 
price indices. For coffee and tea, the free on board (f.o.b.) prices are used as the reference 
prices. 
2.3.4 Analysis of resource demand and farm productivity 
2.3.4.1 Theoretical considerations 
A two-stage bivariate probit selectivity model is used to analyse resource demand (land and 
capital) and productivity in smallholder farms in the Central Kenya region. The first-stage 
probit analysis involves a joint estimation of the factors that determine smallholder farmers' 
credit and land demand as well as supply patterns. There are two objectives at this level of 
analysis: to estimate the demographic, economic and institutional factors that determine the 
participation of farm households in both credit and land markets and to analyse how land and 
credit demand conditions affect resource allocation and farm productivity. In the second stage, 
separate regression equations are used to model the production behaviour of farmers 
conditional on the selection criteria i.e. whether the farmer is credit or land constrained. 
The theoretical foundation of selectivity models rests on discrete choice theory also 
known as qualitative response theory. Under discrete choice theory, individuals or households 
are assumed to make choices among discrete alternatives in a manner that yields the highest 
utility per choice action. The model has a structural microeconomic interpretation as demand 
functions derived from stochastic utility maximisation (MacFadden, 1981). Discrete choice 
theory is thus developed around the notion that there is a set of population choice behaviour, 
defined in terms of a set of individual behavioural rules and a structure of utility function that 
contains a stochastic component (Hensher & Johnson, 1981; Boch-Supan, 1991). Amemiya 
1 3 Reliable time series data on horticultural products was not readily available and hence the marketing margins 
analysis did not include horticultural crops. 
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p{obit and logit distributions are the two most widely used in qualitative response models. 
The probit model, formulated with a normal distribution assumption, is theoretically 
at]tractive but computationally complicated and almost intractable for polychotomuos choices, 
and hence restricted to binary choice (Lee, 1983). The logit model is based upon a very strong 
behavioural assumption of independence and identical distribution of error terms 
(Madalla,1983). The model has also a major weakness in the property commonly referred to as 
independence of irrelevant alternatives that has limited its application. The model applied in 
this study is based on probit distribution. 
A frequently encountered problem in empirical research is the quantification of an 
individual choice that may be influenced by unobservable behaviour or preference. Also 
individual-based data generally require the analysts to deal with potentially biased estimates 
arising from a selection process. For instance, when using cross-sectional household data cases 
are encountered where survey respondents participate in one activity while others do not. As 
clearly illustrated by Judge et al (1985), the missing data situation can be equated to a censored 
sample. To overcome this problem Heckman (1976) developed a procedure that transforms the 
problem from one of missing data on the dependant variable to one of specification error or 
omitted variable resulting from sample selection bias. Following Heckman's study of labour 
supply, many econometric models have been developed to generate and estimate actions not 
taken. These models are generally called switching regression or selectivity models (Lee, 1978; 
Madalla, 1983). Goetz (1992) applied a selectivity model to analyse household food marketing 
behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa in situations where high fixed transaction costs exist. The 
model endogenously switches households into alternative market participation states, 
correcting for bias caused by the exclusion of unobservable variables affecting both discrete 
and continuous household decisions. Other empirical applications of the model include Feder 
et al (1990) on use of credit in Chinese agriculture, Fuglie and Borsch (1995) in analysing the 
use of nitrogen fertilisers in USA, and Freeman et al (1998) in an analysis of dairy production 
in the East African highlands. The majority of these studies have been based on probit 
selectivity models while the current model is based on bivariate selectivity model. 
In a theoretically perfect situation, where markets forces are expected to ration goods 
and services, the supply and demand of factors of production can be expected to equilibrate at a 
given market clearing price. In such a situation, a constraint (shortage) of a factor of production 
is said to occur if the shadow price of an extra unit is sufficiently higher than the market-
clearing price. Nevertheless, as argued in the conceptual framework (see section 2.2), this is 
hardly the case in most of the markets where smallholder farmers operate. Smallholder farmers 
will face constraints in factors of production due to market imperfections that hinder 
equilibration of supply and demand. 
The approach adopted in this study recognises that a disequilibrium may exist in a 
household's credit demand and supply. It is postulated that borrowers and non-borrowers are 
not a homogeneous group. As clearly pointed out by Feder et al (1990), the implicit assumption 
that borrowers and non-borrowers are a homogeneous group is a major weakness that has been 
prevalent in many of the studies that have tried to quantify the marginal effects of credit on 
farm productivity. The homogeneity assumption is often not valid because many non-
borrowers do not borrow either because they have enough liquidity from their own resources or 
because they cannot obtain credit. Thus, for the purpose of this study, farm households have 
be^ en divided into two categories: those who are credit constrained and those who are not. A 
household is considered constrained if the household head expresses a willingness to borrow 
more; indicates credit requests have not been approved; there is no formal lender to offer credit 
or they indicated that they feared borrowing for one reason or another. Those farmers reporting 
there is no lender as well as those who feared borrowing are included in the credit constrained 
category as they have self-selected themselves due to assumptions of non-eligibility and risk-
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aversion. Thus, each household's credit supply and demand condition is used as the first 
selection criterion in estimating the household selectivity model. 
Farm households in the study region also face a disequilibrium in land supply and 
demand. This is primarily the result of high population pressure and the thin land market 
prevalent in the region. As the demand and supply equilibrium for land can affect access to 
formal credit, overall allocation of resources and hence farm productivity, the land supply and 
demand situation of each household is used as the second selection criterion. A farm household 
is considered land constrained if the respondent indicates a desire for more land or a desire to 
acquire more land either through buying or through lease. 
From a theoretical standpoint, land and credit selection criteria are expected to correlate 
as land can be used to improve access to formal credit. Equally, access to formal credit can 
facilitate land acquisition. As such the two selection-criteria equations are estimated jointly 
with assumed correlation in the error terms. 
2.3.4.2 Econometric specification of a bivariate probit selectivity model 
Let Cr* and L* be the unobservable excess demand for credit and land for each household (/), 
respectively. Dropping the i term for convenience, the relationship between excess demand for 
credit and land and the vector of explanatory variables can be specified as: 
Cr" = aaZa + sa 
(2.5) 
L = ai,Zb + £b 
Where Z is a vector of exogenous variables, a is a vector of estimate parameters and s a 
and Sb are correlated random disturbance terms. The excess demand functions for both credit 
and land are not observed but can be determined from the survey responses on household 
constraint conditions. The households are credit or land constrained if the demand for either 
credit or land exceeds their supply, that is; Cr* > 0 and I * > 0. The survey responses are used 
to define a criterion function which is un-observable dichotomous variables Cr and L, where, 
Cr = 1 iff cCaZa + £a>0; Cr = 0, otherwise 
(2.6) 
L = 1 iff UhZh + Bb>0; L = 0, otherwise 
The production behaviour of each farm household can also be modelled by a reduced 
form equation specified by, 
Yt=pX + fM (2.7) 
Where, Yi represent output supply for each farm household, P is a vector of estimate 
parameters, X is a vector of exogenous variables and ju{ is the error term. The random 
disturbance terms s a ,sb and JUI are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution ( allowing 
them to be correlated) with variances (1,1,c?) respectively and correlation (ya, Yb ,pab). 
Maximising the bivariate likelihood function for this kind of model is feasible but time 
consuming (Maddala, 1983). Therefore, following Lee ( 1978, 1983) a two-stage estimation 
method is used to estimate the system of equations (2.6) and (2.7). According to Maddala 
(1983), applying OLS to estimate in equation (2.7) also yields inconsistent estimates as the 
expected value of the error term conditional on the sample selection is non-zero. To correct for 
the inconsistent estimates in the error term conditional on the sample selection, the inverse 
Mills ratio is incorporated in equation (2.6). 
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Following Green (1995); Feder et al (1990) and Freeman et al (1998), the inverse Mills 
ratjio evaluated at OaZa and abZb for each i can be summarised as: 
Aj, = <i> (ajZj)/ 0 (ajZj) iffCr = L = 1 
(2.8) 
Aj2 = <j> (ajZj)/f 1- 9 (ajZj)J iffCr = L = 0 
J=a,b 
Where, X is the inverse Mills ratio, <j> and $ are the probability density function (PDF) 
and cumulative density function (CDF) of the bivariate normal distribution, respectively. 
Incorporating equation (2.8) into equation (2.7) yields 
Ti, = pX + t]y iffC = L = l 
Y2i = pX+02jhj +rj2j iffC = L = 0 (2.9) 
J= a,b 
Where, Ay = A,la + Xlb and A2J = + ^-2b while T]y and t]y are the new residuals having 
zero conditional means. As Lee & Trost (1978), Lee et al (1980) indicate, the residuals in 
equation (2.9) are not only heteroscadastic but also have a downward bias in the standard 
estimates for all the parameters. They have gone ahead and suggested a standard weighting 
procedure for obtaining efficient parameter estimates. As for the bias in estimates, Goetz, 
(1995) points out that most analysts tend to ignore the bias problem and report their results as 
being 'conditional' on the selectivity term. However, Lee et al (1980) and Green (1995) have 
developed suitable variance-covariance matrices to correct for the bias due to the selectivity 
teim. This procedure is adopted in the current study. 
In estimating the current model, this study proceeds as follows. In the first stage, probit 
maximum likelihood method is used to obtain estimates of ctj (j= a,b) from equation (2.6). The 
estimated values of are then used to estimate Ay and A2j in equation (2.7). In the second stage, 
Equation (2.9) is estimated by WLS using the estimated Ay and Ay as instruments for Ay and 
A2j, respectively. The model is estimated using LIMDEP® computer software (Green, 1995). 
2.3.5 Estimation of smallholder farms production efficiency 
2.3.5.1 Theoretical considerations 
Following the pioneering work of Farrell (1957), economic efficiency is dis-aggregated into 
two components; technical efficiency (TE) and price or allocative efficiency (AE). Technical 
ef Ficiency refers to the ability of a firm to obtain the maximum possible output from a given set 
of resources and technology. Technical efficiency is therefore the ability of farm households to 
avoid waste by producing as much output as input usage allows or by using as little inputs as 
output production requires. On its part, allocative efficiency generally refers to a firm's ability 
to maximise profits, by equating the marginal revenue product (MRP) with marginal costs of 
inputs. Thus, allocative efficiency refers to the farmer's ability to combine inputs in optimal 
proportions given the prevailing set of prices (Fried, Lovell & Schmidt, 1993). In FarrelPs 
framework, economic efficiency (EE) is an overall performance measure and is equal to the 
product of TE and AE (i.e., EE = TExAE). 
Economic efficiency is thus a more broader definition than the traditional efficiency 
cdncept which mainly dwelt on allocative efficiency (Ali & Byerlee, 1991). This modern 
efficiency concept is viewed more in terms of a system performance which includes farmers 
and farm support systems rather than focusing on farmer's rationality (Ali & Byerlee, 1991). In 
line with this modern concept of efficiency, interest centres on system inefficiencies that cause 
resource productivity to be below their potential. Economic efficiency has also a dynamic 
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context in that introduction of new technologies, and inputs and market reforms that shift the 
level of relative prices, can cause a déstabilisation of allocation of resources thus creating 
temporal inefficiencies. 
Analysis and measurement of farm household economic efficiency is therefore 
important as the level of efficiency has important implications for the development strategy 
adopted. Where farmers are found to be reasonably efficient, increases in productivity require 
new inputs and technologies to shift the production function upwards. This calls for 
development and delivery of both disembodied and embodied technical changes that can 
increase the productivity of one or all inputs or a specific input. On the other hand, low 
economic efficiency forms a basis for policies geared towards increasing productivity through 
more efficient use of resources and inputs within the current technology. This means 
investments will be needed in the areas of input delivery, extension, information systems and 
better pricing and marketing policies. 
Technical efficiency is usually statistically estimated through production functions or 
through programming models that estimate the best output for comparison with an average or 
individual farmer's output. Allocative efficiency is, however, determined by comparing the 
marginal products of factors with their normalised prices. Following Farrell (1957) a host of 
models - collectively known as frontier models - have been developed. These models can 
further be classified into parametric and non-parametric models depending on their specific 
functional forms (Forsund et al, 1980; Fried et al, 1993). Another important distinction is 
between deterministic and stochastic production frontiers. The deterministic models assume 
that any deviation from the production frontier is due to inefficiency, while the stochastic 
approach allows for statistical noise. 
The stochastic frontier models are the most commonly used to study production 
efficiency. According to Bauer(1990), there are two competing paradigms about the 
construction of frontiers namely the mathematical programming and econometric technique. 
The main advantage of mathematical programming or data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
approach is that no explicit functional form is needed to be imposed on the data. Fare et al 
(1994) have comprehensively discussed these methods. However, most mathematical models 
belong to the deterministic type which have been characterised by sensitivity to extreme 
observations and non-composed error term. To overcome the extreme observation problem, 
Aigner et al (1977) and Meensen & Van den Broeck (1977) independently developed the 
stochastic frontier model. 
The stochastic frontier model incorporates a composed error structure with a two-sided 
symmetric and a one-sided component. The one-sided component reflects inefficiency while 
the two-sided component captures random effects outside the control of the production unit 
including measurement errors and other statistical noise typical of empirical relationship 
(Aigner et al, 1977; Meensen & Van den Broeck, 1977). A recent extension of the stochastic 
frontier model by Jondrow et al (1982) has solved the previous inability of deriving individual 
firm efficiency measures. Brava-ureta & Pinheiro (1993) and Ali & Byerlee (1991) provide a 
comprehensive review of the application of the stochastic frontier models in measuring the 
efficiency of agricultural producers in developing countries. 
The production technology can also be represented in form of cost and profit functions. 
The cost and profit function represent the dual approach in that technology is seen as a 
constraint towards the optimising behaviour of firms (Chambers, 1983). In the context of cost 
or profit function, any errors of optimisation is taken to translate into higher costs or lower 
profits for the producer. However, the stochastic nature of the production frontier would still 
also imply that the theoretical minimum cost and maximum profit frontier would also be 
stochastic. 
According to Lau & Yotopoulos (1971) and Ali & Flinn (1989), a production function 
approach may not be appropriate when estimating efficiency of individual farms due to 
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2.3.5.2 Econometric specification of a translog cost function 
cost function provides a convenient framework for analysing efficiency as it is easy to 
capture the multi-output technologies prevalent in the study region. From a cost function 
perspective, the households are assumed to minimise cost of producing a given level of output. 
As demonstrated by Chambers (1983), the cost function can be used to resurrect all the 
economically relevant information about farm households' technology. The cost function is 
generally positive, it is non-decreasing, concave, continuous and homogeneous to degree one 
in input prices. Chambers, (1983) gives detailed proof of the properties of a cost function. The 
translog cost function which is a second-order approximation of the output, input prices and 
fixed factors is applied in the current study. The translog cost function is chosen due to its 
flexibility and its variability of elasticity (Chambers, 1983; Sadoulet & Janvry, 1995). The 
stochastic translog cost function is defined as: 
In C = a + OCQ InQ + 2_, at lnPt + '^QoflnQ)2 
i 
+ Vz £ frlnPiPi +£ PylnPiPJ+^J pQilnQlnPi 
i i i 
n 
+ ymlnZm + Vzfmm (In ZJ2 + £ ymi InZJn Pi 
mj, 
+ £ YmQ InZJnQ + % (2.10) 
mQ 
The symmetry assumptions hold i.e.,Cjj = cJ5 and h^ =hm 
Where; C is total production cost, Q is the value of total farm output, Pt is a vector of 
variable input prices (fertiliser, pesticides, animal feed and hired labour), Zm is the vector of 
fixed or quasi-fixed inputs (land and family labour) and s{ is the disturbance term. 
Following Aigner et al (1977) and Meensen & Van de Broeck (1977), the disturbance 
term ( 3 ) is assumed to be two-sided term representing the random effects in any empirical 
system. The error term, si is taken to behave in a manner consistent with the stochastic frontier 
cqncept: 
1 4 Quiggin & Bui-Lau (1984) and Carlos (1991) offer good critical reviews of the use of the dual form functions 
and more so the profit function. 
differences in prices and factor endowments. As such, estimation of efficiency should 
incorporate farm-specific prices and levels of fixed factors as variables in the analysis. Where 
there is major variability of input and output prices, as is the case in liberalised markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the use of the dual models in estimating efficiency is expected to give superior 
results. Furthermore, as pointed out by Coelli (1995), the use of dual forms of production 
technology can also enable the simultaneous prediction of both technical and allocative 
efficiency. The dual forms are also flexible enough to account for multiple outputs, which are 
the norm in most smallholder agricultural systems14. 
Given the factors mentioned above, this study has adopted a stochastic cost model to 
estimate the cost inefficiencies in smallholder farms in the study area. The cost function 
approach is preferred over the profit function approach to avoid problems of estimation that 
may arise in situations where farm households realise zero or negative profits at the prevailing 
market prices. As Carlos (1991) points out zero or negative profits can be a major estimation 
problem as the logarithm of a zero or a negative number is undefined 
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£i=Vi+ Ut (2.11) 
The systematic component, Vt represents random disturbance in costs due to factors 
outside the scope of the farmer. U is one sided disturbance term used to represent cost 
inefficiency. Thus, U,• = 0 for a farm whose costs lie on the frontier, U > 0 for farms whose 
cost is above the frontier and Ut< 0 for farms below the frontier (inefficiency). U-t is assumed to 
be identically and independently distributed as | N (0, <JU ) I i.e., the distribution of U is half-
normal15. The population average efficiency is given by ; 
E(e") = 2em2/2 [ 1 - <K<Ju)l (2.12) 
Where, § is the standard normal distribution function. Following Jondrow et al (1982), 
the farm-specific estimates of inefficiency, Ui, for each observation are derived from the 
conditional distribution of U, given (U + V). Given normal distribution of V and half-normal 
distribution of U, the expected value of farm-specific inefficiency Ut, given Si =U{+Vi : 
E [e | ei] = 
a 
Where, au2 and ou2 are the variance of F, and Uh k = <ru /<rv, a2 = au2 +av2 and (|> and 
0> are the standard normal density (PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF), 
respectively, estimated at e;A,/o. 
The Maximum-Likelihood (ML) method is used to estimate equation (2.10) using 
LIMDEP® programme (Greene, 1995). The farm-specific efficiency index is then constructed 
using the results of equations (2.10) and (2.13). The resultant cost inefficiency (CI) index is 
used as the dependent variable in a second stage regression analysis aimed at decomposition of 
the efficiency performance at the farm level. The second stage regression analysis thus 
provides for the relationship between cost efficiency and farm characteristics, institutional and 
economic factors. 
2.4 Data sources 
Price data has been collected from various sources, mainly the marketing organisations 
concerned with the marketing or regulation of each of the four commodities. These are the 
Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK), the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) and Tea Board 
of Kenya (TBK). Monthly maize producer/wholesale prices on the Nairobi market as well as 
milk, fertiliser and other input prices were collected from various sources in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Data on monthly producer prices published in statistical abstracts and other 
government documents were also used. The monthly exchange rate statistics and other 
monetary data were collected from the monthly and yearly Central Bank of Kenya 
publications. The international time series data for coffee prices were collected from the 
International Coffee Organisation and international price abstracts were used for the other 
commodities. 
0(eik I a eik 
1. G(ekla a 
(2.13) 
1 5 For comparison purposes, three models are estimated in this study. The models are based on half-normal, 
truncated and exponential distribution of the efficiency term. 
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Cross sectional surveys were also conducted for a sample of smallholder coffee 
producers in Kiambu/Thika, Murang'a, Kirinyaga and Nyeri districts in Central Province of 
K^nya. The sample comprised 200 households. Their distribution is shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Distribution of the sampled households across districts in the study region 
District No. of 
societies 
sampled 
No. of Smallholders 
Sampled 
No. of Small independent 
farmers sampled 
Total 
Kiambu/Thika 
Murang'a 
Kirinyaga 
Nyeri 
Total 
5 
5 
4 
3 
17 
30 
30 
30 
30 
120 
23 
22 
20 
15 
80 
53 
52 
50 
45 
200 
A two-stage random sampling procedure was used to sample the households. During 
the first stage at least three coffee co-operative societies were sampled from a list of all 
registered societies in each of the four districts. The sampling was done in such a way that each 
of the three main coffee growing agro-ecological zones were represented at least by one 
society. The second sampling stage involved the random sampling of 120 coffee producers 
m the register kept by the societies previously sampled. 
It was considered necessary to sample some independent coffee growers who were not 
members of a co-operative society. The small independent producers have their own coffee 
processing facilities and market their coffee directly to the Coffee Board of Kenya. These small 
independent producers usually have a larger coffee acreage and are more commercialised than 
their smallholder counterparts. A total of 80 small, independent producers were randomly 
sampled from the coffee growers' register kept by the Coffee Board of Kenya. 
A structured questionnaire formed the main data collection instrument. The questionnaire 
was pre-tested on 10 smallholder farmers in the region. Data was collected over a four-month 
period from December 1999 to April 2000. Data on household characteristics, resource 
endowment, income and expenditure, resource allocations among different on and off-farm 
enterprises, household access to production factors and markets as well as access to physical 
infrastructure was collected. Where possible, the data collected from households was verified 
through other sources. For instance, data on the amount marketed and incomes obtained from 
commodities marketed through such organisations as co-operatives was verified from the 
rejcords kept by these organisations. 
5 Observations and conclusions on analytical procedures 
This chapter documents both the theoretical background and the analytical methods applied in 
tr is study. The descriptive and econometric models developed in this chapter attempt to answer 
the six research questions outlined in section 1.5. The models are complimentary and inter-
related as results from one-model builds a case for the next model. The first model which 
analyses agricultural term of trade, price evolution and volatility is geared towards answering 
the first two research questions set out by this study. The analysis is not counterfactual as it 
compares before -and-after scenarios. It is appreciated that in this type of analysis many 
variables may have changed in different directions exerting a variety of effects on terms of 
triade and prices. Nevertheless, the formulated model is considered good enough to show the 
general direction of the variables being analysed. Moreover, the ARCH-M model complements 
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the other statistical methods as it takes into account more variables and their specific effects on 
price means and variance. 
The descriptive institutional analysis also developed in this chapter is central to this 
study. Outputs from the institutional analysis can indicate the level of transaction costs and 
smallholder farmers' access to production inputs (both factor and non-factor) and output 
markets, all of which have important implications for pricing, the allocation of resources, farm 
productivity and production efficiency. Equally, the institutional analysis also hopes to capture 
other institutional issues that have considerable bearing on economic variables. These include 
the governance of smallholder institutions, the structure of farmers' social organisation, the 
nature of contracts and asymmetries in market information. Nevertheless, despite the 
importance of this type of analysis, the institutional analysis model is characterised by a degree 
of subjective judgement because some variables cannot be easily quantified. 
The third model developed in this chapter is the bivariate probit selectivity model to 
analyse a household's demand for credit and land allocation and how this effects productivity. 
The model is formulated to accommodate two constraints, i.e. the land and credit constraints 
faced by smallholder farmers in the study region. The land constraint is regarded as important 
because of there is high population pressure in the study region and because the market reforms 
undertaken in Kenya up to now have not focused on land markets. Credit is also taken as a 
constraint. Evidence introduced later in this study clearly indicates that market reforms have 
been associated with credit constraints. The model is therefore considered suitable as it 
facilitates the incorporation of these two major constraints while mamtaining computational 
tractability. Nevertheless, due to the close interrelationship of factors that might determine the 
demand for credit and land as well as farm productivity, the estimation of the model may suffer 
from problems that relate to endogenous variables. 
A stochastic translog cost function model has also been developed in this chapter to 
estimate the cost inefficiencies of smallholder farms in the study region. The model is preferred 
because of its ability to estimate both technical and allocative efficiencies and its flexibility in 
accounting for the multiple outputs common on smallholder farms while utilising the specific 
farm gate prices that can be expected in a reforming economic environment. However, despite 
its advantages, the translog model formulation tends to explode as the number of explanatory 
variables increase, thereby limiting the inclusion of many variables. 
In conclusion, the formulated analytical models are considered suitable for the research 
questions that have to be answered. Furthermore, the models are formulated with the data and 
computational considerations in mind. Some specific estimation issues are, however, omitted in 
this chapter because they are discussed later in the chapters that report on the empirical results 
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3.1 
CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 
Introduction 
Kenya's agricultural development has been geared towards meeting three principal policy 
objectives: a rapid growth of agricultural income; food security and price stabilisation; and 
income distribution (Republic of Kenya, 1986, Pearson, 1995). Various policy instruments and 
strategies have been advocated and applied throughout Kenya's colonial and independence16 
history in order to realise these objectives as summarised in Figure 3.1. 
Agricultural Development Strategy [2] 
1. Increase intensity of input use per land unit 
2. Reduction of costs and increase in yield through 
development and use of improved technologies 
Increasing farm output and incomes through 
introduction of changes in cropping patterns 
Opening new land for agricultural production 
through settlement 
Î 
Agricultural Policy Instruments 3] 
1. Macro Economic Policies 
2. Public Investment 
3. Competitive prices 
4. Price Stabilisation 
5. Market Regulation 
Agricultural Policy Objectives [1] 
1. Rapid Agricultural Income growth 
2. Food Security and Price Stability 
3. Income Distribution 
Economic Variables [4] 
1 
1. Agricultural Income from Pood and Cash 
Crop Output (Farm & Post Farm) 
2. Food Crop Output 
3. Agricultural Employment (Farm & Post 
Farm) 
Source: Adopted from Pearson (1995) p.8 
Figure 3.1 Linkages among Kenya's agricultural development strategy, policies and objectives 
Since Independence, Kenya's main agricultural development strategy has been based on 
the promotion of smallholder farming. Smallholder-led agricultural strategy has been 
advocated to serve the dual purpose of increasing and intensifying resource use as well as 
addressing equity concerns. In implementing this development strategy a variety of policy 
instruments have been applied. Between 1963 and 1980, policies emphasised government 
intervention in nearly all aspects of agricultural production and marketing (Nyangito, 1999). 
Thèse direct intervention policies related to market regulation and pricing of agricultural 
corhmodities and inputs. Indirectly, the government macro-policies in respect to interest rates, 
exchange rates, trade, wages and investment decisions in public goods (mainly research and 
1 6 Kenya gained its political independence from Britain in December, 1963. 
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rural infrastructure) were also used to influence the direction and rate of agricultural 
development. 
There was, however, a major policy shift from 1981, when government controls were 
gradually removed and initial attempts made towards market liberalisation. The liberalisation 
of markets was aimed at enhancing participation of the private sector in agricultural production 
and marketing while at the same time creating an enabling environment for market forces to 
determine the level of agricultural prices. 
These shifts in policy are reflected in differences in the performance of the agricultural 
sector. Between 1963 and 1972, the sector grew at 6.4% per annum, a rate that dropped to 3% 
between 1973 and 1980. During the early years of liberalisation (1980-1990) recorded growth 
ranged from minus 4% to positive 6% with a mean of 3% as shown in Figure 3.2. Performance 
has been even more disappointing since 1990 when major reforms were implemented in the 
sector. The sector registered negative growth rate from 1991 to 1993 before taking an upward 
turn in 1994. The poor performance of the agricultural sector during the last twenty years has 
adversely affected the performance of the whole economy. 
-8 - I—,—i—i—i—i—i—i—,—,—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—I 
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Year 
Source : K e n y a economic survey (various,) 
Figure 3.2 Agricultural sector real growth rate in Kenya, 1979 to 1999 
In line with the objectives of this thesis it is important to understand how Kenya's policy 
instruments have evolved over time, the direction they are likely to take in an era of liberalised 
economy, and their effects on agricultural development. Furthermore, the problems being 
addressed under SAPs and the need for SAPs in the first place can be clarified if seen from an 
historical perspective. Therefore, a brief historical overview of the policy instruments and 
strategies applied in both colonial and independent Kenya is given below. For convenience this 
review is sub-divided into two sections: the era of government controls which ran from the 
days of colonial rule to the early 1980s and the period of liberalisation (market reforms) from 
1980 to 2000. The review not only summarises the major strategies and instruments applied in 
the agriculture sector in general, but briefly summaries the policy changes that have been 
implemented in the sub-sectors relevant to this study i.e. coffee, tea, dairy, maize and 
horticulture. Changes in factor and non-factor markets are also reviewed. 
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3.2 The era of government controls 
3.2.1 European settler led agricultural development 
From 1900 to the mid-1950s, agricultural development in Kenya was dominated mainly by the 
desire of the British government to encourage and support European settlers to engage in 
commercial agriculture. This was achieved through the alienation of land to create what was 
known as the 'White Highlands' (Sorrenson, 1968). From 1915 a series of Crown Land 
Ordinances were enacted that resulted in 7 million hectares of Kenyan highlands (20% of the 
arable land in Kenya) being reserved for European settlers (Colony and Protectorate, 1931). 
African families were deliberately consigned to 'African reserves', areas which were neglected 
as far as development was concerned. 
Having acquired land, the settlers overcame labour shortages by forcing the African 
population into the monetary economy by imposing taxes. In response to land pressure, 
taxation and coercion, thousands of Africans moved to settle on the estates where they 
provided labour in exchange for access to land and a cash income to cover their tax burden. By 
1928, as many as 40% of men of working age from Nyanza and Central Districts were 
employed on the European-owned farms (Kitching, 1980). This skewed pattern of land 
OAvnership created an agricultural system that persists even in present day Kenya. 
Apart from land and labour, institutions and mfrastructure were also established to 
serve the European settler community. Public investment in transport infrastructure, including 
the Uganda railway was almost exclusively to the benefit of the European farmer. Similarly, 
public sponsored agricultural research concentrated on crops suitable for large-scale production 
in the highlands such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum and maize (Smith, 1976). Export crops were 
'scheduled' for European settlers ostensibly to ensure quality control and to safeguard African 
food supplies. Only cotton, which was ill suited to conditions in the highland conditions, could 
be legally grown by Africans as a cash crop. 
Credit and marketing institutions were also tailored to the needs of European farmers. 
Tlirough monopolistic marketing organisations, European farmers were able to access crop-
secured loans. This set the pattern for monopolistic marketing and crop-secured lending 
practises that prevailed until the introduction of SAPs in the early 1990s. 
As European agriculture was developing, intolerable pressure was building up in the 
African reserves. The colonial government response to this stress dramatically influenced the 
course of agricultural policy and development in Kenya. In 1954, in response to mounting 
resentment amongst the African population, the colonial government published a document -
popularly referred to as the Swynnerton plan - setting out how the intensification of 
development in African agriculture was to be achieved (Colony & Protectorate, 1954). The 
plan aimed at creating a rural elite as the vanguard of development and the first defence against 
revolt. It contained a strategy for the development of smallholder agriculture that has remained 
the corner stone of agricultural policy up to the present day. 
3.2.2 Smallholder led agricultural development 
Central to the 'Swynnerton Plan' was the consolidation and registration of land held by 
Africans as overcoming failures in the land market was seen as mandatory to any development 
(Colony & Protectorate, 1954). The land reform consisted of determining the ownership of 
cultivated plots, consolidating fragmented plots and registering these parcels to individuals 
mainly within the Kikuyu17 reserves. 'Able, energetic and rich Africans' were expected to 
a0quire more land, whereas the 'bad and poor farmers' would eventually sell property and 
became a landless class, employed on larger African farms (Nelson, 1995). 
1 7 iKikuyu is the name of the largest ethnic group in Kenya who are mainly agriculturist occupying the Central 
Kenya highlands. 
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Swynnerton's plan also recommended relaxation of restrictions on the production of 
export crops by Africans. According to the plan, progressive African farmers were expected to 
grow coffee, tea or pyrethrum to generate cash income as well as employ the landless labour. 
Nevertheless, production controls to ensure quality standards were maintained. 
Considerable public spending on infrastructure and extension backed this official 
encouragement of African agriculture. However, much emphasis was placed on development 
of progressive farmers in high potential areas (Heyer, 1981). The removal of cropping 
restrictions produced the impetus for smallholder agriculture development. However, in 1961, 
when agriculture accounted for 85% of Kenya's export earnings, the large-farm sector was still 
accounting for three-quarters of the output (Republic of Kenya, 1962). It was this duopolistic 
agricultural production system that the independent government of Kenya inherited in 1963. 
The newly formed Kenyan government adopted 'development' as its principal objective 
and moved quickly to promulgate policies and programmes designed to ensure a smooth 
transfer of responsibility (Onjale, 1995). Thus, Kenya government policies with regard to 
agriculture and all other sectors of the economy were based on principles outlined in the 
sessional paper number 10 on 'African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya' 
(Republic of Kenya, 1965). The objective as described in the sessional paper were: 
'to achieve high and rapid growth, equitably distributed, so that all are free from want, disease 
and exploitation, while at the same time guaranteeing political equality, social justice, human 
dignity and equal opportunities but also without prejudice to remedying the inequalities 
inherited from the past' (Republic of Kenya, 1965). 
The major emphasis and underlying policy rationality during this period was to alleviate 
the pressing and immediate problems of transition while trying to establish a firm basis for 
rapid economic growth. The overall development strategy was one in which economic and 
social development would be planned at the national level. This orientation towards central 
planning was reinforced by the 'structuralists' paradigm that emphasised the proliferation of 
government activities, particularly through investments in commercial enterprises and 
administrative structures. The government was expected to provide a network of physical and 
social infrastructure as well as managing economic and social activities. It was argued that 
indigenous Kenyans were too poor to participate effectively in commercial activities and 
therefore the government had to take on a guardian role, investing in enterprises on behalf of 
the general public. The government thus created and invested heavily in the parastatals that 
became the hallmark of Kenyan economy in late 1960s and 1970s 1 8 . Rapid, equitable 
economic, social and regional development was to be guided through national planning while 
acknowledging the need to promote private sector participation in the task of nation building. 
The logical question then was what form should such participation take (Alila & Omosa, 
1995). 
In the context of agricultural development policy it was expected that the most 
favourable economic results would come from continuing development along the lines set out 
in the Swynnerton Plan. A World Bank Report drafted at the time supported this strategy 
stating: 'we recommend a programme devoted mainly to land consolidation, enclosure and 
development of cash crop production in non-scheduled areas (World Bank, 1963, p.49). From 
1963 to 1973, in line with these policy objectives, the government undertook a number of 
strategies to deal with land re-distribution, market and price policies and credit and 
mfrastructure. The basic tenets of these strategies are described below. 
1 8 The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continued to expand in the 1980s and by 1990/91 there were 240 SOEs 
in Kenya accounting for 11 % of GDP (O'Brien & Ryan, 1999). 
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Land ownership 
The change from settler-led agricultural development to one led by smallholders can be viewed 
as! an induced institutional innovation. According to Hayami and Ruttan (1985) supply and 
detnand factors can cause institutional change. Changes in factor endowments, technical 
change and growth in product demand factors can cause institutional change. On the supply 
sicjle, institutional change can originate from the mobilisation of political resources and changes 
in cultural endowments. 
The institutional change that occurred in Kenya after 1963 was driven primarily by 
supply. The change of political leadership ensured that the efforts of political entrepreneurs to 
inlroduce land reforms through changes in the tenure system received stronger political 
support. Thus, the settlement of African farmers and granting them freehold title was an 
attempt to address the long-standing problem of land tenure that had been one of the main 
issues in the struggle for independence. 
The African resettlement process, initiated by the colonial government, was intensified 
irrimediately after independence. Land transfer was financed partly by Britain and other donors. 
Tie initial resettlement programme transferred over one million acres of land to about 35,000 
African families in the former white highlands (Heyer, 1981). In order to preserve the large-
scale sector, proportions of farms were transferred intact from European to African farmers. 
To satisfy the remaining demand for access to land, the government focused on the 
allocation and registration of arable land that had remained under African occupation (Lofchie, 
1989). This was justified as a mechanism for increasing lending to smallholder farmers and 
breaking capital constraints on land development19. The government also acquired national 
farms that were to provide essential inputs such as hybrid seeds and improved livestock. Co-
operative and company-owned farms employing large-scale production techniques and 
processing were also encouraged. Thus, although the large-farm sector remained, the structure 
of Kenyan agriculture changed fundamentally after 1963, and by 1967 smallholder farmers 
were responsible for more than half the value of agricultural production (Republic of Kenya, 
1971). Agricultural institutions and policies had to be re-oriented to match this transformation. 
In the next section some of the major institutional and policy changes which were made during 
this re-orientation are discussed. The shortcomings of these new institutional arrangements and 
policies culminated in the liberalisation of the economy in early 1990s. 
Agricultural marketing and pricing policies 
Marketing 
Several statutory marketing institutions (boards) were inherited from the colonial era. 
However, there was need to restructure most of these marketing institutions to serve the 
growing ranks of smallholder farmers. Institutional changes to meet these new conditions 
widened and deepened the government's presence in the agriculture. 
The marketing of most crops (excluding horticulture) and livestock was carried out 
through marketing boards. The main marketing boards were the Maize Marketing Board, 
Wheat Marketing Board and Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC) for dairy and dairy 
products. There were similar boards for the major export crops, coffee, tea and pyrethrum. The 
government also encouraged formation of co-operative societies as a major link between the 
bo&rds and the smallholder farmers. The co-operative societies also offered bulking, transport, 
processing and other social facilities to smallholders. Smallholders were in turn required to 
1 9The importance of land tenure reform to rural development in SSA has remained a matter of debate for the last 
four decades. Major debate issues remains on the relationship between individual property rights and its role in 
enhancing access to credit, higher security of land investments and the increase in land controlled by the most 
efficient farmers. 
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market their coffee, tea, pyrethrum and other products through these co-operatives (Heyer, 
1981). As smallholder agriculture expanded, so did the importance of the co-operatives as 
shown in Table 3.1. Most of the co-operatives gained local monopoly status with the 
encouragement of the government. Producer organisations outside the official co-operative 
system received little government support. 
Table 3.1 The growth of the co-operative movement in Kenya, selected years 
Y e a r N o . o f Membership Turnover 
co-operatives ( ' 0 0 0 ' ) ( K s h million) 
Pre-liberalisation period 
1963 1,030 200 100 
1983 3,314 1,921 4 ,634 
1986 3,524 2 ,160 4 ,715 
1987 3,809 2 ,122 5 ,550 
1988 4,033 2 ,164 6,595 
1989 5,183 2,460 6,985 
1990 5,400 2,593 2 ,438 
1991 5,594 2 ,652 5 ,589 
Liberalisation period 
1992 5,832 2 ,682 5,578 
1993 6,158 2 ,704 10,110 
1994 6,293 3,986 12,451 
1996 6,767 4 ,576 14,884 
1997 7,564 4 ,800 15,000 
1998 8,312 5,000 15,500 
1999 9,151 5,300 15,000 
Source : Gatheru & Shaw (eds.) , 1998 & K e n y a economic survey (various) 
Agricultural pricing policies 
Pricing policies in Kenya date back to the colonial era. The pricing control was given formal 
legislation in 1956 as the price control ordinance which was later re-named Price Control Act 
of 1972. Price control was justified as a means towards reducing fluctuations in farm incomes 
while ensuring affordable food prices to the consumers. Coffee, tea and pyrethrum producers 
received the world prices less the processing and marketing costs of the respective marketing 
boards, cotton was the only crop covered by price stabilisation and producer tax measures 
(Winter-Nelson, 1993). The pricing policies were however different in case of food crops 
especially the main staple- maize. The government concern to ensure that consumers could 
afford maize became a major pre-occupation. The maize marketing board which later became 
the National Cereals Produce Board (NCPB) was given the mandate of providing maize and 
other cereals to all parts of the country at prices consumers could afford and also to ensure that 
farmers had reliable outlets. Through the NCPB, the government tried to provide food security 
for urban consumers and ensure farmers of price security through a system of pre-announced, 
pan-territorial prices for maize at all stages of the marketing chain. The NCPB also controlled 
the physical movement of cereals within Kenya and had a monopoly over the export and 
import of maize. These price and movement controls were used to facilitate crop-collaterilised 
lending to stabilise prices and to protect farmers and consumers from any rise or fluctuations in 
prices However, in the early 1970's there was a progressive reduction of the net producer price 
for maize towards aligning it to the export parity price. This shift in policy was aimed at 
discouraging export surpluses which had arisen from the highly subsidised producer prices. 
Milk was also effected by the drastic pricing changes introduced by government. 
During the 1960s there was little change in the differentiated milk pricing system based on 
quotas, contract and butterfat categories set by the Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC) that 
been operative during the colonial period. This system, however, was abolished in July 1970 
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3 . 3 The era of structural adjustments 
Kenya started the 1980s with more favourable economic structure, incentives and institutions 
than most other Sub-Saharan countries (Swamy, 1994, Onjale, 1995). Nevertheless, structural 
distortions were building up throughout the 1970s with the two oil crises in the 1970s leading 
to sharp deterioration in the terms of trade. Additionally, in the wake of the coffee boom of 
1977 and 1978, fiscal discipline was severely eroded, thereby leading to major financial 
imbalances (Bevan, Collier & Gunning, 1988) . Because of these macro-economic problems 
the Kenyan government approached the Breton Woods institutions for quick-disbursement 
loans. In March 1980, Kenya qualified for a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank. 
According to O'Brien & Ryan (1999), Kenya was the first SSA country to receive structural 
adjustment funding from the World Bank and later an enhanced structural adjustment facility 
loan from IMF. This loan and those that followed until 1985 were focused on correcting 
macro-economic imbalances. 
2 0 During the boom period, consumer and government expenditures increased with the fiscal deficit rising to 
9.5% of GDP in 1975/76 as compared to a deficit of between 3-6 % of GDP in early 1970s. 
and was replaced by one based on a fixed minimum price plus a yearly bonus. The bonus was 
dependent on the operating profits of KCC. In 1971, the pricing system was changed again. A 
fixed price was introduced per litre and with the possibility of a yearly bonus. 
The pricing policies pursued by the various marketing boards especially with regard to 
cereals and milk continued to change over time and occupied the centre of policy debate in 
agriculture until the era of market reforms. The roles, functions and efficiency of the various 
agricultural marketing institutions has also attracted considerable concerns and policy debate in 
subsequent periods up to the era of structural adjustments. 
Agricultural credit and inputs institutions and policies 
At the time of Kenya's independence, there were two main agricultural credit institutions: 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Land Agricultural Bank (LAB). AFC was 
responsible for advancing loans for development and production. LAB specialised in mortgage 
on land, a major and a critical area at the time due to the African resettlement programme. The 
LAB was later taken over by AFC which became the main agricultural credit institution. 
Producer co-operative societies were entrusted with the responsibility of providing short-term 
credit and inputs to their members, most of who were smallholder farmers. Kenya Tea 
Development Authority (KTDA) was established during this period and charged with the 
responsibility of managing smallholder tea production (including provision of farm credit and 
inputs) processing and marketing. 
Due to collateral requirements involving land titles, most of the credit from AFC did not 
reach smallholder farmers, especially those outside the settlement areas. Consequently, the 
bulk of AFC loans went to large-scale producers (Vasthof, 1968). In response to the 
shortcomings of the land-based lending, crop-secured loans were encouraged. For 
smallholders, co-operatives became the primary conduits for crop-secured loans (Bates, 1989). 
ccording to Winter- Nelson (1993), this crop collateralization had two side effects. First, it 
demanded an increased bureaucratic presence in smallholder farming to ensure that appropriate 
production techniques were adhered to and the control of marketing channels available to 
farmers. This entrenched the presence of marketing boards and co-operative societies in 
smallholder agriculture, a phenomenon that persisted up to the structural adjustment era. 
Secondly, the crop-secured lending was generally subsidised and rationed through non-price 
mechanisms, thereby stimulating excessive use of capital in production and processing. 
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2 1 For a detailed chronology of structural adjustment programs in Kenya, the amounts of loans involved, the 
conditionalities and donor experience for the period 1980 to 1994, see O'Brien & Ryan (1999). 
According to Swamy (1994), the first attempt at adjustment (1980-1984) was 
characterised by both a total lack of compliance because of design and timing problems as well 
as a lack of political commitment. Given the limited implementation capacity of the 
government and in the hope of building a greater consensus, it was decided that the World 
Bank would support adjustments on a sectorial basis and the IMF would monitor the macro-
economic situation. 
Accordingly, the first adjustment programme loan for the agricultural sector was 
concluded in 1986. Under the agreement the government was to provide greater incentives 
through an annual revision of commodity prices, an improved provision of inputs and by 
strengthen extension services to the sector involved. The government undertook to liberalise 
the marketing of grains, coffee, tea, sugar, cotton and livestock. However, very few of the 
stated objectives were implemented (Swamy, 1994; Onjale, 1995) and the first attempt to 
liberalise the agricultural sector in Kenya was a major failure. 
On the policy frontier, the government progumated the sessional paper No. 1 of 1986 
on Economic Management for Renewed Growth (Republic of Kenya, 1986). The paper 
provided a broad policy framework, strategies and specific measures for economic growth. The 
government prepared a budget rationalisation programme aimed at increasing productivity and 
investments while advocating private-sector led development strategy in order secure an 
improvement in the economy. Consequently, the government started an industrial sector 
adjustment programme in 1988 and the following year introduced financial sector reform. The 
main economic reforms undertaken so far include2 1: 
• Abolition of administrative controls on international trade such as import licensing and 
foreign exchange allocations. 
• Removal of exchange controls on current account transactions together with partial 
removal on restrictions on capital accounts, including the 90 days foreign exchange 
surrender limit. 
• Removal of restrictions on all foreign commercial borrowings as well as allowing Kenyan 
nationals to invest abroad up to US $ 500,000 without reference to Central Bank of Kenya. 
• Lifting of controls on interest rates and credit limits. 
• Rationalisation of tariff rates, revenue collection reforms including introduction of Value 
Added Tax (VAT), formation of a tax authority in 1995, abolition of the selective 20% 
export tax and introduction of 2% presumptive income tax for marketed agricultural 
products. 
• Removal of price controls for essential food items, petroleum products and agricultural 
inputs. 
• In August 1992, foreign exchange retention accounts permitted for exporters of non-
traditional goods and revision of import licensing to allow issuance of import licences for 
importers having their own foreign exchange. Exporters of traditional exports (mainly 
agricultural commodities) later allowed to retain 50% of foreign exchange in November 
1992. 
• Coffee and tea trade in both Nairobi and Mombasa auctions allowed to be conducted in US 
dollars in 1992. 
• Monetary policy reforms and review of the Banking Act to allow for more participants in 
the financial market and enhancing Central Bank role to monitor and regulate the financial 
sector. 
• Introduction of the civil service reform including a major retrenchment programme that 
was accompanied by government budget rationalisation programme. 
• Privatisation and reform of parastatals. 
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Social sector reform and introduction of cost sharing (user costs) in health and education 
sectors. 
The macro-economic reforms involving the exchange rate and interest rate policies were of 
fundamental importance to the performance of the agricultural sector. During the early 1980s, 
the Kenya shilling was pegged to the special drawing rights basket of currencies in an effort to 
have a flexible exchange rate policy. However, the government controlled the exchange rate 
until 1993 when a floating exchange rate policy was adopted. According to Mosley (1986), 
even prior to SAPs, Kenya's real effective exchange rate had remained constant throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. This trend continued in the first half of 1980s. The real exchange rate, 
however, depreciated by more than 40% in the second half of the 1980s and black market 
premiums declined from 110 per cent in late 1987 to 17% in the third quarter of 1991 (Swamy, 
1994). The depreciation of the real exchange rate was expected to favour growth in exports in 
general and agricultural commodity exports in particular. 
Market reforms have also been implemented in the area of domestic interest rates. Prior to 
1992 the government through the Central Bank of Kenya used to control both deposit and 
leading interest rates. The government also regulated the interest rates charged on agricultural 
credit. During this period real interest rates were negative and declining. This trend was 
reversed in 1992 when commercial interest rates were de-regulated and allowed to adjust to the 
trends in inflation. This high interest rates arising from de-regulation and government deficit 
spending had a major adverse impact on availability of credit to agricultural producers. 
Moreover , the credit crunch and removal of input subsidies during the same period may have 
resulted to low usage of inputs in the agricultural sector. 
Specific agricultural reforms, affecting the marketing and pricing of various commodities 
w^re also introduced from 1992. The next section is primarily concerned with reforms 
introduced among the five commodities of interest of this study - coffee, tea, maize (main 
stable food), dairy and horticultural crops. Equally important are the policy reforms that 
directly or indirectly affect farm prices, relative returns to each commodity and farm incomes. 
3.3.1 Liberalisation of the maize markets 
Maize is the most prominent staple in Kenyan agriculture, producing 40% of the population's 
caloric requirements. Indeed, food security in Kenya is equated to availability of adequate 
supplies of maize, both at national and household level (Republic of Kenya, 1994, Omosa, 
1998). Maize is grown in almost all agro-ecological zones in Kenya, with the smallholder 
producing 70% of the crop. Maize acreage increased steadily from 447,600 hectares in 1963 to 
over 1.4 million hectares in 1998 (Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 Maize area, production, yields, imports and exports in Kenya, 1985 to 1999 
Year Area Production Yield NCPB Exports 
('000' ha) ('OOO'MT) (MT/ha) purchases 
('OOO'MT) ('OOO'MT) 
Pre-liberalisation period 
1985 1,210 1,411 1.25 587 18 
1986 1,200 2,430 2.02 670 227 
1987 1,200 2,890 2.40 652 248 
1988 1,230 2,761 2.24 485 167 
1989 1,260 2,631 2.09 549 110 
1990 1,380 2,286 1.66 528 160 
1991 1,310 2,340 1.78 305 19 
Liberalisation period 
1992 1,407 2,520 1.79 488 0.4 
1993 1,407 1,710 1.22 463 414 
1994 1,400 3,060 2.18 535 13 
1995 1,438 2,691 1.87 99.7 154 
1996 1,402 2,160 1.54 61.9 221 
1997 1,404 2,403 1.71 162 263 
1998 1,410 2,300 1.63 9 9 
1999 1,400 2,250 1.61 192.9 283 
Source: Statistical abstracts and NCPB market reports (various) 
Kenya is usually self-sufficient in maize and imports have been relatively rare. Indeed, 
as shown in Table 3.2, there have been substantial maize exports in most years. According to 
research work done under policy analysis matrix project (PAM eds., 1995) the self-sufficiency 
in maize is however threatened by population and income growth that might outmatch 
domestic production. New initiatives are therefore needed if Kenya is to remain self-sufficient 
in food. It is with this prognosis in mind that the government, with the help of multilateral 
agencies, started the cereal sector reform programme in 1988. 
As indicated earlier maize marketing has been regulated by government for a long time 
and in recent years the system have received considerable attention2 . As also indicated earlier, 
the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) was mandated responsible for purchasing, 
storing and supplying maize throughout the country at a pan-territorial price. While NCPB's 
two main concerns have been the level and stability of prices to farmers and consumers, the 
Board has tended to emphasise measures that affect the prices farmers' receive for maize grain. 
In principle, such a policy provided farmers with a reference price on which to base their price 
expectations. Nevertheless, seasonal and inter-regional fluctuations in actual market prices 
made the costs of pursuing this policy prohibitive. Thus, the NCPB often incurred huge debts 
and by 1987 the Board debts exceeded 5% of GDP (Swamy, 1995). In most years, NCPB's 
budget could not maintain the official price and this resulted in payment delays of up to six 
months. 
In response to these shortcomings in the maize marketing system, a process of market 
liberalising was initiated in 1988 under the Cereals Sector Reform Programme (CSRP). 
According to Gordon and Spooner (1992), the programme had four main objectives: restricting 
the role of NCPB to market stabilisation; enhancing the role of the private sector in maize 
marketing; removing administrative controls on the movement of maize and procurement and 
reserve stock management policy. Despite early official discomfort with the amount of food 
security provided by the new marketing arrangements, the reform process got underway in 
1989. Major successes have been achieved in removing the administrative controls on maize 
trade especially as far as maize procurement procedures are concerned. This has enhanced the 
2 2 Meilink (1999) gives a detailed review of maize market liberalisation policies in Kenya and then-
controversies for the period 1976 to 1996. 
Review of agricultural development in Kenya 55 
2 3 Maize in Kenya is consumed mainly in form of whole grain or in milled form called "unga". The milled form 
accounts for almost 80 % of the disappearance of all maize formally marketed in Kenya. 
2 4 Zero grazing is an intensive production system where animals are confined in sheds. 
rcjle of private sector involvement in the maize trade, especially in maize procurement and 
trJaize milling. According to the policy framework paper for 1994-1996 signed by the Kenya 
government, IMF and World Bank, the future role of the NCPB's in maize marketing would be 
limited to managing strategic reserves. The Board will buy maize at no more than export parity 
price and sell at no more than import parity price. This re-organisation is underway and had 
b¿en hoped that it would have been completed before the end of 2000. 
Another important impact of liberalisation has been to reduce the cost of transporting 
m|aize from surplus to deficit areas as transport loads increases and administrative barriers 
disappear (Kodhek et al, 1993). This is expected to reduce marketing margins, raise returns to 
irjaize production, lower prices to consumers and result in greater market integration between 
producing and consuming areas. Sasaki (1995) reports that between 1992 and 1994, price 
differentials among trading regions narrowed and private transportation of maize increased 
substantially. 
I Liberalisation of maize markets has also implied adjustments in maize milling23. 
Mukumbu (1992) and Kodhek et al (1993) conclude that there has been an important impact as 
fa|r as maize milling is concerned. There has been adjustment towards a greater presence of 
small-scale urban and rural maize millers as opposed to the dominant large-scale miller prior to 
liberalisation. The large-scale millers have also broadened their activities in an effort to 
increase their capacity utilisation. Jayne et al (1997) further indicates that the liberalisation of 
m|aize meal markets have conferred substantial benefits to consumers in Nairobi. The study 
estimated that maize market reforms have led to a 31% decrease in real maize meal prices paid 
by households in Nairobi. Forty percent of the decline was attributed to decline in milling 
margins while the other 60% was due to lower maize grain prices. However, a comprehensive 
analysis of the overall effects of maize market reforms on the welfare of producers and 
consumers in rural areas and other urban centres has not been undertaken so far. 
Nyoro (1995) for his part envisages that there will be large potential price swings due to 
limited increases in yield needed to lower production costs. Thus, maize producers are 
expected to face fluctuating incomes or resort to exerting pressure on the government to 
support the industry. Maize prices, the direction they have taken - and hence the incomes 
generated from maize production since liberalisation - is analysed in this study 
3.3.2 Liberalisation of the dairy industry 
Dairy farming is an important part of the agricultural production systems in Kenya. In 1997, it 
was estimated that the national dairy herd, consisting of over one million cows produced 240 
million litres of milk. (Waweru,1998; Republic of Kenya, 1998). Smallholder farmers produce 
80% of the country's milk and derive almost half of their incomes from livestock (Republic of 
Kenya, 1998). Smallholder dairy production is carried mainly in the highlands under zero 
grazing24 or semi-intensive production systems. Kenya is usually self-sufficient in milk except 
when there is drought. The major dairy products are whole milk, butter, cheese, gee, yoghurt 
and milk powder. 
Milk sold by smallholder farmers - about half of production - goes either directly to 
consumers or to dairy co-operative societies. These societies can sell milk on the local market 
or deliver it to Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC). KCC started as a private, producer-
controlled company in 1931. Over the years it has been the hub around which Kenya's dairy-
marketing systems have developed. In line with market reforms in other sectors of the 
economy, the government commissioned a dairy sector study in 1990 that recommended inter 
alia, that KCC be opened to competition. As a result the de-regulation of the industry was 
officially announced in early 1992 (Staal and Shapiro, 1994). This policy shift was a direct 
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reaction to the sorry state of affairs prevailing in the industry at the time. The country was 
facing declining milk production as a result of drought and KCC was having difficulties in 
paying farmers on time. Consequently co-operative societies were forced to delay payments to 
producers who, as a result, faced high risks and irregular cash flows. 
Although liberalisation applied only to sales of processed milk in urban areas, with raw 
milk sales still officially illegal, it was interpreted differently by milk producers, processors 
and traders (Staal, Delgado & Nicholson, 1997; Ngigi, 1995). To many, liberalisation was 
taken to mean that all manner of milk market transactions were permitted. Since 1992, there 
has been a rapid development of various milk market innovations mostly relating to raw milk. 
These include 'self-help groups' and individual traders who collect and market raw milk. 
Furthermore, dairy co-operatives, once an integral part of the formal KCC milk collection 
system are marketing a larger proportion of their raw milk directly to urban markets (Owango 
era/., 1996;Ngigi, 1995; Staal etal, 1997). 
Liberalisation of the dairy industry has also resulted in stiff competition in the 
processed milk markets. Some 60 new, private milk processing plants have been licensed to 
compete with KCC 2 5 . Half the new market entrants operating in June 1998 were estimated to 
have a market share of 40%. Thus, the reforms introduced so far have resulted in major 
institutional changes in the dairy industry. These changes have far-reaching implications for 
the pricing, transaction costs, resource allocation and efficiency of dairy production in the 
country. 
3.3.3 Performance and liberalisation of the coffee industry 
Background 
Since its introduction as a cash crop by missionaries in the 1900s, coffee has become one of 
Kenya's most important export crops. Prior to 1988, coffee was Kenya's top foreign exchange 
earner and currently it ranks fourth after tourism, tea and horticulture. Over 600,000 
smallholders are engaged in coffee production and currently hold a 58% share of the market 
(Table 3.3). The remaining 42% is produced on some 1300 estates. Coffee production has 
experienced several ups and downs over the years, most of which are closely related to world 
coffee prices and general economic conditions (Table 3.3). While the large farms have been 
able to maintain production at around 35,000 metric tonnes per annum, the smallholder 
farmers' production has declined by 61% in the last decade although the area under coffee has 
increased (Karanja, 1998; CRF, 1999). This decline has reduced smallholder farmer's share of 
total production from 70 percent in 1985 to 58 percent in 1999 (Table 3.3). 
2 3 The low milk intake volumes, financial mismanagement and political interference forced K C C to be 
eventually closed in 1999. It was later put under receivership and in 2000 it was re-organised and farmer asked 
to buy shares of a new company called K C C 2000. 
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Table 3.3 Coffee area, production and exports, 1985/86 to 1998/99 
Crop Area under Coffee production Yield Exports % share of total Smallholders % 
Year' coffee (MT of Clean Coffee) (Kg/Ha) (60kg bags) export revenue share of total 
(ha) Area Production 
Pre-liberulisation period 
1985/86 156,304 114,881 735 2,050,731 29.4 75 70 
1986/87 154,527 104,288 675 1,784,443 40.6 75 65 
1987/88 153,030 128,926 842 1,291,822 25.8 76 65 
1988/89 155,666 116,969 751 1,678,072 26.6 75 67 
1989/90 155,571 103,839 667 2,020,282 20.4 76 67 
1990/91 159,262 86,571 543 1,649,401 18.5 76 56 
Liberalisation period 
1991/92 158,262 89,494 565 1,339,081 14.0 76 58 
1992/93 158,723 75,207 474 1,411,908 14.3 76 56 
1993/94 161,032 73,516 457 1,459,785 15.6 76 54 
1994/95 161,032 95,806 595 1,325,306 16.1 76 65 
1995/96 162,410 97,576 601 1,895,485 14.4 75 58 
1996/97 162,470 67,997 419 1,389,327 14.6 75 56 
1997/98 162,000 55,042 339 805,965 17.0 75 56 
1998/99 162,500 68,100 419 1,193,017 10.4 75 58 
* Coffee crop year refer to the period from October to September 
Source: Coffee Board of Kenya & Kenya economic survey (various) 
Kenya has currently a market share of about 1.5% of the world coffee market with an 
average annual exports of about 1.5 million 60kg bags (Table 3.3). Kenyan coffee is of high 
quality and is mainly used for blending purposes. Over 95% of the coffee is exported and the 
European Union is a major buyer absorbing 70% of the exported crop. Major importers of 
Kenyan coffee are Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom and the Benelux States (Figure 3.3). 
All others 
15% 
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8% 
Other E U 
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7% 
Source: ICO coffee statistics (1998) 
Figure 3.3 Destinations of Kenya coffee exports in 1998 
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This section, unless otherwise stated, is based on Karanja (1998). 
Policy reforms26 
Since October 1992, a number of policy reforms have been made in the coffee industry in an 
attempt to improve farmers' incentives and their control of the industry's affairs. In late 1992, 
the CBK was mandated to conduct the Nairobi coffee auction in dollars. Gradually permission 
was given for coffee farmers to be paid in dollars and they were also allowed to retain dollars 
for their own use. These policies were intended to make it possible for farmers to benefit from 
currency gains and to allow them to participate in foreign exchange dominated trade. Due to 
the overvaluation of the Kenya Shilling prior in 1992, exporters of commodities like coffee had 
a heavy indirect tax. Ephanto (1993) estimated the overvaluation of the Kenya shilling in 1992 
resulted in coffee farmers and other agricultural exporters carrying an implicit tax burden of 
29%. The flotation of the exchange rate and subsequent depreciation has removed this implicit 
tax burden. The retention of foreign exchange by coffee farmers has also allowed them to 
access cheaper foreign currency dominated credit from local banks. Nevertheless, the 
fluctuations in the exchange rate has exposed farmers to price volatility. The smallholder 
farmers who market their coffee through co-operatives have benefited marginally from these 
reforms as most of them lack the necessary skills needed in the money markets. 
Another important policy change has been the introduction of an alternative, farmers' 
payment system. Although coffee farmers in Kenya have always received prices that are close 
to the export parity price (Swamy, 1994, Mosley, 1986), payment delays have been a major 
problem. The delays in payments arise from stock management problems and delays in the 
processing of proceeds along the marketing chain. Prior to 1993, coffee payments were pooled 
together by the CBK, which made several interim payments based on the averaged price for the 
season. A final payment was made after reconciliation of accounts. The pool payment system 
served the purpose of pooling price risks and maintaining as steady a flow of funds as sales 
realisation allowed. This system was reviewed in 1992, by allowing farmers to opt for a 
'direct'-payment system. In this system, farmers are paid the amount their coffee fetches at the 
weekly Nairobi coffee auction less statutory deductions. Thus, the system eliminated the 
pooling of funds. Currently, 80% of Kenyan coffee is paid through the direct payment system 
and 20% through the pool. The main advantage of the direct system is that farmers are paid 
much more quickly and good quality coffee that fetches high premiums also receives the 
weekly auction price rather than the yearly average price. To some extent this avoids the 
adverse selection problem inherent in the former pool payment system. Nevertheless, adverse 
selection continues to be a major issue in smallholder coffee-marketing channels as coffee 
pooling is still practised at the co-operative society level. It should be noted, however, that the 
direct payment system coupled with the deregulation of exchange rates might have exposed 
coffee farmers to higher price risks. 
Reforms have also been introduced into the coffee-milling sector with the licensing of 
more commercial millers. The coffee milling monopoly held by Kenya Planters Co-operative 
Union (KPCU) was dismantled in 1993 when four more commercial millers were licensed. 
This move has increased the installed coffee milling capacity in the country from around 
140,000 metric tonnes to around 230,000 metric tonnes (Karanja & Ndirangu, 1999). This 
increases in installed milling capacity against a background of declming production has 
resulted in an over-capacity of about 60% in 1998. This low capacity utilisation is expensive to 
maintain and is a major constraint to securing lower milling charges which was the original 
objective of liberalising milling. 
In an effort to enhance coffee production, major changes have been introduced into the 
way coffee planters are licensed. In 1996, the minimum acreage required for a farmer to be 
licensed as a coffee planter was reduced from 10 to 5 acres. This change has resulted in a 
doubling of the number of small estates (below 20 acres) from 630 in 1994 to over 1200 in 
1997. Thus, the co-operatives continue to loose a sizeable number of their well-to-do members 
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as these become licensed as planters. This has further lowered the capacity utilisation of those 
coffee-pulping factories owned by co-operatives while creating an increasingly important 
group of medium-sized coffee producers. 
Neither have coffee producer co-operatives been spared in the reform process. The 
government removed its tight control over the way co-operatives operate in June 1998 when 
titie new Co-operative Act was enacted. The government has retained a niinimal regulatory role 
iti the co-operatives while encouraging members of the societies to run them as economic units. 
The review of the Act and politicisation of the co-operative together with the new era of multi-
party democracy in the country, have resulted into splits of the co-operatives into smaller units. 
While these splits might bring decision making closer to the smallholder farmers, the newly 
formed societies have a weaker capital base and this hampers their ability to provide services 
such as farm inputs to their members. The likely effects of these smaller societies on 
smallholder welfare and marketing costs are not yet clear. 
3.3.4 Performance and reforms in the tea industry 
Performance 
Tpa was introduced in Kenya in 1903, but was not grown commercially until the 1920s. During 
the early years tea was grown exclusively on large-scale commercial estates. With the 
launching of the Swynnerton Plan in 1954, smallholder participation in tea production was 
iriitiated and later expanded after independence in 1963. Tea cultivation occurs on three types 
of farms: large private estates under the umbrella of Kenya Tea Growers Association (KTGA); 
smallholder farms under the supervision of Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA); and 
the newly established (1986) government-run-estates called 'Nyayo Tea Zones' concentrated 
o|i the fringes of major government forests. Tea is currently produced in 15 districts in Kenya 
aiid in 1999 occupied an estimated area of about 120,000 hectares. Smallholder farmers control 
86,700 hectares equivalent to 72% of the total area under tea in Kenya (Table 3.4). 
Kenya's tea production has expanded substantially since its introduction and 
particularly in the last decade. Tea is now the second largest foreign exchanger earner after 
tourism. Tea production rose from 18,000 metric tonnes in 1963 to over 260,000 metric tonnes 
i i i 1998 with smallholders producing about 60% of the total crop (Table 3.4). The smallholder 
sector consists of more than 240,000 individual growers and, supervised by the KTDA, it has 
been the driving force behind tea expansion in Kenya. 
Historically, Kenya has been the third largest exporter of black tea in the world, after 
India and Sri-Lanka. But this position has changed rapidly in the last decades. Kenya's share of 
the world tea market has more than doubled from 6% in 1971 to 15% in the 1990s while India 
apd Sri-Lanka share has declined to just over 15% each (PAM, 1995). 
60 Chapter 3 
production 
Year/ National National Yield Exports % Share of total Smallholders share (%) 
period area production (Ton/ (MT) export revenue of total: 
(Ha) (MT) Ha) 
Area Production 
Pre-liberalisation period 
1985 83,837 147,093 175 126,303 24.4 67 56 
1986 84,400 143,316 1.69 116,456 18.0 67 58 
1987 87,400 155,807 1.78 134,627 21.7 67 49 
1988 90,397 164,030 1.81 138,201 20.2 68 52 
1989 93,394 180,600 1.93 163,279 27.2 69 56 
1990 96,391 197,008 2.04 196,586 26.2 69 56 
1991 99,830 203,588 2.03 175,555 24.7 69 55 
Liberalisation period 
1992 102,000 188,072 1.84 166,518 27.8 69 54 
1993 104,860 211,168 2.01 188,435 24.1 70 53 
1994 105,910 209,422 1.97 174,926 20.2 70 57 
1995 111,320 244,525 2.20 217,937 18.9 71 57 
1996 113,680 257,161 2.26 262,146 19.9 71 56 
1997 117,747 220,722 1.87 199.224 21.0 72 59 
1998 118,650 294,165 2.50 263,771 28.8 72 60 
1999 120,430 248,700 2.06 245,710 28.6 72 62 
Source: Tea Board of Kenya reports & Statistical abstracts 
Policy reforms 
Problems with government policy interventions in the tea sub-sector started at the end of 1980s 
(MOA, 1991, Mukumbu, 1993). Major concerns were the efficiency of the marketing services 
(mainly processing and transport) provided to smallholder tea farmers by the KTDA, provision 
of road infrastructure by the government, and macro-economic policy issues relating to the 
regulation of foreign exchange. 
Reforms in the tea industry have primarily been concerned with giving greater 
autonomy to smallholder tea factories and encouraging a greater involvement by the private 
sector in the services provided by the KTDA. Unlike the coffee-marketing sector, there are no 
co-operatives for smallholder tea producers. They are organised around processing factories 
that are private, limited liability companies owned by KTDA, smallholder tea farmers and, in 
some cases, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). KTDA exercises 
considerable administrative and financial control over the other parties. It buys the green leaf, 
transports and sells it to the tea factories, provides management and accounting services to the 
factories, and markets 'made' tea on their behalf (Mukumbu, 1993). Thus, the smallholder tea 
sub-sector is a vertically integrated market through KTDA. This market arrangement has 
caused considerable acrimony in recent years. Of late, KTDA has relaxed its tight control to 
some extent and has made policy pronouncement to the effect that smallholder tea factories 
will be autonomous by 2000. It is, however, still unclear how the share holding of smallholder 
tea factories will be distributed. 
The KTDA has developed a payment system where smallholder tea growers receive a 
monthly payment per kilogram of green leaf delivered within the month (in 1999/2000 the rate 
was Ksh 6 per kg). A second payment (a bonus) is made at the end of the year. The bonus is 
directly related to the performance of the factory in terms of quality, prices of 'made' tea and 
profits. Tea auctions in Mombasa have been conducted in US Dollars since 1993. It is expected 
that farmers will be paid in the same currency, but this has not been possible for smallholders. 
KTDA converts the US Dollars into local currency and pays smallholder in Kenyan Shillings. 
Thus, smallholder tea farmers have not been able to benefit from currency gains as was 
originally intended. 
Table 3.4 Tea area, production, exports and share of smallholder farmers in area and 
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From the above, it is clear that unlike the coffee industry where there have been major 
changes both in policies and institutions, the smallholder tea industry has remained relatively 
untouched. The contrasting scenarios in which smallholder tea production has increased 
whereas smallholder coffee production has suffered a major decline is worth further analysis in 
order to determine the institutional, pricing and production factors that underlie these 
differences in performance. 
3.3.5 Performance and reforms in the horticultural industry 
Horticultural production and exports in Kenya began in the 1930s. Since then, horticultural 
industry has expanded significantly both in terms of production and exports especially in the 
mid 1960s. Horticulture occupies 11% of total arable land, ranking third after dairy and maize 
and beans, which are usually inter-cropped. (Dijkstra, 1997). 
Principal horticultural crops are vegetables, fruits and flowers (see Appendix 3.1). The 
commodities are used as staple foods (potatoes, bananas), complement staples (tomatoes, 
onions, kales) or grown for export (French beans, avocados, cut flowers and Asian vegetables). 
According to Horticultural Development Authority (HCDA, 1990), horticultural exports make 
up only 5% of the horticultural production in the country. The remaining 95% is destined for 
domestic consumption both in rural and urban areas. 
Most smallholder horticultural farmers focus on production for home consumption and 
fcr the domestic market as shown in Table 3.5. There is also a sizeable number of smallholder 
who engage in production of export horticultural crops such as French beans and Asian 
vegetables (Nyoro, 1995; Dijkstra, 1997). The smallholder horticultural production is mainly 
rain-fed and concentrated in the Kenyan highlands where coffee, tea, dairy and maize 
production is also found. Medium and large-scale commercial farms are engaged in production 
and export of horticultural crops mainly fruits, cut flowers and French beans. This is a 
vertically integrated market with producers engaged in production, processing, packaging and 
export (Nyoro, 1995). 
Table 3.5 Horticultural production by farm size 
Farm category 
Small scale Medium scale Large scale 
Export Market % of production 
Fruits 70 20 10 
Vegetables 80 15 5 
Cut flowers 10 30 60 
Domestic market 
Fruits 80 15 5 
Vegetables 90 7 3 
Cut flowers 70 20 10 
Processing 
Fruits 25 5 70 
Vegetables 80 15 5 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1996 
The horticultural export market has registered tremendous growth with the value of total 
horticultural exports increasing by 18.2 % per annum between 1985 and 1993 as shown in 
Table 3.6. However, export growth has slowed down in recent years mainly due to 
unfavourable domestic and international market conditions. 
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Table 3.6 Exports offresh horticultural produce from Kenya, 1985 to 1999 
Year Export Volume Value % of total 
(000 Tonnes) ( Ksh million) export revenue 
Pre-liberaUsation period 
1985 84.5 1,060 7.7 
1986 110.4 1,322 8.2 
1987 136.9 1,542 12.5 
1988 151.5 1,896 12.5 
1989 134.2 2,242 11.2 
1990 188.8 3,198 13.0 
1991 169.3 3,696 11.5 
Liberalisation period 
1992 152.6 4,176 12.2 
1993 150.8 6,442 10.8 
1994 65.2 4,936 9.9 
1995 71.7 6,400 11.4 
1996 84.8 7,700 11.9 
1997 84.2 9,000 12.0 
1998 78.4 14,937 13.0 
1999 80.0 17,641 15.4 
Source: HCDA & Statistical abstracts 
Smallholder horticultural production, which is the centre of interest in this study, has 
evolved over time from its subsistence-orientation activity to a major commercial one. 
According to Dijkstra, (1997) horticulture production has become a major source of cash 
revenues in smallholder farms. Horticultural production is also viewed as a means through 
which smallholder farmers can diversify their production from the traditional export crops such 
as tea, coffee and cotton. 
Unlike the traditional export crops such as tea and coffee, horticultural development has 
been based on active participation of the private sector with minimum government intervention 
(Nyoro, 1995; Kodhek, 1993). Thus, market reforms implemented under SAPs, except for 
foreign exchange and export trade regulation, have been minimal in the horticultural industry. 
It is therefore interesting to compare the institutional arrangements, production systems and 
their level of transaction costs, risks and efficiency of resource allocation across a privately run 
industry (horticultural) and the industries (coffee, tea, milk) where government control had 
been great. The lessons learned can be used to guide both the horticultural and the other sub-
sectors policy directions. 
3.4 Conclusions 
The review of agricultural policies and performance both in the era of government controls and 
during the liberalisation period reflects the central role of the agricultural sector in Kenya's 
economic development. In the pre-liberalisation period, the government is shown to have 
exercised major controls in production, marketing and pricing of most agricultural 
commodities. Equally, the government played a major role in factor markets mainly with 
regard to land and agricultural credit. Earlier attempts to liberalise agricultural markets in the 
1980s were shown to have failed due to various reasons. However, there has been a concerted 
effort in the 1990s to liberalise most of the agricultural commodity markets. The review 
indicates that institutional changes to go with the new policy environment seem to be still 
evolving. 
The review also leads us to the conclusion that, since Independence, economic and 
agricultural development in Kenya has been based on smallholder agriculture. Equally, as in 
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olher developing countries, agricultural export commodities remain the backbone of the 
economy accounting for a major share of national export earnings and the incomes of 
smallholder farmers. Indeed, three of the export commodities considered in this study, coffee, 
tea and horticultural crops accounted for over 54% of total export earnings in 1999. The mixed 
performance of the agricultural sector during the period under review indicates the need for 
consistent and effective policies and institutions for agricultural growth, in general and for 
smallholder agriculture in particular. The review also indicates that during the liberalisation 
period, smallholder agricultural production in the majority of the commodities considered was 
generally in decline despite the increases in supply response expected in such an environment. 
How smallholders farmers can capitalise on the reforms already undertaken to improve their 
pioduction, farm profitability, market participation and, therefore, their incomes and general 
welfare remains a challenge. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LIBERALISATION EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY AND 
INPUT PRICES 
1 Introduction 
This chapter documents the results obtained from analysing the effects of market liberalisation 
on the terms of trade in the agricultural sector in Kenya and the evolution and volatility of 
commodity prices. The analytical methodologies used have been documented in section 2.3.2. 
Tiis chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the results of an analysis of the 
effects of market reforms on the terms of agricultural trade in Kenya. Section 4.3 analyses the 
effects of market reforms on the level of prices for four agricultural commodities - coffee, tea, 
maize and milk - and major input prices. The study hypotheses that market liberalisation has 
benefited smallholder producers by increasing the terms of trade in agriculture and the real 
commodity prices paid to producers. Section 4.4 documents an evaluation of relative 
commodity prices. Due to the emphasis placed on the promotion of export commodities and the 
cerhral role these commodities' play in smallholder agriculture, the working hypothesis is that 
tbje relative price of these commodities has improved with market reforms as compared to those 
of^  food commodities. Section 4.5 contains an analysis of the trends in commodity price 
volatility and in section 4.6 the factors that affect both the mean and volatility of commodity 
prices in a liberalised economy are discussed. This study works with the hypothesis that market 
reforms in Kenya generally increased the conditional price variance (volatility) of agricultural 
commodities. The cost of coffee price volatility to smallholder farmers is estimated in Section 
4.7. In this section, simulations are used to evaluate the effect of various policy options on the 
costs associated with price volatility. The final section of this chapter concludes and draws 
inferences from the results. 
4.2 Effects of market reforms on agricultural terms of trade and input prices 
Tp assess the overall effects of market reforms on the terms of trade in the agricultural sector, 
the index of prices received by farmers is compared to the index of prices paid by farmers for 
inputs and rural consumer goods as shown in Table 4.1. The annual rate of increase for both 
a^icultural output and input prices as well as prices for rural consumer goods during the 
liberalisation period was in most cases higher than in the pre-liberalisation period (Table 4.1). 
As also shown in Table 4.1, the agricultural output price index increased at a higher rate 
than that of farm input and rural consumer goods prices during the reform period. This affected 
the wedge between output and input prices during liberalisation as indicated by O/I price ratio. 
In the years immediately proceeding or following liberalisation, the index of input prices 
surpassed that of output prices. Results in Table 4.1 show that the O/I ratio declined from 98 
points in 1988 to a low of 88 in 1996 before taking an upward turn in 1997. The decline in O/I 
ratio indicates that market reforms may have initially induced price changes that adversely 
affected the profitability of input use and farm gross margins. Nevertheless, this decline seems 
to have been reversed in the latter years of the reform period. 
66 Chapter 4 
The ratio of agricultural output prices to that of manufactured goods (as represented by 
rural consumer goods) also steadily declined from 1986 to 1996 with significant differences 
between the averages in the two periods (Table 4.1). As indicated in section 2.2, this ratio is 
taken to be a good indicator of the terms of trade in the agricultural sector (AgrToT). This 
result therefore indicates that the AgrToT declined during the initial liberalisation period 
(1992-1996). Moreover, the rate of decline in AgrToT accelerated with the onset of market 
reforms in 1990 (see Table 4.1). In 1997 the prices of two of the main export crops - tea and 
coffee - improved by 30% and 80.8% respectively, thereby having a positive impact on the 
index of agricultural output prices. The terms of trade also declined marginally in 1999 as 
shown in Table 4.1. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector terms of trade grew by an annual rate 
of 3.1% in the reform period as compared to an annual decline of 0.6% in the pre-reform 
period. 
Table 4.1 General trend in agricultural output and input prices in Kenya, 1985 to 1999 
Year/Period General Index of Index of purchased Index of rural Output to AgrToT 
Agricultural farm consumer Input (O/I) 
Output prices input prices goods price ratio 
Pre-liberalisation period 
1982 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1983 108.6 110.7 113.8 98.1 95.4 
1984 118.6 125.6 134.0 94.4 88.5 
1985 136.8 146.3 154.8 93.5 88.4 
1986 149.0 150.7 159.9 98.9 93.2 
1987 150.3 158.8 167.8 94.6 89.6 
1988 168.7 170.5 178.6 98.4 94.5 
1989 176.4 181.2 188.4 97.4 93.6 
1990 187.0 196.5 205.9 95.2 90.8 
1991 200.2 214.4 228.6 93.4 87.6 
Average (A) 149.6 155.5 163.7 96.4 92.2 
Average annual change 7.9 8.3 8.7 -0.3 -0.6 
Liberalisation period 
1992 236.2 263.9 284.8 89.5 82.9 
1993 324.2 442.3 430.3 73.3 75.3 
1994 380.7 438.6 565.5 86.8 67.3 
1995 442.7 505.3 572.2 87.6 77.4 
1996 460.7 523.7 632.3 87.9 72.9 
1997 568.7 565.4 650.4 100.6 87.4 
1998 676.0 630.0 683.6 107.3 98.9 
1999 642 610.0 727.3 105.2 88.3 
Average (B) 466.4*** 497,4*** 568.3*** 92.3 81.3*** 
Average annual change 15.2 10.5 11.8 4.4 3.1 
** Significant average differences (average A - B), at 10% level or below based on two-sample T test, 
Average A and B are the average average prices for the two periods, respectively. Average annual 
change derived from the slope of the exponential curve which had the best fit on the data - indicates the 
% increase/decrease for each period. 
Source: Kenya economic survey (various) 
For comparison purposes, the trends in O/l price ratio and AgrToT are juxtaposed on 
the trend in terms of trade for the whole economy as shown in Figure 4.1. The results show that 
O/I price ratio remained above the AgrToT for the entire period. This indicates that the price 
wedge between agricultural output and inputs remained narrower than that between output and 
rural consumer goods. As also shown in Figure 4.1, the terms of trade for the general economy 
declined at a higher rate than that of agriculture during the pre-liberalisation period. However, 
the liberalisation of the Kenyan economy in 1992 seems to have affected positively the export 
prices thereby dramatically increasing the overall terms of trade for the economy. The 
improvement in the agricultural sector terms of trade seems to have lagged behind that of the 
Liberalisation effects on agricultural commodity and input prices 67 
general economy. Equally, the AgrToT increased at a lower rate when compared to the TOT of 
th0 general economy. 
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Figure 4.1 Agricultural sector terms of trade (AgrToT), Agricultural output to input price 
ratio(OZl) as compared to Kenya's economy terms of trade (ToT), 1985 to 1999 
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The increases in both agricultural input and rural consumer price indices from 1992 can 
attributed to changes in price fundamentals particularly inflationary pressure and 
devaluation of Kenya shilling. Most traded inputs have a high import component that makes 
th^ir prices sensitive to exchange rate movements. After the deregulation of the exchange rate 
1993, the Kenya shilling fluctuated and by the end of 1998 had depreciated by 66% (Figure 
4.2). The depreciation of the Kenya shilling coupled with movements in other macro economic 
variables such as interest rates was passed on to farmers through high input and consumer 
prices. Apart from eroding the margin between output to input prices, the high input prices also 
may have compelled credit-constrained smallholder farmers to use less purchased inputs 
thereby depressing further their yields. 
68 Chapter 4 
1985 1986 1988 1990 1991 1993 1995 1996 1998 
Year 
Source : Central B a n k o f K e n y a statistical abstracts (various) 
Figure 4.2 Monthly exchange rate movements, Kenya shilling to the US Dollar, 1985 to 
1999 
Fertilisers are the major purchased non-factor input used by most smallholder farmers. 
During the liberalisation period, the nominal prices of fertilisers increased by 178% while the 
real prices 2 7 have been declining since 1993 as shown in Figure 4.3 and Appendix 4.1. The 
increase in prices peaked in 1993 when fertiliser market was liberalised and fertiliser price 
controls abolished . Fertiliser usage decreased during that year before taking an upward turn 
as from 1994. (Appendix 4.2). Nevertheless, fertiliser usage as shown in Appendix 4.2 may be 
deceptive in as far as fertiliser usage in smallholder farms is concerned. The bulk of the 
fertilisers recorded are used in the plantations with very limited use in smallholder farms. A 
declining trend is more evident in the usage of pesticides from an estimated 10,000 metric 
tonnes in 1986 to 6,500 tonnes in 1998. 
2 7 The Nairobi consumer price index (CPI) is used to deflate all nominal prices to arrive at real prices. 
2 8 Fertiliser subsidies were abolished in Kenya back in 1978. However, in 1979 the government introduced a 
system of import licensing for fertilisers and price controls. The price was determined by a formula that added a 
mark-up for internal handling, distribution and profit margin to the c.i.f. price. During this period, the 
government was also heavily involved in fertiliser import and distribution. Some of the fertilisers were secured 
as aid but sold in the local market to raise revenue. These measures created major distortions in the fertiliser 
market despite the removal of direct price subsidies in 1978. Thus, the total liberalisation of fertiliser markets 
in 1993 involved abolition of import quotas and price controls. 
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1986 =100. Source; Author compilation. 
Figure 4.3 Nominal and real fertiliser prices29 in Kenya 
Labour is the major factor input used by most smallholder farmers. Smallholder farmers 
hire-out or hire labour for farm activities such as land preparation, planting, weeding and 
harvesting. The government started liberalising the labour market in 1994 by initially adjusting 
the wage guidelines introduced in 1973. The guidelines now allow workers and employers 
greater freedom in wage negotiations based on productivity and inflation trends. Despite the 
hith unemployment rates in the country and rural areas in particular, the nominal agricultural 
wages30 have been steadily increasing in the last decade from Ksh 12 in 1985 to Ksh 120 in 
1999, an increase of about 900% (Appendix 4.1). Major wage increases occurred during the 
liberalisation period as shown in Figure 4.4. These negotiated wages have put most smallholder 
faimers at a disadvantage as they are expected to pay equivalent wages to the plantations 
despite the productivity gap between the two categories of farms. This has greatly increased 
production costs, thereby eroding farm incomes especially for labour deficit smallholder 
farmers. However, the reforms in the wage guidelines seems to have arrested the stagnant or 
declining trend in real wages which was dominant before 1994. (Figure 4.4). The trend in real 
wages after 1994 indicates that incomes from off-farm employment might have increased in 
reient years for labour surplus households that are able to secure employment. 
Based on a composite price of the most popular fertiliser brands in Kenya (CAN, DAP, UREA and N:P:K) 
which account for 88% of all fertilisers consumed in the country. 
•jThe agricultural wage refers to the casual worker wage rate negotiated by the Kenya Plantations Workers 
(KPAU), which is applicable to majority of plantation workers. As most smallholders' farmers compete 
plantations for the available labour during peak periods, they are compelled to pay similar rates as those 
;otiated by KPAU. The government minimum agricultural wages, which are generally very low, are in most 
cades ignored. 
Union i 
with 
negi 
70 Chapter 4 
o -I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 v o 
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
Year 
Nominal w age —a— Real Wage 
»1986=100 
Source: Author compilation 
Figure 4.4 Nominal and real agricultural wage per manday, 1985 to 1999 
4.3 Evolution of nominal and real commodity prices. 
Table 4.2 shows the evolution of real price indices for crops and livestock products marketed 
through marketing boards in Kenya during the reform and pre-reform period. A comparison of 
the price indices indicates that the average prices in the reform period across crop and livestock 
products categories - except for cereals - are lower than in the pre-reform period. This 
difference in average real prices is statistically significant between the two periods for 
temporary and permanent crops, for total crops, for livestock & products, and for the overall 
index total crops and livestock. However, the average annual changes in price indices show 
that the negative price trend during the pre-reform period turned positive during the reform 
period. 
The causes for the observed movements in real commodity prices are many and varied 
depending on each commodity's market conditions. Moreover, the composite price indices 
reported in Table 4.2 are highly aggregated thereby making it difficult to infer the actual causes 
in the observed differences in average prices, between the two periods. To overcome this 
aggregation problem, an analysis of the evolution of nominal and real prices of maize, milk, 
coffee and tea which are the center of interest in this study are undertaken and reported in 
Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.2. Real price index by agricultural commodity categories in Kenya, 1985 
to 1999* 
Cereals Temporary 
Crops 
Permanent 
Crops 
Total crops Livestock & 
products 
Total Crops 
& Livestock 
NCPi** 
pre-liberalisation period 
1985 170.78 146.23 153.99 154.41 126.35 148.67 94.1 
1986 171.20 148.50 181.60 180.00 134.80 170.80 100 
1987 163.78 137.14 128.38 130.20 137.04 131.57 109.6 
1988 157.78 141.73 128.93 129.67 123.39 131.87 122.7 
1989 146.07 139.46 113.30 123.00 132.99 118.22 136.1 
1990 140.44 137.77 87.77 104.78 112.40 110.07 175.8 
1991 138.97 119.70 85.55 99.76 99.95 101.94 211.7 
Average [A] 155.57 138.64 125.64 131.68 123.84 130.44 
Average annual change -3.95 -2.59 -11.25 -8.38 -3.84 -7.28 
Liberalisation period 
1992 154.68 113.17 80.24 97.78 107.83 99.77 256.6 
1993 156.83 97.27 105.80 113.09 85.89 106.81 374.3 
1994 170.11 135.71 99.10 107.96 85.59 102.78 478.8 
1995 153.51 133.57 94.80 101.18 91.91 105.92 498 
1996 170.05 119.06 83.99 103.83 72.55 98.31 542.9 
1997 161.73 109.79 127.05 135.72 84.36 123.81 592.7 
1998 167.93 122.30 126.56 132.89 76.82 121.84 647.9 
1999 169.70 116.00 88.87 106.63 70.39 99.49 684.5 
Average [B] 163.06 118.36 100.80 122.38 84.41 107.34 
Average difference 7.49 -20.28*** -24.84*** -19.30*** -39.42*** -23.10*** 
Average annual change 1.13 0.68 2.70 2.56 ^1.45 1.35 
Fcr NCPI, 1986=100, *Cereals include maize, wheat and other minor cereals, Temporary crops include 
sugarcane & pyrethrum, Permanent crops includes coffee, tea, sisal and other tree crops, Livestock & 
products includes live animals, beef, dairy produce, chicken, eggs and other livestock products. **NCPI 
- Nairobi Consumer Price Index used to deflate the crop indices.*** Significant differences between 
the averages [B - A] at 5% level based on two-sample T test Average annual change is derived from the 
sl0pe of the exponential curve which had the best fit on the data - indicates the % increase/decrease for 
each period. 
Source: Author compilation 
During the pre-liberalisation period both maize and milk producer prices were tightly 
regulated by the government. The pan-territorial prices of both commodities were fixed along 
aL the stages of the marketing chain. During this period, both milk and maize markets were 
characterised by mis-match of supply and demand that created shortages and a thriving black 
market. The prices offered in the black markets (un-official channels) were significantly higher 
than the regulated prices but no comprehensive documentation is available of such prices. 
When both these sub-sectors were liberalised in 1992, price determination was left to the forces 
of supply and demand. As shown in Table 4.3, the average nominal producer prices for both 
maize and milk were higher in the liberalisation period in comparison with the average prices 
in the pre-reform period. However, the real maize prices show an average annual decline in 
both pre- and post-reform periods. In fact, the rate of decline in real maize prices accelerated 
during the reform period as compared with the preceeding period. At the same time, the 
average real milk prices were higher in the liberalisation period as compared with the pre-
reform period, with the average annual change changing from negative to positive in the two 
periods under review. 
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Table 4.3 Nominal and real commodity producer prices in Kenya, 1985 to 1998 
Chapter 4 
-Nominal Prices —Real Prices-
(Ksh/kg/lt) (Ksh/kg/lt) 
Year/period Maize Milk Coffee Tea Maize Milk Coffee Tea 
Pre-liberalisation period 
1985 2.65 3.50 4.06 3.50 2.82 3.03 4.31 3.72 
1986 2.95 4.82 4.78 4.82 2.92 3.07 4.73 4.77 
1987 3.25 4.62 3.25 4.62 2.97 3.10 2.97 4.22 
1988 3.60 4.74 4.05 4.74 2.93 3.10 3.30 3.86 
1989 3.75 3.80 2.89 3.99 2.76 2.87 1.12 3.93 
1990 3.75 3.90 3.41 6.26 2.13 2.53 1.94 3.56 
1991 5.60 5.30 4.04 6.95 2.65 2.50 1.91 3.19 
Average[A] 3.65 4.38 3.78 4.98 2.74 2.88 2.89 3.89 
Average annual change 10.78 2.26 -2.84 9.08 -3.13 -3.65 -16.95 -3.91 
Liberalisation period 
1992 7.90 6.70 4.02 9.51 3.08 2.61 1.57 3.71 
1993 10.0 7.80 10.91 16.03 2.67 2.08 2.91 4.78 
1994 12.80 13.25 16.53 21.73 2.67 2.77 3.45 4.48 
1995 8.70 13.70 11.83 11.10 1.75 2.75 2.38 2.23 
1996 10.20 15.50 12.81 13.88 1.88 2.86 2.36 2.56 
1997 15.80 16.95 22.73 16.10 2.67 2.86 3.83 2.72 
1998 12.02 20.00 24.83 23.04 1.86 3.09 3.77 3.56 
Average [B] 11.06 13.41 14.80 15.91 2.37 2.71 2.89 3.43 
Average difference 7.4** 9.04** 11.02** 10.93*» -0.37 0.16 0.00 -0.45 
Average annual change 7.20 19.57 26.92 8.23 -6.44 4.29 10.57 -6.26 
For calculation of real prices,1986= 100 .** Significant difference between the averages (B-A) at 5% 
level and below (based on two-sample T test). Average annual change derived from the slope of the 
exponential curve which had the best fit on the data - indicates the % increase/decrease for each period. 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Whereas, maize and milk are produced mainly for domestic markets, tea and coffee are 
grown mainly for export. As such coffee and tea prices are determined by both international 
and domestic market conditions. During the period under review, coffee prices were regulated 
under the international Coffee Agreement from 1985 to July 1989 when the export quotas were 
suspended. Thereafter, coffee prices have been mainly determined by fundamental market 
factors of production (supply), consumption (demand) and stocks. In Kenya, the domestic 
producer prices are mainly influenced by exchange rate and marketing costs. The average 
nominal coffee producer price in the liberalisation period was 259% above the average price in 
the pre-liberalisation period. However, there is no significant difference in average real coffee 
producer prices between the two periods (Table 4.3). Nevertheless, during the reform period, 
coffee prices increased by an annual rate of 11% as compared to an annual decline of 17% 
during the pre-reform period. It is, however, worth noting that the decline in real coffee prices 
started in 1989 was mainly due to the conditions prevailing in the global coffee economy. It is, 
therefore, difficult at this stage to ascertain the effects of market reforms on real coffee prices. 
Tea producer prices also significantly increased in nominal terms, but declined in real terms 
both during the pre-liberalisation period and during the liberalisation period. In fact, as shown 
in Table 4.3, real tea prices registered the highest average annual decline during the reform 
period. 
The evolution of both nominal and real producer prices for the four commodities was in 
line with the general trend observed across the composite price indices reported in Table 4.2. 
The differences in average commodity prices between the two periods indicates that average 
real prices in the reform period are still lower than the average prices in the pre-reform period. 
However, the negative trend in the real prices of maize, milk, coffee and tea during the pre-
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4.4 Relative commodity prices 
Relative prices of the various commodities are analysed against the real prices of maize, 
fe-tiliser and agricultural wages as shown in Table 4.4. Maize is staple food of most Kenyans 
and is grown by all smallholder farmers. Furthermore, as food security is equated with the 
availability of maize, the price of maize can be an important reference against which the value 
of other commodities can be compared. The relative value of all three commodities increased 
during the liberalisation period by some 4 to 17 points (Table 4.4). Thus, the relative value of 
mWze declined during the liberalisation period. 
Table 4.4 Relative commodity prices (relative to real prices of maize, fertiliser and 
agricultural wage), 1985 to 1998 
Maize Fertilizer Wage 
year/period milk Tea coffee Maize milk Tea coffee Maize milk tea coffee 
pi e-liberalisatioii 
period 
1985 102.4 81.0 94.6 96.7 99.1 77.8 91.0 96.7 98.7 78.3 91.1 
1986 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1987 99.6 87.2 61.7 101.8 101.5 88.1 62.5 101.8 101.1 88.8 62.6 
1988 100.5 80.8 69.4 100.8 101.3 80.8 69.6 100.7 101.0 81.3 69.7 
1989 99.0 65.3 47.6 94.6 93.7 61.3 44.8 94.6 93.4 61.7 44.8 
1990 113.0 102.4 56.1 73.3 82.8 74.4 40.9 73.2 82.5 75.0 41.0 
1991 90.1 73.9 44.5 90.8 81.9 66.7 40.2 90.8 81.6 67.1 40.3 
Average [A] 100.7 84.4 67.7 94.0 94.4 78.4 64.1 94.0 94.1 79.0 64.2 
Lil eralization period 
1992 80.8 73.9 31.4 105.7 85.4 77.5 33.0 105.7 85.1 78.0 33.1 
1993 74.3 98.3 67.3 91.8 68.2 89.5 61.5 91.7 67.9 90.2 61.6 
1994 98.6 102.7 79.7 91.8 90.5 93.6 72.8 91.8 90.2 94.2 72.9 
1995 150.0 78.3 83.9 60.0 90.0 46.6 50.1 60.0 89.7 46.9 50.2 
1996 144.4 83.3 77.4 64.7 93.4 53.4 49.8 64.6 93.1 53.8 49.8 
1997 102.2 62.5 88.8 91.6 93.5 56.8 80.9 91.5 93.2 57.2 81.0 
1998 158.5 117.6 125.5 63.7 101.0 74.3 79.5 63.7 100.6 74.9 79.6 
Average [B] 115.5 88.1 79.1 81.3 88.8 70.2 61.1 81.3 88.6 70.8 61.2 
rAV &rage difference** 14.7 4.4 16.9 -13.5 -5.8 -10.4 -4.7 -13.5 -5.8 -10.4 ^1.7 
* 1986 =100 **The average difference refers to the difference between the averages A and B. 
SOurce: Author's compilation 
Comparison of the relative prices of the commodities in relation to the price of fertiliser 
shows erosion of the real value of all the commodities during the liberalisation period. The 
same trends are observed when comparison is made between the real producer prices of the 
various commodities and the real agricultural wages with tea and maize registering the highest 
level of value reduction. (Table 4.4). There were, however, notable differences in the 
magnitude of value lost among the commodities with maize producers being the main losers 
arid coffee producers loosing the least. The changes in relative prices could have had an impact 
oiji the competitiveness of the various commodities, which result into shifts in resource 
allocation at the household level. The results also indicate that the productivity of fertiliser and 
hired labour in production of the four commodities could have declined (assuming that the 
agronomic response of the crops to fertiliser and labour use has not significantly declined). 
reform period turned positive for milk and coffee in the reform period, whereas the trend for 
maize and tea remained negative. 
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These trends in relative prices are also in line with the declining output to input ratios as 
indicated in section 4.2. 
4.5 Volatility of commodity prices 
Using the trend adjusted coefficient of variation as documented in section 2.3.2, the real 
monthly producer prices for the four commodities are used to determine their instability index 
for the period 1985 to 1998. The results are shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. Index of instability of monthly producer prices, 1985 to 1998 
Maize Milk Coffee Tea 
Pre-liberalisation period Instability index 
(%) 
1985 1.2 4.5 3.8 1.1 
1986 1.8 3.8 8.3 0.8 
1987 1.2 3.8 8.4 1.1 
1988 1.8 4.1 7.1 2.7 
1989 3.3 3.9 9.2 3.4 
1990 4.2 5.2 7.1 4.2 
1991 6.0 3.7 6.0 4.6 
Average [A] 4.2 3.4 6.6 3.4 
Libéralisation Period 
1992 14.6 7.1 4.8 6.0 
1993 6.9 2.4 16.2 8.4 
1994 8.7 2.3 11.1 3.3 
1995 4.2 1.5 4.3 1.9 
1996 8.5 1.1 4.3 1.8 
1997 4.1 2.7 9.8 1.8 
1998 8.3 0.5 14.3 1.2 
Average [B] 7.9 2.5 9.3 3.5 
% Change in average* 88% -26% 41% 3% 
* % change between averages [A] and [B] 
Source: Author's compilation 
The pattern that emerges is a mixed one. Economic liberalisation is accompanied by 
higher degree of instability in the price of maize, coffee and tea price but lower instability in 
the price of milk. Maize prices snowed the highest increase in instability during the era of 
economic liberalisation. The tight government regulation on maize producer prices could 
account for the high stability of maize prices during the pre-reform period Market 
determination of maize prices coupled with the low and slow entry of private traders into the 
maize market are among the reasons for the high degree of instability evident in maize prices 
after liberalisation. The lack of a clear and consistent government policy in the initial years of 
maize market liberalisation lead to most potential, private maize traders shying away from the 
market. This may have affected the equilibration of supply and demand across surplus and 
deficit regions and might have lead to higher price instability. 
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By contrast, milk prices that were also regulated during the pre-reform period, showed 
the highest level of stability during the reform period. Indeed, the stability of milk prices 
irhproved during the liberalisation period (Table 4.5). This could be attributed to the entry of 
many small and large private milk traders who offered producers an almost uniform price per 
season. 
During the reform period instability in coffee prices increased significantly while tea 
producer prices remained stable. However, as Table 4.5 shows, the level of price instability for 
both commodities increased during liberalisation. The high level of coffee price instability was 
njainly due to fact that coffee producer prices were based on the prevailing international coffee 
pjice. These prices exhibited a high degree of instability particularly after the suspension of the 
price regulatory mechanisms under the International Coffee Agreement (ICO, 1997; UNCTAD, 
1995; Karanja, 1999). The volatility of the exchange rate also increased the volatility of 
producer coffee prices in Kenya shillings. The low volatility of tea producer prices is mainly 
tlje result of the current tea marketing system where smallholder farmers are paid a uniform 
price per kilogram of green leaves within a year with bonuses at the end of each year. This tea 
payment system has tended to shield smallholder farmers from international price and 
exchange rate volatility. 
These results indicate that policy changes in marketing and institutional arrangements 
during the liberalisation period have increased the volatility of a number of agricultural 
commodities. Results also indicate that there are major differences in the levels of price 
volatility among the different commodities. This can be attributed to international and local 
rriarketing conditions in each commodity system. 
6 Liberalisation effects on commodity producer prices -the ARCH-M model estimates 
As noted earlier, the index of price instability does not statistically determine the contribution 
of the various factors that might be responsible for price instability. To overcome this 
shortcoming the ARCH-M model as specified in section 2.3.2 (Appendix 2.1 gives more 
details on specification and data) is applied to the data. The results of this analysis are the 
subject of this section. The results of the diagnosis of the model's suitability are reported first, 
followed by results on the application of the model in determination of the factors that 
influence both the level of average and volatility of producer prices. 
4-6.1 Diagnosis of the model 
Based on the LaGrange multiplier test statistic, the null hypothesis of homoskedastic 
conditional variance is rejected for both the ARCH(1,1) and ARCH(1,2) specifications as 
shown in the lower panel of Table 4.6. Secondly, the coefficients on the lagged variance term 
(risk term) in Table 4.6 are positive and statistically significant, thus showing the presence of 
hrteroskadasticity in error terms of the mean equation. This result that is repeated across two of 
the models justifies the use of the ARCH model. 
An inspection of the partial autocorrelation coefficients for each of the four price time 
series indicated that only the first-order autoregressive process is significantly different from 
zero as shown in Figure 4.5. This is further confirmed by the slope estimates of the first-order 
autogressive process as shown by the regression estimates of the lagged price variable (Pt-i) in 
the ARCH-M mean equations (Table 4.6). The result justified the use of the first-order lag 
process in the mean equations. 
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Figure 4.5 Partial Auto-correlation coefficients of the real commodity prices 
4.6.2 Factors determining the level of mean producer prices 
The ARCH-M regression estimates for the four mean equations are reported in Table 4.6. 
Except in a few cases, the ARCH estimates for the four commodities are robust in sign, 
magnitude and are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The negative estimation 
coefficients of the liberalisation dummy in the maize, coffee and tea mean equation model 
confirms the earlier results that indicated that during the period of market reforms, there was a 
decline in real producer prices. With these results the hypothesis set out in the introduction of 
this chapter is rejected i.e. market reforms increased real producer prices. Thus, the general 
assumption that market reforms increases the real prices received by agricultural producers is 
found not to be true for maize, coffee and tea producers in Kenya. It is only in the case of milk 
that this assumption is found to be true. 
This is a surprising particularly because internationally traded commodities such as 
coffee and tea, were expected to attract better terms of trade in a liberalised economic 
environment. The result also explains in a way the declining smallholder production levels of 
maize and coffee alluded to earlier in chapter two. The rising production of tea against a 
background of declining producer prices remains as matter of conjuncture. 
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Mean equation: Dependent variable is real commodity prices (Ksh/kg/lt) 
Independent Variable Maize Milk Coffee Tea 
Constant -0.138(0.205) 0.083(0.261) -53.08(46.90) -0.384(0.398) 
Lagged price (P,.t) 0.758(0.049)" 0.828(0.055)" 0.469(0.069)" 0.780(0.085)" 
Production 0.026(0.054) -0.019(0.038) - -
Trend (T) -0.049(0.067) 0.012(0.002)" -0.307(14.55) -4.163(0.002)" 
Liberalisation(Dummy (L) -0.042(0.132)" 0.092(0.031)" -0.062(0.014)" -0.028(0.016)c 
Season Dummy 0.022(0.03l)a -0.071(0.029)" - -
Sales(S) 0.089(0.035)" -0.002(0.02) 0.004(0.003) -0.078(0.038/ 
Imports -0.058(0.065) - - -
Real Exchange Rate(RER) 0.004(0.001)" 0.002(0.00l)b 0.334(0.055)" 0.007(0.005) 
Border Price (BP) - - 0.181(0.023)" 0.29(0.173/ 
ICA dummy (ICA) - - 0.304(0.145)" -
Risk term 0.560(0.32/ -0.849(0.189)" 0.264(0.205) 0.272(0.271) 
n 154 155 165 164. 
L-Likelihood -118.6 -60.2 -133.2 -124.8 
LMtest 164' no.? 202c 176= 
DWstatistic 1.59 1.94 1.67 1.94 
Note : Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis; 
level 
significance at 1% leve l , " - 5 % level a n d c - 10% 
Results in Table 4.6 also indicate that in all the four commodities, the lagged price (Pt.i) 
is a significant factor that influences the mean price. This indicates that the prevailing mean 
price during any one given period is highly dependent on the price prevailing in the preceding 
period. As such the prices of the four commodities do not follow a random walk. This result 
confirms earlier work by Deaton & Loroque (1992) who have indicated that most agricultural 
commodity prices tend to show high fist-order autocorrelation. An inspection of the lagged 
price coefficients in Table 4.6 further indicates that this coefficient is relatively low for coffee 
when compared to other commodities. This indicates that the mean coffee price is less 
predictable based on the price prevailing in the preceding period. 
The positive but non-significant production coefficient in the maize mean equation 
niodel may indicate that the decline in maize production for most of the 1990s did not have a 
positive effect as far as increasing producer prices were concerned. To even out supply, the 
NCPB, which prior to 1994 was the main buyer and seller of maize in the country, used and 
continues to use open market trade practices. These include export, import and the sale of its 
own maize stocks. These maize trading practices which can be expected to influence the 
determination and evolution of maize prices are analysed in the model by including NCPB 
sales and imports in the maize model. The importation of maize has been a major and 
controversial policy issue since the liberalisation of maize markets in 1994. Maize producers 
have continuously lobbied the government to limit maize imports by private traders and the 
NCPB arguing that imported maize is driving them out of business because of unfair price 
competition. In response to producer's pressure, the government has raised maize import duty 
as an anti-dumping measure on several occasions. The tax policy measure, therefore, seems to 
have little credibility given the non-significant effect of imports on producer prices in the mean 
equation maize model. However, the non-significance of the maize import variable could have 
arisen because private sector imports were not included and sometimes these have been more 
than NCPB imports in years following maize market liberalisation. Reliable time series on 
private sector imports were not readily available. Moreover, maize is imported mainly when 
prices are already high and in response to low production. This creates a simultaneity problem 
that could also explain the insignificance of the import variable. 
Table 4.6 ARCH - M estimates of real commodity prices 
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The volume of NCPB sales significantly affected maize price detenriination despite it 
diminishing role in the maize market after 1994. Our results may indicate that one of the aims 
of the grain sub-sector reforms which was to free price determination from government control 
and allow market forces to operate more freely, has not yet become a reality. The negative sign 
of the non-significant trend variable confirmed earlier results that indicated there was a decline 
in maize prices during the period under study. 
Among the four commodities analysed, it is only in the milk model where market 
reforms seems to have boosted producer prices. The stiff competition and multiplicity of 
marketing channels, which have evolved since the liberalisation of the dairy sub-sector in 
1992, have tended to keep milk prices very competitive while reducing transaction costs in 
fresh milk markets. These factors may explain the increase in real producer prices during the 
reform period amidst the decline in other commodity prices. The result is confirmed by earlier 
work by Staal et al (1998) who estimated that between 1990 and 1995 the unintended large 
increase in the role of unregulated raw milk market, inter alia, contributed to an increase of up 
to 50 per cent in real milk prices in the country. As milk production has been steadily 
increasing during the review period against a background of declining sales volumes in formal 
market channels, the production and sales coefficients capture these trends in milk price 
determination. 
Due to their seasonal nature, both maize and milk prices vary significantly during the 
course of a year and this is reflected in the significant season coefficients in their respective 
mean equation estimates. The sign of the season coefficient indicated that maize prices are 
depressed during the harvest season while milk prices are also lower during the rainy season. 
This seasonal variation in mean prices shows the need for inter-temporal supply management 
strategies such as storage. This is more relevant to maize than milk. 
From a theoretical point of view, the price determination of export commodities such as 
coffee and tea is expected to be influenced by international market factors such as commodity 
price agreements and border parity prices (BP) as well as factors that affect the domestic 
economy. According to Gilbert and Brunett (1998) and Gilbert (1996), the main benefit of the 
International Coffee Agreements (ICA) in the period 1962 to 1989 was that they raised 
producer prices relative to the levels that might have prevailed had these agreements not been 
made. Indeed, Gilbert and Brunett (1998) have estimated that the agreements may have raised 
coffee prices by as much as 50 or 60%. A dummy variable (ICA) for the period when the ICA 
was operative is positive and significant indicating that Kenyan coffee growers also benefited 
from about 30% higher prices during this period (see Table 4.6). Local producer coffee prices 
were also closely correlated to New York coffee future prices as shown by the border price 
(BP) coefficient estimate in Table 4.6. The estimate indicates that the mean coffee producer 
price increased by around 18% for every unit change in border parity price. This low level of 
co-integration between producer and BP price could have arisen due to distortions in the 
exchange rate during the pre-reform period. Differences in coffee quality standards between 
raw (producer level) and green (at market level) coffee could also account for low price co-
integration. 
Kenya has however a 'small nation status' as the country accounts for only 1.5% of 
global coffee exports. As such, the coffee sales volumes in the country have very limited 
impact on world coffee prices but can influence the local auction prices. The sales volume 
coefficient had an insignificant effect on coffee price determination. This result gives the 
indication that Kenya coffee sales volume and by inference production levels are highly 
unlikely to influence producer prices. As such some coffee production expansion can occur 
without adverse price effects. 
As far as the determination of international tea prices are concerned, Kenya is among 
the three biggest black tea exporters in the world accounting for about 17% of global trade. The 
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31 The London tea auction, which was the largest, was closed in August, 1998. 
Mombasa tea auctions is second only to the Colombo (Sri Lanka)31 auction in trade volumes. 
As such, sales volumes in Mombasa are expected to have a substantial effect on prices. This is 
confirmed by the negative and significant sales coefficient in the tea model (Table 4.6). Unlike 
coffee, expansion in tea supply (production) in Kenya can only occur with adverse effects on 
producer prices unless appropriate supply regulations are put into place. As in the coffee 
model, the border parity tea prices (BP) estimation coefficient in the tea model is positive and 
statistically different from zero thereby indicating that the pricing of tea is co-integrated with 
international market prices. The result further indicates that tea producer prices show a higher 
co-integration with BP price as compared to coffee prices. Furthermore, the co-efficient for BP 
can also be interpreted to indicate the share of border parity price received by the farmers. The 
results therefore indicates that tea farmers receive a higher percentage of the border price as 
cbmpared to coffee farmers. 
The real exchange rate has been shown elsewhere to have indirect effects on domestic 
prices through consumer and producer substitution effects and through its impact on the cost of 
imported intermediate inputs (Krueger et ah, 1988). The real exchange rate is therefore 
expected to be a key factor in price determination of both tradable and non-tradable goods and 
services. Coffee producer prices exhibited the highest and significant response to the real 
exchange rate that has been depreciating during the reform period. Only tea producer prices 
were not significantly affected by the movements in real exchange rate despite the high co-
integration of producer and international tea prices. The maize prices were also positively and 
significantly affected by the depreciation of the real exchange rate (Table 4.6). Due to its 
perishability and almost autarkic status, milk in Kenya has remained an internationally non-
tradable commodity with little or no external trade. Furthermore, animal feeds (mainly dairy 
meal and maize bran) which are the main input used in dairy production are also non-tradable. 
Thus, the real exchange rate has a low effect on determination of milk prices as confirmed by 
the low but significant coefficient of the real exchange rate in the milk mean equation. 
The ARCH-M risk term (premia) increased significantly for maize while it decreased for 
milk during the period reviewed. The risk term coefficient for coffee and tea is, however, not 
significant although it had the expected positive sign (Table 4.6) The short-term risk premia 
can be interpreted to indicate the necessary mark-up by an existing farm/firm to cover its price 
risks. These premia can be expected to be low during pre-reform period characterised by 
administered food prices. Thus, the significant increase in maize risk premia indicates that 
maize producers have to put a significant mark-up to their maize prices to cover for price risks. 
Furthermore, the significant premia indicate that in the long-run the general equilibrium 
s xucture of the maize markets may have increased investment and market participation costs to 
households. 
4.6.3 The ARCH-M estimates on commodity prices variability 
The ARCH-M estimates for the price variability of the four commodities are summarised in 
Table 4.7. The estimated liberalisation dummy variable coefficients for maize, coffee and tea 
are positive and statistically significant from zero. 
These results show that, when compared to the pre reform period, the conditional price 
variance (volatility) for these commodities increased during the years of market reform. 
Consequently, the hypothesis set out in the introduction to this chapter is generally supported 
i.e. market reforms increased the conditional price variance of agricultural commodities. Milk 
prices, however, show a lower volatility in the reform period. Furthermore, results indicate that 
the variance in maize, coffee and tea prices tends to persist over a longer period as shown by 
the significant lagged variance term in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 ARCH - M estimates of commodity price variance 
Variance equation: Dependent variable is conditional variance of commodity prices 
Independent Variable Maize Milk Coffee Tea 
Constant -0.028(0.176) -0.219(0.098/ -10.15(0.908) 0.527(0.616) 
Lagged Price(P,.l) 0.063(0.027/ 0.021(0.015) -0.829(19.23) 0.205(0.084)" 
Production -0.036(0.407) -0.253(0.159) - -
Trend (T) 0.021(0.054) 0.027(0.017) 0.014 (0.012) 0.032(0.021) 
Liberalisation Dummy (L) 0.219(0.057/ -0.021(0.017) 0.101(0.050/ 0.113(0.018/ 
Season Dummy 0.023(0.007/ 0.25(0.083/ - -
Sales(S) 0.018(0.033) 0.162(0.135) -0.172(0.146) 0.089(0.164) 
Imports -0.027(0.004/ - - -
RealExch. Rate (RER) -0.006(0.011) 0.017(0.05) 0.11(0.014) 0.995(0.50)" 
Border Parity Price (BP) - - 0.098(0.039/ 0.193(0.205) 
ICA Dummy(ICA) - - 0.336(0.038/ -
Lagged Variance (e,.]) 0.023(0.008/ 0.071(0.088) 0.302(0.077/ 0.019(0.009/ 
LMtest 24c 18° 38° 8.74" 
DW statistic 1.72 2.02 1.95 2.01 
Note : Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis;a significance at 1% level,b - 5% level and °-10% 
level 
The lagged price, the season and the volumes of maize imports (Table 4.7) also 
significantly influenced the variance of maize producer prices. The significance of the lagged 
price indicates that maize price volatility exhibit a higher degree of autoregression that might 
be related to market conditions which are slow in establishing supply-demand equilibrium. 
This result identifies the need for improvements in maize markets to make them more 
responsive in correcting supply-demand equilibrium with a view of reducing the level of price 
volatility. As indicated earlier (section 4.6.2), the seasonal nature of maize production is also 
an important variable affecting the mean prices. This indicates that maize supply regulation 
mechanisms such as storage would be of considerable benefit to both producers and traders and 
would enable them not only to play a part in maize price determination, but also in managing 
risk associated with price fluctuations. Although the NCPB import volumes did not 
significantly affect the levels of maize producer prices, the results in Table 4.7 indicate that 
these imports played a crucial role in decreasing price variability. This may be due to the role 
imports play in correcting the supply-demand equilibrium in the domestic market. 
Apart from the liberalisation and the constant variable, only the season variable had a 
significant effect on price variability in the milk model. All other variables had the expected 
signs but are not significant. The result gave the indication that the volatility of milk prices in 
the country is weather induced with the volatility of prices increasing in the dry season. 
Apart from the significant effect of liberalisation, volatility of coffee prices is highly co-
integrated with the volatility of international coffee prices. This is as attested by the significant 
border parity price (BP) variable in the coffee model (Table 4.7). Thus, the observed volatility 
of coffee prices in the international markets (ICO, 1997; UNCTAD, 1995) also affects the 
volatility of coffee in Kenya. Equally, the variance of producer coffee prices in Kenya also 
significantly increased during the periods the price regulation mechanisms of ICA were not in 
place as indicated by the significant ICA dummy. In contrast, the variance of tea prices is not 
significantly influenced by the variation in international prices but is significantly affected by 
real exchange rate movements. These results indicate that the source of coffee price variability 
is more external unlike the variance in tea prices that is more determined by domestic factors. 
The volatility of tea prices in one given year, unlike that one of coffee prices, is significantly 
related to the prices prevailing in the preceding period as shown by the significant lagged price 
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(Pt-f) variable in the tea model. Thus, the volatility of tea prices has a higher degree of 
a^jtoregression. 
4-7 The cost of price volatility to smallholder farmers 
The results discussed above indicate that price volatility of maize, coffee and tea increased 
significantly during the reform period. In this section an attempt is made to estimate the cost of 
price volatility to smallholder farmers in the study region. Due to the reasons stated in section 
2.3.2.2, the cost of price volatility is only estimated for the coffee enterprise. Simulations are 
also done to determine the effects of various policy interventions on the cost of price volatility. 
$ix scenarios are evaluated for their effects on three categories of households. The households 
aire categorised according to their coffee income concentration. The coffee income 
concentration indicates the percentage of total household income derived from coffee 
enterprise in 1999. Figure 4.6 shows the coffee income concentration in the study area for the 
same period. Majority of the households in the study area are quite diversified with 50% of 
them deriving less than 30% of their income from coffee. For the purposes of this analysis, the 
households are categorised into low-, medium- and high-coffee income concentrations with 
mean income concentrations of 24%, 44% and 78%, respectively. The fist three clusters in 
Figure 4.6 represent the low income concentration group while the next two consecutive 
clusters represent the medium- and high-income concentration groups, respectively. The six 
scenarios and their basic assumptions are as shown in Table 4.8. 
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Figure 4.6 Household's coffee income concentration in Central Kenya region. 
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Table 4.8 Description and assumptions made for each scenario 
Scenario Basic assumptions 
I 
Base scenario 
Represent the current situation in coffee market in Kenya. It is assumed that smallholder 
farmers can only forecast about 50% of the price before the start of every season. This is 
based on results obtained from Table 4.6. Smallholder farmer's coefficient of relative risk 
aversion ( s ) is assumed to take a near extreme value of 2. 
II 
Improved price 
forecastability 
Represent policy environment where there is public investment in market information 
service that enhances coffee price forecastability. This improves, ceterus peribus, the coffee 
prices forecast from 50% in the base scenario to around 80%. The market information 
service is hoped to indicate the minimum price per season based on short and long term 
trends in international terminal markets. This scenario can also represent an environment 
where there are institutional arrangements that enable coffee farmers to use market price 
risk instruments (e.g. futures, options, warehouse receipts) that link local and international 
terminal markets. 
i n 
Lower smallholder 
risk aversion 
Represent a policy environment that enables smallholder farmers to better mitigate risk thus 
lower their risk aversion. This is envisaged to occur through development of rural credit 
(financial) markets. Quantitatively this is assumed to lower the smallholder farmer's 
coefficient of relative risk aversion from 2 to 1.5, all other factors constant. 
r v 
Lower price 
volatility 
This scenario represents an environment where there is international market invention that 
lowers coffee price volatility. This can occur through a negotiated international commodity 
agreement or through an effective producer cartel which maintains prices within an agreed 
price band, m the simulation this is expected to lower coffee price volatility from the current 
levels (CV equal to 12.5%) to the ones existing when international coffee agreement was in 
place ( C V of about 6 % ) . This is as earlier documented in this study. 
V 
Less household 
coffee income 
concentration 
This scenario represents a long-term policy shift that encourages income diversification. 
This is envisaged to reduce the household's coffee income concentration by 50% from the 
base scenario. 
r v 
Best case scenario 
Represents improvements of base case scenario through combination of policies in Scenario 
U t o V . 
Based on the assumptions made in Table 4.8, the estimated cost of price volatility for 
smallholder coffee farmers in the study area are as shown in Table 4.9. The costs in each 
scenario are broken down into three components as specified in equation (2.4) section 2.3.2.2. 
These are the standard risk aversion term, the Oi (1963) term and production-price covariance 
term. 
Table 4.9 indicates that the cost of price volatility (insurance premiums) to smallholder 
coffee farmers would vary from 0.09% to about 1% of their total income within the current 
prevailing situation (scenario I). This cost of price volatility is mainly related to farmers risk 
aversion, which overshadows the benefits they can derive from price response as postulated by 
Oi (1963). However, the Oi term is quite substantial for the highly specialised coffee farmers 
relative to their less specialised counterparts. 
The results in Table 4.9 also indicate improvement of price forecastability has a small 
marginal effect on the cost of price volatility. Due to enhancement in price forecastability, the 
Oi term increases by about 2lA times thereby reducing the cost of price volatility. Indeed, the 
highly specialised farmers would actually face higher costs of price volatility under this 
environment as compared to the current situation. This result can also indicate that due to auto-
correlation in mean prices, farmers are able to predict prices to a certain extent i.e. the general 
direction of prices is to some extent predicable. As indicated by Newbery, (1996), auto-
correlation of prices reduces the benefits that can be derived from market risk management 
instruments such as futures. Nevertheless, as the cost of price volatility increases quadratically 
with price forecastability, then increasing price forecastability even by a small margin can still 
remain worthwhile to producers. 
Policies geared towards lowering smallholder farmers risk aversion such as 
development of rural financial markets are also shown to reduce the cost of price volatility by a 
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around 23%. This reduction in cost occurs through major reduction of both farmers risk 
aversion as well as reducing the profits that can be derived from responding to price volatility. 
ITius, policies and institutional frameworks that reduce or enable farmers to pool and mitigate 
risks such as credit and availability of financial services can play a role in dampening the 
impact of price volatility. 
Lowering coffee price volatility significantly reduces the cost smallholder would incur. 
As results in Table 4.9 indicate, a 50% reduction of coffee price volatility can result into 70% 
reduction of the cost of insurance premiums. Indeed, among all the policies considered in this 
analysis, the reduction of coffee volatility yields the highest reduction to smallholder farmers 
costs. However, the possibility of an international institutional arrangement to stabilise coffee 
prices remains remote. 
The other option that can be used to mitigate volatility coffee price is the promotion of 
policies that stimulate household's income diversification. As the results of scenario V in Table 
4.9, show, a 50% reduction in coffee income concentration would result in a 73% reduction in 
cost of price volatility faced by smallholder farmers. Nevertheless, income diversification can 
only be promoted as a long-term goal as it requires major investments in alternative income 
sources for the rural households. 
The results of the best case scenario indicate that with a combination of appropriate 
domestic and international policies, the cost of coffee price volatility can be reduced 
significantly or eliminated altogether, in general terms the simulations carried out in this 
section may also indicate that the cost of price volatility will vary considerably between 
smallholder households depending on their income concentration, risk taking behaviour and the 
level of price volatility they face. 
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Table 4.9 The cost ofprice volatility (as % of total income) to smallholder coffee farmers in 
Central Kenya under various scenarios 
Household 
Category 
CD P O F C D p r2 e o p Risk 
aversion 
term 
Oi(1963) 
term 
Covariance 
term 
Cost 
of 
price 
volatility 
(%) 
% change 
hi cost 
from base 
case 
Scenario I: Base case 
Low 0.24 2 0.48 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.090 0.023 0.008 0.095 
Medium 0.42 2 0.84 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.276 0.069 0.004 0.275 
High 0.78 2 1.56 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.951 0.238 -0.029 0.917 
Scenario II: Improved price forecastability 
Low 0.24 2 0.48 0.8 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.090 0.058 0.004 0.088 7.88 
Medium 0.42 2 0.84 0.8 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.276 0.176 0.002 0.267 2.90 
High 0.78 2 1.56 0.8 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.951 0.608 -0.012 0.919 -0.20 
Scenario HI: Lower smallholder risk aversion 
Low 0.24 1.5 0.36 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.068 0.017 0.009 0.074 21.94 
Medium 0.42 1.5 1.17 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.207 0.052 0.009 0.212 23.92 
High 0.78 1.5 0.63 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.713 0.172 -0.008 0.698 23.01 
Scenario IV: Lower price volatility 
Low 0.24 2 0.48 0.5 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.021 0.005 0.007 0.022 76.96 
Medium 0.42 2 0.84 0.5 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.064 0.016 0.004 0.063 76.94 
High 0.78 2 1.56 0.5 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.219 0.055 -0.026 0.211 76.92 
Scenario V: Less household coffee income concentration 
Low 0.12 2 0.24 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.023 0.006 0.005 0.027 71.92 
Medium 0.21 2 0.42 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.069 0.017 0.007 0.074 73.95 
High 0.39 2 0.78 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.05 0.238 0.059 0.005 0.239 73.09 
Scenario VI: Best case scenario 
Low 0.12 1.5 0.18 0.8 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 95.96 
Medium 0.21 1.5 0.32 0.8 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.012 95.77 
High 0.39 1.5 0.59 0.8 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.041 0.026 0.005 0.04 95.65 
Notes : x is coffee income concentration^ is farmer's coefficient o f relative risk aversion, b is 
coefficient o f partial r isk aversion, r2 degree o f price forecastability, f is elasticity o f coffee supply 1985 
to 1999, t price variability measured as standard deviation o f price shocks , c is regress ion coefficient o f 
coffee production shocks to price shocks. A posit ive change from the b a s e case indicates a reduction in 
costs , while a negative change indicates an increase in c o s t 
Source : Authors compilation 
4.8 Conclusions 
Results from this study indicate that during the period subsequent to macro-economic and 
agricultural sector reforms in Kenya, the agricultural terms of trade firstly deteriorated and 
improved towards the latter years of the reform period under study. The deterioration of 
agricultural terms of trade is shown to mainly result from high prices of rural consumer goods 
attributable to high inflation rates, devaluation of the national currency and a general decline in 
macroeconomic performance. Thus, the general held view, and one of the stated objectives of 
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market reforms of enhancing the agricultural sector terms of trade, is found only to be partly 
true for the Kenyan situation. The initial deterioration of agriculture terms of trade could 
explain the continued slow and depressed growth of agricultural sector in Kenya. It is also 
\k)rth noting that the deterioration of agriculture terms of trade was occurring at a time when 
tjie private sector was being expected to invest in the sector after contraction of government 
services. 
J Analysis of the evolution of producer prices before and during reforms shows that uring the latter period, agricultural producers realized higher nominal prices for their 
cjommodities. The nominal prices were, however, eroded by inflationary pressure and the 
development of the real commodity prices gives a mixed picture. The average real tea and 
Braize prices were lower in the reform period, while the milk price was marginally higher, if 
compared with the average prices in the pre-reform period. The average real coffee price 
remained almost constant when a comparison was made between the two periods. The price 
trends during the reform period were also mixed with tea and maize prices declining while 
coffee and maize registered a positive annual growth. These results indicate that market 
reforms had a mixed effect on the real producer prices received by smallholder farmers. 
If qually, the wedge between output and input prices initially narrowed during the reform period 
as indicated by a declining output to input price ratio, but widened towards the end. This result 
indicates that the gross margins and hence profitability of most farm enterprises might have 
gone down during the reform period, to recover during the last three years of the analysis. 
Analysis of the relative prices indicates that there is a decline of the value of maize 
relative to the other commodities and major inputs. Although there is no clear-cut shift across 
the various commodity relative prices, there is however a notable loss of value of all 
commodities relative to the prices of fertilisers and labour. These changes in relative prices, if 
they remain unchecked, may cause shifts in usage of productivity enhancing inputs resulting 
into changes in resource allocation among the various agricultural commodities. 
Variability of agricultural producer prices is also shown to have increased during the 
period subsequent to the reforms. Volatility leads to uncertainty thereby affecting resource 
allocation among producers. Furthermore, as agricultural income forms a significant source of 
rural household incomes, the general increase in price volatility can translate to income 
instability. The low price response documented among smallholder farmers and their risk 
aversion implies that high price volatility induces costs that can reduce welfare. Theoretically, 
tie magnitude of the costs has been shown to vary depending on the producer's degree of risk 
aversion, product concentration (degree of specialisation), price volatility and price 
forecastability (Newbery & Stiglitz, 1981; Gilbert, 1998). Simulations undertaken in this 
chapter (section 4.6.4) indicate that the cost of coffee price volatility to smallholder farmers 
dan range from 0.09% to 1% of their total income. The results from the simulations also 
indicate that with an appropriate combination of domestic and international price risk 
management policies and institutions, the cost of coffee price volatility can be reduced 
significantly or eliminated altogether. Some of these policies and institutions cut across all 
commodities, while others, such as market based risk instruments, might be more applicable to 
international traded commodities such as coffee and tea. The significant seasonality effects in 
determining the mean and variance of maize producer prices also indicate that inter-temporal 
supply management strategies such as storage can be beneficial to both producers and traders. 
Results from this study also indicate that there is a non-significant effect of coffee sales 
volumes in Kenya on both the mean and variance of producer coffee prices. This indicates that 
some increases in sales volumes or production levels in the country are unlikely to adversely 
affect coffee prices. However, the sales volumes in Mombasa tea auctions are shown to 
significantly affect the mean and variance of tea prices. This result indicates that as tea 
production (hence tea sales volumes) increases in the country, producer tea prices are likely to 
decline. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SMALLHOLDER FARMERS' MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN A 
REFORMING ECONOMY 
5.1 Introduction 
As expounded earlier in the conceptual framework (section 2.2), the current study posits that 
institutions (both exchange and non-exchange) form the crucial linkage between the policy 
maker and agricultural producers. As such, it is vital that those institutions involved in the 
exchange process are effective. Not only do they exert a strategic influencing on the transaction 
costs that determine farmers' market participation, they also affect resource allocation decisions 
and production efficiency. The market reforms that have been introduced in Kenya can be 
sxpected to have a fundamental impact on the institutional arrangements in which smallholder 
producers undertake their trade and production decisions. The New Institutional Economics 
JNTE) approach has been widely applied in an attempt to analyse the effects of these 
institutional changes on the level of transaction costs and smallholder farmers market 
participation. According to Delgado (1998), the application of NIE concepts to smallholder 
agriculture in Africa has provided seminal breakthroughs in understanding how structural 
constraints operate to constrain market participation by farmers. It is with this in mind that the 
Current study undertakes an analysis of the institutional changes heralded by market reforms in 
prder to understand their effects on the level of transactions costs and thus on the efficiency of 
Smallholder farmers. 
This chapter describes the results obtained in the analysis of the institutional changes 
precipitated by market reforms and follows the analytical framework documented in section 
2.3.3. The results are categorised into four main areas. The institutional changes in the 
provision of agricultural production and marketing services to smallholder farmers are 
documented in section 5.2. They highlight the changes in the provision of extension, research, 
livestock services, market information and physical mfrastructure (roads). Sections 5.3 and 5.4 
document institutional changes in the factor markets (land, labour and credit) and the effects of 
market reforms on smallholder farmers market co-ordination and control over the five 
pommodity systems, respectively. The last but one section reports on the analysis of the 
changes in trade contacts and producer margins while the final section draws conclusions. 
5.2 Institutional changes in the provision of agricultural production and marketing 
services 
5.2.1 Agricultural extension, research and livestock services 
Public expenditure in agriculture 
Due to structural reforms, the government has reduced its involvement in provision of various 
agricultural production services, mainly in animal health. These services were supposed to 
have been taken over by farmer's organisations and the private sector. Consequently, the 
Eroportion of government expenditure in the agricultural sector has declined by half from an nnual average of 8% of total public expenditure during the pre-liberalisation period to an verage of 4% during the liberalisation period (Table 5.1). In real terms, the total public 
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expenditure in agriculture has also declined and stagnated during the liberalisation period as 
shown in Figure 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Public expenditure in agriculture sector as compared to total public expenditure in 
Kenya (million Ksh), 1984/85 to 1999/2000 
Year Agricultural Agricultural Total Total Public % Share of 
Recurrent Development Agricultural Expenditure Agriculture* 
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure 
Pre-reform period 
1984/85 1,808 780 2,588 30,420 8.5 
1985/86 1,244 1,552 2,796 32,568 8.5 
1986/87 2,454 1,994 4,448 41,262 10.7 
1987/88 3,362 1,354 2,716 43,978 6.1 
1988/89 6,200 1,832 8,032 62,038 12.9 
1989/90 1,654 1,422 3,076 63,120 4.8 
1990/91 772 804 1,576 56,314 2.8 
Mean** 2,299 1391 3,604 39,055 7.8 
Reform period 
1991/92 266 98 376 98,534 0.4 
1992/93 2,340 3,544 5,884 121,294 4.8 
1993/94 3,212 6,058 9,270 180,154 5.2 
1994/95 3,688 3,844 7,532 184,122 5.1 
1995/96 4,320 3,410 7,732 183,408 4.1 
1996/97 4,403 2,560 6,963 183,741 3.8 
1997/98 4,269 3,488 7,757 313,430 2.5 
1998/99 4,868 4,598 9,466 242,741 3.9 
1999/2000* * * 4,422 5,316 9,738 287,839 3.4 
Mean** 3,532 3,657 7,190 199,474 3.6 
* Share of agriculture to total public expenditure.** provisional figures. **Mean per period. 
Source: Economic surveys (various; 
As a result of the government's budget rationalisation program, agricultural 
development expenditure increased considerably in nominal terms during the reform period, 
surpassing in some years recurrent expenditure (see Table 5.1). Development expenditure 
appears erratic, a pattern that can be attributed to an over-reliance on donor funds32. Since 
1991, donor funding has not only been in decline but has also been unstable (see Appendix 
5.1). Declining levels of recurrent expenditure coupled with instability in development 
expenditure poses a major constraint to securing a sustainable, long-term strategy for 
agricultural development in Kenya. As the national agricultural development strategy in Kenya 
is centred on smallholder farming, and given the high dependency of smallholder farmers on 
services provided by the government, the results indicate that smallholder agriculture growth 
may have been severely hampered by these shifts in fiscal allocations. 
3 2 Gross Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) inflows to Kenya increased from an annual average of 
US$205 million (US$ 15 per capita) in the 1970s to over US$630 million (US$34 per capita) in the 1980s, and 
slightly over US$ 1 billion in 1990 - 1996 (US$ 40 per capita). At the peak in 1990-91, net ODA inflows were 
equivalent to 14% of GDP and approximately 45% of total government expenditure (O'Brian & Ryan, 1999). 
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Figure 5.1 Real total public expenditure (TPE) and total public agricultural sector expenditure 
(TAE) in Kenya, 1984/85 to 1999/2000 
A qualitative assessment of both access to and the quality of the various services 
offered to smallholder farmers in Kenya in the period 1982-1997, undertaken by Guatam 
(2000), confirms the results of the present study. As shown in Table 5.2, when farmers were 
asked to evaluate the changes that had occurred over the last 15 years, they identified 
improvements in both access to and the quality of private sector services. In contrast, access 
and quality of public sector services such as roads, health and extension were said to have 
deteriorated during the same period. As this timeframe corresponds with the pre- and post-
reform period, the assessment reported in Table 5.2 also indicates that most public sector 
services deteriorated during the reform period. 
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Table 5.2 Smallholder farmer's evaluation of both access and quality ofpublic and private 
service (1997 compared to 1982) 
% of total households 
Access Quality 
Service Better Worse No Don't Better Worse No Don't 
change Know change Know 
Private services 
Seed dealer 34.6 1.0 63.9 0.5 51.7 6.2 37.5 4.7 
Fertiliser-chemical store 31.5 1.0 66.4 1.0 48.7 3.7 40.2 7.4 
Output market 14.5 1.3 84.0 0.2 53.3 10.6 34.3 1.8 
Banking services 18.7 1.3 77.5 2.5 27.9 3.2 43.2 25.8 
Other credit sources 10.6 1.4 78.5 9.5 22.5 8.9 40.6 28.0 
Private health centre 62.0 0.6 34.8 2.6 54.2 4.9 26.7 14.2 
Veterinary services 51.7 0.7 32.5 15.1 42.1 5.1 30.3 22.6 
Public services 
Public health centre 23.7 1.9 74.3 0.2 30.8 48.2 20.2 0.9 
Telephone facility 48.6 2.2 48.0 0.3 30.4 8.9 46.4 14.4 
Piped water 33.7 18.0 59.4 3.8 11.9 20.4 46.7 21.0 
Tarmac road 14.7 1.9 83.1 0.3 26.1 30.2 40.7 2.8 
Dry season road access 6.5 3.3 90.0 0.2 22.9 50.3 26.5 0.4 
Public transport 7.6 1.2 91.2 0.0 41.3 17.9 40.8 0.0 
Public Veterinary services 17.2 2.4 77.3 3.1 16.0 27.3 42.8 13.9 
Extension services 16.6 3.8 75.0 4.6 11.4 39.4 32.9 16.4 
Note: The surveys in 1982 and 1997 on which these results are based, covered a total sample of about 
700 households in six out of the seven rural Kenya provinces. The services covered in the surveys were 
19 but those selected for their relevance to this study are 15. 
Source: Adopted from Gautam (2000), pl4. 
Agricultural extension 
Research and extension services continue to take the major share (about 70%) of agricultural 
expenditure. According to Gautum (2000) in 1996/97 extension alone accounted for 65% of 
Ministry of Agriculture's (MoA33) development expenditure. Extension also accounted for 
about 45% of the ministry's total expenditure and more than half of its staff. Despite the high 
expenditure on extension services, the effectiveness of the service in the study region has been 
poor. This is attested by the low percentage of farmers who reported to have acquired farming 
information from government sources and also the low farmer to extension staff contacts as 
shown in Table 5.3a. Among the sampled households, only 11% had acquired technical 
farming information from government extension staff in 1999. About 21% of the households 
acquired their farming information from neighbours and local traders in 1999 (Table 5.3a). 
During the same year, majority of farmers (66%) had no contact with government extension 
staff. Even those who had a contact, this was mainly once in a year (Table 5.3b). These results 
are confirmed by a World Bank report that evaluated the impact of government agricultural 
extension services in Kenya (Gautam, 2000). According to the report the public extension 
services have achieved very little despite the continued usage of the Training and Visit (T&V) 
extension system since 1982. Appendix 5.2 summarises some of the major conclusions from 
the World Bank evaluation report. 
3 3 Due to regular changes in the name of the ministry in-charge of agriculture, the name Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) is used throughout this study for consistency. 
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fable 5.3 Sources offarming information, farmers contact with government extension staff in 
Central Kenya region, 1999 
Sources of information % o f 
Farmers 
Farmer - Govt. Extension 
Contacts per year 
% of Farmers 
Government extension 11.4 none 67.5 
Other public sources 18.9 one 16.7 
Media 5.5 two 6.4 
Neighbours/traders 20.8 three 4.4 
No Access 43.6 >three 4.7 
Total 100 100 
n = 200 
)ther public sources include attendance to field days and training courses organised by co-operatives 
ad government parastatals. 
^ource: Household Survey, 1999/2000. 
I Agricultural extension services are also offered by government parastatals responsible 
for various commodities. The most notables in the study region were the Coffee Board of 
Kenya in coffee and Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) in tea. The government has 
already off-loaded all smallholder tea extension services to KTDA which offers these services 
at a fee. Plans are also underway to off-load smallholder coffee extension services to farmers 
organisations. Limited extension services are also offered by co-operative societies, church 
organisations, private firms and other NGO's within their narrow areas of operations. There is 
however lack of clear policy and legal framework that can be relied upon in establishing these 
services. There is also lack of a clear assessment on the private sector institutional capacities 
and their degree of willingness in the provision of these services that are essentially public 
goods. Furthermore, as indicated in section 4.2 the deterioration of agricultural sector terms of 
rade offers a major economic constraint towards attraction of private sector investments in the 
Rector. 
agricultural research 
agricultural research is carried out by the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), the 
:offee Research Foundation (CRF) and the Tea Research Foundation (TRF). KARI has 
responsibility for conducting agricultural research on all crops and livestock except coffee and 
tea. The institute is both government and donor funded. As shown in Appendix 5.3, research 
ppenditure by KARI has been increasing in nominal terms in the last ten years. In 1997/98, 
I's budget accounted for 16% of total public agricultural expenditure or 0.87% of total 
agricultural GDP, which was also equivalent to 0.4% of total public expenditure. This is as 
compared to 2.8 % of total public agricultural expenditure (0.57% of agriculture GDP) 
equivalent to 0.5% of total public expenditure in 1987/88 . This trend indicates that, the core 
W g e t for agricultural research as a proportion of agriculture GDP and total public expenditure 
has been declining over the last ten years. These levels of research funding are also well below 
the international set guidelines. The 1974 UN World Food conference had set research 
intensity34 target of 0.5% to be reached by 1985, while the World Bank had aimed to achieve 
%% intensity by 1990 (UN, 1974; World Bank, 1981). 
Coffee and tea research is undertaken by CRF and TRF, which are funded by farmers 
through a levy on all marketed coffee and tea. As also shown in Appendix 5.3, the research 
tiding for these two commodities have been increasing in nominal terms in the recent past, 
«ed at around 2% of the marketed commodity value. Thus, the research funding levels for 
t^ hese two commodities has been close to the World Bank targets (World Bank, 1981). 
lowever, the research funding for these commodities have tended to fluctuate from year to 
Agricultural Research Intensity (ARI) is measured as a ratio between expenditures on public-sector 
agricultural research to agricultural GDP (Pardey et o/,(eds.), 1991). 
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Livestock services 
Prior to 1993, the government was the sole provider of livestock services. These included 
veterinary and artificial insemination (A.I.) services and limited cattle dip services. Since then, 
most of these services have been fully or partially privatised. As shown in Figure 5.2, majority 
of the households in the study region obtained both A.I. and veterinary services from private 
providers. In 1999, the government provided livestock services to less than a third of the 
households while co-operatives played a minor role. In 1989, it was estimated that majority 
(65%) of smallholder households were using government A.I. services, while 20.3 % were 
using A.I. services from co-operatives (Karanja, 1990). The results therefore indicate that 
during the liberalisation period there has been a major shift from public sponsored livestock 
services towards private sector services. 
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Figure 5.2 Providers of artificial insemination and veterinary services in Central Kenya 
region 
Despite the low cost of services provided by the government, majority of the 
households interviewed expressed preference for the private and co-operative livestock 
services due to their reliability. The unreliability of government services may lead to higher 
transaction costs. Farmers might have to spend at least a day waiting for a government agent 
and, if the agent does not turn up, they face a host of implicit costs due, for example, to 
extended calving intervals with losses in milk production and possible animal deaths if animals 
are left unattended.35 These risk perceptions about government livestock services may explain 
the high reliance on private A.I. and veterinary services by farmers in the region. 
3 5 By 1989, the transaction costs (implicit costs) per dairy cow pregnancy was estimated to be at least 7 1 % 
higher for smallholder farmers using government AI services as compared to smallholder farmers using co-
operative A.I services (Karanja, 1990). 
year due to volatility and general decline of commodity prices in the world markets as well as 
local production trends. Through representation, coffee and tea farmers are involved in 
research identification and prioritisation process unlike the other commodity producers who are 
not necessarily consulted in setting the research agenda at KARL These research arrangements 
have been cited to create disparities in technology development in favour of tea and coffee. 
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5.2.2 Smallholder farmers access to information and physical infrastructure 
From a micro-economic point of view, access to relevant market information is an 
indispensable tool for an efficient marketing system as information facilitates rational decision 
making with regard to production, marketing and consumption. Information needs encompass 
pot only gathering of facts concerning available technology and prevailing prices but also of 
information necessary for screening business partners. Indeed, the need to acquire information 
in order to do business can be said as one of the most important components of transaction 
posts The households visited during the course of this study identified various sources of 
market information as shown in Figure 5.3. 
Non 
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Notes: Public refers to information acquired from government and co-operatives, media refers to 
both electronic and print media sources, private sources refers to information supplied by traders 
and neighbours, multiple refers to those farmers having access to more than one source of 
information while non refers to farmers having no access to market information. 
Source: Household survey 1999/2000 
Figure 5.3 Percentage of farmers using various sources of market information 
The major type of information sought by most households concerns prices with little 
conscious effort being made to get information necessary for screening business partners. Most 
(47%) household got their market information from private traders and neighbours. 
Government agents, co-operative societies, print and electronic media played a minor role as 
isources of market information (Figure 5.3). As expected most traders will only give market 
information that is obviously asymmetrical in their favour. Thus, the results indicated that most 
of the households are disadvantaged as many of their sources of market information are rated 
us asymmetrically and not in their favour. Enhancement of public sources of market 
information could, therefore, go a long way to correct this asymmetry. 
Access to physical mfrastructure especially roads can enable farm households to access 
markets as well as reduce transaction costs that are transport related. Forty-eight percent of 
households in the study region accessed their local markets via ungraded roads that are often 
mpassable during the rainy season. Only 28% of the households had access to an all weather 
^tarmac) road with another 23% having access via a graded road. Although the region could be 
said to have an advantage in terms of road accessibility when compared to other regions, the 
'ligh proportion of households relying on un-graded roads had a direct effect on transport costs 
md produce losses. For example, although the average distance to the nearest market for most 
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53 Institutional changes in the factor markets 
5.3.1 Provision of agricultural credit 
Various actors are involved in the rural financial markets (RFM) in Kenya and in the study 
region in particular. According to the broad definition of RFM given by Von Piscke et al 
(1983) and Moll (1989), these include both formal and informal financial intermediaries. The 
main formal financial institutions are commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs), government, co-operative societies and the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) 
which is a specialised farm-credit institution. Crop development institutions such as KTDA and 
CBK also give limited amounts of credit to farmers growing crops under their jurisdiction. 
Informal financial institutions such as professional moneylenders, farmers, and social and 
welfare groups are also active financial intermediaries in the research region. However, during 
the course of the study it was not possible to gather sufficient and comprehensive enough 
information to enable an analysis of the actual role of these informal financial intermediaries in 
the provision of credit. 
Commercial banks and NBFIs have a dominant role in mobilisation of deposits and 
provision of credit in Kenya and in the study area. By the end of 1998, Kenya had a total of 57 
operational commercial banks and 21 NBFIs as compared to 14 banks and 17 NBFIs in 1981 
and 23 banks and 52 NBFIs in 1986. This significant increase in absolute numbers of operators 
in the financial markets (mainly banks) has occurred during the liberalisation period mainly as 
result of most NBFIs converting into banks to meet Central Bank regulations. The existing 
banks and NBFIs have a wide branch network but their activities remain concentrated in urban 
centres. As shown in Table 5.4 the amount of credit advanced to the agricultural sector from 
commercial banks and NBFIs has been increasing in absolute terms over the years. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of credit advanced to agriculture from the banks and NBFIs as a 
percentage of their total advances has declined steadily from an average of 15% and 7.8% 
during pre-liberalisation period to about 11% and 5%, respectively, during the liberalisation 
period as shown in Table 5.4 
of the households visited is 4 kilometres, the cost of transporting a bag of produce is Ksh 60 
equivalent to Ksh 15 per kilometre. The poor state of roads is despite the fact that coffee and 
tea farmers who dominate the region pay a road cess of 1% of the value of these commodities 
to their respective local authorities. The cess is specifically meant for maintenance of rural 
access roads but this is rarely the case as the funds are diverted to other uses. 
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'able 5.4 Amount (Ksh billions) and proportion of agricultural credit advanced by 
commercial banks, NBFIs and the AFC, 1984/85 to 1998/99 
Year Agricultural Sector Credit from 
Banks NBFIs AFC Total credit 
Agricultural Sector Credit as % of 
Bank Credit NBFI Credit GDP 
pre-liberalisation period (Ksh Billions') 
1984/85 2.96 1.48 0.38 
1985/86 2.94 1.24 0.90 
1986/87 4.09 1.18 0.75 
1)987/88 4.71 1.35 0.63 
1988/89 6.03 1.53 0.34 
1989/90 6.01 2.24 0.34 
1990/91 7.19 2.49 0.38 
Mean 4.85 1.64 0.53 
Liberalisation period 
991/92 8.24 2.79 0.52 
992/93 9.57 2.39 0.69 
993/94 11.89 2.10 0.76 
994/95 14.48 1.96 0.50 
995/96 14.86 1.78 0.30 
996/97 17.96 1.09 0.25 
997/98 21.93 1.02 0.17 
998/99 23.43 
ean 15.29 1.88 0.46 
(%) 
4.82 
5.08 
6.02 
6.69 
7.90 
8.59 
10.06 
7.02 
11.49 
12.65 
14.75 
16.94 
16.94 
19.30 
23.12 
N/A 
16.45 
12.8 
10.0 
15.1 
16.2 
18.4 
16.2 
15.5 
14.9 
13.8 
13.5 
12.7 
11.0 
9.1 
8.8 
9.4 
1.0 
10.8 
12 .0 
9.6 
6.5 
6.4 
6.1 
7.1 
6.8 
7.8 
6.5 
4.4 
5.6 
5.6 
4.3 
3.9 
3.2 
5.0 
5.1 
4.2 
5.3 
5.1 
5.3 
5.1 
4.8 
4.9 
4.7 
4.1 
3.8 
3.7 
3.2 
3.3 
3.9 
3.8 
jouree: Complied from Central Bank of Kenya & AFC Statistical Bulletins (various) 
The higher level of bank and NBFIs lending to agriculture during the pre-reform period 
was mainly due to a government policy that had established an agricultural portfolio ceiling of 
17% of total credit. However, in most of the years this portfolio ceiling was not met as shown 
jn Table 5.4. Moreover, the repeal of this portfolio ceiling and the deregulation of interest rates 
in 1993 seem to have contributed to the shrinking of agricultural credit from the banks and 
NBFIs. On the overall, agricultural credit has declined from 5% of total GDP during the pre-
jiberalisation period to 3.8% during the liberalisation period (Table 5.4). Equally, the total 
advances to the agricultural sector in real terms also declined substantially during the 
liberalisation era as shown in Figure 5.4. This decline of agricultural sector lending is despite 
the sector's contributions to total GDP that run at an average of 27% since 1985. 
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Figure 5.4 Total credit (nominal and real terms) advanced to the agricultural sector in 
Kenya by Banks, NBFIs and the AFC, 1984/85 to 1998/99 
The Agricultural credit squeeze is even more severe to smallholder farmers who in the 
last fifteen years (1985 to 1998) have only been getting 21% of agricultural credit given by 
commercial banks as shown in Figure 5.5 Among, the sampled farmers, only a mere 1.5% had 
access to bank credit as shown in Table 5.5. The bank credit is secured by land titles. Stringent 
collateral requirements, high interest rates and the repayment conditions imposed by most 
banks are cited as the main factors why farm households in this region borrow very little from 
banks. Even where special credit arrangements tailored to smallholder commodities systems 
are channelled through banks, they have been found unsuitable for smallholder farmers mainly 
because of the set sizes of the minimum loan, unfavourable repayment conditions and the 
collateral requirements (Karanja & Ndirangu, 2000)36. This state of affairs upholds the view 
that rural agricultural households are generally outside the scope of commercial bank lending. 
Furthermore, the low level of land-secured loans in the study area may indicate that there is a 
weak relationship between land and credit markets. This result confirms earlier work done in 
this area and in other parts of Africa by Migot-Adholla et al (1993) and Pinckney and Kimuyu 
(1994). 
3 6 Such credit lines include, the small scale tea and coffee farmers loan scheme operated by the Kenya 
Commercial Bank, the Global Private Enterprise (GPE) loan program financed by the European Investment 
Bank and the OPEC fund for international development. For instance, the GPE loans are set at a niinimum of 
ECU 50,000 or Ksh. 4 million, which in most cases is outside the capacity of small and medium farmers in 
Kenya. 
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Figure 5.5 Percentage of commercial banks' agricultural credit advanced to different sub-
sectors of agriculture, 1985 to 1999 
Table 5.5 Sources of credit and percentage of smallholder farmers accessing credit in Central 
Kenya region 
Smallholder farmers Commercial farmers Average 
n = 120 n = 80 n = 200 
Producer & Marketing Co-operatives/companies 
Farmers growing coffee with input loans (%) 28.3 N/A* 17.1 
Milk producers with input loans (%) 8.3 7.2 7.8 
Farmers growing tea with input loans (%) 78 80 80 
Maize/beans producers with input loans (%) 7.5 3.6 5.6 
SACCOs 
Membership (% of farmers) 28.2 14.6 22.8 
Farmers with shares (%) 25.0 12.5 20.0 
Farmers with loans (%) 5.8 9.7 4.3 
Average value of shares (Ksh) 5,740 47,516 16,406 
Average size of loan (Ksh) 15,720 5,416 13,143 
Banks 
Farmers with loans (%) 1.6 1.2 1.5 
Average size of loan (Ksh) 15,000 200,000 61,250 
Self-help groups 
Membership (% of surveyed farmers) 34.6 19.5 28.1 
Average size of loan (Ksh) 345 12,312 3,645 
* Commercial farmers don't market their coffee through the co-operatives and are therefore not eligible 
loans from that source. 
Source : Household Survey, 1999/2000 
In an effort to improve farm household access to agricultural credit services, the 
government of Kenya started the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) in 1963 to provide 
agricultural development and production credit. Like most other specialised farm credit 
institutions in developing countries, the performance of AFC has been below expectations. The 
amounts of loans advanced by AFC have been dwindling over the years and especially after 
1994 as shown in Appendix 5.4. Furthermore, a scrutiny of the AFC loan portfolio indicates 
that small loans meant for smallholder farmers have been the most adversely affected by the 
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declining AFC lending as also shown in Appendix 5.4. AFC relies on government and donor 
supported credit lines that have not been forthcoming in the last couple of years. The 
corporation's lending policies that have tended to keep interest rates below the prevailing 
market rates37 coupled with undue political interference on its lending and loan repayment, 
have over the years been attributed to its poor performance. It is therefore safe to assume that 
the non-significant role of AFC as a financier of smallholder agriculture will continue and there 
is a high likelihood that this situation will deteriorate further as government disengages as a 
key player in financing the agricultural sector. 
The other formal sources of credit to smallholder farmers in the region are marketing 
and credit co-operatives and self-help groups as shown in Table 5.5. The milk and coffee 
marketing co-operatives are the most prominent while tea factories (companies) served tea 
farmers. Tea, coffee and milk producers, in that order, had the highest access to credit from 
their marketing companies or co-operatives (Table 5.5). A small percentage (5.6%) of food 
crop producers had access to input credit from co-operatives although the food crops are not 
marketed through this channel. 
The marketing co-operatives and tea factories give their credit in form of farm inputs 
such as fertilisers and pesticides. The credit is secured through crop collateralization, in a 
typical inter-linked contract. However, due to market reforms that have eroded the monopoly 
status of milk and to some extent coffee marketing co-operatives, most of these co-operatives 
are not keen to give input loans due to the high default rate witnessed since mid-1993. This 
high default rate is a clear manifestation of contract enforcement problems arising from market 
reforms. Furthermore, the splitting of co-operatives into smaller units that has taken place since 
1992 has eroded most societies' capital base required to secure credit for onward lending to 
their members. Even the tea factories reported some problems in loan repayment from farmers 
although at a lesser scale than the marketing co-operatives. The institutional changes in 
commodity marketing, therefore, seems to be jeopardising the confidence between parties 
involved thereby weakening the very fundamental requirement of any financial transaction. 
In an effort to meet the credit demand unfulfilled by other formal financial institutions, 
Savings and Credit Co-operatives Societies(SACCOs) have mushroomed in the country and in 
the study region. For instance in 1985 there were 1,350 SACCOs in Kenya that had increased 
to over 3,800 in 1998 (Republic of Kenya, 1999). The number of SACCOs in the study region 
has also increased from 150 in 1985 to around 220 by the end of 1998. Majority of these 
SACCOs (90%) are, however, urban based.The the rural SACCOs are mainly new institutions 
set up after 1992. Details on the rural SACCOs turnovers and loan portfolios are, however, not 
available. Nevertheless, during the course of the household surveys it was apparent that these 
organisations are yet to become important financial intermediaries in the study region.This is 
reflected by the small numbers of farmers who are members of SACCOs (Table 5.5). However, 
the potential of SACCOs as avenues for mobilising savings is clearly demonstrated by the 
share holding of the interviewed households that averaged Ksh 16,406. Equally, as shown in 
Table 5.5, the average loan size given to SACCO members is quite considerable, especially for 
smallholder farmers whose average loan size is about three times their share capital. 
As most SACCOs relay on members' savings in form of shares, their interest rates are 
far below the market rates. As of 1999, most SACCOs in the region were lending at an interest 
rate of 15% per annum as compared to 26% per annum charged by commercial banks. 
However, the SACCOs do not pay interest on deposits but only pay dividends - averaging 5% 
in 1999 - at the end of the year whenever surpluses do occur. The other advantage of SACCOs 
is that loans are issued on the strength of each member shares backed by a guaranteeship of at 
least three other peers. This guaranteeship creates peer pressure that minimises the rate of 
default. Furthermore, unlike the marketing co-operatives that give only input credit, the 
3 7 For instance, during the period 1993 to 1998, A F C lending rate was pegged at 20% p.a. against commercial 
banks rates of about 30% p.a. over the same period. 
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SACCOs have a wider range of financial products ranging from school fees loans to 
development loans. Some of the SACCOs have even gone further to offer pseudo-banking 
facilities including processing of salaries and front-office banking facilities. Their affiliation 
ajnd sharing of market and client information with marketing co-operatives and companies is 
another added advantage. However, most SACCOs in the study region derive between 50% to 
80% of their core business from coffee payments thus implying a very high degree of co-
integration with the sub-sector. This over-exposes most SACCOs to the price and general 
Performance risks emanating from the coffee sub-sector. These risks have escalated in the 
rpcent past thereby adversely affecting SACCO performance. 
Moreover, despite taking an increasingly bigger role in financial intermediation, the 
ACCOs operate within the co-operative legal framework, which curtails their business 
Í
'perational space as compared to other financial institutions that operate within the more 
beral company framework. As a result the development of SACCOs as significant rural 
nancial intermediaries is venerable to serious governance problems arising from the co-
operative's egalitarian democracy that encourage high moral hazard and free riding. This 
mainly manifests itself through the co-operative ideals that allows each member one vote 
regardless of the number of shares held. Thus, one's shareholding is not in any way related to 
t(ie control of SACCOs management, a situation that has allowed rent seekers to ascend to high 
n(ianagerial positions in these organisations. 
Í
Informal self-help groups also played a role as sources of credit as also shown in Table 
5. The majorities of the self-help groups are, however, loose organisations whose main 
ijective is identified as geared towards social security. This served to explain the limited 
edit-advancing role these groups played especially among the smallholder households, 
owever, the groups seemed to play a bigger role as financial intermediaries among the larger 
-jmmercial farmers. 
5.3.2 Land and labour markets 
ajority of smallholder farmers in the region has acquired their land through inheritance and 
|as individual freehold land titles that gives them perpetual land ownership (Table 5.6). The 
ers can therefore theoretically participate in land markets either through outright sales or 
through rentals. The land property rights in the region thus give the farmers incentives to use 
lpid efficiently and to invest in other long term land improvements. As land is a major resource 
constraint in the region, expectations are that a vibrant land market would prevail. However, 
the household survey data indicate that land markets are thin, as less than 12% (1.2% per year) 
of the sampled farmers had participated in land markets in the last ten years as shown in Table 
5.6. This result is in line with an earlier study covering one of the Central Kenya districts 
(vlurang'a) by Pinckney & Kimuyu (1991) that indicated that over the period 1963 to 1991, 
land purchases per annum was equivalent to 0.6% of total land owned. 
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Table 5.6 Features of land markets in Central Kenya region 
% of smallholder farmers % of Commercial Farmers * % of total 
n = 1 2 0 n = 80 sample 
n = 200 
Method of land acquisition 
Inheritance 78.3 31.1 60.2 
Purchase 10.4 40.0 23.0 
Other Means 11.3 23.8 16.8 
Ownership of freehold title 
With title 78.3 96.3 85.5 
Without title 22.6 3.7 14.5 
Participation in land markets 
(in the last 10 years) Total 
Buying Land 4.3 7.3 11.6 
Hiring land 9.4 0.5 9.9 
Leasing Land 3.9 0.6 4.5 
Average Land prices Ksh/acre Ksh/acre Ksh/acre 
Purchase 113,500 132,000 125,600 
Leasmg/hiring (rent) 1,350 7,000 2,400 
*Refers to coffee farmers who are non members of coffee co-operative who have their own coffee 
processing facilities 
Source: Household survey data 1999/2000 
The land value depended on location and quality of the land. The average land price is 
Ksh 125,600 per acre with no significant differences in prices between the two categories of 
farmers. Rental land markets also are present but to a limited extent with 10% of the farmers 
participating in this market as shown in Table 5.6. The smallholder farmers' participation in the 
rental land markets is relatively higher than that of commercial farmers. The severe land 
pressure among the smallholder farmers could be the reason for their higher participation in the 
rental land markets. Land rents per year are, however, five times more among the commercial 
farmers as compared to the smallholder farmers (Table 5.6). This could reflect differences in 
farm productivity across the two categories of farmers. A study done in 1987-88 in one of areas 
covered by the current survey had indicated that only 1.9% of smallholder households had 
rented land by then (Migot-Adholla et al, 1993). This gives the indication that there have been 
improvements in rental land markets in the region since that time. 
Cultural heritage considerations may also account to a certain extent the thin land 
markets in the region. Studies done elsewhere in Kenya (Okoth-Ogendo, 1980) indicate that 
although there is a weak land market in the country, the market is more severely restricted in 
former 'African reserves' -which include the study region - where the market operates mainly 
among members of the same ethnic group. However, most of these cultural heritage 
considerations are being discarded as more and more farm households engage in commercial 
agriculture. 
The current government policies and regulations on land transactions can also be major 
factors behind the thin land markets. Land transfers are mainly controlled by village elders and 
provincial administration through the district land boards. This makes land transfers a long 
bureaucratic process that is conducive for rent seekers leading to high transaction costs. This 
bureaucratic process is officially justified as a safeguard to the likely dispossession of poor 
peasants by their richer neighbours. 
Due to the high population density leading to a high labounland ratio in the region, the 
labour markets are quite vibrant. Table 5.7 gives the salient features of the labour markets in 
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the study region. The smallholder farmers had a labour: land ratio that is about four times that 
of the commercial farmers. Majority (84%) of households reported hiring labour at different 
periods of the year with most of the hired labour being used in coffee and tea harvesting. The 
percentage of the small farmers hiring labour is lower (73%) as compared to 100% of the larger 
farmers who hired labour (Table 5.7). More than a third of the households also employed 
permanent workers of which the larger farmers constituted the majority as shown in Table 5.7 
.About 39% of the households had resident members employed outside the farm, with the 
larger farmers participating more in these off-farm labour markets. This gave the indication 
that the majority of small farmers are mainly engaged in full-time farming activities. There is, 
however, suspicion that the small farmers tend to downplay off-farm engagements as most of 
them are involved in short time jobs which they did not regard highly. Furthermore, most of the 
off-farm engagements could have been undertaken by women and children and could have 
been unreported by the household heads who are mainly men. 
Table 5.7 Labour markets characteristics in Central Kenya region 
Smallholder farmers Commercial farmers Total sample 
n = 1 2 0 n = 80 n = 200 
Labounland ratio (MD/acre/yr)* 2,186(1,889) 545(462) 1,536(1697) 
Farmers hiring labour (%) 
72 100 84 
Farmers having permanent workers (%) 
13 65 34 
Household having members engaged in off-farm 
work (%) 32 53 39 
| Av. Period worked by hired labourers(hrs/day) 6.5(1.3) 6.4(1.3) 6.5(1.3) 
Wage per day (Ksh) 78.10(14.9) 79.50(12.7) 78.7(14) 
wage per Manday * * (Ksh) 97.0(13.9) 100.3(13.9) 98.4(13.9) 
Farmers offering inducements (%) 67.6 41.5 56 
* Total family labour avai lable for farm activities plus hired labour (permanent and casual) per year 
divided by farm size * * O n e manday = 8 working hours; Figures in parenthesis indicate the standard 
deviations 
Source: Household survey, 1999/2000 
There are no major differences as far as the length of the working day for hired labour 
| in both small and larger farms is concerned, with the average working day for hired labour 
being 6.5 hours. This is also the case for wages paid per day and its equivalent per manday 
(based on 8 hours per day) that averaged Ksh 78 and Ksh 98 respectively as shown in Table 
5.7. Despite the uniformity in wages across the two farm categories, a higher proportion (67%) 
of small farmers as compared to 40% of the larger farmers reported that they offer 
inducements, mainly in form of meals, to their hired labourers. On this account, the smaller 
farmers could be said to face higher wages than the larger farms. Like any other farming 
situation labour shortages are said to occur during the peak seasons mainly in times of coffee 
picking. 
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5.4 Changes in market co-ordination and control of commodity systems 
5.4.1 Coffee market 
Before the onset of liberalisation all aspects of coffee production and processing were strongly 
vertically co-ordinated by the Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK). The CBK and its agents used to 
co-ordinate coffee planting, uprooting as well as designating coffee-growing zones. Legal and 
adrninistrative provisions existed and still exist in the Coffee Act (Cap. 333 laws of Kenya38) to 
ensure smallholder farmers abide by these requirements. In order to avoid adverse selection 
problems related to coffee cherry quality, the co-operative societies had field management 
committees that ensured smallholder farmers followed the laid-down production 
recommendations. With the onset of liberalisation, this vertical co-ordination in production has 
ceased as the field management committees no longer operate. This has given smallholder 
farmers greater control of coffee production but has enhanced both moral hazards (related to 
poor and good quality coffee cherries being pooled together) and adverse selection (quality not 
related to payments) problems in coffee marketed in the co-operative channel. As such, 
smallholder farmers are no longer keen to improve cherry quality as there are no incentives to 
do so. 
To avoid the moral hazard problems in the co-operative marketing channel smallholder 
farmers in the study region and other areas have resulted to selling their coffee cherry to private 
traders thereby breaking the monopoly enjoyed by co-operative societies prior to liberalisation. 
Although this trade is considered illegal by CBK, it is reported to be rampant in the study 
region with 53% of the coffee growers either acknowledging to have participated in this 
parallel market or identifying active private coffee traders in their localities. As the private 
traders are not licensed, hence are operating outside the regulatory framework, their operations 
remain shrouded in secrecy but continue to undermine the vertical co-ordination of the coffee 
trade. 
Despite the emergence of private coffee traders, the co-operative societies remain the 
main channel through which smallholder farmers undertake primary processing (pulping) of 
their coffee cherries. Prior to 1992, the government, through the Ministry of Co-operative 
Development, had wide ranging powers over the day to day management of co-operative 
societies. Those powers were severely reduced through the revision of the Co-operative Act in 
1998. Since then farmers have been given over-riding powers to decide on the management of 
co-operative societies. In exercising these powers, the farmers have demanded the splitting of 
co-operative societies into smaller units and as a result the number of coffee co-operative 
societies has increased by 62% from 207 in 1990 to 335 in 1999. Mismanagement and poor 
governance structures (see appendix 5.5 for an example) may also have fuelled the splitting of 
co-operatives. Although the splits may have brought decision making closer to smallholder 
farmers, the newly formed societies have a weak capital base that is hampering their ability to 
provide services such as supply of farm inputs to their members. This has further eroded the 
vertical integration of co-operative societies and their member as farmers no longer rely on 
them for provision of production services and credit. 
As indicated earlier in chapter two, the coffee co-operative societies have been loosing 
a sizeable number of their well-to-do members who have been licensed to become small 
independent estates. This resulted from reduction of the threshold coffee acreage a farmer 
needs to be licensed as an estate from 10 acres to 5 acres as part of coffee industry 
liberalisation. The exodus of these more commercially-oriented farmers from the co-operatives 
has created excess processing capacity in the co-operative factories and an increase in 
processing costs. The high co-operative processing and overhead costs have in turn increased 
the role of private coffee cherry dealers as smallholder farmers try to avoid these high costs. 
3 8 A new Coffee Act which repeals most of the old provisions in the old Act was passed by parliament in 
December, 2001 and is expected to become effective in April 2002. 
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The secondary coffee processing stage (milling39) has also undergone changes that have 
affected the vertical co-ordination and control of the coffee marketing system. Prior to 1994 
there was only one coffee miller- a farmer owned organisation - with a market share of almost 
9$%. Since then, three other milling companies have been licensed, thereby increasing the total 
installed milling capacity to over 230,000 metric tonnes against a production of around 80,000 
rnetric tonnes. The licensing of more millers has reduced the vertical co-ordination of the 
coffee-marketing channel as the milling companies have tended to act independently based on 
their particular business interest. With the decline of the market share of the original farmer-
owned milling organisation, the smallholder farmers have also lost a great deal of control over 
the coffee milling business. The competition in milling has, however, not resulted into any 
significant reduction in milling tariffs as envisaged. 
After milling, coffee is offered in a central auction in Nairobi. The central coffee auction -
the only means of selling coffee in Kenya - has remained well co-ordinated after liberalisation. 
The CBK controls the sales volumes, reserve price as well as making the payments to both co-
operative and estate farmers. However, payments to the estate farmers are made directly into 
their bank accounts while those of smallholder farmers are passed-on to their respective co-
operatives for on-ward payments to individual smallholders. The CBK also licenses the brokers 
and other participants in the auction. Nevertheless, the export trade, that accounts for over 95% 
of Kenya's coffee disappearance lacks co-ordinated promotion. Coffee dealers - exporters and 
roasters- numbering 85 in 1999 undertake the export trade with CBK having little or no 
information on the final buyer of the Kenyan coffee. This has created a major gap in market co-
ordination as consumer preferences are not well linked with the production aspects. This means 
that smallholder farmers have weak control over the auctions, a venue that is supposed to bring 
together the producers and coffee exporters (Table 5.8). 
3 9 Coffee milling involves hulling (removal of parchment skin) and polishing of the coffee beans to end up with 
green (clean) coffee beans ready for marketing and roasting. The millers also perform the function of coffee 
grading based on the size, colour and density of coffee beans. 
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Table 5.8 Vertical co-ordination and farmers control of commodity markets before and during 
liberalisation 
Commodity Vertical co-ordination * Smallholders farmers control * * 
pre-liberalisation liberalisation pre-liberalisation liberalisation 
Coffee 
Coffee Export trade weak weak poor poor 
Central Auction strong strong weak weak 
Secondary processing strong poor weak poor 
Primary processing strong poor weak strong 
Smallholder production weak poor weak strong 
Overall strong weak weak weak 
Tea 
tea exports weak weak poor poor 
Auctions strong strong weak strong 
Management of factories strong weak weak weak 
Primary processing strong weak weak weak 
Leaf collection strong weak weak weak 
Smallholder production strong weak weak weak 
Overall strong weak weak weak 
Milk 
Milk & milk products sales strong poor weak strong 
Processing weak weak weak poor 
Milk collection strong weak weak strong 
Smallholder production weak poor weak strong 
Overall weak poor weak strong 
Horticultural crops 
Export sales weak weak poor poor 
local sales weak weak weak weak 
processing & Packaging weak weak poor poor 
Collection poor poor weak weak 
Smallholder production poor poor weak weak 
Overall weak weak weak weak 
Food crops (maize & Beans) strong poor strong strong 
* Refers to vertical co-ordination by the central authority either the government or a government 
agency. **control refers to smallholder farmer's control over various production ( horizontal control) 
and processing and marketing (vertical control). 
Source: Compiled by Author 
In general, liberalisation has severely reduced the vertical co-ordination of coffee 
production, processing and marketing as shown in the subjective rating in Table 5.8. This weak 
co-ordination has created poor linkage between the smallholder producers and the exporters, 
thereby leading to serious asymmetries in information flow. Most smallholder farmers 
confessed during the household survey that apart from knowing when their coffee is ripe for 
harvesting, they have no idea of when and how their coffee is offered in the market. They are 
even more unsure of when they will receive their coffee payments from co-operatives. This 
was given as the main reason as to why they prefer cash payments from private traders. As the 
central focus for any exchange process is information with regard to preferences, products as 
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well as exchange of property rights, the liberalised coffee marketing and exchange process has 
npt improved the flow of information. The weak smallholder farmers' control over the process 
aggravates the information asymmetry problems and their bargaining power. The weakening of 
smallholder marketing co-operatives in the advent of liberalisation coupled with lack of 
grassroots smallholder lobby groups have worsened the situation. 
5|4.2 Tea market 
The KTDA40 is the main provider of services to smallholder tea growers in Kenya while the 
KTB is the sub-sector regulator. KTDA provides field services, tea factory management and 
marketing services. Unlike coffee, tea processing and marketing is centred around tea factories 
which are private limited liability companies owned by KTDA, the smallholder farmers and 
financing agencies. Prior to liberalisation, KTDA exercised considerable administrative and 
financial control over other parties in management of tea factories thereby making tea 
collection, processing, transportation and marketing a strongly vertically co-ordinated system 
as shown in Table 5.8. KTDA also provides smallholder farmers with extension services and 
farm inputs as well as processing farmers payments, all which increases it's co-ordination in 
smallholder tea production. KTDA vertical-co-ordination is extended up the ladder to 
controlling tea market outlets either in Mombasa or London tea auctions as well as in domestic 
markets. 
Liberalisation has reduced the vertical co-ordination role played by KTDA by reducing 
its administrative and financial control roles. Currently, KTDA's role has been reduced to that 
of a management agent with tea factory companies gaining greater degree of autonomy. In the 
n;w institational arrangement, KTDA provides financial and administrative services to tea 
companies, in accordance to specific management agreements. KTDA together with tea factory 
companies still co-ordinate tea marketing as well as the provision of extension services and 
inputs. These institutional arrangements, although weak in comparison to the situation before 
liberalisation, are far better co-ordinated than in the coffee sub-sector. 
With regard to smallholder farmers' control, the new institational arrangements have 
given the farmers greater control in production and processing of their tea. At the production 
level, farmers have become more active through the formation of lobby groups to improve their 
bargaining power. In the study region, a group known as Kenya Union of Small Scale Tea 
Owners (KUSSTO) has been formed. Most farmers interviewed during the present study, were 
of the opinion that KUSSTO has been able to disclose to them information regarding market 
pices, the operational overheads of their tea factories and KTDA. Thus, the union has, to a 
certain extent, been able to bridge the information asymmetry that existed before liberalisation. 
A stockholders organisation known as Kenya Small scale Tea Growers Association (KSTGA) 
has also been formed to regulate tea cultivation, processing and marketing. To overcome delays 
in tea collection by KTDA and factory companies some farmers have also resulted to selling 
tea leaves to private factories or middlemen. The trade in tea leaves has increased in the recent 
past as it is seen as an alternative marketing window, especially for tea rejected by KTDA and 
tea factory managed buying centres. In this system, the farmers are paid cash-on-delivery 
without any other obligations. Despite the low prices paid to farmers, the cash-on-delivery 
system is said to ease the cash-flow constraint as well as reduce the transaction costs associated 
wlith tea leaves rejection at the KTDA/factory buying centres. 
Under the new institutional arrangements, the smallholder tea farmers are expected to 
buy the equity held by KTDA in tea processing companies. This move is expected to enhance 
farmer's control on tea processing companies as they are supposed to elect the Board of 
Directors to these companies. The companies are expected to vertically co-ordinate and gain 
4 0 The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) changed its name to Kenya Tea Development Agency 
(KTDA) in June 2000 after amendment of the Tea Act. 
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control of the upstream marketing functions on behalf of their shareholders. However, the 
ownership of KTDA was not quite clear during the study period. 
These institutional changes in the tea sub-sector seem therefore to have reduced KTDA's 
vertical co-ordination role while strengthening the smallholder tea farmer's control over the 
production and processing. Although the evidence at this stage is limited, there remain major 
issues of governance and management which farmers feel strongly about (see Appendix 5.6 for 
an example). The effects on these changes on smallholder tea sub-sector development in the 
study area and in Kenya are not yet clear, but there are high expectations that they will enhance 
tea production. 
5.4.3 Milk market co-ordination and control 
Unlike coffee and tea commodity systems, that had strong market co-ordination agencies 
before liberalisation, the milk commodity system was weakly co-ordinated even before the 
onset of liberalisation. The Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) has the mandate to regulate the milk 
commodity system. However, the KDB had vested most of its powers on its agent, the Kenya 
Co-operative Creameries (KCC). KCC mainly inter-linked with dairy co-operative societies as 
their main buyer of milk. The Co-operative in turn had direct co-ordination role in milk 
collection, quality control and supply of inputs to smallholder farmers. In addition KCC had a 
monopoly in milk processing and distribution. 
Since the liberalisation of the dairy sector in 1992, new institutional arrangements in 
milk collection, processing and marketing have emerged. At the level of rural markets, 
informal marketing channels dominate with most farmers preferring to sell their milk through 
these channels as shown in Figure 5.6. The dominant sales channels are neighbours, business 
establishments like hotels, private milk dealers and a number of self-help groups. The dairy co-
operatives that dominated in milk trade before liberalisation, are the least preferred milk-
marketing channel. Indeed, most farmers treat dairy co-operative societies as milk marketing 
channels of last resort. The main reason given for this high preference for informal channel is 
their higher and prompt payment systems that assured farmers of daily, weekly or monthly 
incomes. This contrasts sharply with co-operatives that take at least 45 days to pay farmers. 
Equally, the informal channels are preferred due to their ability to collect milk directly from the 
farms and their facilitation in collection of evening milk, which the co-operatives are unable to 
do. In a bid to entice farmers, the societies have started to offer artificial insemination services 
as well as limited veterinary services. The provision of these services is inter-linked with the 
milk supply. One dairy co-operative in the region has also ventured into milk processing to 
compete with the KCC and other milk processing plants that have been started since 1992. The 
private and co-operative processing plants procure their milk from farmer organisations or 
directly from farmers. There is therefore stiff competition at the farm level in milk trade with 
limited vertical co-ordination. 
Despite the multiplicity of milk marketing channels, only 49.6% of the total milk 
produced is marketed as shown in Figure 5.6. The rest is retained for domestic use and feeding 
calves while some goes to waste due to lack of appropriate milk storage facilities. Indeed, most 
households indicated that their major problem as far as milk production is concerned is the 
losses incurred due to milk spoilage especially the evening milk. 
Unlike the coffee and tea smallholder farmer, dairy farmers have taken strong control of 
various marketing activities. There is strong horizontal control in dairy farming as farmers' 
control the procurement of inputs, artificial insemination and veterinary services through 
organisations such as co-operatives, and self-help groups. The farmers have also taken control 
of milk collection through their organisations or through making their own transport 
arrangements. However, the farmers have weak control of milk processing due to the fact that 
the market share of KCC, which is a public organisation, has been declining. As indicated in 
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Fjgure 5.6 Smallholder farmers' milk marketing channels in Central Kenya. 
The atomistic production and marketing activities in the milk commodity system have, 
therefore, reduced the co-ordination hitherto played by KCC. The rural milk markets and to 
some extent the urban markets have witnessed major institutional changes that have enhanced 
the dairy farmers control as well as changing the contractual arrangement and transaction costs. 
The institutional changes may call for regulatory mechanisms to enforce quality standards as 
well as in enforcement of trade contracts. 
5J4.4 Horticultural crops markets co-ordination and control 
The horticultural crops commodity system has remained mainly a private sector oriented 
system with minimal government presence, even before the onset of liberalisation. As such the 
horticultural commodity system has weak vertical co-ordination. The HCDA, which is vested 
\yith regulatory powers with regard to horticultural crops, has mainly concentrated on licensing 
of exporters and trader as well as maintenance of horticultural trade data. The organisation has 
little to do with smallholder production and marketing although it is supposed to provide them 
with seeds and market information. 
Due to the weak vertical co-ordination offered by HCDA, some horticultural exporting 
companies have tried to co-ordinate their market activities with smallholder production through 
p revision of inputs such as seeds within a loose contract farming arrangement. However, due to 
stiff competition among the exporters and lack of binding contracts, the incidences of 
smallholder farmers taking such inputs and not delivering the produce are widespread. This has 
discouraged most companies from the contract farming arrangements. As such, most 
smallholder producers organise production without consulting prospective buyers, hoping that 
section 3.3, KCC has been of late been facing serious financial problems that forced the 
company to close for some time in 1999 before winding-up in 2000. Farmers who were 
shareholder of the original KCC thus lost total control of the co-operative. Despite the loss in 
fcjrmal market control, farmers have a strong control at the raw market retaining level as they 
sell most of their milk direct to consumers. 
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5.5 Trade contracts and producer margins 
This section documents the expected type of contractual arrangements at farm-gate level for the 
five commodities studied and the margins captured by smallholder farmers. The expected type 
of contractual arrangements is based on each commodity's characteristics, the frequency of 
transactions as well as asset specificity for each commodity. The expected contractual 
arrangements and producer margins are contrasted with those existing before and after 
liberalisation. 
5.5.1 Product characteristics, frequency of trade and contractual forms 
Table 5.9 provides a summary of the ratings for each product characteristics, frequency of trade 
and asset specificity for the five commodities under study. The five commodities produced by 
smallholder farmers in the region have various degrees of perishability with tea leaves and milk 
having a high level of perishability. Coffee cherries and French beans have a medium level of 
perishability as they can keep a fair quality for more than a week. Although ripe coffee cherries 
have to be picked at the right time, drying the cherries, which can later be sold as dry-
processed coffee commonly referred to as buni, can arrest the loss of quality. This is, however, 
not the case with milk and tea which have to the processed or sold within the same day 
otherwise the farmer will incur a 100% loss. Dry maize and beans are rated to have the lowest 
perishability as most farmers have basic storage facilities and technologies to enable them to 
preserve these products even to a period of 3 months. 
their produce will be bought when ready for harvest. This has led to a situation where 
horticultural crops are produced but not sold thereby increasing farmers' risks and transaction 
costs. The farmers are also not organised in either co-operatives or as self-help groups. Thus, 
various forms of middlemen who act as go-in-between the farmers, the exporters or the local 
market outlets, dominate horticultural production and marketing. These arrangements have lead 
to a situation where smallholder farmers have a poor to weak control over many aspects of 
horticultural commodity system (see Table 5.8). The weak vertical and control in the system 
also has created serious information asymmetries especially with regard to export trade and 
quality. These factors have created major constraints to the development and growth of 
smallholder horticultural production. 
5.4.5 Food crops markets co-ordination and control 
The study area is a food deficit region in the country. As such, most households rely on local 
markets for their food supplies. There is, therefore, little or no vertical co-ordination in the 
maize and beans markets (Table 5.8). The farmers also grow the food crops for then-
subsistence requirements and only participate in the markets during harvest period at times 
when they need to purchase or sell. No inputs are provided by any agency and the farmers have 
full control of the production and marketing process. In times of surplus, maize and beans are 
sold to local traders who then transport the produce to urban centres. According to the 
household survey, 75% of the households are market participants and they buy maize most of 
the time. Due to the decentralised trade of food cops in the region, the market participating 
households have to incur the cost of transport as well as search for suitable buyers. The 
markets are dominated by cash-on-delivery transaction contracts. The frequency of trade is 
high as most household buy maize and beans in small quantities whenever they are needed. 
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Commodity System Perishability Seasonality Frequency of 
Transaction 
Product 
Differentiation 
Asset 
specificity 
Coffee 
Tea* 
Milk 
Horticulture 
(French Beans) 
Food Crops 
(maize & Beans) 
Medium 
High 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Occasional 
Continuous 
Continuous 
Occasional 
Occasional 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
None 
Idiosyncratic 
(high) 
Idiosyncratic 
(high) 
idiosyncratic 
(medium) 
non-specific 
non-specific 
Notes: 
* T e a refers to tealeaves Perishability:- based on the period a commodity can be maintained at good quality under 
this prevailing storage and processing technologies; high - period less than 3 days, medium - 4 to 10 days, low-
more than 10 days. Seasonality:- high- product harvested with a period of one month, medium- product harvest 
period between 30 to 60 days, low-product harvest and trade period almost throughout the year. Frequency of 
Transaction:- based on Seasonality and the period smallholder farmers conduct trade transactions; occasional-
product traded mainly during or immediately after harvest, continuous- product traded almost through out the 
year. Product differentiation:- based on number of grades after primary processing; high- more than 5 grades, 
medium - 3 to 5 grades, low- less than 3 grades, none- no grading. Asset specificity- based on asset specificity 
index described in section 2.3.2 (Table 2.1). 
Source : compiled b y author 
Tea leaves and milk, which are high risk products as measured by their perishability 
also happen to have low level of seasonality as they are produced almost throughout the year. 
Tliis implies that these products require a continuous trade relationship as indicated by the 
frequency of trade rating (Table 5.9). However, the two commodities differ in their level of 
grading in the market. Made (processed) tea is differentiated into five grades at the auction 
leVel (BP1, PF1, PD, Dl, Fl) 4 1 with significant differences in prices. However, at the farm-gate 
level the farmer is paid an average price based on the weight of the tea leaves. This has been a 
major source of concern as it exposes farmers to adverse selection problems. Nevertheless, 
there is no known method of relating quality of tea leaves to the final product. Milk on the 
other hand is treated as a relatively homogenous product both at the consumer and at the farm 
level. Although there are minor differences in various brands of milk offered to consumers in 
tejrms of butterfat content, the farmers are only paid for their milk in terms of quantity alone. 
There is therefore less adverse selection problem in milk as compared to tea. 
The similarity in product characteristics between coffee and French beans in terms of 
perishability, seasonality and frequency of transaction do not however transcend to product 
differentiation. French beans are graded into standard and premium grades at the export level 
while farmers are paid an average price based on standard grade. There are minor differences 
inj the pricing system between these two grades. Coffee however is a highly differentiated 
product at the export level. 
Due to the need to maintain the high quality standard for which Kenya coffee renown 
wbrld-wide, coffee is graded into seven grades that are further placed into 10 classes42. The 
4 1 The grades are based on processed (black) tea physical and liquor characteristics. 
4 2 |The grades are AA, PB, B, AB , C, TT, and T while the classes are from 1 to 10. Grades AA, AB, PB and E 
an: the premium grades which mainly constitute coffee in the top classes of 1 to 4 while the rest of the grades 
fo:m the average quality commonly referred to as Fair Average Quality (FAQ) in coffee trade. FAQ coffee falls 
Table 5.9 Product characteristics and asset specificity of the five commodities 
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grading is based on bean size while the classification is based on cup quality (taste, acidity). As 
shown in Table 5.10, the growers of premium classes (1 to 3) are expected to be paid around 
20% and 60% higher price than those producing middle classes (3 to 6) and poor classes (7 to 
10), respectively. Despite this elaborate grading and classification system, the smallholder 
farmers are only paid an average price based on the quantity of coffee cherry. This is as 
compared to plantation farmers who are paid in accordance to quantity in each class. The 
smallholder mode of payment is necessitated by the fact that coffee cherries are pooled 
together at the co-operative society level with little regard for quality. The average price 
system used by co-operatives therefore encourages and perpetuates severe adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. Secondly, the high coffee differentiation and its high correlation 
with pricing indicates that the exchange of property rights is potentially more suited for 
vertically integrated channels rather than spot markets that do not take coffee differentiation 
and pricing patterns into account. 
Table 5.10 Coffee realisation per quality class and % differences in price in Kenya for 
Selected years 
Quality class 1993/94 1995/96 1998/99 
U S $ per K g of clean coffee 
Premium classes 
1 4.26 2.85 -
2 3.86 2.80 3.37 
3 3.72 2.70 3.09 
Mean (A) 3.95 2.78 3.23 
Medium classes 
4 3.52 2.65 2.78 
5 3.42 2.55 2.23 
6 3.06 2.10 1.74 
Mean (B) 3.33(15.7%) 2.42 (12.6%) 2.25 (30.3%) 
Poor classes 
7 2.76 1.70 1.32 
8 3.31 1.15 0.91 
9 2.06 0.80 0.60 
10 1.61 0.55 0.37 
Mean (C) 2.19 (44.5%) 1.05 (62.2%) 0.8 (75.2%) 
Figures in parenthesis indicate % mean difference from mean (A) 
Source: Coffee Board of Kenya market reports 
Among five commodities, coffee and tea have high asset specificity that is idiosyncratic 
mainly associated with investments at production, processing and marketing level. This is as 
compared to milk which has medium asset specificity while French beans and food crops are 
associated with low asset specificity (Figure 5.7). Due to their perennial nature, coffee and tea 
farmers have to invest substantial amounts in establishment of these crops. They also need to 
have shares in co-operative societies and tea processing factories that process their produce. 
Most co-operative societies and tea processing factories also own shares in secondary 
processing and marketing agencies that are held in trust for the smallholder farmers. These 
vertically integrated activities make coffee and tea farmers to have relatively higher asset 
specificity and idiosyncratic investments as compared to producers of other commodities. 
Figure 5.7 gives the estimated relative indications of the magnitude and the components of the 
asset specificity index (ASI) in each commodity system as defined in section 2.3.3. 
under classes 4 to 6 while classes 7 to 10 are considered as poor quality. Grading is based on bean size, colour 
and other physical characteristics of the bean. Classification is based on liquor attributes of taste, acidity and 
body of the liquor. 
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Coffee Tea MOk 
Commodity 
F/beans Food crops 
I Production Ï Processing • Marketing 
The ASI is based on an index of 60 points, 20 points each for production, processing and 
marketing. 
Source: Authors estimation based on factors in Table 2.1 (section 2.3.3 
Figure 5.7 Estimated asset specificity at production, processing and marketing stages across 
the commodity systems 
The expected types of contracts for each commodity system from a transaction costs 
perspective is shown in Table 5.11 Coffee and tea transactions are expected to be conducted 
vjdfhin long term vertically integrated type of contracts that minimises risks associated with 
their high and idiosyncratic asset specificity, product differentiation and perishability. These 
types of contracts are also expected to ensure continuity in trade relationships. Milk trade is 
expected to be conducted within long term contracts which might not necessarily be vertically 
integrated to cover for the risks associated with milk perishability and a medium level of asset 
specificity. The French beans and food crops seems ideally suited for short-term, relational 
contracts and even spot markets as they have low risk levels and occasional trading patterns. In 
most of the commodity systems, the contracts are also expected to be inter-linked to inputs and 
other services. 
These expectations in terms of contracts types have changed with market reforms 
despite little changes with regard to product characteristics, transaction frequently and asset 
specificity. Table 5.11 indicates the forms of contracts by which different commodities are 
transacted in the study region. The situation before reforms is compared to the post reform 
period. Major changes in types of contracts have been witnessed in coffee, tea and milk 
commodity systems. Food crops contracts have remained at the spot market level while the 
French beans contracts have been dominated by spot markets as was the case before 
liberalisation. 
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Table 5.11 Expected types of contracts as compared to existing trade contracts before and 
after market liberalisation 
Commodity Expected type of contract Pre-reform types of Post-reform types of contracts 
contracts 
Coffee • long-term vertically • long-term vertically • Long-term vertically 
integrated and inter- integrated and inter- integrated with few 
linked linked interlinkages [D] 
• Spot market 
Tea • long-term vertically • long-term -vertically • Long-term vertically 
integrated and inter- integrated and inter- integrated andinter-
linked linked lmked[D] 
• Spot market 
Milk • Long-term and inter- • Long-term vertically • Short-term with no 
linked integrated and inter- interlinkages [D] 
linked [D] • Spot market [D] 
• short-term • Long-term vertically 
• Transaction specific integrated with few 
mterlinkagesfM] 
Horticulture(French • Short-term • Short-term • Spot markets [D] 
beans) m Spot market • spot market • short-term contracts[M] 
m Transaction specific 
Food crops (maize and m Spot market • Spot markets • Spot market 
beans) 
[D] -dominant contract form; [M] minor contract form 
Source : Author compilation 
The emerging spot market contractual arrangement across all commodities, and 
especially in tea and coffee, may be a manifestation of the dissatisfaction the smallholder 
farmers have on the otherwise potentially more efficient vertically integrated mode of 
organising trade. The dissatisfaction originates primarily from the high transaction costs 
associated with the vertically integrated marketing system. Limited development in suitable 
rural financial markets to cater for consumption smoothing also compels most smallholder 
farmers to result to spot markets in their effort to ease their cash flow constraints. Furthermore, 
the information asymmetries that prevails in the vertically integrated markets have the double 
effects of making farmers believe that they are being exploited, while at the same time enabling 
traders in the spot market to capitalise on the situation. Equally, the decline in interlinkages of 
trade contracts with input supply have in some cases increased transaction costs to both the 
traders and the farmers by increasing the searching costs. Inter-linkages in product and input 
contracts may also provide significant economies of scope in monitoring of trade partners. 
These economies have also been severely eroded by the low preference of inter-linked 
contracts. Furthermore, the farmers have lost the principle benefit of interlinkage - access to 
seasonal credit- that was being offered by co-operatives. 
5.5.2 Smallholder farmers' share of consumer prices 
The smallholder farmers' share (margin) of the price paid by the consumers across the four 
commodities before and after reforms are shown in Table 5.12. Among the food crops, maize 
producers receive the highest share of the price paid by consumers. This may be due to the fact 
that the whole grain maize trade involves little or no processing. The maize producer share 
increased slightly after market reforms from 73% in 1985 to 75% in 1998, thereby indicating 
marginal gains in marketing efficiency. By contrast, the milk producer share that averaged 50% 
before market reforms, decreased to around 42% by 1998. As the milk prices used in arriving 
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s üected years 
Year M i l k * Maize Coffee T e a 
1985 52 73 46 58 
1990 50 73 58 84 
1993 43 72 64 73 
1996 44 76 67 70 
1998 4 2 75 63 69 
* Milk marketed through the co-operative channel 
Source : Compl ied by author 
Among the export crops, the producer margins have increased after the market reforms 
with the coffee producer margin increasing by ten percentage points (Table 5.12 and Appendix 
5 7). The same trend is repeated in tea with the producer margin increasing from 58% in 1985 
to an average of 72% after market reforms as shown in Table 5.12. The increase in tea and 
coffee producer margins could be attributed to the changes in taxation. Prior to 1989, coffee 
and tea exports used to attract an export duty, which in 1985 was around 12% of export value. 
The duty was replaced in 1992 by a presumptive income tax that was originally pegged at 5%, 
bat latter reduced to 2% in 1998. However, a further examination of the margins along coffee 
ahd tea marketing chains indicates that at the primary processing stage (dominated by coffee 
co-operatives and tea factories) the margins remain inordinately high43 averaging 24% as 
shown in Figure 5.8. This could explain in a way why farmers are shunning these formal 
marketing channels in favour of the informal channels. 
The trends in producer margins generally indicate that there have been marginal 
improvements during the reform period. Nevertheless, where such improvements have 
occurred they can be attributed to tax reform rather than reduction in transaction costs. Indeed 
niost of the commodity systems are steeped by high transaction costs in processing and 
distribution as the cases of milk, coffee and tea margins clearly illustrates. 
4 3 The government guidelines based on the various efficiency studies in the two sub-sectors indicates that 
processing and other overhead costs should not exceed 15%. 
aj: the producer share are those prevailing in the formal marketing channel dominated by KCC, 
the reduction in producer share can only indicate deterioration of the efficiency of formal 
marketing channel after market reforms. This observation could help to explain why most 
farmers shun the formal channel in preference of the informal channel that has a higher margin. 
Equally, the low and declining producer margin before and after reforms indicates that milk 
processing and distribution - which takes the bulk of the price paid by consumer - is steeped 
with high costs, and may be an indication of inefficiency. Furthermore, due to its perishable 
nature, milk markets are highly dependent on road mfrastructure, which as indicated earlier, 
has deteriorated in recent years. This may have increased transport costs which eventually 
increases the price wedge between consumers and producers. 
Table 5.12 Producer share as a percentage of consumer or f.o.b. price across commodities for 
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Coffee 
Marketing 
tea 
Source: Complied by Author 
Figure 5.8 Distribution of coffee and tea trade margins among different agents, 1998 
5.6 Conclusions 
Through the use of the NIE approach and the exchange configurations analytical framework, 
the present study evaluates the characteristics of commodities traded, the actors involved and 
the institutional environment in which smallholder produce and exchange their goods and 
services. Results in this chapter show that during the market reform period, there have been 
major institutional changes in the environment in which smallholder farmers undertake their 
production and marketing activities. The decline in levels and share of public agricultural 
expenditure in Kenya has limited smallholder farmer access to agricultural production services 
especially in areas of technology development and its dissemination. The poor delivery of 
agricultural extension services in the study region especially by the government, therefore, 
means that smallholder farmers in the region have limited access to new production 
technologies. The on-going government rationalisation and down-sizing of Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA) extension staff will also mean that farmers and their organisations will not 
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only incur higher extension costs but will also have to brace themselves for new institutional 
aiTangements in agricultural information delivery. The anticipated private participation in the 
provision of these services seems not to have occurred. However, the study results indicate that 
the privatisation of livestock services (veterinary and artificial insemination), which have a 
lOwer level of public good component, has attracted a higher private sector participation. 
The study also concludes that smallholder farmers in the study region had not only poor 
access to market information, but also that the available information is asymmetrical. As the 
degree of bounded rationality depend, inter alia, on levels of education and availability of 
rharket information, the indications are that smallholder farmers in the study region are bound 
to be disadvantaged in their production and marketing decisions by the prevailing information 
asymmetries. Furthermore, the prevailing information asymmetries can lead to development of 
opportunistic trading practices that can retard smallholder agricultural development. The study 
also showed that the farmers are not well served with access roads, a factor that increased their 
transport and information costs. 
The factor markets are also shown to be in various stages of development and may in 
most cases impede smallholder agricultural development. Market reforms are further shown to 
have created a major agricultural credit squeeze that has particularly affected smallholder 
producers. This is shown to be particularly the case for the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC) which is the main agricultural credit organisation. Rural financial intermediaries in form 
of producer co-operatives and SACCOs were also adversely affected by market reforms 
thereby reducing their role as sources of formal credit of smallholder farmers. 
Despite the revelation that most smallholder farmers in the study region had individual 
l^nd titles, and also the high land pressure, the analysis indicates that the land markets are very 
tijiin. The low incidence of land colleteralised formal credit in the region also indicates in a way 
at land titling has been not a sufficient condition for increased access to formal credit. The 
institutional arrangements in factor markets have therefore led to labour intensive production 
systems with reduced use of purchased inputs. 
The analysis of the market actors through their market co-ordination and control roles 
dicates that market reforms have been associated with a general reduction of vertical co-
ordination of the commodity markets. This may have created asymmetric information problems 
as the producers are not well linked with the various exchange configurations and more 
itnportantly to the ultimate consumers. However, although there are inter-commodity 
ifferences, the results indicate that smallholder farmers are gaining more control in production pects, a case that is not repeated upstream in the various marketing institutions. This 
decreasing farmers' control on marketing functions may impact negatively on strategic decision 
njiaking and the farmers' influence on pricing. Equally, institutional governance issues persist 
especially for the tea, coffee and dairy commodity systems and may be related to the decline in 
farmers marketing functions control and reduction in vertical co-ordination. 
Evaluation of trade contracts before and after reforms resulted into the conclusion that 
tpe long-term vertically integrated types of contracts prevalent among most commodity 
systems are progressively been replaced by short-term relational contracts and spot market 
contracts. This is despite the indication from the study that long-term vertically integrated 
Contracts are potentially more efficient mode of organising trade in smallholder, coffee, tea and 
to some extent the milk commodity systems. The emerging spot markets, especially in coffee 
and tea trades, are likely to have minimal long and medium term benefits to smallholder 
farmers given the product characteristics and asset specificity. 
Lastly, the study results indicate that although it is difficult to compare the efficiency of 
die four commodity systems studied, it is however clear that there have been minimal if any 
improvements in efficiency based on the trends in producer share after market reforms. This 
situation is attributed to high transaction costs in processing, distribution and transport that 
have not been clearly targeted by the market reforms implemented so far. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRODUCTIVITY OF SMALLHOLDER FARMS UNDER CREDIT AND 
LAND CONSTRAINTS 
1 Introduction 
The evidence adduced in Chapter five indicates, inter alia, that institutional changes arising 
from market reforms in Kenya have induced a significant contraction of agricultural credit 
from formal institutions. This credit contraction has mainly affected smallholder farmers. 
Equally, agricultural production in the study region is also shown to take place under severe 
land constraints with poorly developed land markets. This chapter analyses the factors that 
determine household's demand for credit and land as well as farm productivity in the Central 
Kenya region within a liberalised market regime. 
Economic theory suggests that farmers facing binding capital constraints would tend to 
use lower levels of inputs in their production activities as compared to those not constrained 
(Feder et al, 1989; Bell, 1993). Improved access to credit can therefore facilitate optimal input 
u^e with a major impact on productivity. The productivity gains arising from enhanced 
availability of farm credit can be expected to be more pronounced in situations where land 
constraints necessitates intensified production systems that require continued and substantial 
use of external non-factor inputs. 
Market liberalisation policies implemented in Kenya in the last decade have had both 
positive and negative impacts on the livelihood strategies of rural farm households. On the 
positive side, the contraction of state and parastatal control in agricultural production and 
marketing has greatly expanded opportunities for smallholder farmers mainly with regard to 
economic enterprises. The expanded opportunities have been witnessed in most Sub-Saharan 
Africa states that have embraced market reform policies. For instance, in a participatory study 
done in a cross section of Tanzanian villages, the villagers regarded the increased options for 
npn-farm income generation as the single most significant change in their lives arising from the 
market reform policies ( Booth et al, 1993). A casual observation in rural Kenya leads one to 
the same conclusion as more and more farm households are engaging in off-farm activities 
mainly in form of micro-business ventures. The on-farm enterprise mix is also in a dynamic 
flux as resources are allocated to new enterprises, while some traditional farm enterprises are 
abandoned all together. 
On the negative side, market liberalisation has been associated with higher market risks 
and uncertainties mainly arising from price risks as well as risks associated with uncertainties 
in the emerging institutional framework. Confronted with these risks and uncertainties, the risk 
averse farm households have adopted ex ante risk management strategies through income 
diversification measures, apart from engaging in ex-post risk coping strategies. Income 
diversification strategy is achieved through a choice of an enterprise portfolio (both on and off-
farm) that has low covariant risks between its components. As expected, on-farm production 
and agricultural labour wage exhibit high correlation between risks associated with alternative 
income streams, thus offering limited risk protection to smallholder farmers. By contrast, 
diversification into non-farm income sources can lead to low risk correlation between income 
sources. 
The need to take up new opportunities while minimising the risks arising from market 
reform policies have led most farm households to review their enterprise portfolios and the way 
they allocate resources to the chosen enterprises. Some households have been able to take up 
the opportunities opened up by market liberalisation while other have not. Studies across most 
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developing countries that had implemented SAPs, indicate that a big proportion of rural 
households, and especially the very poor, have indeed lost in welfare terms despite the new 
opportunities (Medelay, 1999). Major concerns have been raised about the erosion of food 
security and escalation of poverty levels in rural farm households. The cause of these 
differences in responses to the opportunities arising from market reforms across farm 
households is an important developmental issue, that need to be addressed in the formulation of 
agricultural development and poverty alleviation policies. 
From a theoretical point of view, a number of factors, both endogenous and exogenous to 
the households, can be expected to influence their resource allocation decisions and hence their 
incomes. The household resource endowment, its demographic characteristics and the 
conditions of the physical, social and economic environment are expected to be prime 
conditions determining the resource allocation behaviour and household incomes. As 
postulated in the conceptual framework of this study (section 2.2), farm household decision 
making will be particularly influenced by each household's food trading condition, level of 
transaction costs and liquidity constraints. Thus, access to credit is a critical factor that can 
affect household's resource allocation and investment behaviour, which in turn affects their 
risk bearing ability and incomes. 
Farm households in many developing countries have to cope not only with poverty but 
also with variable incomes in any one period. In most of these countries, rural insurance 
markets are totally lacking or incomplete, which makes saving and credit transactions to 
assume a special role of allowing households to smooth their consumption streams in the face 
of the random income streams. Thus, access to credit allows farm households to satisfy their 
cash needs induced by the agricultural production cycle and consumption requirements. In the 
absence of credit markets, farmers would have to maintain cash reserves or near liquid assets to 
facilitate production and consumption. 
As Singh, Squire & Strauss (1986) have shown, when a producer has unlimited access 
to liquidity, production decisions will be independent of consumption decisions. However, due 
to asymmetric information and adverse selection prevalent in most rural credit markets, farmers 
are confronted with credit rationing that impinges upon their optimal behaviour (Carter, 1988). 
When credit is rationed, some borrowers cannot obtain the amount of credit they desire despite 
the level of interest rates. In such circumstances, liquidity can become a binding constraint in 
many farmers' operations. This leads to sub-optimal use of farm inputs. The marginal 
contribution of credit is therefore to bring input use closer to the optimal level thereby 
increasing output (Feder et al, 1989). 
In the context of agricultural policy, an important issue arising from the above 
arguments, is the magnitude of expected productivity gains arising from access to credit. The 
productivity gains from credit can be expected to differ between liquidity-constrained and non-
constrained farm households as shown by Feder et al (1990) in Chinese agricultural settings. 
Carter & Weibe (1990) in an analysis of the productivity of smallholder farms in Kenya, 
indicated that despite the farmers' access to cheap labour, the potential of increasing small 
farms productivity was eventually overwhelmed by countervailing capital constraints. In a 
more recent study on smallholder dairy farms in East African highlands, Freeman et al (1998) 
also concluded that credit was likely to facilitate investments in cross-bred dairy cows by 
credit-constrained farms leading to a substantial increase in dairy productivity. It is therefore 
apparent that improved access to credit may have a significant impact on smallholder farmer's 
productivity. 
Credit constraints also have an added effect of shaping production strategies by 
conditioning enterprise choices and subsequent allocation of household resources. The desire 
of risk-averse farm households to stabilise consumption in the face of uncertain income streams 
may lead to a situation where enterprises with a greater food security are chosen and allocated 
a bigger share of available resources. Thus, faced by consumption credit constraints, cash-flow 
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Economic reforms in the health sector included introduction of cost-sharing policy in 1989 where patients 
attending government health facilities pay a nominal fee. By 1996/97 the cost-sharing revenues amounted to Ksh 
391 million or 15% of non-recurrent expenditures for the ministry of health. The figure was estimated to 
increase to 25% in 1999/2000 (Kimuyu eds., 1999). Equally, in 1988 the government withdrew financial 
support for teaching and learning materials in primary and secondary schools and introduced cost sharing in the 
education sector. Parents therefore meet the cost of textbooks and other learning materials while being 
responsible in putting up physical facilities including classrooms and workshops. Also fees payments have also 
l>een introduced at colleges and universities. As a result the cost of these services especially education have 
increased by more than ten times during the last decade. 
problems and volatility of food prices, a farm household may tend to adopt a safety-first kind 
of resource allocation behaviour. The household may also opt to diversify income sources as a 
risk management strategy. 
The incentive for ex ante risk-reducing strategies such as diversification, can be 
jowered with the availability of effective mechanisms for dealing with these uncertainties ex 
tyost. Availability of credit, liquidation of assets, participation in labour markets and temporary 
migration serves as good examples of such ex post risk coping strategies. Even if labour and 
input credit is available across households, their enterprise choices and optimal resource 
allocation may differ depending on the availability of consumption credit. 
Despite the evidence from the above-enumerated studies, which clearly verifies the 
Importance of credit on farm productivity, there is nonetheless little empirical evidence on the 
Simultaneous effects of credit and land constraints on farm productivity. This is despite a 
common observation in most farming environments that depicts a systematic inverse 
relationship between farm productivity as measured by physical yields and the size of farm 
holding (Feder, 1985; Barrett, 1996). The high land pressure in the study region coupled with 
rapid population growth as well as environmental sustainability concerns, precludes 
smallholder agricultural development strategy based on land expansion. Thus, intensification of 
production and commodity (enterprise) substitution remains the only viable option for 
agricultural growth. Intensification in small farm sizes requires widespread use of appropriate 
agricultural technologies that requires to be financed. Although, farmers can use and do use 
their savings to finance their farm operations, the low farm productivity, unemployment, high 
dependency ratios, cash-flow constraints as well as high cost of social services44 such as 
education and health occasioned by market reforms severely limits their self-financing 
Capacity. From a policy perspective, understanding how credit and land constraints interact to 
determine farm productivity can be of major importance. This cannot only aid in the 
formulation of effective credit policies but can also serve to illustrate the gains that such 
policies can achieve by enhancing complimentarity between land and credit markets in rural 
^reas. 
It is in view of these considerations that this study hypothesised that, in a land 
constrained production system taken to be prevalent in Central Kenya region, smallholder farm 
productivity will significantly differ among credit constrained and non-constrained households. 
A priori expectation being that farmers faced by simultaneous credit and land constraints will 
have lower farm productivity regardless of the availability of labour. Secondly, the farmers' 
production strategies in terms of resource allocation will also vary depending on the land and 
Credit constraints. As such resource allocation between cash crops such as tea and coffee, food 
Crops, horticultural crops, dairy and participation in off-farm income generating activities will 
depend mainly on the prevailing land and credit constraints. To test for the above hypothesis a 
iivariate probit selectivity regression model is applied as detailed in section 2.3.4. The model istinguishes between credit and land constrained and non-constrained households that are sed as the selection criteria. Apart from this section, this chapter is organised into four sections. Section 6.2 describes 
|he data and variables used in the analysis. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 details the results of the 
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analysis on factors affecting the households' constraint (land and credit) conditions and farm 
productivity, respectively. The final section draws inferences and conclusions from the results. 
6.2 Data description and model estimation considerations 
As detailed in section 2.3.4, the approach adopted in this study recognises that a dis-
equilibrium exists in household's demand and supply of both credit and land. Thus, each 
household's land and credit demand and supply conditions are used as the first selection 
criteria in estimating a household selectivity model. The first-stage probit analysis involves 
joint estimation of the factors that determine smallholder farmer's credit and land demand. 
Nevertheless, the analysis takes recognition of the fact that there are differences in factors 
determining household's demand for land and credit. Credit demand is taken to be mainly 
related to each household's income level, savings, need for working capital as well as 
consumption patterns, whereas demand for land is taken to be mainly related to labour supply 
factors and the demand placed by the adopted on-farm enterprises. 
The second stage analysis, that is closely related to the first, determines the effects of 
household's land and credit demand conditions on farm productivity. This is done through the 
use of separate regression equations to model the production behaviour of the farmers 
conditional on the selection criteria, i.e. whether the farmer is credit or land constrained. 
Households with low productivity may have more reason to indicate a higher demand for credit 
and land as compared to the more productive ones. This may create a possibility of endogenous 
credit and land demand dummy variables. However, as indicated in section 2.3.4, the Heckman 
procedure, that is applied in this second stage analysis, is hoped to adjust the estimates to take 
care of the endogenous constraint variables. 
The household data used to estimate the bivariate selectivity model was collected 
through a household survey as described in section 2.4. The dependent variables in the first 
stage bivariate probit model are the farmers' credit and land constraint conditions. The credit 
(Cr) and Land (L) constraint variables take a value of 1 if a farmer is credit or land constrained, 
respectively and 0 otherwise. As also earlier defined in section 2.3.4, the constraints refer to 
household's responses to their situation with regard to credit and land demand conditions. 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of the households in relation to their credit and land 
constraints. 
Table 6.1 The distribution of households according to their land and credit demand 
conditions 
Land and credit demand condition Number of households % of total sample 
(n=200) 
Land and credit constrained 80 40.0 
(L=l, Cr=l) 
Land constrained and no credit constrain 21 10.5 
(L=l, Cr=0) 
Land non-constrained and credit constrained 86 43.0 
(L=0,Cr=l) 
No land or credit constraint 13 6.5 
(L=0,Cr=0) 
Total 
Land constrained (L=l) 101 50.5 
Credit constrained (Cr =1) 166 83.0 
Source: Household survey, 1999. 
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Among the total sample of 200 households, 13 (6.5%) of them are neither credit nor 
land constrained while another 21 (10.5%) are land constrained but not credit constrained. 
$ighty-six (43%) of the households are land non-constrained but credit constrained while the 
land and credit constrained households are 80 (40%). In total, 83%of the households are credit 
Constrained while 50.5% are land constrained (Table 6.1). This indicates that credit constraints 
are more severe as compared to land constraints. These credit demand conditions corresponds 
t)o the results reported in section 5.3 that indicate significant contraction in credit supply mainly 
as a result of market reforms. 
Table 6.2 shows the description of the variables used in the analysis and the descriptive 
statistics for the continuous variables. The household characteristics constitute the first set of 
independent variables. They include age, sex and education level of household head. The 
household resource endowment is represented by farm size and available family labour (related 
to household size). Where applicable, each households' land holding is adjusted for hired and 
leased land to arrive at the farm size. The total available family labour is based on the number 
of adults and children in each household and the number of hours spent by each member in the 
farm. To allow for differences in labour output across sex and age, females and children labour 
is weighted by a factor of 0.8 and 0.5, respectively. Direct estimation of labour spent on 
domestic and social activities is attempted but proved to be unreliable. As such, the available 
male and female labour is further weighted by a factor of 0.75 and 0.6, respectively to cater for 
these activities. The lower weighting of female labour is meant to account for the high labour 
demands for domestic activities. 
Due to the need to analyse the effects of household resource allocation behaviour on 
their land constraint condition, the proportions of land allocated to food crops (maize and 
beans), perennial crops (coffee and tea) and horticultural crops is also included as independent 
variables. Land allocated to perennial crops is fixed both in the short and medium term, and 
(fan therefore be expected to increase household's land demand. The number of dairy animals 
per household is also included as a variable related to household resource allocation behaviour. 
The household's off-farm income, expenditure patterns and credit availability are the 
main economic independent variables. Off-farm income from wages, salaries, remittances and 
tirade is applied in both the land and credit models. The argument is that higher off-farm 
income can induce lower demand for credit by complementing farm incomes thereby offering 
households the much needed cash to finance farm inputs and consumption. Equally, 
engagement in off-farm income generating activities can reduce the demand for land as 
households have less labour dedicated to on-farm production. 
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Table 6.2 Description and descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
Variable Code Description Mean STD deviation 
Dependent variables 
Cr 
L 
Q 
Household credit constraint condition, 1 for constrained 0.83 
households, 0 otherwise 
Household land constraint condition, 1 for constrained 0.53 
households, 0 otherwise 
Value of total farm production (Ksh) 261,888 599,806 
Independent variables 
1. Household characteristics 
SEX sex of household head (hh), 1 if female, 2 if male 1.79 
AGE Age of household head (years) 59.40 
EDU Formal education level for hh, 1 = no formal education...,5 
= college education 3.00 
2.Household resources 
FSIZE Farm size in acres 9.51 
FLABOR Total available family labour (MD*/year) 5,445 
3.Farm enterprises 
FOOD % of farm allocated to food crops 20.31 
CT % of farm allocated to coffee and tea (perennials crops) 40.62 
HORT % of farm allocated to horticultural crops 2.95 
COWS Number of mature dairy animals 2.49 
ENTERP Number of farm enterprises (crop and livestock) 4.78 
4. Household credit and expenditure 
CREDIT Total available credit from all sources in 1999 (Ksh) 7,823 
EXPVC Total farm expenditure on purchased inputs (Ksh/year) 81,045 
EXPDOME Domestic expenditure (Ksh/year) 43,796 
EXTSCFE Total School fees expenditure per year (Ksh) 27,881 
HIRED Total hired labour (casual and permanent)-MD/year 1,506 
5. Institutional factors 
EXT Number of extension contacts per year 0.80 
LMARKET Household participation in land market, 1 for participants 0.12 
and 0, otherwise 
FMARKET Household participation in food market, 1 for participants, 0.75 
0 otherwise 
INFRAS Distance to the nearest market X type of road (index) 
COOP Household marketing coffee through co-operatives, 1 for 0.60 
members, 0 otherwise 
SACCO Household membership to a credit saving co-operative 0.23 
society, 1 for members, 0 otherwise. 
6.Location 
DISTRICTS Truncated variable for district 
0.41 
14.05 
1.11 
11.04 
3,004 
16.37 
25.66 
5.13 
2.77 
1.12 
28,712 
194,366 
52,471 
57,783 
2,075 
1.97 
* MD = Man Days equivalent to 8 working hours 
Source: Household survey, 1999/2000 
To incorporate the effects of expenditure levels on the demand for credit, the 
household's expenditure on purchased farm inputs, hired labour, domestic consumption (food 
and other consumable domestic items ) and school fees are applied as independent variables in 
the credit constraint model. The domestic and school fees expenditures are considered special 
items as they normally take precedence over the other household expenditure items. As shown 
in Table 6.2 these two expenditure items take a major proportion (50%) of household's 
expenditures. Furthermore, as school fees are usually paid in three instalments in a year it tends 
to create major cash-flow constraints to households unlike domestic expenditure which is 
spread throughout the year. The amount of credit borrowed from all the available sources (co-
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operatives, social groups, and banks) is also entered the credit model as an independent 
variable. As indicated earlier in section 5.3, most of the credit advanced to households is of 
short-term nature with a credit period of six to eight months (one season). In special cases 
where credit was advanced for a period longer than one year or less than six months, an 
adjustment is made to reflect the credit due in a year. 
Several institutional factors are also used as independent variables in the land and credit 
constraint models. These include, household participation in the land and food markets, access 
to extension services, membership to a SACCO, access to a tarmac road and household 
membership to a coffee co-operative society. A household is considered as a land market 
participant if it has sold/purchased or hired/leased land in 1999 or in the preceding five year 
period. Equally, a household is considered a food market participant if it had purchased or sold 
maize (in all its forms) in 1999. Data from the household survey indicates that all those 
households selling maize are also buyers while the rest are non-participants. Finally, the district 
dummy is used to control for location effects. 
The dependent variable in the second stage estimation of the selectivity model is the 
logarithm of the total value of farm production. Due to the multi-product nature of the farm 
households in the study region, the value of farm production is an aggregation of coffee, tea, 
dairy and horticultural crops production in the 1999 production year. The production is valued 
using the farm gate prices at the time of the household survey. Coffee, tea and French beans are 
produced entirely as cash crops and hence their farm gate prices are determined by the market 
forces. Equally, as most households in the study region are net milk sellers, the farm gate milk 
sales price that averaged Ksh 15 per litre in 1999 is used to value the milk produced per 
household. 
With regard to maize the average price between selling and buying price is used to 
value production. As indicated earlier all those households selling maize are also buyers, albeit 
with a time difference. According to the survey results, the average price band between maize 
sales and purchase price is 15%, although the band tended to differ across households 
depending on the timing of sales and purchases. This indicates that averaging both sales and 
buying prices could give a close approximation of the household's decision prices rather than 
use of either price. The results also indicate that 75% of the households are food market 
participants. This result implies that 25% of the households have endogenous maize prices, as 
they are non-market participants. Nevertheless, no attempt is made in this study to estimate 
these endogenous prices. The assumption is that the endogeneity of a proportion of maize 
prices could not bias the estimates of the whole analysis as maize only formed as small 
proportion of the whole farm production. Furthermore, as shown by Janvry & Sadoulet (1994), 
the decision (shadow) price for self-sufficient household faced with credit and land constraints 
falls wimin the selling and buying prices of the food commodity in question. This is taken to be 
the case for the endogenous price for the maize self-sufficient households 
In the second stage analysis, all continuous explanatory variables are also expressed in 
logs. Logarithmic expression is meant to provide a dimension-less measures of responsiveness 
of farm production to changes in the considered variables. Since the coefficients of the 
regression equations are estimates of the partial farm production elasticity, then the larger the 
coefficients the higher the response of farm production to marginal changes to the respective 
Variables, the vice-versa, being true. 
The independent variables representing the household characteristics are identical to 
those used in the first stage bivariate probit estimation. On a priori basis, no clear-cut sign 
could be assigned to the household characteristics of age and sex. However, the expectation is 
that the educational level of household head could have a positive impact on the farm 
productivity. 
The household endowment factors and expenditure patterns as represented by farm size, 
amount of family labour, total expenditure on variable inputs and credit available are applied in 
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estimating the productivity model. The a priori expectations are that these factors would have a 
positive influence on farm production. The household resource allocation behaviour is captured 
by the proportions of land allocated to perennials (coffee and tea) and food crops. The number 
of dairy animals is also included as an independent variable. The expectations are that the 
higher the proportion of land allocated to the high-value crops such as tea and coffee as well as 
dairy, the higher the farm productivity, the vice-versa being expected in relation to land 
allocated to food crops. Equally, the total number of farm enterprises is used as independent 
variable as a proxy for farm diversity, that in turn indicates the level of risk aversion. The 
expectations are that the higher the number of farm enterprises (diversity) the lower the farm 
productivity. 
The institutional factors included in the production model are the household 
participation in food markets, the number of extension contracts per year and access to all 
weather road. As in the first stage probit model the household are categorised across districts 
and whether households marketed their coffee through a co-operative society or not. 
The second stage regression does not include independent variables specifically related 
to the credit or land constraint models. These include membership to a SACCO, household 
participation in land market and expenditure on domestic and school fees. The maintained 
hypothesis is that these variables are unlikely to directly influence the level of farm output. 
Additionally, the exclusion of these variables served to identify the production model as shown 
byMaddala, (1983). 
6.3 Estimates of factors affecting households land and credit demand (constraints) 
conditions 
Table 6.3 shows the results of the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates of 
the bivariate probit equations. The goodness of fit measures indicate that the estimated models 
fit the data reasonably well. The models correctly predict the household's credit and land 
constraints condition for 86% and 94% of the observations, respectively (Table 6.3). Of 
particular interest is also the fact that the estimated rho(p) is significantly different from zero, 
thereby indicating the suitability of the bivariate model estimates in constructing the selectivity 
term for consequent use in the second state regression. 
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Table 6.3 Bivariate probit model estimates for household's land and credit constraint 
conditions 
FIML Bivariate Probit Estimates 
Variable Land constraint condition Credit Constraint Condition 
(n=200) (n=200) 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
CONSTANT 0.758 0.966* 1.079 1.281 
AGE -0.016 0.008* 0.003 0.012 
pEX 0.061 0.268 
EDU -0.108 0.109 -0.202 0.193 
FSIZE -0.077 0.028* -0.008 0.033 
CT -0.085 0.477 0.235 0.765 
FOOD -1.314 0.768* 0.257 0.139 
HORT -0.296 2.262 - -
COWS 0.053 0.051 0.021 0.097 
FLABOR 0.004 0.005 - -
HIRED -0.009 0.008 - -
OFFINCOME 0.111 xl0' s 0.102 xl0' J 0.320 xl0 J 0.401 x VS* 
LMARKET 0.206 0.207 - -
tOODM 0.624 0.254* -1.181 0.621* 
EXT -0.101 0.061* - -
CREDIT - - -0.345 x 10-" 0.128 x 10-4' 
SACCO - - -0.945 0.411* 
EXPVC - - 0.458 x 10"* 0.46 x 10"5 
EXPDOME - - -0.128 xlO"5 0.628 x 10 J 
EXPSCFE - - 0.422 xlO' 7 0.293 x 10"6 
po-op 0.384 0.333 0.645 0.525 
¡DÍSTRICT 0.484 0.077 0.186 0.211 
Rho (1,2) -0.254 (0.018) 
% of correct predictions 86% 94% 
* Indicates significance at 10% level or below. 
6.3.1 Factors determining household land demand 
The age of the household head significantly decreases the household's land demand (Table 
5.3). A plausible explanation is that older household heads tend to have larger land holdings 
unlike the younger heads who acquire smaller land sizes from their parents. Given the 
prevailing cultural practice of land inheritance where all the sons sub-divide their father's land, 
this result implies that land demand will grow with time. One of the ways of ameliorating this 
Increase in land demand is to encourage a more vibrant land market. Although the household 
land market participation variable has the expected positive sign, it did not significantly affect 
the land constraint. This could be as a result of the low proportion of households that are 
participating in land markets during the considered period. 
The farm size variable had a negative and significant effect on land demand. The 
variable has the expected theoretical expectation viz. that households with smaller farm sizes 
kre expected to be more land constrained than those with bigger farms. This result reinforces 
the fact that, as land pressure continues to increase, land demand in the region will continue to 
increase. 
Among the variables indicating household resource allocation decisions, only the 
proportion of land allocated to food crops had a significant effect on household land demand. 
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The a priori expectations that land allocated to permanent crops could reduce the household's 
land demand is found not to be the case. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the proportion of land 
allocated to food crops decreases from around 30% to less than 10% with an increase in farm 
size. By contrast, the proportion of land allocated to the high-value perennial crops (coffee and 
tea) increases with farm size but with little variation among the farm size groups with the 
proportion allocated being around 40% across all farm sizes. The result is a clear indication 
that there are differences in resource allocation between the land constrained households and 
those not constrained, with the former group allocating more of their land to food crops. 
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Figure 6.1 Proportion of land ( 
Central Kenya 
%) allocated to different crops across farm size groups in 
The decision to participate in food markets as either a seller or a buyer also 
significantly increases the land constraint condition. Households that participate in food 
markets are mainly those with lower land demand (land non-constrained). As shown in Figure 
6.2, the households' food market participation increases from 69% to 100% with increase with 
farm size. This indicates that the land non-constrained households rely more on the market for 
their food supply, a condition that enables them to allocate less of their land to food crops. 
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Figure 6.2 Household's level offood (maize) market participation in Central Kenya 
According to Janvry & Sadoulet (1994), household's market participation can be 
determined by price bands that create a wedge between the sale and purchase price. When the 
price band is very large this can force the household to seek self-sufficiency in food 
production. This is found to be the case with households with small farm sizes in the study area 
as shown in Table 6.4. The results presented in Table 6.4 indicates that households with less 
than 5 acres of land tends to sell their maize early in the harvest season when prices are low 
^nd to buy later in the season when prices are high. Consequently, their price band between 
sale and purchase price is around 30% as compared to households with medium (5 to 20 acres) 
farms who face a price wedge of around 5%. The households with large farms are also shown 
to face a price band of around 17% as they tend to sell and buy maize in mid-season when 
prices are moderate. The differences in timing of market participation and hence the price 
fcWds could also be related to investment in storage facilities. Nevertheless, these results 
indicate that, as the land constraints increase in the future, it will be necessary to review the 
food marketing policies with a view of reducing the transaction costs in these markets. This 
will enable the land constrained households to get better access to food from these markets and 
possibly reallocate more of their land resources currently held by food crops to other more 
^igher valued farm enterprises. 
m 
Table 6.4 Household's maize selling, buying prices and the price band 
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Household type by farm size Selling price Buying price Price band* 
(acres) (Ksh/bag) (Ksh/bag) (%) 
Small 
Less than 2.5 1254 1658 32.0 
2.51 to 5 1151 1493 29.7 
Medium 
5.1 to 10 1297 1367 5.4 
10.1 to 15 1398 1479 5.8 
Large 
15.1 to 20 1707 1800 5.4 
over 20 1446 1678 17.2 
Average 1376 1579 14.8 
* Price band =[(selling price -buying price)/selling price]xl00 
Source: Household survey,1999. 
Among the other household resources, the amount of family labour is positively related 
to the land constraint condition, although not significantly. From a theoretical perspective, the 
available labour and particularly family labour can be expected to significantly increase the 
demand for land. Thus, this result is in line with the theoretical expectations. Nevertheless, the 
amount of hired labour has a non-significant negative relationship with land constraint 
condition. As also expected, off-farm income tended to decrease the demand for land although 
not significantly. This results indicates in a way that enhancement of off-farm income 
generating opportunities can be used to lower land demand in the region. 
The land-constrained households have a more limited access to extension services than 
those without a land constraint. This may indicate that government extension agents tend to 
concentrate on the larger farms. Equally, the land-constrained households may also have little 
motivation to seek extension advice. The categorisation of farmers as co-operative and non co-
operative member has no significant relationship with their land constraint condition. The same 
case applied for categorisation of farmers in terms of their districts. This may be an indication 
that there is limited locational effect on the sampled household. Overall, the estimates indicate 
that the probability of a household to be land constrained is mostly related to the size of the 
farm and the proportion of land allocated to food crops. 
6.3.2 Factors determining credit demand 
There is no significant relationship between the household's credit demand and the farm size. 
This is despite evidence elsewhere that indicates that the larger farm sizes tend to attract higher 
credit due to fixed costs of borrowing that are invariant to credit size (Binswanger & Siller, 
1993). The non-significant relationship between the credit constraint condition and farm size in 
the study region could have arisen due to the low levels of land collateralized credit. As 
indicated earlier, high transaction costs in land markets as well as bureaucratic and cultural 
considerations, limit the use of land as credit collateral in the study region. This result therefore 
confirms the poor complimentarity and inter-linkages between land and credit markets. 
The proportion of each farm allocated to different enterprises and the number of dairy 
animals does not significantly affect the credit demand. The theoretical expectation is that 
activities that generate cash flow throughout the year, such as sale of milk and off-farm 
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6.4 Estimation of factors affecting farm productivity 
The two weighed least squares (WLS) estimates of the second stage selectivity regression 
models for farm output are shown in Table 6.5. Due to limitations in degrees of freedom, 
reliable model estimates for those households that are neither credit nor land constrained as 
well as those land constrained but not credit constrained could not be undertaken. 
Consequently, the model estimates reported in this section refer to households that are either 
land non-constrained and credit constrained or those that are land and credit constrained. 
Employment, can serve to significantly reduce the credit constraint. Equally, farm enterprises 
like perennial crops (mainly coffee) which place high demand on credit could enhance the 
credit constraint. Thus, the positive but non-significant effect of area allocated to tea and coffee 
on credit constraint (Table 6.4) is counter the theoretical expectations. Results shown in Table 
6.4 also indicate that the off-farm income tend to increase the probability of a household being 
credit constrained. No clear explanation is forthcoming for this unorthodox result, as the 
expectation is that off-farm income would ease the households credit demand. 
The results also indicate that the probability of a household being credit constrained is 
hot influenced significantly by the household head characteristics such as age and sex. 
However, the level of formal education of the household head has a negative correlation with 
the credit constraint. This may be an indication that the more formally educated households are 
eble to identify credit sources that in turn reduce their credit constraint. Equally, the more 
lbrmally educated household heads could be less risk averse than their less educated 
counterparts, a factor that enabled them to access higher levels of credit. 
The amount of credit available per farm as well as farmer's membership to a SACCO, 
significantly decreases the credit demand condition. The significant relationship between the 
Eimount of credit and the household credit constraint condition provides evidence to support the 
non-ambiguity relationship between household borrowing status and credit constraint. This 
imding also serves to provide further support to the hypothesis that borrowers and non-
borrowers are not homogenous with respect to their demand for credit. Indeed, this observation 
is consistent with the survey results where 10.2% of credit constraint household are found to be 
borrowers as compared to 73.5 % of credit non-constrained households who had loans. The 
average loan size for credit constrained households is Ksh 1,720 as compared to Ksh 37,620 for 
the non-constrained households. The significant SACCO membership variable on the credit 
constraint status is interesting from a policy point of view. It not only indicates the pivotal role 
these rural financial institutions can play in easing credit constraints but also shows that given a 
conducive environment farm households can be able to mobilise financial resources through 
savings and investments to ease their credit constraint. 
Another closely related result indicates that farmers who market coffee through co-
operative societies are less likely to be credit constrained. This is mainly due to the availability 
of input credit from these co-operatives. The household expenditure patterns in the form of 
Variable inputs and domestic requirements are found not to significantly affect the credit 
Constraint condition. However, expenditure on school fees has a significant effect on the credit 
Constraint condition. The indications is that those households that have school fees obligations 
fjend to have higher unmet credit demands. This may be due to the high demands school fees 
obligations places on the household incomes thereby compelling them to exhibit a higher 
demand for credit. 
As in the land constraint equation, there is non-significant locational effect on the 
household credit constraint. This indicates that the perceived credit constraints affect the 
households equally across the various districts. 
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Among the land and credit constrained households, farm productivity is significantly 
influenced by the formal education level of the household head, the farm size, the number of 
dairy animals, amount of family labour, credit available and expenditure on purchased farm 
inputs as shown in Table 6.5. The number of dairy animals has the highest partial farm 
production elasticity. This may indicate the importance placed on dairy enterprise as a source 
of farm income. Furthermore, as zero-grazing is the predominant dairy production system, the 
results indicate that the land constrained households are using dairy as a production strategy 
aimed at relaxing the land constraint. Indeed, it is important to note that among the farm 
enterprises, only the number of dairy animals has a significant effect on farm production with 
area allocated to coffee and tea and horticultural crops having a positive but non-significant 
effect on value of farm production. Equally important is the negative and significant coefficient 
on land allocated to food crops that gives an indication that allocation of land resources to food 
crops seemed to depress farm productivity. 
Among the land non-constrained and credit-constrained households, the number of 
dairy animals significantly increases the value of farm production. Also significant is land area 
allocated to coffee and tea, amount of family labour and hired labour. Thus, the relaxation of 
the land constrained seems to induce some differences in the factors that affect farm 
production. First, education, which is important in a land constrained condition, lost its 
importance. This may be due to the fact that the land-constrained households are mainly 
younger with higher formal education than the non-land constrained households who are 
mainly older generation of farmers. It therefore seems credible to associate higher farm 
productivity with higher formal education. This can be important policy intervention point. 
Secondly, the size of the farm holdings positively and significantly influences farm 
productivity for the land and credit constrained household, but not in households where the 
land constraint is relaxed. Empirical evidence adduced elsewhere indicates a systematic inverse 
relationship between farm productivity and the farm size except for the smallest farms (Feder, 
1985; Barrett, 1996; Benjamin, 1995; Newell & Symons, 1997). As such the positive and 
significant effect of farm size may appear as counter-intuitive. However, taking cognisance of 
the credit constraints, the food security concerns (higher land allocation to food crops), the low 
value of food crops and the high labour to land ratio of small land constrained households then 
the result can be well understood. As pointed out by Deininger & Binswanger (1999), 
imperfections in rural markets, such as capital and insurance markets, can severely erode the 
productivity advantages enjoyed by small farms. Indeed, Lele & Agarwal (1989) indicate that 
smallholder coffee, tea and tobacco farms in East and Central Africa exhibit lower farm 
productivity when compared to large farms despite their higher soil fertility. This is mainly 
attributed to inefficiencies in input markets and the smallholder household's risk taking 
behaviour. The current result therefore seems to confirm the Lele & Agarwal finding despite 
the market reforms undertaken in recent years, which should have corrected for these market 
distortions. 
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Variable" Land & credit constrained 
households 
( n = 8 0 ) 
Land non-constrained - Credit 
constrained households 
(n = 86) 
C O N S T A N T 8.378 (3.282)* 7.491 (2.656)* 
A G E -0.229(0.509) 0.185(0.430) 
S E X -0.284(0.254) 0.131(0.216) 
EDU 0.467(0.255)* 0.043(0.226) 
I SIZE 0.228(0.174)* 0.024(0.171) 
C T 0.104(1.145) 0.165(0.076)* 
FOOD -0.127(0.019)* -0.075(0.105) 
HORT 0.020(0.055) 0.002(0.064) 
COWS 0.480(0.102)* 0.257 (0.064)* 
HLABOR 0.297(0.154)* 0.257(0.087)* 
IHRED 0.01.0(0.052) 0.109(0.056)* 
OFFINCOME -0.006(0.019) -0.012(0.019) 
CREDIT 0.059(0.036)* 0.012(0.039) 
E X P V C 0.182(0.112)* 0.064(0.094) 
T^NTERP -0.441(0.555) 0.0304(0.536) 
rjxT -0.063(0.119) -0.027(0.049) 
ISIFRAS -0.073(0.086) 0.023(0.076) 
FOODM -0.045(0.027) 0.254(0.233) 
c:oop 0.106(0.334) 0.336(0.326) 
DISTRICT -0.013(0.072) -0.061(0.067) 
Selectivity Term ( C ) ' 2 (a) -0.066 (0.486) 0.422(0.415) 
(b) 0.060(0.530) 0.049(0.629) 
Adjusted R 2 63J) 6 4 6 
II- All continuos variables expressed in log 
12 - Selectivity terms (a) and (b) refers to land and credit constraint conditions, respectively. 
*i - Statistical significance at 10% or below. Std errors in parenthesis 
Thirdly, while the area allocated to food crops significantly affects farm productivity 
for land constrained households, the same is not the case for land non-constrained households. 
Instead, the area allocated to high-value perennial crops (coffee and tea) has a significant 
influence on value of farm production for the land non-constrained households. This result 
clearly indicates that the two categories of households have different resource allocation 
strategies that affect their farm productivity. The result also indicates that relaxing the land 
Constraint tends to give households some degrees of freedom to seek internal ways of relaxing 
the credit constraint. This is especially the case where there is high labour to land ratio, a 
Situation that can allow households to use more labour as a credit constraint relaxing strategy. 
Furthermore, the significance of land allocated to coffee and tea in enhancing farm productivity 
indicates that any development policy in the region that encourages promotion of these export 
crops has to address itself to the land constraints faced by a large proportion of farm 
households in the region. 
Fourth, farm productivity in land constrained households is significantly influenced by 
availability of credit, which is not the case for land non-constrained households. This results 
indicates not only the importance of credit, but also the central role credit has to play towards 
increasing farm productivity, for households facing the land constraint condition. The land-
I 
fable 6.5 Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimated coefficients of the second stage selection 
model for farm output; Central Kenya region 
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constrained households farm productivity is also significantly influenced by the value of 
variable inputs used (Table 6.5). The land non-constrained households may have relied more 
on extensive production using hired labour and family labour with minimal use of purchased 
inputs. Indeed, the credit coefficient in the land non-constrained household has a negative sign, 
giving an indication the available credit is negatively related to production. The other 
explanation for the non-significant impact of credit in land non-constrained farms is the amount 
of credit provided is too small to have any tangible impact on productivity. 
In both models, the age and sex of household head did not significantly affect farm 
productivity. Nevertheless, the age and sex of household head seems to enhance productivity in 
credit constrained households while having a depressing effect in land constrained situation. 
Results in Table 6.5 also indicate that the area allocated to horticultural crops tended to 
enhance farm productivity, albeit insignificantly. This may be due to the fact that horticulture 
farming (mainly French beans) is usually confined to small plots that are intensively cultivated. 
The level of off-farm income also tended to insignificantly decrease farm productivity 
in both land and credit constrained situations. This result indicates the effort and time taken to 
engage in off-farm activities tends to lower farm productivity despite the income enhancing 
benefits such activities may confer on households. However, a recent study by Woldehanna 
(2000) in Ethiopia indicates that off-farm income can be complementary to farm income if 
farms are borrowing constrained. The study also indicates that expenditure on farm inputs is 
more dependent on off-farm incomes due to capital markets constraints. Results from Table 6.5 
also indicate that expenditure on variable inputs increases farm productivity. This is 
particularly the case where households faces both land and credit constraints. Furthermore, the 
result indicates that under credit and land constraints conditions, the partial production 
elasticity arising from use of inputs is 3 times higher than that of credit. The result therefore 
tends to indicate that, the effect of off-farm income and credit might have been embodied in the 
use of purchased inputs. 
Equally, the available family labour significantly increases the value of farm production 
regardless of the constraint situation. In both constraint conditions, family labour has the 
second highest partial production elasticity after the dairy cows (Table 6.5). Based on these 
partial labour coefficients and the mean value of farm output indicated in Table 6.2, the shadow 
value for a unit (manday) of family labour is estimated to be Ksh 14.30 for the land and credit 
constrained households. For households with no land constraint, their labour shadow price is 
estimated to be Ksh 12.30, which is 14% lower than for the land constrained households .These 
labour shadow prices are only 10% of the prevailing nominal wage rate of about Ksh 120 per 
manday. These results gives two important indications. First, despite the high partial elasticity 
of farm production arising from use family labour, on-farm labour productivity is low. As such, 
farm households would be better off engaging in off-farm activities. The second indication is 
that, relaxing the land constraint offers small marginal gains to family labour productivity. This 
may be due to the credit constraints that limit the use of external productivity enhancing inputs 
such as fertilisers. Nevertheless, the result gives the indication that although the opportunity 
cost of family labour is low, it is nonetheless not equal to zero even an environment 
characterised by high labour to land ratio. 
Among the institutional factors, the a priori expectation was that availability of extension 
services would enhance farm productivity. However, as shown in Table 6.5, availability of 
extension services tends to decrease farm productivity although not significantly. This result is 
somehow confirmed by the World Bank report that evaluated agricultural extension impact in 
Kenya (Gautam, 2000). The report indicates that between 1982 and 1997, crop productivity in 
the more productive regions in the country (including the study area) may have stagnated or 
declined. This is despite the consistent focus of extension services on these areas. The study 
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identifies the stagnation in dissemination of appropriate technologies as one of the main 
reasons behind the observed trends in productivity. 
6.5 Conclusions 
An increasing population pressure that is progressively reducing the available land per 
household confronts small farmers in the study region. They are also faced with market failures 
and institutional changes that generate binding farm level constraints in land and credit, among 
others. There is need therefore to evaluate the factors that can alleviate these farm level 
constraints with a view of increasing farm productivity. These issues are analysed in this 
chapter using a bivariate selectivity model. 
This chapter provides evidence to the effect that the proportion of land allocated to food 
crops is a major factor that determines household's land demand. This is contrary to a priori 
expectations that the proportion of land allocated to perennial crops (such as coffee and tea) is 
the main factor determining land demand. The results further show that household's 
participation in food markets tends to alleviate the land constraint. Furthermore, the results 
show that the land constrained households face higher price bands in food markets that tends to 
limit their market participation. It is therefore apparent that policies that address the 
development of smallholder agriculture in the study region should focus on the issue of food 
sscurity. 
The study also shows that the land demand is also related to the size of the farm, with 
households having smaller farm sizes being more land constrained than those with larger land 
sizes. This result shows the development of a more vibrant land market could improve land 
allocation. 
With regard to the households credit demand the study shows that there is an 
insignificant relationship between the credit constraint condition and the size of the farm. This 
is contrary to economic theory and empirical evidence from other similar farming situations. 
Inis result can be attributed to the low levels of formal credit secured through land 
qolletarisation, despite most households having individualised land ownership in the region. 
The result therefore emphasises the potential for the development of an efficient land market 
that is inter-linked with the credit market. 
The observed significant and negative relationship between a household credit 
Constraint condition and its membership to a SACCO indicates the pivotal role these rural 
financial institutions can play in easing the credit constraint. The significant role of SACCOs in 
ajlleviating credit constraints also indicates the farm households' ability to save and invest. This 
dicates that policies to induce dependable saving opportunities through SACCOs and other 
ancial intermediaries would ease the credit constraints. Results from this chapter study also 
show that some household expenditure items such as school fees are important factors that 
letermine credit demand. This indicates that apart from investment credit, the household credit 
constraint condition also depends on the availability of consumption credit. As such the 
development of suitable and effective rural credit policies in the region ought to take into 
ajccount the households needs for consumption credit. 
This chapter also analyses the factors that determine productivity among households 
facing or not facing a land constraint given the prevailing credit constraint condition. The 
results indicate that the number of dairy animals significantly increasses farm production of 
both land and land non-constrained households. Results also show that allocation of land 
resources to food crops tends to depress farm productivity regardless of the household's land 
constraint condition. However, the proportion of land allocated to food crops significantly 
depresses the value of farm production in land constrained households, but not in non-
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constrained households. As households facing a land constraint condition tend to allocate a 
bigger proportion of their land to food crops, the results can be interpreted to indicate the need 
for encouraging households to move away from food crops to dairy and high value export 
crops that enhance farm productivity. Moreover, the factors that determine farm productivity 
are shown to differ among households facing land constraint and those not constrained. This 
indicates that land constraint condition is important in determining household's farm 
productivity and their resource allocation decisions. 
From a policy point of view, the study results indicate that there are various interventions 
that can be applied to enhance the value of farm production in the study region. The results 
from the analysis of farm productivity also confirm earlier observations regarding the 
importance of deliberate policy interventions to address the food security concerns and 
enhancement of vibrant rural land markets. The latter intervention could go a long way in 
alleviating the land constraint faced by households in the region, a constraint which is bound to 
escalate as population pressure increases. For smallholder farmers to increase their farm 
productivity there is also need to address the imperfections in capital markets. The linking of 
land markets to capital markets will also allow the smallholder farmers in the study area to 
access formal credit. Furthermore, availability of credit can improve labour productivity, which 
is shown to be low. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PRODUCTION (COST) EFFICIENCY OF SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the enduring themes in development economics over the last three decades has been 
Shultz (1964) -'poor but efficient' hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, peasant farmers in 
traditional agriculture settings are viewed as efficient in their resource allocation behaviour 
given their operating circumstances. There is no doubt that production efficiency of 
smallholder farms has important implications for development strategies adopted in most 
developing countries where the primary sector is still dominant. Although most developing 
countries' agriculture has evolved over time to an extent where it can no longer be termed as 
traditional, the scope of increasing its efficiency still remains great. 
Economic reforms implemented in many developing countries during the last two 
decades have major implications for the dynamics of the socio-economic and institutional 
environments within which farmers operate. The reforms have been justified as a means 
through which farmers can enhance their economic efficiency thereby spurring higher 
agricultural productivity. However, in this unfolding process of agricultural and economic 
reforms, there has been a dearth of empirical studies documenting the level of agricultural 
production efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa. Equally, the relationship between market 
indicators, household characteristics, institutional factors and production efficiency has not 
been well understood. An improvement in the understanding of the levels of production 
efficiency and its relationship with a host of farm level factors can greatly aid policy makers in 
clearing efficiency-enhancing policies as well as in judging the efficacy of present and past 
reforms. For individual farms, gains in efficiency are particularly important in periods of 
fmancial and economic stress similar to the one being currently experienced in most Sub-
Saharan Africa agricultural sectors. The efficient categories of farms are more likely to 
generate higher incomes and thus stand a better chance of surviving and prospering. 
In recent years, there have also been important methodological developments in 
treasuring economic efficiency that provide better empirical estimates of levels of efficiency. 
These new methodologies need to be tested in more diversified farming situations than 
currently is the case. A review of production efficiency literature indicates that most of the 
studies done to estimate farm inefficiencies have been undertaken in Asia (see Ali & Byerlee, 
1^91, Battese, 1992, Bravo-ureta & Pinheiro, 1993). Very few studies have been undertaken in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and none is reported to have been undertaken on coffee farms, despite the 
importance of the crop in world trade and economic development of less developed countries. 
Owing to major economic and institutional differences, efficiency evidence from Asia may not 
be directly applied in the formulation of agrarian policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter 
therefore hopes to contribute towards better understanding of smallholder farmers' economic 
iciency in Sub-Saharan Africa while utilising the new methodological developments in isurement of economic efficiency. 
As stated in the objectives' section of this study (section 1.5), this chapter analyses the 
economic efficiency levels of smallholder coffee farms in Central Kenya using a stochastic 
frontier approach. This framework is applied to measure cost efficiency of the smallholder 
households. The derived inefficiency index is then related to household demographic variables 
including institutional as well as economic factors. We start with a description of the variables 
used in estimating the model and the empirical estimation considerations in section 7.2. 
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 report the analytical results on estimation of cost efficiencies and their 
decomposition, respectively. Conclusions from this chapter are drawn in the last section. 
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7.2 Data description and empirical estimation considerations 
To analyse the data, we developed a translog cost function as specified in section 2.3.5. The 
model is estimated by Maximum-Likelihood (ML) method using the LIMDEP® computer 
programme (Greene, 1995). For comparative purposes, three models are estimated differing in 
the assumed distribution of the efficiency term. The models are based on the half-normal, 
truncated and exponential distribution of the efficiency term. The log-likelihood functions of 
the three distributions are as given by Fried et al 1993; Aigner et al 1977. 
Cross-sectional data for the sample of 200 households are used to estimate the model. 
The data collection methods are earlier described in section 2.4. Due to the multi-product 
nature of the farm households in the region, total costs are aggregated across the four 
commodities; coffee, tea, dairy and horticultural crops. The total production costs constitute the 
cost of purchased inputs, cost of manure and hired labour for each individual farm household. 
The independent variables used in estimating the translog cost function include, the 
value of farm output (Q), the prices of fertilisers (f), pesticides (p), animal feed(a) and 
wage(w). Also included as independent variables are the fixed or quasi-fixed inputs in form of 
land size (L) and amount of family labour(H). 
The value of farm output is aggregated over the four commodities and valued at the 
going farm-gate prices. The details of the considerations made in valuation of the farm output 
are as indicated in section 6.2. Due to the heterogeneity of fertilisers, pesticides and animal 
feeds used by the households, the prices of these inputs are arrived at as a weighted average 
price of the various brands used by each household. The wage rate for hired labour also varied 
with sex, with female labour being paid less per day. Where such cases are encountered a 
weighted wage rate per manday is used. Family labour and total cultivated land in acres are the 
fixed inputs entered in the model. Family labour is measured in man-hours after taking care of 
family labour hired out, as well as sex and age differences. The farm size in acres owned by 
each household represents the land size. The detailed descriptions and considerations made in 
measuring these variables are also indicated in section 6.2. 
As indicated earlier, the constructed levels of cost inefficiencies (CI) per household are 
used as dependent variable in the second regression stage. Various factors are hypothesised as 
being responsible for the estimated farm-specific cost inefficiencies. Factors like land size, land 
tenure, credit availability, subsistence needs, extension, education level, age (experience), off-
farm work have been shown to influence farm efficiency (Kaliranjan & Flinn, 1983; Ali & 
Flinn, 1989; Parikh et al, 1995). In the current, study cost inefficiency is related to various 
household, institutional and socio-economic factors. The estimated regression equation is 
defined as: 
CI=ao+ an AGE + a2EDU +CC3HSIZE+ a4 FSIZE +CC5FOOD + oaCT 
Jra-jCOWS + asExt +a9Ficome + ccioOffincome + auEnterp 
+ anFoodm + anCredit +ai4Sacco +auD + s (7.1) 
Where, AGE and EDU are the age and formal education level of the household head; 
HSIZE and FSIZE are the household and farm sizes, respectively; FOOD and CT are the 
proportion (%) of land allocated to food crops and coffee and tea; COWS is the number of 
dairy animals kept by each household, Ext is the number of extension visits made by 
government agents per household in 1999, Fincome and Offincome are the amounts of on-farm 
and off-farm income received per household in the 1999/2000 production year, Enterp is the 
number of farm enterprises; Foodm is a dummy variable indicating household participation in 
food markets; Credit is the amount of credit received per household; Sacco is a dummy 
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variable indicating a household membership in a credit co-operative. D is a dummy variable 
categorising households into those marketing their coffee through co-operatives and those who 
are non-members. 
On a priori basis, the age and education level of the household head are expected to have 
a positive effect on level of efficiency as they embody experience and skills which can improve 
on economic efficiency. The household size determines to a great extent the available family 
labour. The size of the household can therefore be expected to improve efficiency especially in 
situations where labour is a constraint. Efficiency is however expected to decrease with farm 
size. This is in accordance with results from earlier studies that indicate higher relative 
efficiency of smaller farms (Yotopolous & Lau, 1973; Khan & Maki, 1979). 
The a priori expectation is that the level of market integration would increase efficiency 
as it allows a household to acquire market information that enables it to have higher allocative 
eificiency. Furthermore, most inputs and production technologies are in most cases interlocked 
with cash crops. As such, the proportion of land allocated to coffee and tea (CT) and the 
number of cows are expected to be positively related with efficiency, while the contra is true 
fcr area allocated to food crops. The availability of extension, credit, membership to a SACCO 
and participation in food markets are expected to increase efficiency. Equally higher farm 
income is expected to enhance efficiency as it enables a household to apply the necessary 
inputs that enhance technical efficiency. However, no a priori expectation could be placed on 
olf-farm income. Engagement in off-farm income generating activities can reduce the amount 
o\- labour available for on-farm production. Nevertheless, income from off-farm activities can 
b^ used to purchase inputs and hiring of labour thereby enhancing efficiency. 
7 J 3 Estimation of levels of cost inefficiencies 
Table 7.1 indicates the maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the translog cost frontier 
mjodels under the assumptions of half-normal and exponential distributions of the error term. 
As pointed out by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), the parameter X (ratio of standard 
deviations of the error terms) embodies the stochastic frontier model's level of inefficiency 
under the half-normal distribution assumption. As such the half-normal frontier model is 
parametized in terms of X and a2 (variance). Thus, the estimated value of X equal to 2.79 
indicates that the one-sided error term (u) dominates the systematic error (v) as shown in Table 
7 J . This is further attested by the values of the variance terms, with the one-sided component 
variance (au2 ) being seven times larger than the systematic variance term (a2) as also shown 
in the lower panel of Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 Maximum likelihood estimates of the translog cost frontier 
Name o f variable Parameter Half-normal model Exponential model 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficients T-ratio 
Constant bo 28.245 0.87 17.68 0.98 
Output (Q) b o -0.596 -3.02* -0.520 -4.17* 
Fertiliser price ( f ) b f 6.959 0.99 -1.249 -0.31 
Pesticide price (p) bp 3.171 1.33 -2.097 -1.59 
Animal feeds price (a) b , 4.947 1.39 -1.659 -0.79 
Wage (w) b „ 5.282 0.90 0.250 0.07 
Output X Output (QQ) C Q Q 0.016 1.47 0.015 2.09* 
Fertiliser X Fertiliser (ff) Cff -0.201 -0.17 -0.406 -0.58 
Pesticide X pesticide (pp) C P P 0.051 0.38 0.016 0.25 
Feeds X feeds (aa) ^aa 0.603 1.25 0.243 0.99 
Wage X Wage (ww) ^ W W 1.438 1.91 0.203 0.35 
Fertiliser X pesticides (fp) cii> 0.304 0.71 0.161 0.68 
Fertiliser X feed (fa) c a 0.223 0.56 0.099 0.38 
Fertiliser X Wage (fw) c f tv 0.606 0.77 -0.049 -0.10 
Pesticide X feeds (pa) C p a 0.083 0.48 -0.028 0.313 
Pesticides X wage (pw) C p w 0.045 0.19 0.132 0.87 
Feed X wage (aw) ' 'aw -0.084 -0.29 -0.018 -0.11 
Land (L) K 0.159 0.31 -0.010 -0.03 
Family Labour (H) bn -0.355 -0.27 -0.197 -0.27 
Land X Land (LL) 0.042 2.45* 0.026 2.08 
Labour X Labour (HH) "HH 0.006 0.09 0.009 0.26 
Land X Fertiliser (Lf) \I 0.080 0.97 0.065 1.14 
Land X pesticides (Lp) -0.048 -1.71 -0.024 -1.21 
Land X Feeds (La) b u 0.005 0.14 -0.015 -0.64 
Land X wage (Lw) b t w -0.102 -1.50 -0.069 -1.77 
Labour X Fertiliser (Hf) bw 0.177 0.99 0.1279 1.15 
Labour X pesticides (Hp) bep 0.157 2.23* 0.13 3.05* 
Labour X Feeds (Ha) hn. 0.064 1.09 0.023 0.62 
Labour X Wage (Hw) bnw 0.078 0.63 0.133 1.63 
Land X Output (LQ) D L Q 0.027 2.53* 0.03 4.58* 
Labour X Output (HQ) -0.093 -6.04* -0.083 8.43* 
Lambda 2.7 0.39 
Sigma j 0.187 18.04* Theta r - - 9.84 9.48* 
rv 0.03 4.19* 
t 2 0.312 0.0103 
t 2 
1 V 
0.044 0.0013 
Log likelihood 196.78 198.79 
* s ignif icance at 5% level 
The cost frontier model formulated under the assumption of exponential distribution of 
the disturbance term also gave equally good results as those of the half-normal model. The 
parameters of the exponential distribution {0 and are both significant at 5% level (Table 
7.1). The cost frontier model with truncated-normal assumption is also estimated for 
comparison purposes. However, the MLEs coefficient estimates are similar to those of the half-
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normal model and the parameter u is not statistically different from zero. As such the 
assumption of ju = 0 seems warranted, and consequently the MLEs are not reported. 
Based on the MLEs of the translog cost frontier, the mean of the cost inefficiency 
measure (u) is 8.5% and 7.9% for the half-normal and exponential distribution models, 
respectively (Table 7.2). As the difference between the observed cost and the frontier costs is 
attributed to both technical and allocative efficiency, the results indicate that on average 7.9% 
to 8.5% of the costs incurred by farm households could be avoided without any loss in total 
output. Table 7.2 and the corresponding bar chart in Figure 7.1 shows the frequency 
distribution of the estimated cost inefficiencies across the farm households. The frequency 
distributions of the farm-specific cost inefficiencies show a wide variation in the level of 
inefficiencies. The cost inefficiencies ranges from 1% to 66.3% with 91% of the households 
having inefficiencies below 15% (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 Frequency distribution offarm-specific cost inefficiencies of the 
stochastic translog cost frontier models 
Inefficiency Half-normal model Exponential model 
index (%) 
No. of % o f Cumulative % No. of farms % o f Cumulative 
farms farms farms % 
0 - 5 70 35.0 35.0 86 43.0 43.0 
5.1 - 1 0 58 29.0 64.0 63 31.5 74.5 
10 .1 -15 54 27.0 91.0 30 15.0 89.5 
15 .1 -20 5 2.5 93.5 7 3.5 93.0 
2 0 . 1 - 3 0 8 4.0 97.5 7 3.5 96.5 
30.1 - 4 0 2 1.0 98.5 5 2.5 99.0 
40.1- 50 1 0.5 99.5 1 0.5 99.5 
above 50 1 0.5 100 1 0.5 100 
Mean 8.57 7.87 
STD dev 7.82 8.32 
S.E. of mean 0.55 0.59 
Minimum 0.13% 0.02% 
Maximum 61.92% 66.30% 
Assuming that; 
i. The cost inefficiency levels in Table 7.2 also applies to coffee enterprise. 
ii. Smallholder coffee production in 1999 of 50,000 tonnes. 
I iii. Average cost of coffee production of Ksh 60,000 per tonne in 1999 (CRF,1999). 
This study estimates that if half the cost inefficiencies in coffee production are avoided, this 
might lead to smallholder coffee farmer's savings about Ksh 200 million per year. These cost 
savings would increase coffee enterprise profitability and hence the overall competitive 
advantage of the enterprise. The multiplier effect of cost savings in other farm enterprises can 
be expected to lead to marked improvements in farm incomes with no changes in production 
l0vels. Thus, although, the cost inefficiency levels may appear small they can translate into 
significant savings at the farm level. 
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Figure 7.1 Frequency distribution of cost inefficiency index per stochastic model type 
7 . 4 Factors determining the level of efficiency 
The derived farm-specific cost inefficiency indices are used as dependent variable in estimation 
of regression equation 7.1. This analysis is mainly aimed at identifying the factors that 
influence the farmer's level of inefficiency. Table 7.3 shows the estimation coefficients and the 
other relevant parameters. 
As shown in Table 7.3, both the estimated models based on the farm-specific cost 
inefficiencies under the assumptions of half-normal and exponential distributions of the error 
terms give almost similar results. The results indicate that the household size and the age of the 
household head coefficients have a negative sign, but not significant. This result seems 
plausible in that larger families can be expected to not only dedicate more labour to farm 
operations but also to ensure that operations are performed on time. As Parikh et al (1995) has 
shown for Pakistan, a larger family size can also offer a rational household head wider 
possibilities for matching jobs with the right person in terms of sex and age. Viewed from a 
broader context this result also indicates that, despite the high labour to land ratio prevalent in 
the study area, the opportunity cost of family labour is still positive. 
The age of the household head can also be expected to have an efficiency enhancing 
effect as older household heads tend to be more experienced in farming, a factor that has been 
shown to enhance efficiency in many farming situations (Rougoor et al, 1998). While 
experience in farming can enhance efficiency in farming due to prudent resource allocation 
decisions, age can also hinder adoption of new technologies due to higher risk aversion 
associated with older farmers. 
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Variable 
Table 7.3 Relationship between farm-specific cost inefficiencies and household's 
demographic, economic and institutional factors 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
Constant 5.789 1.208 4.507 0.906 
Háize -0.159 -1.041 -0.196 -1.239 
Age -0.908 xlO" 2 -0.215 -0.019 -0.456 
Edu 0.669 1.197 0.498 0.858 
l'size 0.329 4.968* 0.372 5.416* 
F o U 0.128 0.034 0.388 0.100 
CT -0.889 -0.408 -1.187 -0.525 
Cckvs -0.245 -1.252 -0.211 -1.037 
Ext 0.134 0.477 -0.012 -0.042 
Fincóme -0.361 x 10' 5 -2.168* -0.495 x 10" s -2.868* 
Oipncome 0.266 x 1 0 s 0.571 0.585 x 10"5 1.208 
Epterp -0.013 -0.026 0.105 0.204 
Fojodm -1.399 -1.146 -1.712 -1.350 
Credit -0.263 x 10-4 -2.352* -0.239 x 10"4 -2.881* 
Sacco -0.308 -0.233 -0.377 -0.289 
Dummy -1.148 -0.704 -0.343 -0.203 
R 2 
F(15,184) 
D W statistic 
Log -likelihood 
0.183 
2.75 
1.96 
674.47 
0.222 
3.50 
1.95 
681.93 
Mbdel 1 and model 2 are based on the cost inefficiency estimates from the translog cost frontier under 
the half-normal and exponential distribution of the disturbance terms, respectively. * indicates 
significance at 5% level. D-W stands for Darbin Watson statistic. 
The results also indicate that the level of formal education of the household head tends 
to increase inefficiency but not significantly. This result seems contrary to expectations and 
contradicting empirical evidence from other developing countries that supports the hypothesis 
that associates higher education with improved efficiency as reviewed by Bravo-Ureta & 
Pipheiro (1993); Phillips (1994) and Rougoor et al (1998). 
Equally, the result from this study indicates no significant effect of extension on the 
level of farm inefficiency. Indeed, results from model 1 (Table 7.3) indicate a positive 
relationship between extension visits and level of cost inefficiency. Guatam (2000) also had 
found no significant relationship between supply of extension services and district-specific 
efficiency measures in Kenya45. Moreover, these findings seems to confirm the earlier results 
reported in section 6.3.2 indicating that extension did not enhance farm productivity. 
The farm size is found to have a significant effect on farm inefficiency. This means that 
larger farms are associated with higher levels of inefficiency. As shown in Table 7.4 , the level 
of" cost inefficiency increased with farm size among the sampled households. This result is also 
confirmed by Gautam (2000) who indicates that smaller farms in Kenya have higher cost and 
technical efficiency than the bigger farms. 
4 5 The study measured relative efficiency of households using data enveloping analysis (DEA). Technical, 
allocative and economic (cost) efficiencies were estimated using household data collected in 1997. 
142 
Table 7.4 Relationship between cost inefficiency and farm size. 
Chapter 7 
Farm size group half-normal model Exponential model 
(acres) 
mean STD deviation Mean STD deviation Number (N) 
% cost inefficiency 
0 - 2 . 5 6.19 4.63 5.35 3.91 64 
2 . 5 1 - 5 6.26 4.16 5.16 4.97 32 
5 . 1 - 1 0 9.13 7.08 8.07 6.98 48 
1 0 . 1 - 1 5 8.08 8.54 8.16 8.45 17 
1 5 . 1 - 2 0 12.38 7.31 10.94 7.94 15 
2 0 . 1 - 3 0 12.01 10.95 11.89 11.72 10 
3 0 . 1 - 5 0 16.08 17.13 17.57 19.04 11 
over 50 19.96 7.02 21.33 12.91 3 
Pop. Mean 8.56 7.83 7.87 8.32 200 
The amounts of land allocated to food crops, coffee and tea, and the number of dairy 
animals are included as variables to test the relationship between household resource allocation 
behaviour and efficiency. These factors are, however, not significant in accounting for the level 
of cost inefficiency. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that the proportion of land allocated 
to food crops tends to increase inefficiency while the proportion of land allocated to cash crops 
(coffee and tea) as well as number of dairy animals tends to reduce the level of inefficiency. 
Participation of households in food markets also tends to enhance efficiency level (Table 7.3). 
Participation in food markets can be expected to reduce the amount of land allocated for 
subsistence production thereby having a positive effect on efficiency. 
The amount of on-farm income has a significant positive impact on the level of 
efficiency while the amount of off-farm income tends to increase the level of inefficiency, 
albeit not significantly. Allocation of more time and effort to off-farm activities may bring in 
extra cash that can ease the pressure for a household to seek credit, but it has the negative 
impact on the effort spent on farm activities. In contrast, more effort on on-farm activities has a 
positive impact on efficiency as clearly indicated by these results. 
Availability of credit can shift the cash constraint outwards enabling farmers to not only 
purchase farm inputs, but also ensuring timely application of such inputs. These factors can be 
expected to enhance efficiency of production, a fact that is confirmed by the significant credit 
coefficient as shown in Table 7.3. Equally, those households who are members of a saving and 
credit co-operative society (SACCO) tend to have lower inefficiency levels, although not at a 
significant level. 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter uses cross-sectional data on input costs and aggregate farm output to measure 
farm-specific inefficiencies using stochastic cost frontier models. A translog cost frontier is 
used to estimate the cost efficiency levels of smallholder households in Kenya. Three such 
models based on half-normal, exponential and truncated-normal distributions of the error terms 
are estimated. Two of the models give quite similar results, except for the model based on 
truncated-normal assumption whose efficiency parameter is not significant. This result indicate 
that the estimates are not significantly affected by the stochastic assumptions albeit for the 
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trjuncated-normal assumption. It is therefore concluded that equally good results can be 
obtained from other stochastic assumptions without necessarily relying on the half-normal 
distribution assumption that has almost become the standard choice of most researchers. 
The results show that the smallholder farmers in Central Kenya region are quite cost 
efficient. The average level of cost inefficiency is between 7.9% and 8.5% depending on the 
stochastic distribution assumption. We therefore conclude that there is still scope for improving 
production efficiency of smallholder agricultural producers in Kenya. Furthermore, given that 
most smallholder farmers are reasonably efficient, indications are that increases in productivity 
will require a development strategy that can shift the production frontier outwards though use 
of new inputs and technologies. 
The estimated values of farm-specific cost inefficiencies are regressed on various 
hausehold demographic, institutional, and economic variables with an aim of decomposing the 
levels of inefficiencies. The results indicate that cost inefficiencies increase significantly with 
farm size, while they decrease with the level of farm-incomes and amounts of credit available 
to each household. The result on the relationship between farm size and the level of 
inefficiency can be interpreted to indicate that small farms have higher efficiency than bigger 
ones. Thus, the results from this chapter may serve as an indicator that smallholder-based 
ajricultural development policy is still relevant, and an efficient mode of organising production 
in Kenya and other contemporary developing countries. 
The results further show that household demographic factors such as age and education 
l^vel of the household head did not significantly affect the level of farm efficiency. Equally, the 
institutional factors such as availability of extension services, participation of households in 
food markets and membership to a credit co-operative society do affect the level of efficiency, 
but not significantly. However, availability of credit is shown to have a significant positive 
impact on efficiency. Household's resource allocation behaviour as proxied by land allocation 
to food and cash crops as well as the number of dairy animals are also found to be important 
but not significant variables. Thus, the study concludes that the opportunities for increasing 
smallholder farms productivity through more efficient use of the existing resources still exist 
although to a limited scale. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
8 1 Introduction 
Tpe effects of market reforms on the agricultural sector, and smallholder coffee farms in 
Central Kenya in particular, is the theme of this study. These effects are analysed from a 
number of perspectives based on the specific research questions outlined in section 1.5.2. 
Smallholder-based agricultural systems offer formidable challenges especially as far as the 
organisation of market chains, the provision of public goods and services and the institutional 
requirements necessary for functioning factor and non-factor markets are concerned. 
Nevertheless, smallholder-based agricultural development strategy also offers opportunities for 
generating broad-based agricultural and economic growth. These opportunities and challenges 
are among the broader issues discussed in this chapter and are particularly important in the 
SSA context where smallholder agriculture is still dominant. 
This chapter has been divided into five sections. The first four sections discuss the results 
friom the present study. Each section focusing on a specific research question (s) in the order 
ojiflined in section 1.5.2. Section 8.2 discusses the impact of liberalised pricing and marketing 
policy on terms of trade in the agricultural sector, the general level of selected commodity 
pices and their price volatility. Section 8.3 discusses the effects of market reforms on 
smallholder market institutions with specific emphasis on farmer's access to production and 
marketing services as well as to factor markets. The impact of reforms on market structure and 
trade contracts is discussed in section 8.4. Section 8.5 discusses the factors determining 
smallholder farm productivity in a reforming environment characterised by credit constraints 
and thin factor (land) markets. This section also evaluates the factors determining farm-level 
efficiency and the policy measures that can be applied to enhance efficiency. The final section 
concludes and identifies various policy measures that can be applied to promote smallholder 
agricultural development in Kenya. Areas of possible further research are also highlighted in 
the last section. 
8 2 Impact of market reforms on agricultural sector terms of trade and commodity prices 
8.2.1 Agricultural sector terms of trade and implications to development 
The results of this study indicate that during the period subsequent to macro-economic and 
agricultural sector reforms in Kenya, the agricultural sector terms of trade initially deteriorated 
and remained on average below the pre-liberalisation levels. Nevertheless, since 1997, the 
terms of trade have increased to pre-liberalisation levels. Thus, the general held view that 
market reforms enhance the agricultural sector terms of trade is found to be partially true for 
the Kenyan situation. The results further indicate that market reforms have arrested the 
declining trend in agricultural sector terms of trade. This may indicate that, in the long-term, 
the agricultural sector terms of trade can be enhanced if the momentum of reform is sustained. 
The deterioration of the agricultural terms of trade is shown to be the result of a decline in 
ajjricultural output prices against major price increases in manufactured consumer goods. The 
decline in agricultural output prices can be attributed to both domestic and international 
factors. On the domestic front, the results of this study indicate that market reforms have 
reduced the implicit tax burden placed on the agricultural sector through regulation, taxation 
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4 6 Preferential trade initiatives have been recently introduced such as the European Union (EU) 'everything but 
arms' initiative for L D C s , and the United States -Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). There is 
however growing evidence to the effect that real benefits of concessional trade arrangements are limited. For 
instance, in the 25 year existence of the Lome Convention, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
exports to EU have fallen from 7% to 3% in total (CFC, 2001). The limited success of preferential trade has 
been attributed to quota ceilings, non-linkage of market access and productive capacity, Imitations on coverage 
and more recently limitations based on environmental, consumer and other concerns. 
and local currency overvaluation. Nevertheless, high inflation rates, high transaction costs and 
poor macro-economic performance have had the double effect of reducing agricultural output 
prices while increasing the price of manufactured goods. Tax reforms such as the introduction 
of Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1992 may have also contributed to increasing the price of 
manufactured goods, thereby lowering the terms of trade in agriculture. However, the tight 
monetary policy that has been in place since 1997 has contained inflation rates to single digit 
levels while the VAT rate has been gradually reduced from an average of 18% in 1997 to 
around 15% in 1999. These developments coupled with better coffee and tea prices could 
explain recent improvements in agricultural terms of trade. Although further reforms in 
taxation and other macro-policies are needed to correct the historical policy bias against 
agriculture, special and further attention is also needed for reforms that can lower transaction 
costs. These kinds of policy reforms are not only necessary to improve the terms of agricultural 
trade, they are also needed to stimulate broad-based growth driven by the dominant agricultural 
sector. 
Corbo and Fisher (1995) and Teranishi (1997) have shown that differences in levels of 
government investments - especially in rural infrastructure, technology, human capital and 
other support services - can be used to account for poor agricultural sector performance in most 
SSA countries. It can also help explain why the sustainable growth recorded in the region is 
below that of countries in Latin America and East Asia. While appreciating the role of the 
market, Stiglitz (1998) shares the same view by arguing that the market, left to itself, is likely 
to under-provide on human capital, research and development and other physical and social 
infrastructure necessary to enhance growth and development. Furthermore, recent work by 
Dollar and Kay (2000) also shows that economic growth is a key factor in poverty reduction, 
an issues that currently dominants in the development agenda. Moreover, according to Hanmer 
and Naschold (2000), the type of growth also matters in terms of the particular processes and 
sectors that generate growth. Various studies have shown that the agricultural sector is 
particularly important in generating the type of broad-based growth needed to secure a rapid 
poverty reduction (Lipton, 1977; Dart & Raviallion, 1998). Poverty reduction has been 
attributed to the growth of agricultural output and a growth in small-scale enterprises and 
services related to the rural economy but not to the movement of labour and capital out of 
agriculture (Thorbecke and Jung, 1996). Timmer (1997) and Bourgignon and Morrisson (1998) 
further indicate that growth in agriculture and basic services reduces poverty more than 
expanding industrial output. Thus, the lessons are clear, agricultural growth is important for 
both economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
The global trading environment, and more specifically, the ability of LDCs to 
participate fully in the process of globalisation, is also a major factor that continues to 
contribute to low agricultural terms of trade and prospects for economic growth. Trade not only 
provides the opportunity for increasing export earnings, it also makes possible the transfer of 
technology and provides scope for enhancing economies of scale. However, agricultural 
producers in developing countries continue to confront high trade barriers that limit their 
market access and result in the deterioration of prices and terms of trade 4 6 . According to World 
Bank estimates, for example, when the average poor person (producer) in a developing country 
participates in global trade he or she confronts market barriers that are roughly twice as high as 
those faced by a typical worker in a developed country (World Bank, 2001a). A case in point is 
the high subsidies and other support given to agricultural producers in developed countries, 
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estimated to be US $ 1 billion per day. Thus, it is also necessary to reshape the global trade 
environment, especially in agricultural trade, to enhance market access and promote pro-poor 
market based initiatives. 
The results of this study can, therefore, serve to indicate that while there is still room 
for galvanising and solidifying the positive effects of the liberalisation measures taken so far in 
tpe Kenyan agricultural sector, increases in government expenditure are needed in technology 
development, extension and rural infrastructure. This will not only stem the flow of resources 
from the sector but will also help boost the declining supply response of agriculture producers. 
I: is also likely to be an effective way of enhancing economic growth and reducing poverty. 
$.2.2 Evolution of commodity prices 
As indicated by Thorbecke (2000) and Kuvyenhoven et al (2000), evidence emerging from 
SSA indicates that liberalisation has largely been of the priciest type -"getting the prices right" 
4 whose aim has been to rise real prices of agricultural commodities. However, there is a lot of 
empirical ambiguity about the actual effects of market reform policies on the general direction 
and magnitude of real price changes. Inter-commodity differences, inter-seasonal variations 
ahd international commodity price movement complicate predictions about both the direction 
ajnd magnitude of real prices. Nevertheless, the general direction and magnitude of real 
cjommodity price changes continue to be of great importance as they determine, inter alia, the 
direction and magnitude of the supply response that can be expected from agricultural 
producers. As Mellor (1968) has pointed out, the output pricing system can be used to 
encourage investment and capital formation in agriculture. High farm prices relative to those in 
other sectors can therefore increase the rate of return to capital in agriculture and in this way 
encourage investment and growth in the sector. In developing countries most of the population 
i^  engaged in agriculture. Therefore, growth in this sector will translate into general growth in 
tjie macro-economy and will perform a major equity role as well. 
The results of this study indicate that the average real crop and livestock commodity 
prices in Kenya in the period of liberalisation were below those in the pre-liberalisation period. 
Tfhere are, however, inter-commodity differences with the real producer prices of tea and maize 
registering a decline in the liberalisation period, and an increase in the prices for milk and 
cjoffee in the same period. Nevertheless, overall price movement of crops and livestock was 
positive in the reform period unlike the negative trend predominant in the pre-reform period. 
The results of this study confirm earlier findings by Karanja et al. (1998); Jayne & Kodhek 
(1997) and Staal et al (1998) who had indicated declines in maize prices and increases in milk 
prices during the reform period. Further results from this study show that the wedge between 
output and input prices widened in the period subsequent to the reforms as indicated by the 
declining ratio of output to input (O/I), only to recover during the last years of the period 
analysed. This indicates that the profitability of input use may have declined during the main 
part of the reform period. This is confirmed by analysis of the trends in relative prices that 
show a notable decline of commodity to fertiliser relative prices. This result contradicts that of 
Mbithi (2000), indicating that the fertiliser-maize price ratio decreased during the reform 
period in Kenya. A number of factors can be suggested to explain this mixed effects of market 
rsforms on producer prices and the output to input ratio. 
At the international level, real non-oil commodity prices have been declining for most 
cf the twentieth century and particularly since the beginning of 1970s (CFC, 2001; World 
Hank, 2000c). One of the major factors in the decline of commodity prices, particularly in 
recent years is related to a steady growth in supply that has not been matched by growth in 
demand and which has lead to a high ratio of global stocks in relation to annual consumption. 
According to CFC (2001), for example, coffee stocks as a percentage of consumption in 2000 
were estimated at 38% as compared to 40% for cocoa, 37% for cotton and 49% for sugar. This 
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scenario is reminiscent to the "fallacy of composition" which indicates that commodity 
producer countries as a group can hardly expect to boost their export revenues by merely 
increasing their production. Nevertheless, the global over-supply can in part be seen as a 
response to the economic reforms that have been implemented in most LDCs over the last two 
decades. These reforms, especially in the agricultural sector, have removed the bias against 
exports thereby improving the incentives for commodity producers to boost exports. Apart 
from the supply response by producers, there is also robust statistical evidence, both across 
commodities and countries, that supports the hypothesis that there is a growing disparity 
between producer and consumer prices. This factor could be responsible for the slow growth in 
commodity demand and hence the decline in prices (CFC, 2001). CFC (2001), for example, 
estimates that while the price of raw coffee declined by 18% on the world markets between 
1975 and 1993, coffee consumer prices increased by 240% in the United States which is the 
largest consumer of coffee. Furthermore, it has been estimated that the constrained growth in 
demand may have cost commodity-exporting countries around US $ 100 billion per year (CFC, 
2001). Thus, the global trading environment, and the ability of LDCs to participate fully in the 
process of globalisation, is a major factor that might have contributed to the decline in producer 
prices despite the positive effects of market reforms. The challenge, therefore, remains of how 
to offer increased returns and opportunities (through wider access to global markets) to LDCs 
commodity producers. 
For producer countries market reforms were expected to dampen the negative effects of 
global commodity markets. However, the results from this study clearly give the indication that 
market reforms did not immediately improve the producer prices received by smallholder 
farmers in Kenya. As such, there is unambiguous initial negative effect of market reforms on 
producer prices in Kenya. The smallholder supply response was negative as expected in a 
situation of declining prices. This is attested by the decline in the marketed agricultural 
production during the period under review as documented by Nyangito (1999) and Republic of 
Kenya (2000). 
A literature review indicates that the Kenyan situation is similar to that documented by 
Valdes (1996) for eight Latin American countries where all major agricultural producer prices 
declined in real terms between 1986 and 1995. Similarly as in the eight Latin American 
countries studied by Valdes, the initial decline in real producer prices in Kenya could be 
attributed to half-hearted, intermittent market reforms which have been implemented in 
acrimony and sometimes seen as imposition from international development institutions. As 
Onjale (1995) and Swamy (1994) indicate the non-conducive environment, timing and 
sequencing of the liberalisation measures in Kenya may well have negated the benefits of what 
could have accrued from the reforms. Due timing and sequencing problems, some agricultural 
sector reforms preceded macro-economic reforms. In October 1992, for instance, the 
government stipulated that trade at the coffee and tea auctions in Nairobi and Mombasa should 
be conducted in US dollars as part of export commodity trade reform. However, coffee and tea 
farmers could not benefit from this trade reform as they could not transact their business in 
dollars due to foreign exchange controls, which were only amended in 1993. There are also 
glaring and costly timing and sequencing problems in the agricultural sector reform program. A 
particularly illustrative example can be found in the liberalisation of the agricultural inputs 
market in 1993 that included the abolition of fertiliser subsidies, while liberalisation of most 
output markets was delayed until the end of 1996. In fact coffee and tea output markets were 
still not fully liberalised in 1999. The liberalisation of interest rates coupled with the 
liberalisation of fertiliser and other input prices in 1993 was also not matched by any reform in 
rural credit markets, a situation that stiffed the use of inputs and farm productivity. Thus, 
timing and sequencing problems, especially in the input and output markets, might account to 
some extent for the widening of the output to input price ratios during the reform period. As 
indicated by FAO (1994), it is generally advisable to liberalise the output markets before the 
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ijnput markets in order to reduce the short-term structural problems that smallholder farmers 
face in procuring inputs from private channels. 
However, the issue of the timing and sequencing of market reforms is not confined to 
Kenya and Latin American countries. It has also been reported in other SSA countries such as 
Malawi (Spooner & Smith,1991; Kherallah & Govindan, 1999) and Tanzania (Booth,1991). 
Experiences derived from these and other studies (see Duncan & Jones, 1993; FAO, 1994) 
indicate that before reducing government operations in agricultural markets, measures to 
decontrol all prices and to promote private sector participation should be in place. The studies 
also suggest that domestic financial market liberalisation should precede efforts to promote 
private sector participation as lack of access to finance is a major barrier to entry. A World 
Bank (1994) evaluation of SAPs in Africa also indicates that it is those countries that have 
undertaken and sustained policy reforms that have enjoyed some degree of economic as well as 
agricultural growth. This indicates that over and above timing and sequencing, there is a need 
for consistency in the reform process. In a wider context, the results of this study seem to 
vindicate the need for sustained and well-timed liberalisation measures as a necessary 
Condition for reversals in agricultural prices and growth trends. 
Apart from the lapses in the implementation of market reform policies, the initial 
decline in real producer prices in Kenya could also have been a result of the inefficiencies 
created along the marketing chain by retention of the monopoly power enjoyed by some 
marketing boards. Among the four commodities considered in this study, for example, only the 
real producer prices for milk and coffee increased during the liberalisation period. A closer 
lpok into the marketing channels of milk indicates that, unlike the other three commodities, 
stiff competition, multiplicity of marketing channels and strong private sector participation 
since the liberalisation of the dairy sub-sector in 1992, have lowered transactions costs in the 
fresh milk markets. This is in total contrast to the other sub-sectors where statutory marketing 
boards and local monopolies (e.g. co-operatives) still exercise considerable control in 
marketing and where there is limited private sector participation. As indicated by Booth 
(1991), delays in reforming marketing institutions in a liberalised trade environment can result 
in major distortions and high transaction costs that reduces farm gate prices and hence farm 
incomes. 
However, it is important to point out that low food prices can be beneficial to both rural 
and urban consumers. In most situations the majority of smallholder producers are also net 
buyers of food as shown by Deaton (1989); Weber et al (1988), and Barrett & Dorosh (1996). 
Results from this study also point in the same direction. Thus, while it is important to address te issue of declining prices for cash crops like coffee and tea in order to enhance rural >useholds' incomes, the same cannot be said about policies that are intended to raise food 
¿rices. Moreover, Fafchamps (1992); Jayne (1994), and Goetz (1993) have highlighted the fact 
that lowering food costs to food-deficient rural households can release resources that can be re-
allocated to cash crops and off-farm activities with higher expected payoffs. In addition, as 
indicated by the results in chapter 6 of this thesis, farm productivity and resource allocation is 
ijighly dependent on a household's ability to participate in food markets. Although the need to 
lpwer consumer food prices while enhancing the level of producer prices may appear 
paradoxical, the two objectives can be achieved by enhancing both production and marketing 
efficiency. This requires policies specifically targeted to enhancing farm productivity and 
reducing transaction costs. Thus, further trade and institutional reforms aimed at promoting 
domestic investments, productivity and lower production and transaction costs would be 
beneficial. 
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8.2.3 Volatility of commodity prices 
Pre-occupation with the presumed adverse effects of price instability has led many developing 
countries to establish a wide variety of mechanisms to stabilise prices for both internationally 
and domestically traded commodities. Volatility in commodity prices exposes producers, 
traders and consumers to price risks that, if unmitigated, can adversely affect incomes, trade 
margins and costs. In Kenya, prior to the introduction of liberalisation policies, one of the 
stated agricultural development policy objectives was to stabilise consumer and producer 
prices (Republic of Kenya, 1986; Pearson, 1995). This policy was aimed at reducing 
fluctuations in farm incomes while ensuring affordable food prices to consumers. 
At the macro-economic level, commodity price volatility can cause fluctuations in 
macro-economic variables (such as exchange rate), the overall balance of payment position and 
the level of investment. In turn this can have an adverse affect on economic growth. Indeed, 
one frequently voiced claim is that instability in agricultural export earnings (arising from 
instability of production and prices or both) has a detrimental effect on the rate of economic 
growth and socio-political stability. Indeed, one of the voiced claims is that instability of 
agricultural export earnings (arising from instability of production and prices or both) has 
detrimental effect on the rate of economic growth and socio-political stability. Although some 
studies have contested this argument (MacBean, 1980), the weight of opinion seems to suggest 
that instability of agricultural export earnings has for various sample sets, data periods, 
statistical methods, and a host of independent variables, negative effects on economic growth, 
growth of exports and investments to GNP ratio in many developing countries (Adams & 
Berhrman, 1982; Sengupta,1980; Deaton & Miller, 1996). A recent analysis of factors 
determining economic growth in Africa by Collier & Gunning (1999) indicates that minerals 
and agricultural commodities dominate the region's exports. This export concentration means 
that Africa's terms of trade are determined by commodity prices, a fact that has made the terms 
of trade extremely volatile and consequently has given rise to a reduction in economic growth. 
Another recent study from the World Bank using a historical perspective indicates that 
sustained periods of stable growth and income stability are more conducive to robust poverty 
reduction than periods characterised by cyclical patterns of 'boom and bust' (World Bank, 
2000d). The lesson for LDCs and the international community is therefore clear: commodity 
price volatility is a source of instability that undermines prospects for steady economic growth 
and should therefore be addressed. 
At the commodity trade level, companies involved in exports, stockholding and other 
related business activities are also affected by price volatility. Price volatility if not mitigated 
upon can eliminate profits and jeopardise business survival. Low trade volumes and limitations 
in accessing price insurance forces most companies in developing countries to raise their trade 
margins, a factor that reduces their competitiveness and increases the transaction costs in 
commodity chains. Thus, policies that enhance price risk management will be of great 
importance to trading houses in most developing countries. Nevertheless, price volatility can 
also be turned into business opportunities through stockholding and other inter-temporal supply 
management strategies. Results from this study, for example, indicate significant seasonal 
variations in maize prices. These variations can be utilised to induce inter-temporal supply 
management strategies both at the farm and trade level. 
It has been further argued that high price volatility can reduce the welfare of the poor 
(such as smallholder farmers) who have limited price (income) risk management strategies. 
However, liberalisation policies have had a mixed effect on increased/lowered price volatility 
(Barrett, 1997). Results from this study indicate that the volatility of agricultural producer 
prices in Kenya increased during the period after liberalisation. This result when compared 
with earlier results from other studies (Shively (1996) in Ghana; Barrett (1997) in Madagascar 
and Badiane (2000) in Malawi may indicate that market reforms are generally associated with 
higher long-term price volatility. This means that price risk management policies in Sub-
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Sanaran Africa deserve higher priority than they are being given at the moment. According to 
Newbery (1996), crop insurance schemes aimed at stabilising producer incomes are plagued 
with moral hazards that limit their success. As such, most policy interventions designed to 
stabilise incomes are undertaken with the objective of stabilising producer prices. In the recent 
past, International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) have been used with a certain degree of 
success to stabilise producer prices in developing countries. The prevailing economic thinking 
that advocates increasing globalised free trade, however, consigns most ICAs to history. 
Indeed, obituary notices for ICAs have already been written (Gilbert, 1996). This means that 
developing countries have to take the onus of stabilising the commodity prices for their 
producers by using stabilisation funds/agricultural funds and to a more limited extent 
marketing boards regulation. The operation of these direct market interventionist programmes 
will, however, require a constant evaluation of the temporariness and trends of commodity 
prices. As it can be appreciated, forecasting the future path of commodity prices can be a 
notoriously difficult task. Moreover, market reforms in most developing countries have greatly 
limited the direct market intervention options by governments and agricultural marketing 
boards. 
Rather than reacting to commodity price changes (which is the hallmark of price 
stabilisation funds), it is possible for Sub-Saharan countries to trade away much of the price 
risks by using modern market instruments such as futures, option and commodity swaps. 
However, this development requires a suitable legal and financial environment before it can 
become reality. The World Bank led International Task Force on commodity risk management 
(iTF) has already undertaken a study of the way these instruments are used. Pilot projects to 
test their use are being undertaken by the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC, 2001)47. The 
ITF proposal identifies the need to strengthen smallholder producer associations and co-
operatives to enable them to serve as a bridge between international price insurance markets 
and their members or what are termed as Local Transmission Mechanisms (LTMs). It is 
envisaged that LTMs will aggregate the volumes needed for purchasing price insurance. They 
are also expected to distribute the funds from the price insurance (in case of claim) and 
facilitate the provision of core services and technical assistance. However, before this scheme 
becomes a reality, major investments in capacity building and farmer education are needed. 
Equally, the producer associations have to learn to accept their new role in price risk 
management, a role that, before liberalisation, was largely borne by governments and 
njiarketing boards. Indeed, the transition from commodity production to future exchanges and 
njiarket-based price risk management may seem far-fetched at the moment. However, given 
current global trends, farmers and their associations cannot simply limit themselves to 
cammodity production and processing but must become actively involved in marketing and 
planning based on certain price expectations. Farmers associations therefore need to take a 
more active role in the promotion and use of market-based risk management and see it as an 
essential element of their forward-looking strategy. 
In certain circumstances, parastatals involved in commodity marketing can also play a 
major role in risk management intermediation on be behalf of farmers. The KTDA which, over 
the years, has offered smallholder tea farmers in Kenya a guaranteed monthly price (adjusted at 
the end of each year by a bonus payment) is a good example of such a parastatal. KTDA has 
the added advantage of dealing with the large trade volumes that are necessary for price 
insurance. 
Gilbert (2001) has pointed out that that the willingness of farmers' to pay commercial 
premiums for price insurance must also be considered. Most farmers tend to be self-insured 
either through diversification in the form a diversity of crop and livestock activities or by 
According to the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), the first such project was approved in April 2000 
a i d will asses the feasibility of using market based price risk management instruments in the cocoa sector in 
West Africa (CFC, 2001) 
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4 8 Social capital has been defined as the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively. See 
Woolcock & Narayan (2000) on a recent review of social capital and its implications to development, research 
and policy. 
engaging in agricultural (farm) and non-agricultural (off-farm) income generating activities 
(Dearon,1996; Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 1993). Results from this study indicate that in the 
study region about 68% of the households had a coffee income concentration of less than 50% 
(see section 4.7). Based on these income concentration ratios the cost of price volatility (the 
insurance premiums) for a smallholder farmer with a 42% coffee income concentration ratio is 
estimated to be about 0.28 % of total income. The more specialised farmer would incur a cost 
of about 1% of his or her income. While the cost may seem low it is, however, significant to 
farmers who are operating close to the poverty line. Nevertheless, these premiums can be 
reduced by public sector participation that promotes institutional frameworks and other social 
capital4 8 that enable smallholder farmers to collectively deal with price risks. 
There is also a need to create an enabling environment that allows farm households to 
overcome and manage price risks. As shown by Bevan et al (1989), agricultural producers are 
prudent managers of price volatility through participation in the financial markets if given the 
right policy environment. As one of the preliminary conclusions drawn by the ITF indicates, 
access to risk management instruments can also be an important means of enhancing 
smallholder credit (ITF, 1999). This is particularly so in the case for working capital as the 
purchase of price insurance would result in lower default rates of commodity related loans. As 
such, improved intermediation in commodity price risk management can be seen as way of 
enhancing rural credit. 
According to Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and Gilbert (1998), being able to forecast 
price is also an important element in a successful price risk management strategy. When price 
forecasting is improved, farmers and other agents are able to make prudent and timely 
decisions about the allocation of resources. Equally, most commodity producers in developing 
countries operate in markets that are far from perfect mainly because of information 
asymmetries and high transaction costs. This substantially reduces the gains producers can 
derive from the resource re-allocation postulated by Oi (1961). Therefore, governments and 
other agencies in Sub-Saharan Africa should try to improve commodity prices forecasting by 
putting market information programs in place. In this way farmers can keep in touch with 
current prices in local markets as well as the short-term price forecasts from international 
terminal markets. As shown by the simulation done for coffee farms in section 4.7 of this 
study, investments in market information programs can reduce the cost of price volatility to 
smallholder farmers. This is mainly the case for households with low (24%) coffee income 
concentration, whose costs can be reduced by a margin of 8%> by investing and promoting 
policies and institutions that enhance the forecasting of coffee price by a 50% margin. Such 
investments would benefit the majority of farm households in Central Kenya as most of them 
had a coffee income concentration ratio below 40% (see section 4.7). Investments in public 
market information programmes and institutions can also act as a pre-requisite to market-based 
risk management policies as it tends to lower the insurance premiums. 
Individual farmers can also be encouraged to diversify their production and sources of 
income. Results from this study indicate that the promotion of income diversification policies 
and programmes can be quite beneficial to smallholder farmers. Taking the case of coffee 
farmers in the study region, results indicate that the cost to farmers of price volatility can be 
reduced by up to 73% if their coffee income concentration is reduced by half. Nevertheless, 
income diversification can only be promoted as a long-term objective as it requires major 
investments in alternative income sources. Furthermore, on-farm diversification can be 
severely limited by natural factors that cannot be altered easily. 
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ei.3 Impact of liberalisation on smallholder farmers market institutions 
cj.3.1 Agricultural production, marketing and service institutions 
Liberalisation policies implemented in Kenya and other developing countries have been shown 
to have a fundamental impact on the institutional arrangements within which smallholder 
farmers make production and trade decisions. One such change is the decline of institutional 
capacity of governments to provide public goods such as extension and research (Reardon et 
a l , 1996; Nuppenau & Badiane, 2000). This is mainly due to cuts in public expenditure on 
agricultural extension and other services including research. The cuts in public expenditure 
have compounded an already unfavourable situation characterised in the past by poor service 
delivery (Collier & Gunning, 1999). Results from this study confirm that this was also the 
situation in Kenya during the reform period. Results from this study show that government 
direct expenditure on agriculture services and programs declined from an average of 7.8% of 
total public expenditure during the pre-liberalisation period to only 3.6% during liberalisation. 
ITiis is a clear case of what Lipton (1991) calls the 'state compression' phenomenon brought 
about by market reforms. Study results also indicate that cuts in public agricultural expenditure 
have severely limited smallholder farmers' access to extension services, market information 
and physical infrastructure. Furthermore, private participation in the provision of such services 
as extension and market information is also found to be non-existent in most cases and where 
Such services do exist there is a fundamental asymmetry in information. These information 
asymmetries create room for opportunistic trading practices that hamper smallholder 
production and market participation, apart from increasing transactions costs. Indeed, a study 
ihidertaken by Gautam (2000) shows that most smallholder farmers in Kenya associate market 
reforms with a decline in both access to and the quality of public services. 
Many agricultural services have a significant component of public good. Furthermore, 
agricultural producers, especially smallholder farmers, are geographically dispersed and poor. 
This may limit the willingness of the private sector to participate in the provision of 
agricultural services. Dorward et al (1998) have also argued that relatively little attention has 
been given to the capacity of the private sector to provide agricultural services. Neither has 
there been much discussion about what contribution the private sector could make in the 
provision of agricultural services given the economic, political and social conditions prevailing 
in most SSA states. Indeed, the disappointing response to market liberalisation can be 
attributed to the unduly optimistic view held by liberalisation enthusiasts about the potential of 
the privatisation in SSA settings. As far as they are concerned liberalisation can be equated to 
privatisation and government is ascribed a minimalist role (Stiglitz, 1999). 
Given these facts, what role can the government and the private sector play in the 
provision of agricultural services (mainly technology development and dissemination) in a 
liberalised economy? The way forward is to build public, community and private institutions 
tiat enable smallholder farmers to enhance their productivity and market participation. 
Coincidentally, this is the focus of the World Bank's 2002 world development report - building 
institutions for markets. 
Various studies have shown that public investments in agricultural technology 
development and information dissemination can yield high social rates of return. For instance, 
according to the World Bank (2001b) the sum of private and social returns on agricultural 
research and extension in Africa for the period 1953-1998 is around 34%. As indicated in 
chapters 6 and 7 of this study, smallholder productivity and efficiency in the study region 
would be enhanced through investments in technology development and dissemination. 
Nevertheless, results from this study also indicate (see section 5.2) that both public expenditure 
i i agriculture and the agricultural research intensity ratios have declined in the last decade. 
There is a case, therefore for increasing public expenditure in agricultural technology 
development. However, increases in fiscal allocations alone might not enhance the 
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development of suitable agricultural technologies as past experiences have shown. Changes in 
fiscal allocations need to be accompanied by institutional reforms to cut down overhead costs, 
enhance the sharing of information in order to avoid duplication and to strengthen research-
extension networks. 
Attracting significant private sector investments in research and development is 
unlikely to occur in Kenya or other SSA countries in the near future. It is, however, necessary 
to create an environment that will attract private investments as supplement to public funding. 
One major institutional need will be in the area of intellectual property rights, which are 
currently not well defined and protected in Kenya or in other SSA states. Legislation might be 
in existence (as in Kenya) but mechanisms for enforcing these laws remain weak. Community-
based funding of technology development has been used with some degree of success in the 
past and can be expanded even further. The funding of coffee and tea research by farmers 
(through a levy) has a long history in Kenya and offers a good example of involving farmers in 
research funding. However, farmer-funded research has come under pressure in the recent past 
due to the proliferation of marketing channels. Poor regulatory frameworks have made it 
possible for some market participants to device methods of either not paying the research levy 
or under-invoicing the amounts due. Widening and enhancing farmer's involvement in research 
funding will, therefore, call for institutions that can maximise research levy collection from 
various marketing channels. More important it is necessary to increase farmers' social capital 
to ensure that they set the research agenda and maximise the direct benefits they can derive 
from the technologies developed. 
As demonstrated by the results of this study and the evaluation done on Kenya's 
extension system (section 5.2), technology development without effective extension can be of 
little value to farmers. Extension enhances farm productivity through imparting knowledge that 
can enhance technical change and efficiency. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Feder & Slade 
(1995), the availability of public sponsored sources of agricultural information such as 
extension services, can lower the overall cost of information acquisition and in this way bring 
the allocation of resources closer to the social optimum. According to the World Bank (2001b) 
three main institutional reforms are necessary to ensure improvement in extension services. 
These include the options of decentralisation, privatisation and separating funding from 
execution. To some extent, as the results of this study show, there has been some form of 
decentralisation and privatisation of extension services taking place in Kenya. Tea and to some 
extent coffee and livestock services have been decentralised from government to various 
government agencies and community groups. These services (especially for dairy and tea) have 
attracted considerable private sector participation. What seems to be lacking is the institutional 
capacity of farmers' organisations such as co-operatives and farmer groups to participate more 
fully in offering extension services to their members. The main challenge to the privatisation of 
extension services, therefore, remains at the level of enhancing farmers' willingness to pay by 
demonstrating the positive effects of extension on productivity. Evaluations done by Gautam 
(2000) in Kenya indicate that smallholder farmers are ready and willing to pay for extension 
services either individually or as a group49. This result indicates that there is a potential for 
charging farmers a fee to cover a part of the cost of extension services. The advantage of this 
type of cost recovery is that it provides appropriate incentives, budgetary respite, demand-
driven and responsive service as well as encouraging alternative service providers. Such 
institutional arrangements remain largely unexplored in Kenya. Equally, the alternative of 
4 9 Paid extension service in Nicaragua has been cited as one of the success stories through its effects on 
improving service delivery, cost effectiveness and cost recovery (Dinar & Keynan, 2001) 
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providing extension services through private sector with public funding remains another un-
ejcploited option50. 
As highlighted in other sections of this study, institutional arrangements in market 
information, quality control and general market regulation are also needed in order to foster 
smallholder agricultural development. While the role of the private sector in the provision of 
most of these services can be expected to increase with time, the role of public institutions will 
be central both in the short and medium term. Community-based institutions can also play a 
vital role in the provision of most services but public investment in capacity building will be 
necessary. 
8 3.2 Liberalisation and factor markets 
Agricultural credit markets 
Apart from the their impacts on agricultural services institutions, market liberalisation is also 
shown to affect the structure and performance of factor markets. The results of this study 
it dicate that agricultural credit from banks, NBFIs, and AFC declined from around 5% of GDP 
it. the period before reforms were introduced in 1991 to a mere 3.8% during the reform period. 
The credit contraction mainly affected smallholders although credit from co-operatives and 
SACCOs was also affected. Results further indicate a weakening of crop collateralisation as 
lo|an security and a lack of institutional mechanisms capable of providing repayment incentives. 
These factors are shown to undermine and threaten the continuity of financial relationships in 
rural financial institutions and in co-operatives in particular. The poor performance and weak 
capital base of producer and credit co-operatives after liberalisation is also shown to constrain 
their role as important intermediaries in rural financial markets. Collier & Gunning (1999) have 
identified the decline of social capital in rural credit markets as one of the major factor that 
hampers the economic growth of rural households in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Dorward et al 
(J998) also report, market failures in farm input finance is a prevalent phenomenon 
characterising smallholder cash crop production systems across SSA and Asia. Credit market 
failures have became even more pronounced after market liberalisation mainly because of 
weakening of interlocking (inter-linkage between product and input markets) contracts. The 
reduction of interlocked credit coupled with sporadic and the uncoordinated nature of 
agricultural lending by banks, political interference and poor loan screening and enforcement 
hitve led to an escalation in the culture of 'strategic loan defaults' and borrower opportunism. 
Reliable and faithful borrowers have received little reward for their good faith and this has 
further exacerbated the serious incentive and enforcement problems that characterise rural 
financial markets. The challenge of creating the legal and economic environment necessary for 
thriving rural financial markets and institutions (or what Collier & Gunning, (1999) call 
financial depth) cannot therefore be over-emphasised. 
The traditional assumptions of many policy makers regarding the capacity of farm 
households to invest and save and the performance of formal financial intermediaries have 
been questioned and generally found to be either weak or false (Moll, 1989). Cheap 
agricultural credit policies backed by government or donor credit schemes have not proved 
supportive of agricultural development especially in the emerging liberalised economic 
environments of developing countries (Adams et al, 1983). Nyaribo andYoung (1992) in then-
study of the impact of capital and land constraints on the livestock technologies adoption by 
smallholder farms in Kenya shared this view. They advocated private capital markets as a way 
of enhancing a demand for borrowing and lead to technology adoption. Cheap institutional 
According to Hanson & Just (2001), certain economic principals need to be considered when choosing 
between public and private extension services. Key among the considerations is the welfare and ability of poor 
farmers to pay so as to avoid exclusion. 
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credit schemes are subject to government budgetary constraints and political interference with 
lending and loan repayments and therefore lack sustainability. In addition they can result in 
credit rationing and distortions in financial markets. Evidence documented in this study, for 
example, indicates that the poor performance of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) -
the main public agricultural credit organisation in Kenya - as financial intermediary was 
mainly due to political interference. It is for these reasons that various studies have advocated 
broader, more diversified rural financial markets (Von Pischke et al, 1983; Moll, 1989). The 
fundamental feature in sound rural financial markets is that financial transactions between 
parties are based on confidence in their present and future ability and intentions (Moll, 1989). 
Farmer credit co-operative societies is one such rural financial market where confidence can be 
encouraged. 
The survival of farmer credit co-operatives societies, however, depends on the farmers' 
ability to save and invest. Moll (1989) has reviewed literature on this topic and concluded that 
farmers' do have the ability to save and invest especially when the incentives to save are 
matched with secure and dependable opportunities to do so. This is illustrated by the example 
of coffee co-operative schemes in Kenya during the 1970s and 80s where the societies 
accumulated deposits in excess of volumes of loans (Von Pischke et al, 1983). This success 
was, however, short-lived, as most of these societies collapsed in the early 1990s due to mis-
management, distortions in capital markets and from the effects of a rigid legal and socio-
political environment. 
Asset based lending is also increasingly being identified as a viable means through 
which commodity producers in developing countries can finance their operations as well as 
mitigate upon transaction and financial risks. Asset-based lending is premised on the notion 
that any commodity that is freely traded and tendered on the world markets is potentially good 
collateral. However, this potential can only be realised if such a commodity is located in an 
environment that allows a clear transfer of property rights. In pursuit of this idea, the CFC has 
proposed a commodity marketing, development and promotion project. The objective of the 
project is to increase the benefits from commodity production and marketing by developing a 
transparent and efficient marketing structures that promotes the use of warehouse receipts 
using commodities as collateral (CFC, 2001). For the system to be functional it is necessary to 
develop legal and institutional infrastructure that clearly defines the rights, liabilities and duties 
of each party involved. Capacity building in producer associations is also necessary if the 
system is to benefit smallholder farmers who have only a limited individual capacity to access 
such a financing system. 
Land market 
As noted by Feder and Feemy (1993), land transactions can increase efficiency of resource use 
as agents with potentially higher marginal land productivity acquire land from those with lower 
marginal productivity. Nevertheless, results from this study indicate very thin land markets in 
the study region, There is .therefore, a case for creating a conducive policy environment in the 
study region to support a robust land market. 
The low incidence of land collateralised formal credit in the region also indicates that 
land titling has not been a sufficient condition for increasing access to formal credit. In order 
for land to be a useful collateral, uncertainties and asymmetric information with regard to 
property rights - and transfer rights in particular - have to be minimised or eliminated 
altogether. As indicated by Migot-Adholla et al (1993) and Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) land 
as collateral can be of little value in some parts of Kenya and other Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries as land transfers to outsiders through sales (or fore-closure) are not always 
recognised as legitimate because of cultural and ethnic considerations. The bureaucratic and 
cultural considerations present in land markets in the study region may have created land 
transfer uncertainties and therefore need to be addressed to enable farmers to access more 
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formal credit. Such policy interventions need to identify the most important constraints 
hindering the development of functioning land markets while sequencing the removal of such 
constraints in a manner that does not jeopardise the social security of the poor. As Deininger 
ahd Binswanger (1999) have pointed out key areas of concern in formulating such a policy 
include: the clarification of property rights; the establishment of an institutional framework that 
guarantees the security of these rights; and increasing efficiency by facilitating the 
transferability of land rights in both rental and sales markets. Removing restrictions that affect 
the operation of the land sales market may, however, not be an urgent priority as far as 
increasing efficiency is concerned given the prevailing socio-political climate. Rather, priority 
should be given to measures that emphasise and facilitate a thriving land rental market that is 
well integrated into other rural factor markets such as credit. The same view is shared by 
Binswanger and Ronsenzweig (1986) and Collier and Gunning (1999) who identify land 
rentals as one of the main instruments through which production units can arrive at near 
optimal land to labour and capital ratios especially in a land-scarce environment. 
Labour market 
Unlike the capital and land markets, labour markets appear quite vibrant. Labour transaction 
costs are also low and relate mainly to supervision and such inducements as meals offered to 
hired-labour. Due to distortions in other factor markets, smallholder production systems in the 
sludy region are labour intensive with little use of purchased inputs that are a necessary pre-
requisites for improving productivity in a land-scarce environment. 
84 Liberalisation and its impact on market structure and trade contacts 
8.4.1 Market co-ordination and control 
According to Thorbecke (2000) the impact of market liberalisation policies are expected to 
differ across exchange configurations depending on the products traded, actors involved, and 
o:her unique commodity characteristics. The organisation of the actors in an exchange 
configuration can be viewed as the market structure. An analysis of coffee, tea, milk, 
horticulture (French beans) and food crops (maize) exchange configurations revealed that 
although the five systems differ in terms of the number of market actors involved, the greatest 
impact of liberalisation has been to reduce the level of vertical co-ordination while having a 
differentiated effect on smallholder farmers market control. The reduction of vertical control 
mainly arose from lack of effective regulatory and information institutional frameworks, as 
government agencies (parastatals) have been reduced to spectators in their areas of jurisdiction 
alter liberalisation. According to Jaffee and Morton (1995), the absence of an effective vertical 
co-ordination process in any commodity system can lead to resource mis-allocation, economic 
inefficiencies and an enhancement of production and marketing risks. Thus, the reduction of 
vertical co-ordination associated with liberalisation may have created poor linkage between 
smallholder producers and consumers, a situation that may lead to a mis-match of supply and 
demand conditions and a mis-allocation of resources. This is found to be particularly the case 
with coffee producers in the study region. This re-emphasises the need to have effective public 
and private market information systems with regard to pricing, quality and consumer 
preferences. 
Concerning smallholder farmer's control of production and marketing aspects, this 
study finds that although there are inter-commodity differences, the farmers are progressively 
gaining horizontal control in production aspects after market liberalisation. However, these 
gains in control are negated by the loss of vertical control mainly in the areas of processing and 
narketing. Gains in horizontal control have enabled smallholder dairy, maize and to some 
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extent tea farmers to influence prices, incomes and other outcomes. Coffee and French bean 
farmers are, however, not as influential as other commodity producers when it comes to 
determining prices and other market outcomes. The loss of vertical control by smallholder 
farmers that came with liberalisation has eroded their strategic position as the most important 
group in an exchange configuration. Smallholder farmers, especially coffee, French bean and to 
some extent milk farmers, have not only lost the benefits associated with scale economies in 
processing and marketing but also seem vulnerable to opportunistic trading practices as they 
have weak lobby groups. The loss of vertical control may also not portend well for exchange of 
property rights especially for commodities like tea, coffee and French beans that require some 
form of post-harvest processing before sale and payments are effected. 
8.4.2 Farm-level trade contracts 
The study results indicate that liberalisation has also had an impact on the trade contracts made 
by smallholder farmers. It can be expected that product characteristics are important in 
deterrnining which form these trade contracts will take. An analysis of the products indicates 
that products traded differ in their perishability, seasonality, differentiation, transaction 
frequency and associated levels of asset specificity. Trade contracts are shown to be in a 
process of evolution as a result of market reforms. The long-term, vertically integrated types of 
contracts prevalent among most commodity systems are progressively been replaced by short-
term relational contracts and spot market contracts. This is despite the fact that the present 
study indicates that long-term, vertically-integrated contracts are likely to be the most efficient 
mode of organising trade in smallholder coffee, tea and (to some extent) milk commodity 
systems given their high and idiosyncratic asset specificity, high product differentiation, 
perishability and the need for continuous trade relationships. In contrast, the horticultural and 
food crops trade shows that it is better served by short-term, relational trade contracts and even 
spot contracts as they have low risk (low-asset specificity, perishability and differentiation) and 
occasional trade relationships. The emerging spot market contractual arrangement across all 
commodities and especially in tea and coffee may, therefore, be a manifestation of the 
dissatisfaction of smallholder farmers with the potentially more efficient, vertically-integrated 
mode of organising trade. Dissatisfaction mainly originates from the high transaction costs 
associated with the vertically integrated marketing system. These systems, especially for 
coffee, tea and to some extent horticultural crops, are characterised by adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems mainly due to a lack of a clear linkage between product differentiation 
and pricing. 
Limited development in rural financial markets to cater for consumption smoothing 
credit also compel most smallholder farmers to resort to spot markets in their effort to ease 
their cash flow constraints. Furthermore, the asymmetrical information which prevails in 
vertically integrated markets has the double effects of making farmers believe they are being 
exploited while at the same time allowing traders in the spot market to capitalise on the 
situation. Equally, the decline in inter-linkages of trade contracts with input supply have in 
some cases increased transaction costs for both the traders and the farmers by increasing search 
costs. Inter-linkages in product and input contracts may also provide significant economies of 
scope in the monitoring of trade partners. These economies have also been severely eroded by 
the low preference of inter-linked contracts. Furthermore, farmers have lost the principle 
benefit of inter-linkage - that is access to the seasonal credit - that was being offered by co-
operatives. This study, therefore, found that the transaction cost considerations of smallholder 
farmers are important determinants of their supply response and market participation. As 
pointed out by Williamson (1995); Jaffee and Morton (1995) and Dorward et al (1998), 
imperfect information influences the level of market participants 'bounded rationality' and also 
creates opportunism in trade relations. Trade opportunism, in turn, has increased the 
performance risks of producer organisations as some farmers have neglected their contractual 
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obligations. This has resulted in adverse consequences for all producers in the form of 
insufficient market volumes (in production and processing terms)51. These conditions seem to 
have escalated with market reforms and need to be addressed if smallholder agriculture is to 
remain the corner stone of development in Kenya. 
i<.5 Smallholder farmers productivity and efficiency in a reforming economy 
ci.5.1 Farm productivity as affected by credit and land constraints 
ITie results of this study indicate that both farm productivity and resource allocation behaviour 
of smallholder coffee farmers in Central Kenya region are significantly influenced by the 
households' land and credit demand conditions. Households that face both land and credit 
constraints tend to allocate a significantly higher proportion of their farm to food crops, which 
in turn depresses farm productivity. As shown by Janvry et al (1991), the objective of most 
risk-averse farm households - to secure self-sufficiency in food - is one of the major factors 
effecting sub-optimal resource allocation behaviour. Although households in Central Kenya 
region do not suffer from chronic food insecurity, transitory food insecurity is prevalent just 
like in many other parts of rural Sub-Saharan Africa. The emerging liberalised food markets 
with reduced government food prices stabilisation role may compel most households to adopt a 
safety-first resource allocation behaviour aimed at addressing transitory food insecurities. 
Furthermore, as Janvry et al (1991) and Janvry and Sadoulet (1994) have indicated, 
imperfections in food markets can also cause a high degree of instability in food prices and 
family incomes as households are confronted with high transaction costs that imposes wide 
price bands between selling and buying prices. The results of the present study confirm this 
theoretical assertion. Households' participation in the food (maize) market is shown to depend 
on the size of the price band between selling and buying prices. The price band varied from 5% 
to 30%. Households in the smaller farm size category faced the highest price band and this 
reduced their capacity and willingness to participate in maize markets. 
It has been argued that the long-term solution to food insecurity, especially transitory 
fjbod insecurity, is to increase the level of farm productivity and household incomes (FAO, 
1996) or what Sen (1990) calls the entitlements approach. One way of raising incomes (hence 
Jod entitlements) is to encourage higher production of high-value commodities such coffee, a, and horticultural and dairy products. The encouragement of high-value enterprises pecially cash crops have been shown to have the added advantage of making farm 
households more market integrated (Von Braun et al, 1994). Market integration on its part has 
been shown to further reduce the need for self-food sufficiency (Fafchamps, 1992). Thus, the 
development and expansion of cash-crop production (mainly tea and coffee) in the Central 
Kenya region requires comprehensive policies that address the existing imperfections in food 
inarkets in order to allow smallholder farmers to allocate more resources to enterprises that 
enhance farm productivity, market integration and farm incomes. 
Equally important is the result of this study that indicates that the availability of credit 
Significantly enhances farm productivity in those households with high land demand (mainly 
with small farm sizes) but not those households where this is not the case. Furthermore, 
contrary to empirical evidence from similar farming situations, farm-size positively and 
significantly influences farm productivity for those households that are both land and credit 
constrained but not in those households where land constraints are relaxed. Apart from re-
emphasising the importance of credit in enhancing the farm productivity of small farms, the 
3 1 For instance, by not delivering coffee cherry to the co-operative society despite being advanced farm inputs 
and other services. This not only makes the faithful farmers bear a heavy debt burden but also creates over-
capacity that is costly to maintain. 
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8.5.2 Smallholder farmers efficiency 
The analysis put forward in chapter 7 shows that smallholder farmers in Kenya are quite cost 
efficient. The average level of cost inefficiency is between 7.9% and 8.5% depending on the 
stochastic distribution assumption. Inefficiency levels ranges from as little as 1% to as much as 
66.3%. Such levels of inefficiency are comparable to those estimated for smallholder farmers 
in Asia and other developing countries as reviewed by Ali and Byerlee (1991); Battese (1992); 
Bravo-Ureta and Pinhiro (1993); Phillips(1994) and Rougoor et al (1998). Nevertheless, 
Gautam (2000) indicates that the level of cost efficiency of Kenyan smallholder farmers in 
1997 was about 15%. However, this estimate was done for all the regions in the country. As 
might be expected there is a wide variation between the natural and economic productive 
potential of different regions in Kenya. Furthermore, the use of the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) technique may have made the estimates more unreliable due to its sensitivity to extreme 
observations and non-composer of the error terms which are usually inherent problems in 
deterministic estimation techniques such as DEA. 
We therefore conclude that there is still scope for improving the production efficiency 
of smallholder agricultural producers in Kenya. Although, the cost inefficiency levels may 
appear small they can, however, translate into significant savings at the farm level if they can 
be improved upon. For instance, this study estimated that if half the cost inefficiencies in coffee 
production are cut, this might lead to smallholder coffee farmers saving about Ksh 200 million. 
The cost savings would also increase coffee enterprise profitability and hence the overall 
competitive advantage of the enterprise. The multiplier effect of cost savings in other farm 
enterprises can be expected to lead to marked improvements in farm incomes with no changes 
in production levels. 
Given that most smallholder farmers are reasonably efficient, indications are that 
increases in productivity will require a development strategy that can shift the production 
frontier outwards through the use of new inputs and technologies. Moreover, when these 
results are viewed in the context of the on-going market reforms they can lead to the 
conclusion that the reforms may have enabled the farm households to match resource allocation 
with prices. The shift in the production frontier will require investments and higher public 
expenditure on research and extension. This creates a dilemma as structural reforms have 
advocated fiscal austerity measures that have lead to a reduction the amount of public 
expenditure allocated to research and support services. 
The analysis of factors affecting efficiency levels indicate that cost inefficiencies 
increase significantly with farm size, while they decrease with the amount of farm income and 
level of credit available to each household. The result of the analysis of the relationship 
between farm size and inefficiency levels can be interpreted to indicate that small farms have 
higher efficiency than bigger ones. This result confirms in a way earlier research findings by 
Lele and Agarwal (1989) who indicated that smallholder tea and coffee farmers in Kenya had a 
comparative advantage in terms of domestic resource costs as compared to large plantation 
producers. Deineinger and Binswanger (1995) also came to the same conclusion in their 
comparative study of small and large farms in Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. They did 
not, however, test for relative economic efficiencies between the farm categories studied. 
results of this study also indicate that the imperfections in rural factor markets in the region are 
severely eroding the productivity advantages usually enjoyed by small farms as indicated by 
Feder (1985); Barrett (1996); Newell and Symons (1997); Deininger and Binswanger (1999). 
Furthermore, the present study also indicate that although family labour is a significant input 
that enhances the value of farm production, its opportunity cost is only a tenth of the current 
agricultural wage rate. This is attributed to unemployment and credit constraints that limit the 
use of productivity enhancing inputs - conditions that lead to labour intensive production 
systems. 
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Adesina and Djato (1996) in their comparison of small and large rice farms in Cote d'lvoire 
found no differences in relative economic efficiency between the two farm types. Not 
withstanding this finding in Cote d'lvoire, evidence from India and Pakistan tends to confirm 
the existence of a relatively higher efficiency in smallholder farms (Yatopolous and Lau, 1973; 
Khan and Maki, 1979). Thus the results from this study coupled with evidence from other 
S|imilar agricultural settings may serve as an indicator that smallholder-based agricultural 
development policy is at least relevant, and is possibly the most efficient mode of organising 
production in Kenya and other contemporary developing countries. The pursuit of a 
smallholder-based agricultural development policy may call for intensified removal of the 
production, credit and marketing policies that have tended to favour large farms in the past. 
The significant effect of credit on improving farm efficiency highlights the need for 
enhancing agricultural credit and other policies that promote and deepen rural financial 
Jiarkets. According to Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), risk aversion is one of the factors that fleet the efficiency of household resource allocation. Those farmers with greater access to 
credit for both consumption smoothing and investment purposes are better equipped to handle 
risk, which in turn improves their efficiency in resource allocation. This finding is confirmed 
by Carter (1989) who found that credit recipient smallholder farmers in Nicaragua exhibited 
significantly higher technical efficiency in production than their non-credit recipient 
colleagues. Binswanger & Sillers (1983) also came to the same conclusion. They found that the 
cifferential technology adoption behaviour of Indian farmers could be attributed to their 
cifferential risk preferences and this was largely due to differences in access to relevant credit 
institutions. Thus, the significant effect of credit on smallholder farmers efficiency in Central 
Kenya region only gives more impetus to the dire need of alleviating the severe credit squeeze 
facing smallholder farmers arising from market reforms as earlier results indicated. 
i .6 Conclusions and policy implications 
S.6.1 Conclusions 
From a theoretical perspective, this study suggests that the neo-classical assumption of perfect 
competition is hardly met even after market liberalisation in Kenya. As such the NIE 
framework that relaxes this restrictive assumption is found to be better suited to analysing and 
rnderstanding the economic performance and structures of agricultural markets in developing 
countries such as Kenya. Equally, the study finds the concept of 'exchange configurations' 
which categorises commodity systems into products, actors and their production and trade 
environment provides a useful analytical framework. Not only does it allow for flexibility but it 
also offers useful insight that can help to understand the intricacies of commodity markets 
Within the broad NIE conceptual framework. 
j The analysis of the impact of liberalisation on agricultural markets in Kenya leads to 
tpe conclusion that liberalisation measures implemented in the country have been of the 
'minimalist' type i.e. mainly concentrated on getting the prices right. As such the reforms have 
partly been able to halt declines in the terms of trade in the agricultural sector and real producer 
pjrices. Consequently, expected increases in supply response have not been forthcoming. The 
study also concludes that market reforms in Kenya have been associated with a higher 
volatility of commodity prices thereby exposing smallholder farmers to higher price risks. The 
study finds the intermittent nature of market reforms and their sequencing to be important 
factors that have contributed to negating some of the desirable effects of market reforms in the 
agricultural sector. 
The results of this study also lead us to the conclusion that market liberalisation was 
accompanied by a significant reduction in public agricultural sector expenditure, which 
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severely constrains the provision of essential services needed to promote the productivity of 
smallholder farms. The study indicates that the expectation that the private sector would take 
on some of the roles left behind by government and its agencies has, for a complex variety of 
reasons, only been fulfilled to a very limited extent. This study, therefore, concludes that while 
there is a need for a consistent liberalisation programme, it is also necessary to reinforce the 
agricultural liberalisation policies already undertaken by increasing public expenditure on rural 
mfrastructure, technology and human resources development and other agricultural support 
services. 
This study also concludes that liberalisation policies implemented in Kenya have 
resulted in a major contraction of agricultural credit from banks and other rural financial 
institutions and that this has particularly effected smallholder farmers. The scarcity of credit 
has, in turn, had a negative impact on both productivity and the efficiency of production 
especially in the land-scarce environment that prevails in much of Central Kenya. Land 
markets (both rental and sales) are also shown to be characterised by high transaction costs and 
uncertainties, attributes the market reforms did not attempt to address. As a result land markets 
are thin and poorly integrated with capital markets despite the system of individual land tenure 
prevalent in Central Kenya. Due to distortions in factor markets, smallholder production 
systems in the study region are labour intensive with little use of purchased inputs that are a 
necessary pre-requisites for improved productivity and efficiency in a land-scarce environment. 
Market reforms are also associated with major institutional changes that affect the 
environment within which smallholder farmers make their production and marketing decisions. 
After market reforms, the vertically co-ordinated marketing systems are in a state of dynamic 
flux towards a more decentralised system. This has created asymmetrical information that may 
lead to resource misallocation while enhancing production and marketing risks to smallholder 
farmers. This study also concludes that the control exercised by smallholder farmers' over 
production aspects may have increased with market reforms, nevertheless their control over 
marketing functions has generally declined. This may lead to a loss of their strategic bargaining 
position and encourage opportunistic trading practices. Another major effect of liberalisation 
can be seen in trade contracts that have generally moved from the vertically integrated 
contracts of the pre-reform period to relational and spot market contracts in the post-reform 
period. This study concludes that the shift from vertically integrated contracts is not in the best 
interest of smallholder producers, especially those involved in production of crops with high 
asset specificity and product differentiation such as coffee and tea. The spot market contracts 
are also not ideal for interlocking credit and products markets thereby constraining credits 
supply and hence supply response. 
Based on the cost efficiency levels of smallholder coffee farms in Central Kenya, it is 
concluded that a smallholder-based agricultural development strategy is still relevant. It is also 
concluded that while there is still room for improving smallholder farmers levels of efficiency 
through better resource allocation and re-allocation, the highest source of growth is likely to 
come from technology development that shifts the production frontier outwards. The risk 
mitigation behaviour of smallholder farmers' risk mainly with regard to food security concerns 
is identified as a major factor deternhning their resource allocation behaviour. It is therefore 
the conclusion of this study that both food security and consumption smoothing concerns 
determine the resources allocated to high-value crops such as coffee and tea by smallholder 
farmers in Central Kenya region. 
8.6.2 Policy issues for smallholder agricultural development 
The conclusions reached by this study have led us to identify a number of policy issues that 
require attention. These directly affect smallholder-based agricultural development in Kenya 
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and Central Province in the present liberalised economic environment. We have divided these 
issues into seven clusters: 
7 [ Implementation of market reforms 
Market reform policies should be sequenced in a way that is self-reinforcing in order to 
maximise their intended positive impacts while minimising any deleterious effects. In 
this way general economic and agricultural sector growth will be fostered. This has been 
clearly demonstrated by the successes registered in South East Asian countries and even 
some of the consistent reform-orientated countries of SSA. 
Provision of services with high public goods component 
Improvement of agricultural terms of trade, real commodity prices and supply response 
will require the enhancement of public expenditure on rural infrastructure, technology 
development and dissemination, human resource development as well as other 
agricultural support services that have a high 'public good' component. This is 
particularly the case for smallholder farm which are more dependent on public services 
especially in areas where private sector participation is limited. Indeed, there is a strong 
case for using public expenditure as a lever to stimulate agricultural development even 
in a liberalised economic environment. Private sector participation in the provision of 
agricultural services with commercial appeal should also be encouraged and fostered by 
removing any existing barriers that hinder entry. This will not only lessen government 
involvement but will also enable the government to concentrate resources in areas 
where such resources can give the highest returns. Studies are, however, required to 
assess private sector capacity and the necessary incentives needed in the provision of 
agricultural services given the economic and social conditions prevailing in most 
developing countries and in SSA in particular. 
3. Institutional frameworks for risk management 
To counter the negative effects of high price volatility associated with market reforms 
and the global trends in commodity markets will require identification and 
implementation of suitable price risk management mechanisms backed by effective 
institutional capacity. Such mechanisms may include the use of market-based risk 
management instruments such as futures and options: the creation of reliable market 
information programmes: and the development of rural financial markets to enable 
farmers to smooth their incomes and expenditures. There is also a need to strengthen and 
enhance the capacity of producer organisations to enable them play a more central role in 
risk management for the benefit of their members. However, the formulation and 
implementation of these risk management policies should be preceded by studies to 
quantify smallholder farmers' price risk bearing ability and the roles rural financial 
markets and farmer organisations can play in this respect. Furthermore, such studies 
should also determine the effects of declining international commodity prices and the 
globalisation of trade on smallholder farmers market participation and welfare given their 
double roles as producers and consumers. 
4. Rural financial markets 
There is need to put into place discretionary policy measures aimed at improving 
smallholder farmers' access to production and consumption credit in order to boost farm 
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productivity and efficiency. Such policy measures should focus on creating a conducive 
policy environment for a vibrant rural financial markets and micro-financial institutions 
that are inter-linked with the evolving commodity market. Private and farmer-driven 
institutions such as credit co-operatives can play a crucial role in this respect. In addition 
there is a need to create appropriate legal and institutional infrastructure to enable 
commodity producers to access finance through the use of warehouse receipts and other 
commodity based collateral. 
5. Land Markets 
Policy interventions are also required to encourage the development of vibrant land 
markets that are well linked to rural financial markets. This is not the case in the Central 
Kenya region at the moment. The policy should aim at establishing an effective 
institutional framework that guarantees land security rights, facilitates the transferability 
of land rights and the reduction of transaction costs in both rental and sales markets. 
Priority should, however, be given to rental land markets, which have been shown to ease 
land constraints without necessarily jeopardising the social security of the poor. 
6. Regulatory framework 
There is need to strengthen the institutional framework within which smallholder farmers 
in Central Kenya and other parts of the country make production and marketing 
decisions. Such interventions are necessary in order to deal with the weak regulatory 
framework created by liberalisation and that is presently jeopardising smallholder 
farmers' co-ordination and control of production and marketing. Farmers' lobby groups 
and the creation of an effective public sponsored information system should be 
encouraged in order to increase farmers control in the marketing chain and address the 
information asymmetries prevalent in the current systems. It is essential to create a legal 
and policy environment that governs and enforces trade contracts to reduce opportunistic 
trade practices while at the same time ensuring regulation of quality standards to 
facilitate trade. Equally necessary are policies that address the governance problems that 
are beginning to appear in the management of farmer organisations - and in co-
operatives in particular - which if not addressed may lead to the collapse of such 
organisations with severe consequences for both smallholder farmers production and 
market participation. 
7. Food security 
To boost cash crops - mainly export crop - production in Central Kenya smallholder 
farmers' food security concerns need to be directly addressed by creating thriving food 
markets and by minimising transaction costs in these markets. In this way the 
disproportionate amount of land and other resources currently allocated to food 
production can be re-allocated to cash crops and dairy production which have a higher 
market value consequently boosting farm incomes, investments and contribute to poverty 
reduction. 
Most of the above policy fields focus on creating institutional frameworks necessary for 
reducing the transaction and production costs, increasing access to production resources and 
markets by smallholder farmers. This study considers this to be primary challenge facing 
Kenya in the new century if agricultural development and prosperity is to be achieved. The 
government has a major role to play in implementation of the policies identified above. 
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Paradoxically, this indicates that the government remains a major player in promoting 
agricultural development and particularly the development of smallholder agriculture even in a 
liberalised market. Implementation some of these policies will also require major public 
development expenditure both in the short and medium term. We believe such expenditures is 
justified and will bring dividends in the long term both to the government and the Kenyan 
economy as a whole. Furthermore, such expenditure should be seen as part of the ongoing 
development strategy has the alleviation of poverty as its ultimate goal. 
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Appendix 1.1: Commodity* export dependence greater than 50% for African countries, 1997 
Country Commodities as % of 
merchandise exports Leading Commodities 
GNP per Capita %of 
population 
living on 
less than one 
US $ /day 
1997 unless 
otherwise stated 
us$ Changes % 
1997 in% 
1996-97 
440 2.1 31.4 
230 3.5 
290 -2.0 
4,120 3.3 
210 -5.6 45.7 
200 0.0 61.5 
670 -2.7 
290 4.2 
230 4.4 88.2 
140 -1.5 
380 2.7 
340 2.1 
210 2.5 4.3 
390 1.7 
620 1.7 
110 3.0 46.0 
370 1.8 84.6 
260 3.5 
140 10.5 
340 2.0 
210 1.2 
340 0.4 50.2 
250 3.2 
250 1.5 72.3 
330 3.0 69.3 
720 0.1 41.0 
710 4.3 17.7 
2,110 -1.3 
160 -20.6 
320 3.8 
540 2.5 54.0 
Mauritania 
Chad 
Sao Tome &Principe 
Gabon 
Rwanda 
Nger 
GJmgo, Rep 
SUdan 
Guinea-Bissau 
Burundi 
Scmalia 
Btinin 
Gambia 
Malawi 
Ghana 
Cameroon 
Ethiopia 
Zambia 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Togo 
Tinzania 
Kenya 
Burkina Faso 
Madagascar 
Ujjanda 
Zimbabwe 
Cote divoire 
Namibia 
Sierra Leone 
Cj Africa Republic 
Senegal 
99.6 
85.4 
95.2 
99.6 
98.0 
93.3 
99.7 
91.8 
96.3 
96.6 
93.2 
93.6 
99.1 
96.2 
99.8 
84.0 
98.7 
61.8 
89.4 
65.9 
87.9 
89.2 
93.7 
99.3 
64.2 
95.3 
60.1 
73.8 
84.9 
99.9 
99.9 
99.9 
98.1 
97.7 
97.6 
97.3 
97.2 
95.8 
95.7 
95.5 
95.4 (1996) 
92.8 (1996) 
92.7 
92.3 
92.0 
86.8 
68.5 
83.9 
83.3 
80.5 
78.2 (1996) 
74.7 
73.7 
72.1 
70.7 (1996) 
70.4 
70.0 
69.2 
57.8 (1996) 
57.4 
50.2 
iron ore, fishery 
cotton, meat 
cocoa, copra, coffee 
fuels, manganese ore, wood 
coffee, tea, tin ore 
uranium, livestock 
fuels, wood, sugar 
cotton, animals, sesame seeds 
nuts, fishery 
coffee, tea 
live animals, fishery, bananas 
cotton, fuels 
peanuts, fish, cotton, palm 
tobacco, tea, sugar 
cocoa, aluminium, wood 
fuels, wood, coffee 
coffee 
copper, zinc 
cotton, gold 
fishery, nuts, cotton 
phosphate, cotton, coffee 
coffee, cotton, cashew, minerals, 
tobacco, sisal 
tea, coffee, fuels 
cotton 
coffee, vanilla, cloves, fish, sugar 
coffee, cotton 
tobacco, nickel, cotton 
cocoa, fuels, wood 
minerals, fish, skins 
minerals, cocoa, coffee, fish 
wood, live animals, cotton 
fish, nuts, fuel, phosphates, cotton 
* Excludes countries solely dependent on fuels 
Source: Common Fund for Commodities (CFC.2000) 
180 Appendices 
Appendix 1.2 International Coffee Organisation indicator prices for robustas, Brazilian 
arabicas and other mild arabicas, average annual prices 1947 to 1998 
350 
Source: Complied from ICO coffee market reports (various) 
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Appendix 2.1: Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedacity (ARCH-M) Estimation* 
This appendix gives more econometric details of the ARCH estimation method 
introduced by Engle(1982). Bollerslev (1986) generalised the ARCH (GARSH) 
technique, so did Engle et al, (1987) by offering the ARCH-in- Mean (ARCH-M) 
refinement. The ARCH-M model that is used in this study permits the conditional 
variance (ht) to affect the level of conditional mean (//) i.e. providing for the 
expectation that the mean and variance move in the same direction. This condition can 
be expressed as: 
IM =fio +Sg (h^ (1) 
Where, (3o is a constant and g(ht) is a monotonic function of the conditional 
variance (ht). The term 8g(ht) represents a risk premium i.e. the increase in expected 
rate of return due to an increase in the variance of the return. Bollerslev et al, (1992) 
and Bera & Higgins (1995) provide a good review of the ARCH literature. 
In line with the general principles of the model, the price time series of each 
commodity (Pu) can be modelled in a linear ARCH-M form: 
n(L)Pit = fio+fiT+% fiX„ +Sg(hit) + uit (2) 
udWt.i ~iidN(0,hi() 
hit = ao + atT+^ ajUif-j + ^JAZU (3) 
Q(L) is a polynomial lag operator, ao and fio are constants, and t is unit time index 
\vhose coefficient present a linear monthly trend (T). The residuals of the conditional mean 
equation (2) are normally distributed conditional on the information set, Wu, being available. 
The function g(hit) transforms the conditional variance as in equation (1). In the current model 
g(hi() - hth is the risk premium with respect to conditional price(P,() standard deviation. The X 
and Z vectors contain c and q exogenous variables affecting the mean and variance, 
respectively, as shown in the Table below. 
* The theoretical part of this appendix is mainly based on Barrett (1997). 
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Independent variables in vector X and Z of the estimated modelfor each commodity time series. 
Independent Variables Unit Maize Milk Coffee Tea 
Vector X (Variables in the mean equation) 
Lagged real price(Pt-i) Ksh X X X X 
Time Trend (T)u - X X X X 
Liberalisation Dummy (L)m (0,1) X X X X 
Production Metric Tonnes X X N/A N/A 
Seasonality Dummy (S)lv (0,1) X X N/A N/A 
Sales (S)v Kg.bags, Lt, X X X X 
Imports71 90kg bags" X N/A N/A N/A 
Real Exchange Rate (RER)™ Index( 1982= 100) X X X X 
Border Parity price (BP)™ Index N/A N/A X X 
ICA Dummy (ICA)* (0,1) N/A N/A X N/A 
ARCH term (h M ) X X X X 
Vector Z (the variance equation) 
All the above variables except the arch term. The lagged variance (f,.i) is also included in the variance 
equation. 
Notes 
i) x - indicates inclusion of the variable in the model, N/A -indicates the variable is not included 
in the model. 
ii) The time trend is calculated as a simple regression of price against a time variable i.e. P = f(t), 
where t = 1, 2,.. n (years); P = nominal monthly price. The trend is calculated: Trend = a + pp, 
.where, a is a constant estimated from the price regression equation, B is the trend coefficient 
and p, is the price at period t. 
iii) L = 0, for the period January 1985 to December, 1991 (pre-Uberalization period) and L= 1, for 
the period January 1992 to December 1999 to correspond with the liberalization period. 
Although specific market reforms in each sub-sector were implemented on different periods 
after 1991, for comparison purposes this study adopted 1992 as the liberalization year. The 
maintained hypothesis is that trade and other macro-economic reforms undertaken from 1992 
had major impact that cut across all commodities and agricultural sector in general. As such the 
study did not attempt to have different dummy variables for particular periods in which specific 
reforms were undertaken in each of the commodity systems under consideration. 
iv) In the maize model, S = 1 in January, February, August, October and November of each year, 
which are the maize harvest months, S = 0, elsewhere. In the Milk model, S = 1 in the rainy 
months of April, May, June, October, November and December and S = 0, elsewhere for the 
dry months. 
v) In the maize model, sales refers to 90 kg bags sold by NCPB into the market, milk sales refers 
to litres of milk procured by the registered milk processing plants. Coffee and tea sales refers to 
bags and kg of clean coffee and made tea, respectively, offered in the weekly Nairobi coffee 
auctions and Mombasa tea auctions 
vi) Imports refer to maize imports by NCPB. Data on maize imports by private traders before and 
after maize market liberalisation are not available. 
vii) Real Exchange Rate (RER) is defined as the index of monthly average Ksh exchange rate 
adjusted by the ratio of Nairobi middle income consumer price index (CPI) to the U.S.A. 
wholesale price index (WPI) obtained from IMF international financial statistics. 
viii) The New York Coffee futures (2nd and 3rd) position price (US $ per kg of green coffee) is used 
as the coffee parity price as it is used as a reference price at the Nairobi coffee auction. The 
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London tea auction prices(US$ per kg of made(black) tea ) are used as the parity price for tea. 
The border parity prices are expressed in US dollars rather than in Ksh equivalent to avoid 
multi-collinearity problem with the real exchange rate variable which is included in the model, 
lix) In the coffee model, ICA = I for the periods, January 1985 to February 1986 and October 1987 
to June 1987 when the ICA regulations were in place and ICA = 0, elsewhere. 
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Appendix 3.1: Major Horticultural Commodities in Kenya 
Vegetables & Artichokes Cauliflower Lettuce 
tubers Asparagus Celery Okra 
Baby marrows Chillies Onions 
Beetroot Cucumbers Potatoes 
Brinjals Dudi Radishes 
Brussels sprouts Galka Snake gourds 
Cabbages Karela Spinach 
Capsicums Kohlrabi Turia 
Carrots Kale Turnips 
Fruits Avocados 
Apples 
Bananas 
Cape gooseberries 
Figs 
Grapes 
Guavas 
Lemons 
Limes 
Mangoes 
Mulberries 
Oranges 
Papaya 
Passion fruit 
Pears 
Pineapples 
Plums 
Pomelos 
Strawberries 
Sweet melons 
Tangerines 
Tomatoes 
Tree tomato 
Watermelons 
Cut-flowers Alstoemerias Lilies Solidasters 
Ammi majus Molucella Spray carnations 
Arabicum Orchids Standard carnations 
Chrysanthemums Ornithogalums Statice 
Delphiniums Roses Tuberoses 
Source: Dijkstra, T. (1997) 
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Fertiliser price 
(Ksh/kg) 
Wages 
Ksh/manday 
Consumer 
Price Index 
(CPI) 
Year Nominal real nominal Real 
1985 3.91 4.16 13.20 14.03 94.1 
1986 3.90 3.86 13.30 13.17 101 
1987 4.84 4.42 15.00 13.69 109.6 
1988 6.07 4.94 16.35 13.33 122.7 
1989 6.55 4.81 18.00 13.23 136.1 
1990 7.03 4.00 24.15 13.74 175.8 
1991 9.52 4.50 29.65 14.01 211.7 
1992 11.38 4.44 35.05 13.66 256.6 
1993 18.57 4.96 45.05 12.04 374.3 
1994 20.96 4.38 52.10 10.88 478.8 
1995 18.91 3.80 62.55 12.56 498 
1996 22.35 4.12 75.00 13.81 542.9 
1997 21.99 3.84 80.30 13.55 592.7 
1998 21.96 3.39 93.00 14.35 647.9 
1999 - - 120.00 17.70 678 
Notes 
The Nairobi consumer price index (CPI) is used to deflate all nominal prices to arrive at real 
prices. 
Fertilizer price based on a composite price of the most popular fertiliser brands in Kenya 
(CAN, DAP, UREA and N:P:K) which account for 88% of all fertilisers consumed in the 
country. 
ITie agricultural wage refers to the casual worker wage rate negotiated by the Kenya 
Plantations Workers Union (KPAU), which is applicable to majority of plantation workers. As 
most smallholders' farmers compete with plantations for the available labour during peak 
periods, they are compelled to pay similar rates as those negotiated by KPAU. The government 
minimum agricultural wages, which are generally very low, are in most cases ignored. 
Source: Complied by Author 
Appendix 4.1: Nominal and real, fertiliser prices and agricultural wages in Kenya, 
1985-1999. 
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Appendix 4.2 : Types and quantity of fertilisers used in Kenya, 1985 to 1998 
Fertiliser type 
V-ar DAP MAP CAN UREA 20:20:0 23:23:0 25:5:5 20:10:10 17:17:17 All Total 
others 
Metric Tonnes 
1985 47,338 5,052 21,479 12,001 16,998 0 21,000 13,476 4,195 - 141,539 
1986 62,774 3,425 41,709 16,122 15,325 0 32,184 27,897 2,974 - 202,410 
19X7 63,500 1,000 48,000 8,750 18,000 0 36,175 23,000 4,500 - 202,925 
1988 76,689 3,584 30,724 13,691 27,558 0 37,884 15,300 5,112 - 210,542 
19X9 81,351 2,532 39,449 16,377 22,580 1,740 51,675 12,373 5,498 233,575 
19-111 80,576 4,111 36,188 5,652 12,065 4,340 51,622 13,952 1,345 209,851 
1991 73,343 8,367 21,792 18,779 9,971 1,932 41,373 23,237 4,855 25,066 228,715 
1992 80,225 4,943 28,248 9,471 2,789 23,538 58,773 7,791 9,306 29,003 254,087 
1993 65,845 11,512 31,680 14,926 7,449 8,882 54,937 7,514 10,664 19,486 232,895 
|<MI4 76,098 10,150 36,194 23,036 24,368 20,245 42,949 21,123 1,897 30,459 286,519 
1995 82,346 16,898 38,733 20,716 10,595 11,394 51,332 7,359 8,751 33,098 281,222 
19% 47,863 34,929 43,614 18,505 7,702 5,468 61,698 10,533 10,847 58,775 299,934 
I'i9~ ; 52,067 14,393 32,842 14,020 13,577 14,441 65,629 11,709 12,671 31,352 262,701 
1998 79,809 17,570 28,858 13,273 8,218 7,687 54,307 6,567 9,474 29,281 255,044 
DAP = Diamonium Phosphate, MAP =Multiple Ammonium Phosphate, CAN= Calcium 
Ammonium Phosphate, The others represent compound fertilisers given in the ratios of 
Nitrogen (N): Potassium (P) : Phosphorus (K). 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture database 
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Appendix 5.1 Total AID flows to Kenya, 1970-1996 (US$ millions) 
1970 66.1 31.8 
1971 80.0 49.6 
19"2 141.5 92.8 
1973 141.2 84.5 
1974 150.7 105.1 
1«"5 187.6 109.2 
1976 258.7 147.4 
1977 253.6 148.4 
1978 343.4 226.6 
1979 432.0 297.0 
1980 480.9 370.1 
19X1 535.8 396.0 
l!>N2 578.0 406.1 
1983 519.6 354.3 
1984 655.6 416.4 
1985 526.5 397.8 
l«>86 637.1 452.0 
1987 752.6 515.8 
1 ()88 954.4 737.7 
1989 1091.9 798.2 
1490 1615.0 1442.2 
1991 1102.1 863.1 
1992 987.1 798.3 
1«)93 869.7 749.3 
1«W4 731.3 611.9 
1995 1020.9 727.1 
1996 743.3 575.0 
Notes 
All data in current prices. Total Official Development ass istance ( O D A ) includes both concessional 
jloans ( t h o s e with a grant element o f at least 2 5 % according to Development Ass is tance Committee 
( D A C ) definitions) and grants. Grants include both technical co-operation and debt relief on previous 
O D A loans. L o a n data from World B a n k debt reporting system; grant from O E C D / D A C . Effective 
Development Ass i s tance ( E D A ) from Chang, et al 'Measur ing aid flows, A new approach' . E D A 
includes all grants plus the grant element o f all development loans recalculated according to the 
methodology in Chang, et al. 
Source: Adopted from O 'Brien and Ryan (1999), p. 43. 
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Appendix 5.2 Win Id II.ink VjiKiiltui.il I xliiisnni I'rniiits in ki'iija I Impact I valuation i 
I he k u w a n eUtttsjun sel \ i i x adopted the liaininc .mil ' Nil ( l & V ) ,-.stim o f iiiai.aecuiiait ir. I 1 1 * , .md has since 
bom • . u . i p n . i v . a hv ihe Wmld Rink tlrons 'h the 1 î i s i , i n d SeCnrul National [ ' x i i ' i - s i o n Protects i M I'-l and II) I h i -
proteiN h . i i l two nhteciiics- i n M i t u l i i T i . i l development ol' l i t e extension service ¡11 id sustained i m - i o a - o s i n n g r i t i ' i L n r n l 
p roJu i i . v iu . I l.e cUcap cncss o l 1 h e extension ..pproaeih adopted In i h c projects h a s b e e n ¡1 stihiecl o f debate 
.because 0 1 " i l s permvci i his'.h cost a n d a n apparent lack o f impact o n u;j.ricultural pnuijcl ion. This debate is part o f a 
h-<udei dis.igieemein un the ullecliiniess of the I A I V '.ipproaih 1 0 intension I lie .niiulriems have largely fociissed 
ion i i s e f n i a i i ickitive i n alieinalive mechanisms lor delncrini: e iuns 0 1 u l i i n Vthile r i s ucrei.illv agreed tl . 1 1 die 
l & Y svsicii! i s cosllv. I he cnnnovvisy C L - I I U C X on ihe returns 1 0 ihc h i t ' . h level:, ol ir.vcstmcnis h v :J:e l i n r n m i n ! ' . 
countries, and hence on i h c impact on ajinculmnil production. Uespie t h e ii : ici:siiy o f the debate a n d ilie h id ' volume 
ot lenilinj! h v the- Bank, there have beer, v e r y 1'evv a u e i : : p l s 1 0 rigorous!;, esrahlisii ' h e i r r . p s i e l o l ' T r t i V protects. 1'liis 
c\alu.it lui. j i ' o p t o i a iLeorv b a s - c d approach m s v s U n . i t i i . 8 l 1 > Ratlin a itcdihlc iiod> nl e-mpiiual evidence m 
restabjfsh the likely impaU uf ihe p r o f i t s I ollnwiii ' j -i r ^ s u l l < - b n i i u m . i i i . i g e i n e i I Kimevvoik. t K evaluation sought 
li- î e l . i i e the observai results m the fanners' i l e i t i s in i l v projects inputs. In . n i i i i l u n : . huei;::eih;ile output and 
o - . i l e o M i e indicators are i : : e : i s t i i e d to a s s e s s Ilie penbn i i . i i i c e o f die c.\:crsioi: system n i n n y the l e s u l l s chain to m i i l ' m r . 
Main lludiii^s aud cunclusioiis' 
iiitiiiii'i-i;„ dc.-!o"im. I h i - iiisliti'linnal develon ' i . e n i impact ol M l'-l .n<d II las hecn limited M P-l f n t r o d i n v i ! 
; i s " f j i s t and .bicinnsi a niaii.iyeiner.l system." However, alter rilicen v e i n * , lheie appears L O have b e e : : n o 
appreciable improvement i n die e l leci ivcress o f the extension sen ices: there i s a lack n l ' a strategic V M u r . I w ihe 
lut t i i . nVvJopmeul n l Ills exiensii'i system and l e 11 au .iyi.rnem e o n i i n i ' e s . t u b e 'veak with viiiiially non-existent 
lutf i rmauor s\stems H i . prolonged ineffectiVcJiess o f j f e e x t e n s i o n services has led to icn-ru el'lorte b y the 
'Goveimuei.t oj Kenv.i \' nil iht help ofothcr Bank projects and donofè^^rat ion . i î i/e ils e\tcrs 0 1 1 seivice . using 
alternative approaches. The :>rnjceis established a ti.iiiiiiii.il syslet:. o r a i : n i / e d a^oiig the ]'&\ h " . : s o " management. 
Ihe mam beneliis. ol" 1 I 1 0 . protects have been increased -;eiiuraphi(..il envenime, unproved i v s e . i r e h - e v i c i i M i ' i : l i i i k . i . i ' . e s 
tulbeit heLtedi . m e . :i"piiivec s U i i ï iinalily rhrouah '.raining. Ihe ii'.simitloikil i i e s i - r i , reilci.1in>>. ihe (-roieets' 
nbjutives l i a s 1 . « k i d . 1 Incus on thi e i i k . i i issue n l " (atiner erripuvvei:-iem \s s . . i h . iruppropri.Hi 1 1 cenin^ s have 
re-iulted in .t hek t»l" 11'e . iunUibilrv 0 1 lesponsivuics^ to the cluiiis needs, l l u hurarehiuil stiuiluie h a s beer .> 
J i s U j i i r M . v i lor uuii v . i i i n i i i i .nli iersh p s . a r . d e l t i e . e r ^ v . and t h i evknsioi, «y.stein has been top i.nvi 1 1 . .s-.ipplv driven 
• I h e s\stsm i s uuiliei financieilK susraiiMblc not eost-cheelivi 
• Ihe c u r i f i n l s y . s l e m issigiuficiniK m n r . - e o « t K .ind no m o r e 11lic-ieni. than_tbcfine 11 leplaeed. 
Government allocations 1 0 exieiisinn. a s t o i other public expenditures, cnnliritie 1 0 decline, and ilie s y s - e n i i s 
heavily depcrider.i o n donor IViiiK. 
• - \ n overvvli. Iiiimj.. p iopint . o i I S ( I " . , I n l " the opcr.11 I O I I H I l i . a M i C l i s connu:' e d b> >uil'i s a l . u i e - -\s a . rcsnh. 
; - m . . u y problems l lut limned tlic eilcuivcncss o l ' l l . e previous s \ s i c r r . havi persisted, and staff have reverted 
l o the meihodi o l dissemmalioii tltiil were u s e d earlier 
, • Ihe anpr i i . i i h laker. - , 1 lu»l intensity ill innimi with . 1 limited munbei o f l i : n i i e r s - h . c b e e n eesilv , i r d 
unw.inanied j - i v c i i t h e inadei | - a i c stock nl'messajies fn; i l i s s e r r . i n , i l i o i i i : n t ! t h e s l o w p a c e o f n e w ieehnnliv>v 
ffi'ri«i.i.. \ d i s t i n c i K i n i s needed Klweei i the relewmee ot exuiision s e n 1 1 e s / j e . s e and i h e l e l e v . i n e e o f pro;en 
d d s - g n I'l-e M l i o n j l e 0 ' providing c v c i - s i u u services t o srutdllnilders i s still lelev.-.nl Ilovvevei. several features of 
l l ieptojec 's 'design p r o v e d 'o he linppropiiate 
• lheie i s iin inline: ceinantl lor extension s e r i n e s , a m i the larmers value t h e a c c e s s ¡ 0 s u c h service criiniuh to 
• lheie arc sLlI l e w alieru.u.ves 10 g'^ciniinii i -providud e \ i e n - i n i : . .ilihoii'ih alien , n • e providers arc 
• I l k l e l c v . i r e e o f the brvîickly o : ever , 1 nu<ntlilv. v'sit schedule is i | u e s l :onable eoiisideiiiiu thai H U M 
fanners, including , h e conir'.ct larmers. d o noi waul to meet i l v exicr.sioi: i r j c r . l very olicr.. Ihe s i n l l " 
ii:emseive> l i e i> h i v o f t h e l e p e l u v ^ r n ^ and inei leel i i . e n e s . s . i l ' the visits. 
• \ h|.ii:kcr o v e r o l il.e mj iur - t v ol pidductioii areas u s i n j » i single a p p r o ^ e l and standard uiessa-jcs p i o w d 
1 0 h e inefficient ard unptuducl i 1 1. The l i m ' U i d expenerce n o m snmc pilot mili.itives I I F U L I \ l P-l I n in l i in s 
• l i e po'eiHia' uset. r . e s s ol ahem Hive drd m n i e lespntis-ie approaches 
I !l:i-ir). Ihe f a n n e r s d i d :iol h a v e a d c i j t i a l e access i n extension a d v i c e in I ' l . S J . and appear not lo have a d e i p i a l e 
a e i . e s - m m Ml methmis u ^ i r e ihc a. j d . ib le data nul. 1 . t i e thai the anient >i slilu'ional . i i iai i inii i i i i l - are merteiiive i n 
deliveiin;: tin servue I h i s telle"!-,- in pan. Lbs pom ei .J -hnu e i i M m - i i i i c n t n which ihc extension service l a s 
opernuu in recent y e a i s l lnwcvej . l i e poor p c T f o r m a n e e in not cniiieU a lunilitm nfeMern.i l :"aslnrs. Available 
evidern. s i i ' - ^ e i l s fh.-.i the current siuialieu i s not mik h d i t l e r e n t I r o n - 1 h . 1 i n l " Q f i 
• lioll- i h e <iu.ililaiive and i.u.inira i \ i , s ^ s s " - e i ' i s indi iau ill it I h e r e l e v a n t e o l ilie . u : v l e e u e h v e t e d l . a s been 
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j | : limited. Ilie cxicnsimi system l i as no; been responsive in the t y p e s of i i i l o i n i a i i n i i lancets wain, and the 
relevance nflhe ad\ ice :n the i w i l s of a ' . irond ranre ol" farmers is uiicslionahlc. 
• I'hc Incus n f the extension service lias remained mi d i s s c m t i i a i U H ; simple a .uiniiDinic and : i i a i / c i elated 
incssapes. I'v.eiisinn aniviiics under M. l ' - I and II ha\e had liule inlluenee o n die evnhninn n f l h e patterns: 
T - ; o f ' awareness atid adcipnopi^recomrr^Siatioiis. 
• The failure '.o l a k e advantage of - .he face-in f a c e extension approach l o deliver more advanced and eonle.xl-
specific advice ha%educe<i|thc cost-ffiigctiveness ol the Mnjocl destpn. Mils N pa::icularlv l i n e lor N l . l ' - l l . 
% : \ at the start Qflwhicfftttost wcic known lo have already adopted " h e simpler mai/e messages. 
• A sis;iiilie:nr. lindinp. is -.bit a very lny.li proportion o f rlmsc who are aware ol ' the incomes, m: even the 
m o r e complex practices, h a v e adopted them. lhns. a.lliuuili n o n extension rela.ed factors, including the 
o'"ten c i le i l lack of linancial rcsnuiecs o r a c c e s s in credil. : " . i y h e important in pieventiim I'aimeis from 
adoptir.y ceitain complex pi-je-iccs (eat., fertilizers and p c s ' . i c i d c s ' i . i; is evident -.rial '.he l a c k nl'iiilornia'.inn 
ennlinues in he an i m n m l a i i i cnnsliaini. 
.; • I he progress nn " c n d c r is-ates has 'iccn mixed. I he earlier hi::s against women farmers has been leetilied,; 
bin m i n e bias persists in the selection r>l" cnu'.ael farmers. I'hc proportion o f female field-extension agents 
has remained !i:raely unchanged -inee l ' JS i . 
• AithniHh :he cmcia;;.- has increased, access to e.xisliny services is limited, especially for .he pnor and thc ; 
less educated. The availability nf iiunriiiaiion and the uunli \ n f lhe services provided are reported by the; 
S flames in have declined since ilie caiiv I'JSOs. 
Tlte level n f n i - l r c . i c h is well b e l o w umicipaici: l e v e l s . vvi : l : o n l v a b n u . nf lhe contact farmers (and 2% o f all, 
farmers) mc:i:i::e. with e x i e i ' . M n r attems nn a rejr.iar basis and in a s e i l i n ; ' . prescribed b y the project dcsiiui. 
EjiirU -n-.v: Overall, a positive rate n f l e t urn In -.he current expeiulnures nn cx'.cnsion cannot be es-.abii.shcd. It is likely 
that Nl . I ' l hr:d some early :vne liciul impacts. I low ever, i h e s e hcnclits a p p e a r in h a v e been ^horl-liveJ as the data do 
rail iiidicaie. at :y M i i i i i f j c . ' i i r . impact even b y 199(1. 
• l'here ha?, been -nine uuprnvemen: in :he technical efficiency o f farmers si;;ce I9!*J. but '.he overall 
t| elliciency ennlinues in be low. I heir inw economic ellieicncx indicates the potential Inr funnel > to achieve 
»!uiiilic:irr. sav-.n<.'s by simply moving in a more econninical r.'.ix nl'inputs under c m rem market conditions. 
• lite data shnvv a very small positive impac1. o f extension s e i v ices nil ihe level o f technical efficiency, bin :he 
l e v e l o f confidence it: the resitli is Invv. '1 he da:n alsn indiea'.C thai extension sen. i c e s have no discernible 
impact nn ilie level ol economic efficiency. 
• \ si-milicai'.i iitipac: o f the supplv n f extension on pmcliic.ivi'.v a: the far::- level cannot be established from 
%y- What can i>c established is dial the ullncalinr. of extension resources has been inefficient, lixlen-ion services 
h a v e 'leen pnuilv iar;jek:il. The g n v v ' . h in aiiriviilliir.il production has been hi'jher ir. the previously loss 
productive a r e a s , whereas the placemen- o f e.x-.erisinn ->;aiT has favoured Ihe more, produc-.ive a r e a s . While 
exicis'i ' i i possibh had a i . e a r l y positive impact in :he spread nl" simple iccluinUvical messages : n ihe 
previously l e s s productive and uiuier served areas, thisjmpacftcaniiol i ie conclusively established wiih die 
• A significant prnpnriron o f farmers are viilliui! lo pay for extension services. lhi» lellecis that the farmers 
value the advice when ihey receive i:. Ilie perceived k-.nelr.. a s rel'.eeied :n ihe amoui.i. ; h a : fanners are 
vvil.'irip lo pay. however, is wcil below wh.r the imvcraiiient currently spends on cxiension seivices per 
Note: M l ' I t l ' W M ' W I ) and NI.PII ( l ' J « l 1'WSi.The evalua inn was conducted b y OlT> b a s e d on data 
collected Uinmph I OS"! rural hnusehoid budget s u i T e y (Kl l l iS. I . TOO household survey courlucicd by World Bank 
M'tican teclinieal liepaftmenl rind 199"? household sjp.-ev dalti e o l l e c . e d :iy O L D . 
"l"*%doj^ied lintti Ciaulam. VI. iJtiOOj. Afi iculiutal l-Meiisinn: Ihe K.eii>:.'ii Cxpeiicnce. an impact evaluation. 
World lian .1 ( J p c n i . - o u s I .valua . inns Department t O L D l .Washiiv.'.'on. I) ('. (V p. 
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A p p e n d i x S3 (a) Agr icu l ture research expendi tures b y K A R I , T R F a n d C R F and expendi ture 
shares , 1987/88 to 1997/88 
Y E A R KARI TRF CRF Total Expenditure Total Expenditure as 
(KARI +TRF+CRF) % of Agr GDP 
Expenditure in Ksh Millions % 
1987/88 220 (0.57) 12.12 66.24 298.36 0.78 
1988/89 231.12(0.55) 11.76 73.46 316.34 0.75 
1989/90 396.57 (0.88) 12.93 68.29 477.79 1.06 
1990/91 402 (0.86) 14.9 81.54 498.44 1.07 
1991/92 415.80 (0.77) 15.65 115.67 547.12 1.02 
1992/93 534.28 (0.64) 18.22 106.08 658.58 0.79 
1993/94 719.66 (0.67) 19 154.89 893.55 0.84 
1994/95 830.45 (0.71) 25 172.89 1028.34 0.91 
1995/96 1028.56 (0.82) 30 202.45 1261.01 1.01 
1996/97 1041.47(0.74) 40 232.86 1314.33 0.94 
1997/98 1301.14(0.87) 50 252.43 1603.57 1.07 
Figures in parenthesis indicate KARI's expenditure as % of Agr GDP 
Source : KARI, CRF, TBK annual reports and Author's calculations 
A p p e n d i x 5.3 (b) Agr icu l tura l R e s e a r c h intens i ty Rat ios ( A R I ) for var ious w o r l d reg ions , 1961 to 
1985. 
Simple Average (%) 
Country/Region 1961 -1965 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 
Nigeria 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.48 0.35 
Western Africa (15) 0.42 0.50 0.56 0.80 0.91 
Central Africa (6) 0.51 0.61 0.51 0.55 0.77 
Southern Africa (7) 0.71 1.09 1.00 1.08 2.04 
Eastern Africa (7) 0.4 0.57 0.5 0.51 0.63 
Suh-Saharan Africa (37) 0.49 0.65 0.63 0.75 1.06 
China 0.41 0.31 0.39 0.47 0.39 
Asia & Pacific, ex. China (15) 0.34 0.55 0.45 0.50 0.62 
Latin America & Caribbean (26) 0.42 0.59 0.63 0.69 0.82 
West Asia & North Africa (13) 0.60 0.71 0.93 1.05 1.27 
Less-Developed Countries (92) 0.46 0.62 0.64 0.73 0.94 
Developed Countries (18) 0.88 1.30 1.48 1.72 2.02 
Agricultural research intensity (ARI) measured as agricultural research expenditure as percentage of 
AgrGDP 
Figures in parenthesis represent the number of countries considered 
Source: Pardey era/., (eds.), 1991 p.36-37. 
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A p p e n d i x 5.4 Agr icu l tura l F i n a n c e Corporat ion ( A F C ) L o a n Di sbursement s p e r L o a n Category , 
1984 /85 to 1997 /98 
L o a n Category * 
Year L a r g e s c a l e * Small scale Seasonal Total 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
11987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
IJ993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
1996/97 
1997/98 
183,016 
188,573 
218 ,448 
164,972 
123,886 
84 ,340 
133,270 
128,460 
258 ,160 
165,510 
159,322 
191,127 
208 ,219 
78 ,408 
K s h ' 0 0 0 ' 
46 ,165 
135,476 
108,474 
84,501 
50 ,136 
94 ,880 
34 ,350 
93 ,440 
63 ,420 
115,398 
236 ,671 
4 ,931 
21 ,246 
32 ,450 
153,872 
580,211 
418 ,108 
380 ,451 
164,661 
163,480 
207 ,415 
294 ,620 
372 ,360 
481 ,955 
104,504 
104,826 
20 ,173 
62 ,119 
383 ,653 
904 ,260 
745 ,030 
629 ,924 
338 ,683 
342 ,700 
375 ,035 
576 ,520 
693 ,940 
762 ,863 
500 ,497 
300 ,497 
249 ,638 
172,975 
Notes 
* A F C offers four facilities: 
Large-sca le loans - all farm development loans worth more than K s h 100,000 
Smal l-scale loans - all farm development loans worth less than K s h 100,000 
Ranch loans - loans granted for development o f ranches for meat production. 
Seasonal credit loans - L o a n s under special loan scheme for maize and wheat production 
(mainly given to large scale farmers) 
* * Includes both large and ranch loans 
Source: AFC statistical digests, 1994 and 1998 
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Appendix 5.S 
PEASANT REVOLT 
Festus Murathe is a bitter man. He has already sold four of his five sheep and one of his two cows in 
a desperate effort to raise money. But his youngest son is idling at home after being expelled from 
school because of unpaid fees. His two other children face a similar fate. His smallholding of coffee, 
formerly his main source of cash, now seems like a curse. 'They are killing me and my family also,' 
Festus says, glowering at his neat rows of once-prized coffee plants stretching down the hillside. 'I 
feel as if I'm dead already. I don't have fees, my children are just at home, what am I to do VThe 
focus of his anger is the management of the local Mukurwei-ini Coffee Farmers Cooperative Society 
of which he is a member. Festus planted 600 coffee bushes in 1976 when coffee industry in Kenya was 
experiencing a mini-boom, with Kenyan coffee beans fetching high prices on world markets. He joined 
the Co-operative, which gave small growers a chance to do what had hitherto been done only by white 
settlers farming coffee on a large scale. 
The system worked well and Festus earned a good enough living with an expensive roof or iron sheets 
up on the lull beside his plantation. He would take his beans - 'black gold' as they call it - down the 
steep muddy track to Mutitu coffee factory in the valley. At the factory, run by the Co-operative, the 
beans would be washed then spread on mesh racks to dry in the sun. From the factory the beans would 
be taken to the millers for removal of the outer shell, then transported to the Coffee Board of Kenya 
for grading and selling at auction. The Co-operative paid the farmers according to the profits made 
and ensured delivery of the pesticides and fertilisers needed to produce• a healthycrop. But the heyday 
did not last long. The high profits attracted unscrupulous operators who took advantage of the simple 
farmers' inexperience in business. Local barons wormed their way into positions of influence within 
the Co-operative by manipulating the management elections. They colluded with 'elected' officials to 
win contracts for the delivery of farm inputs and other services, and again with manufacturers and 
distributors to further inflate their profits. Tim Co-operative sagged under the weight of corruption, 
mismanagement and inefficiency. The farmers bore the brunt. Sometimes their coffee plants were 
blighted by insects because the pesticide they were sold was diluted with chalk. Yield* fell as they 
fertilisers they had paid for were poor quality - and sometimes were not even delivered. 
Today, Mukurwei-ini Co-operative's 22,000 members may earn as little as 10 per cent of the price 
ultimately realised for their coffee. The other 90 per cent is siphoned off by various commissioning 
agents and shadowy bureaucracies. In some wan. the fawn lur.r not been paid c oii-ibc Co 
operative claimed its profits had been used to pay off debts or overdrafts. Reduced to poverty, Festus 
Murathe took up his hoe and machete a few months ago and joined other farmers in taking over 
Mutitu factory and declaring independence from the Co-operative. They dug trenches and felled trees 
to block the roads and fought off police who tried to evict them from the factory. Tired of the 
corruption and inefficiency of the Co-operative management, they determined to run their own affairs 
and reap the trw reword of ihvir awn luhmn: The rebellion \prcmt lint throwji the cuffee-wmiiri 
region of highland Central Province. Older people were reminded of the last violent struggle that 
gripped the area .- the Mau Man revolt against the British colonialists more than 40 years ago. The 
whole coffee sub-sector is now in chaos. Farmers are using their agricultural tools to fight the police 
and rival groups of farmers opposed to splitting up the Co-operatives. Factories and other property 
have been burnt and some farmers have uprooted their coffee plants in defiance of the law. 
Source: BBC Focus On Africa Jan-March, 2000 Issue 
*Mukurwei-ini coffee farmers co-operative is located in .Nyeri District (one of the study 
districts) 
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Appendix 5.6 
STORM BREWING 
Josephine Muthoni Thigori has been harvesting tea in the village ofMeerifor the past fifteen years. 
With the hot sun beating down, she works all day from seven in the morning with a large basket 
strapped to her head, plucking tea leaves. Working at u ferocious pace, bending and straightening 
her back, she gathers until her baskets are full. Then she awaits the lorry from the buying centre. 
The wait for the bus is just about the only respite Josephine gets during her back-breaking day. 'I 
usually work about seven hours,' she says. 'But if the lorry doesn't come, we go on until six in the 
evening. Often they don't come on time'. Sometimes the lorries don't come at all. The roads to the 
plantations are rocky and stony and often impassable during die rainy season. The farmers pay an 
annual levy for the maintenance and repair of roads. But they have never seen any work carried out 
on them. • • • -
Josephine, like the others, harvests between 30 and 40kg of tea leaves a day, which is all thrown into 
the basket resting on ttie backbone. 'I'm tired all the time because I work hard from Monday to 
Saturdays,' she complains. 'But we don't make enough money. 'Josephine's eldest son is eighteen, 
but doesn't go to school because she can't afford the fees. His younger brother is very bright and has 
passed all his exams, but there's no money to send him to Secondary school. More and more, tea 
plantation workers and farmers like Josephine are blaming their plight hard work for not enough 
return- on the parastatal Kenyan Tea Development Authority, the KTDA. Farmers have been saying 
for some time that much of the profit from tea is being pocketed by corrupt officials. 
Tea farmers are calling for tighter controls on the KTDA and greater autonomy from what they see 
as a corrupt government. Wanjema Wanjogia, spokesperson of the Association of Farmers in Meeri, 
said that members of the board who are supposed to represent farmers' interests are not elected by 
them, but are appointed by the government. According to Wanjema, until the small farmers have the 
power to elect their own representatives to the KTDA board, they will be continually exploited. 
Following the example of the coffee farmers (see Focus on Africa Magazine Jan - March 2000), tea 
farmers have embarked on a campaign of protests. Josephine was herself arrested after a 
demonstration in Uhuru Park in downtown Nairobi. She said her night in the cells will not deter her 
from fighting for her rights and going on another march. A few kilometres from the plantation, down 
a bumpy road, lies the Theta tea factory. Here, the hundreds of basket of tea are off-loaded, sorted, 
withered and then bagged, ready to be driven down to the tea auction in Mombasa. The assistant 
factory manager is Stephen Mugweka who was quick to refute the farmers' allegations that they don't 
get a fair price for their crop and are being exploited by the KTDA and the factories. "The price of 
tea in Kenya is one of the fairest in the World,' he said. 'Prices are determined by market forces of 
supply and demand have nothing to do with the factories 
According to him, most of the noise made by the farmers has been caused by misinformation. Yet he 
could not explain who those who do the hard work don't have enough money to support their families 
and have never seen the profits trickling down. The definitive explanation came in a landmark report 
published by the Ministry of Agriculture in February. The report shows the KTDA has for the past 
decade been beset by dishonesty, inefficiency and fraud: billions of Kenyan shillings have gone 
missing from the KTDA coffers; managers have undersold farmers' tea; numerous irregular 
contracts have been issued for the purchase of fertilisers and other goods and services The report 
also cites evidence that some board members and even farmers have been bribed into silence. Other 
farmers have been bribed mt to join those agitating for change. 
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A p p e n d i x 5.7 C o m m i s s i o n s , taxes a n d deduct ions m a d e a long the coffee m a r k e t i n g cha in i n 
K e n y a , 1984 /85 to 1998/99 
Year Marketing 
charges 
Non-
marketing 
levy 
Export Presumptive 
duty Income Tax 
(PIT) 
Milling 
charges 
County 
Council 
cess 
Commission 
agent 
fee 
Co-
operative 
deductions 
Total 
deductions margin 
Pre-reform period % of coffee price at the Nairobi Auction 
84/85 2.06 8.82 8.33 0.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 26.00 52.21 47.-V 
85/86 1.08 10.21 11.99 0.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 26.00 54.28 45.72 
86/87 3.18 6.72 5.74 0.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 25.00 45.64 S-U6 
87/88 4.38 9.83 8.89 0.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 25.00 53.10 46.911 
88/89 9.49 2.74 1.70 0.00 3.20 1.00 1.00 27.00 46.13 5.W 
89/90 5.96 0.99 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 29.00 41.95 58.05 
90/91 4.69 2.01 0.00 0.00 3.20 1.00 1.00 30.00 41.90 58.10 
mean 4.41 5.90 5.24 0.00 3.20 1.29 1.00 26.86 47.89 52.11 
Reform period 
91/92 6.90 2.10 0.00 0.00 6.70 1.00 1.00 27.00 44.70 55. <tt 
92/93 3.14 1.70 0.00 0.00 2.40 1.00 1.00 27.00 36.24 U3.7(i 
93/94 2.16 1.40 0.00 2.00 2.10 1.00 1.00 25.00 34.66 65.34 
94/95 3.41 2.00 0.00 2.00 3.10 1.00 1.20 25.00 37.71 62.2V 
95/96 3.05 2.90 0.00 0.00 2.90 1.00 1.20 22.00 33.05 ftli.y.i 
96/97 1.68 2.80 0.00 0.00 2.80 1.00 1.20 23.00 32.48 f>-.52 
97/98 3.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 1.20 24.00 36.70 (¡3.30 
98/99 3.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 1.50 25.00 38.00 (¡2.00 
Mean 3.29 2.36 0.00 1.00 3.13 1.00 1.16 24.75 36.69 (Ú.3I 
Notes 
Marketing charge levied by Coffee Board of Kenya to cover marketing costs, Non-marketing levy 
caters for non-marketing costs of CBK and research costs, Milling charges are levied by millers for 
secondary processing, the country council cess is levied by local authorities for "improvement" of rural 
access roads, commission agents fees is to cater for "professional "services offered by the agents while 
Co-operative deductions caters for society operational costs and other overheads. 
Source: Coffee Board of Kenya annual reports and Author's calculations 
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S U M M A R Y 
Ijn most least developed countries (LDCs), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries in 
particular, agriculture remains the dominant sector accounting for a large proportion of GNP, 
employment and export revenues. Equally, in most SSA states, agricultural development 
policies have for various economic, social and political reasons centred on smallholder farms 
unlike in the developed countries where large family farms are the preferred mode of 
organising agricultural production. The smallholder based agricultural systems however offer 
formidable challenges mainly with regard to organisation of the market chains, provision of 
public goods and services, as well as the institutional requirements necessary for functioning 
factor and non-factor markets. 
The performance of the agricultural sector and particularly the small farms in SSA 
countries has not been impressive in the last two decades. This is despite the implementation of 
wide-ranging liberalisation policy measures under the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs). For agriculture, the SAPs contained fundamental policy changes meant to correct the 
extensive and pervasive government interventions in the sector that were associated with slow 
agricultural sector and economic growth in the region. Despite the differences in specific 
policy measures implemented across SSA countries the overriding objective has been to 
improve internal terms of trade for the agricultural sector, promotion of agricultural exports 
and to increase both productivity (supply response) and efficiency in the agricultural sector. 
The obvious question is the extent to which these liberalisation objectives have been achieved 
and especially their impact to smallholder agricultural production and marketing. This is the 
$road issue addressed in this study with particular reference to Kenyan situation in general and 
tjhe smallholder coffee farms in Central Kenya province. 
Like most of other developing countries, Kenya's economy is agriculturally based with 
80% of the population living in rural areas mainly engaged in agriculture related activities. The 
main agricultural development strategy in independent Kenya has been based on promotion of 
smallholder farming. Initial attempts to liberalise the Kenyan economy and the agricultural 
sector in particular were made as far back as 1981, but these initial reform attempts were not 
implemented due to various reasons. It was only after 1991 that consistent implementation of 
SAPs began in Kenya. Despite the implementation of wide ranging market reforms, the volume 
of marketed agricultural production has not increased as expected while smallholder market 
participation has also declined. 
Central Province, which is the study area, is one of the provinces with high agricultural 
potential in the country. The province is highly populated with land holdings averaging 1.5 ha 
per household. Smallholder farmers in the region mainly practice intensive farming systems 
characterised by a diversity of crop and livestock enterprises. Thus, although this study focuses 
6n smallholder coffee farmers, these farmers also have other farm enterprises with coffee being 
the main common farm enterprise. 
Study objectives and methodology 
JThe study has three objectives: (1) Determination of the effects of market reforms on the 
agricultural sector terms of trade, evolution of smallholder farmers' commodity prices and 
price volatility in Kenya. (2) Assessment of the institutional changes brought about by market 
reforms and their impact on smallholder farmers' transaction costs, access to factors of 
production and inputs and the attendant changes in market co-ordination and control in various 
commodity systems. (3) Assessment of the effects of economic, institutional and household 
factors on smallholder farmers resource allocation decisions and their subsequent effects on 
farm productivity and efficiency in a liberalised economy. The period 1985 to 1990 is taken as 
"he pre-liberalisation period while the 1991 to 1999 period represents the reform period. Five 
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commodities systems that are the major smallholder enterprises in the study region namely; 
coffee, tea, maize, horticultural crops (French beans) and milk are analysed in fulfilment of the 
above stated objectives. The study uses both time series and cross sectional data sets. The cross 
sectional data was collected between December, 1999 and April, 2000 covering a total of 200 
households in the study region. 
Four separate but related analytical models are formulated and applied in this study, 
details of which are presented in chapter two. The first model analyses the effects of market 
reforms on agricultural terms of trade, commodity price evolution and volatility in Kenya for 
the period 1985 to 1999. The second model is based on exchange configuration analytical 
framework that is rooted in the New institutional Economics (NIE). The model analyses the 
institutional changes occasioned by market reforms as they affect smallholder farmers' level of 
transaction costs and their access to markets and services. The model also analyses changes in 
trade contracts and farmers control and co-ordination roles in the emerging market institutions. 
A bivariate probit selectivity model is applied as the third model that relates households' credit 
and land constraints with farm productivity. Finally, a stochastic frontier model based on a 
translog cost function is used to measure the cost efficiency of smallholder farmers' in the 
study region and the explanatory factors to the estimated inefficiency levels. 
The application of the analytical models is, however, preceded by a review of the 
agricultural development policies in Kenya as documented in chapter three. The review aims 
at appraising the agricultural development and pricing policies pursued by the Kenyan 
government while elucidating on the nature of market reforms undertaken in the country. The 
review indicates that during the both pre- and post-reform periods there has been a mixed 
performance of the agricultural sector in Kenya. The review also gave the indication that 
during the considered liberalisation period, smallholder agricultural production in the majority 
of the commodities was generally declining despite the expected increases in supply response 
expected in such an environment. 
Terms of trade, price evolution and volatility 
The results of the analysis undertaken to determine the effects of market reforms on 
agricultural sector terms of trade, commodity price evolution and their volatility is documented 
in chapter four. Market reforms are shown to be of the 'minimalist' type, mainly concentrated 
on getting the prices right. Results indicate that during the period directly after macro-
economic and agricultural sector reforms in Kenya, the agricultural terms of trade generally 
deteriorated, but that they increased towards the end of the period of analysis. During the same 
period, there was a general increase in both nominal output and input prices. The real producer 
prices show substantial differences, with the producer prices for tea and maize registering a 
decline, and those for milk and coffee an increase in the liberalisation period. The wedge 
between output and input prices first widened as indicated by declining output to input price 
ratio, but recovered at the end of the period of analysis. Results also indicate that market 
reforms in Kenya significantly increased volatility of coffee, tea and maize prices thereby 
exposing smallholder farmers to higher price risks. However, there is a non-significant 
decrease in the volatility of milk prices during the same period. 
Institutional changes 
Market reforms are also associated with major institutional changes that affects the 
environment within which smallholder farmers makes their production and marketing decisions 
as detailed in chapter five. Market reforms are shown to have induced significant reduction in 
public agricultural sector expenditure that severely constrained the provision of essential 
services needed in promoting productivity of smallholder farms. The envisaged entry of the 
private sector to take up some of the roles left behind by the government and its agencies 
occurred only to a limited extent due to a myriad of reasons. Market reforms are also associated 
Summary 197 
\idth major contraction of agricultural credit from banks and other rural financial institutions 
that has mainly affected smallholder farmers. Scarcity of credit has in turn impacted negatively 
6n both productivity and efficiency of production especially for the land-scarce environment 
prevalent in Central Kenya region. Land markets (both rental and sales) are shown to be 
characterised by high transaction costs and uncertainties, attributes the market reforms did not 
attempt to address. As a results land markets are thin and poorly integrated with capital markets 
despite the individual land tenure system prevalent in Central Kenya region. Due to the 
distortions in factor markets, smallholder production systems in the study region are labour 
intensive with little use of purchased inputs that are necessary pre-requisites for improved 
productivity and efficiency in a land-scarce environment. 
Furthermore, due to changes brought about by market reforms, the prevalent vertically 
0o-ordinated marketing systems are shown to be in a dynamic flux towards more decentralised 
systems after market reforms. This has created asymmetrical information that may lead to 
resource mis-allocation while enhancing production and marketing risks to smallholder 
farmers. Equally, the results indicate that smallholder farmer's control of production aspects 
may have increased with market reforms. However, their control on marketing functions have 
generally declined, which leads to situation that may lead to loss of their strategic bargaining 
position while encouraging opportunistic trading practices. The results also indicates that trade 
contracts have generally moved from vertically integrated contracts before reforms to relational 
^nd spot market contracts after reforms. The shift from vertically integrated contracts may not 
be in the best interest of smallholder producers, especially those involved in production of 
cjrops with high asset specificity and product differentiation such as coffee and tea. The spot 
iharket contracts are also not ideal for mterlocking credit and products markets thereby 
Constraining credit supply and hence supply response. 
Farm productivity 
Chapter six documents the results of the analysis of the economic, institutional and household 
factors affecting farm productivity in an environment characterised by credit and land 
constraints. Results indicate that both farm productivity and resource allocation behaviour of 
smallholder coffee farmers in the study region are significantly influenced by each household's 
land and credit demand conditions. Those households facing both land and credit constraints 
tends to allocate a significantly higher proportion of their farm to food crops which in turn 
depresses their farm productivity. This leads to the conclusion that smallholder farmers' risk 
ljnitigating behaviour with regard to food security is a major factor that determines resource 
allocation to high-value crops such as coffee and tea. Equally important is the result from this 
study indicating that availability of credit significantly enhances farm productivity in those 
households with high land demand (mainly with small farm sizes) but not in households that 
are not. Furthermore, contrary to empirical evidence from similar farming situations, the farm 
size positively and significantly influence farm productivity for those households that are both 
land and credit constrained but not in those households where the land constraint is relaxed. 
Apart from re-emphasising the importance of credit in enhancing farm productivity of small 
farms, the results indicate that the imperfections in rural factor markets in the region are 
severely eroding the productivity advantages usually enjoyed by small farms. 
Cost efficiency 
estimates of the cost efficiency of smallholder coffee farmers in Central Kenya using a 
Stochastic cost frontier model are reported in chapter seven. The result indicates that farmers 
jn the region are cost efficient with a mean cost inefficiency level of 8%. There are, however, 
wide dispersions of the farm-specific inefficiency levels, which ranges from 1% to 66%. Levels 
0f farm-specific cost inefficiencies are significantly influenced by farm size, amounts of farm 
incomes and availability of credit. Other household demographic factors such as age, 
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Policy implications 
In chapter eight, general discussions and conclusions of the results from the previous chapters 
are made mainly with respect to the policy implications to the agricultural sector and 
smallholder farming both in Kenya and in the wider context of SSA region. The study further 
identifies a number of policy issues that deserve attention as they directly affect smallholder 
based agricultural development in Kenya and Central Province in particular in a liberalised 
economic environment. These issues are grouped into seven fields related to; sequencing and 
implementation of market reforms, the role of the government and private sector in provision 
of public goods, creation of the necessary institutional framework for risk management, 
improvement of rural financial markets, development of land markets and their linkage to 
financial markets, strengthening of regulatory framework and promotion of high-value 
commodities by addressing food security issues. Most of these policy fields focuses on creating 
institutional frameworks necessary for reducing the transaction and production costs, 
increasing access to production resources and markets by smallholder farmers. This study 
views this as the main challenge to be tackled in the new century for agricultural development 
and prosperity in Kenya. 
The government is identified as a key player in implementation of most of the policies 
despite the diminished role of government as a market player in a reformed economy. 
Furthermore, we note that the implementation of majority of the policies will call for increased 
public expenditure that can be justified by long-term benefits to the general economy and 
enhancement of household incomes. Moreover, such expenditure should be seen as part of the 
ongoing development strategy that focuses on alleviation of poverty. 
household size and education level as well as institutional/economic factors such as availability 
of extension services or off-farm employment did not significantly affect the levels of 
inefficiency. The study concludes that while there is still room for improving smallholder 
farmers levels of efficiency through better resource allocation and re-allocation, the highest 
source of growth is likely to come from technology development that shifts the production 
frontier outwards. Generally, the results also indicates that smallholder based agricultural 
development policy is still relevant, and an efficient mode of organising production in Kenya 
even after the major institutional and economic changes brought about by liberalisation. 
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InJ veel ontwikkelingslanden, in het bijzonder de landen in Afrika ten zuiden van de Sahara, 
blíjft landbouw de belangrijkste sector die een grote bijdrage levert aan het bruto nationaal 
product, de werkgelegenheid en de export. In de meeste landen ten zuiden van de Sahara heeft 
hejt landbouwontwikkelingsbeleid zich vanwege economische, sociale en politieke redenen 
geconcentreerd op kleine landbouwbedrijven, in tegenstelling tot de situatie in ontwikkelde 
landen waar landbouwproductie overwegend in grote familiebedrijven georganiseerd is. 
Landbouwsystemen die op kleine bedrijven gebaseerd zijn roepen uitdagingen op voor de 
organisatie van de marktketens, de voorziening van publieke goederen en diensten, en de 
institutionele voorzieningen die nodig zijn voor het functioneren van factor en niet-factor 
markten. 
De prestaties van de landbouwsector in Afrika ten zuiden van de Sahara, en in het 
bijzonder de prestaties van de kleine bedrijven, zijn de afgelopen twee decennia niet 
indrukwekkend geweest. Dit ondanks de uitvoering van verstrekkende liberalisatie maatregelen 
bipnen structurele aanpassingsprogramma's. Voor de landbouw bevatten deze 
aanpassingsprogramma's fundamentele beleidswijzigingen bedoeld ter correctie van het 
uitgebreide overheidsingrijpen dat verantwoordelijk gesteld werd voor de langzame groei van 
dé landbouw sector en de economie in de regio. Ondanks verschillen in beleid tussen de landen 
ten zuiden van de Sahara waren de algemene doelstellingen de verbetering van de interne 
ruilverhouding tussen de landbouw en de rest van de economie, stimulering van de 
laadbouwexport, en de verhoging van productiviteit en doelmatigheid in de landbouwsector. 
Ei;n voor de hand liggend vraag betreft de mate waarin deze doelstellingen zijn bereikt, in het 
bijzonder de effecten op de productie en marketing van kleine bedrijven. Dit onderwerp wordt 
ini deze studie behandeld met speciale aandacht voor de situatie in Kenia en de kleine 
koffiebedrijven in de Central Province. 
Zoals in de meeste ontwikkelingslanden is de economie van Kenia gebaseerd op de 
landbouw en 80% van de rurale bevolking is betrokken bij landbouw gerelateerde 
ondernemingen. De belangrijkste landbouwontwikkelingsstrategie in Kenia na de 
onafhankelijkheid is steeds gebaseerd geweest op de stimulering van landbouw door kleine 
bedrijven. De eerste aanzetten tot liberalisatie van de Keniaanse economie en de landbouw 
se ctor in het bijzonder dateren van 1981, maar deze eerste pogingen tot heivorming werden om 
verschillende redenen niet uitgevoerd. Pas na 1991 werd in Kenia een begin gemaakt met de 
systematische uitvoering van aanpassingsprogramma's. Ondanks de invoering van uitgebreide 
rriarkthervormingen is het volume van de op de markt gebrachte landbouwproductie niet 
toegenomen, terwijl de deelname van de kleine boeren afgenomen is. 
Central Province, het studiegebied, is één van de provincies met een hoog 
landbouwkundig potentieel. De provincie is dichtbevolkt en de bedrijven hebben een 
gemiddelde grootte van 1,5 hectare per huishouding. Deze kleine boeren hebben een intensief 
landbouwsysteem bestaande uit verschillende gewassen en diersoorten. Dus, hoewel deze 
studie gericht is op kleine boeren die koffie produceren als één van hun belangrijke activiteiten 
worden ook de andere activiteiten in beschouwing genomen. 
Studie doeleinden en methodologie 
E)e studie heeft drie doeleinden: (1) Vaststellen van de effecten van marlcmervormingen op de 
ruilverhouding van de landbouwsector; de ontwikkeling van prijzen en prijsschommelingen 
geldend voor de kleine boeren in Kenia. (2) Beoordelen van institutionele veranderingen 
veroorzaakt door de markt hervormingen met de gevolgen voor de transactiekosten van de 
boeren; de toegang tot productiefactoren en productiemiddelen met de veranderingen in 
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marktstructuur in een aantal productketens. (3) Beoordeling van de gevolgen van economische, 
institutionele- en huishoudfactoren op de bedrijfsbeslissingen van boeren met de gevolgen voor 
productiviteit en doelmatigheid binnen een geliberaliseerde economie. De periode van 1985 tot 
en met 1990 is genomen als de periode vóór de liberalisatie, terwijl de periode van 1991 tot en 
met 1999 geldt als de periode van de hervormingen. Vijf productsystemen die van belang zijn 
voor de kleine boeren in het onderzoeksgebied, namelijk koffie, thee, maïs, tuinbouwproducten 
(sperziebonen) en melk, zijn geanalyseerd om de gestelde studiedoeleinden te bereiken. De 
studie gebruikt zowel secondaire data als primaire data. De primaire data betreffende 200 
huishoudens in het onderzoeksgebied zijn verzameld tussen december 1999 en april 2000. 
Vier verschillende, maar samenhangende analytische modellen zijn geformuleerd en 
toegepast in de studie, de details staan vermeld in hoofdstuk 2. Het eerste model analyseert de 
effecten van markthervormingen op de ruilverhoudingen in de landbouw en het verloop van de 
prijzen en prijsschommelingen in Kenia voor de periode van 1985 tot en met 1999. Het tweede 
model is gebaseerd op het exchange configuraüon analytical framework dat is gegrondvest in 
de nieuwe institutionele economie. Het model analyseert de institutionele veranderingen als 
gevolg van markthervormingen en de gevolgen op de transactiekosten en toegang tot markten 
en diensten van kleine boeren. Het model analyseert ook veranderingen in contracten en de 
controle en coördinatie van boeren in de nieuw opkomende instituties. Een bivariate probit 
selectivity model is toegepast als derde model om de beperkingen van huishoudens op het 
gebied van krediet en land te relateren aan de productiviteit. Tenslotte is een stochastic frontier 
model gebaseerd op een translog cost function gebruikt voor het meten van de kosten 
efficiëntie van de kleine bedrijven in het onderzoeksgebied en voor de verklarende factoren in 
de geschatte inefficiëntie niveaus. 
De toepassing van de analytische modellen wordt voorafgegaan door een overzicht van 
het landbouwontwikkelingsbeleid in Kenia in hoofdstuk drie. Het overzicht bespreekt het 
landbouwontwikkelings- en prijsbeleid van de Keniaanse overheid waarbij de aard van de 
markthervormingen duidelijk gemaakt wordt. Het overzicht toont dat gedurende de 
onderzochte liberalisatie periode de landbouwproductie door kleine boeren terugliep ondanks 
de verwachte positieve aanbodsreactie in een dergelijke situatie. 
Ruilverhoudingen, prijsontwikkeling en prijsschommelingen 
De resultaten van de analyse van de gevolgen van markthervormingen op de ruilverhoudingen 
in de landbouw, productprijzen en prijsschommelingen wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk vier. 
Markthervormingen blijken 'minimalistisch', voornamelijk betrekking hebbend op de prijzen. 
De resultaten laten zien dat gedurende de periode na de macro-economische en landbouwsector 
hervormingen in Kenia de ruilverhouding in de landbouw aanvankelijk verslechterde, maar 
verbeterde in de laatste jaren van de geanaliseerde periode. Gedurende dezelfde periode was er 
een algemene nominale prijsverhoging van producten en productiemiddelen. De reële prijzen 
vertoonden grote verschillen, waarbij de producentenprijzen voor thee en mais daalden, en die 
van melk en koffie stegen in de periode van liberalisatie. De verschillen tussen productprijzen 
en de prijzen van productiemiddelen werden aanvankelijk groter, maar verkleinden aan het 
eind van de liberalisatieperiode. De markmervormingen leidden tot grotere 
prijsschommelingen voor koffie, thee en maïs waardoor kleine boeren hogere prijsrisico's 
liepen. In dezelfde periode was er een niet significante daling van schommelingen van de 
melkprijs. 
Institutionele veranderingen 
Marldhervormingen zijn ook gekoppeld aan institutionele veranderingen die de omgeving 
beïnvloeden waarin kleine boeren beslissen over productie en verkoop, hoofdstuk vijf. 
Markthervormingen hebben duidelijk geleid tot een aanzienlijke vermindering van het 
overheidsbudget ten behoeve van de landbouw. Het gevolg was een aanzienlijke inkrimping 
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van diensten die nodig zijn voor de verhoging van de productiviteit op kleine bedrijven. De 
voorziene opkomst van de private sector in taken die door de overheid werden afgestoten heeft 
om vele redenen slechts gedeeltelijk plaats gevonden. Markthervormingen worden ook in 
verband gebracht met de inkrimping van landbouwkredietverlening door banken en andere 
rurale financiële instituties die voornamelijk kleine boeren getroffen heeft. Schaarste aan 
kj-ediet heeft een negatief effect gehad op de productiviteit en de doelmatigheid, in het 
bijzonder in de situatie van landschaarste in centraal Kenia. De landmarkt, betreffende zowel 
het verkopen als het huren van land, blijkt hoge transactiekosten te hebben die niet onderkend 
zjn bij de markthervormingen. Het gevolg is dat de landmarkt een beperkte omvang heeft en 
nauwelijks geïntegreerd is met de kapitaalmarkt, ondanks het individuele landbezit in centraal 
Kenia. Als het gevolg van de verstoringen in de factormarkten zijn de productiesystemen van 
de kleine boeren arbeidsintensief met een gering gebruik van gekochte productiemiddelen die 
nbdig zijn voor een hogere productiviteit en doelmatigheid in een situatie waar land de 
beperkende factor is. 
Als gevolg van markthervormingen blijkt de bestaande verticale coördinatie in de 
n|arktketen te verminderen met een tendens naar een meer decentraal systeem. Dit heeft geleid 
tot asymmetrische informatie die kan leiden tot onjuiste allocatie van productiefactoren waarbij 
productie- en marktrisico's van boeren groter worden. De resultaten laten echten ook zien dat 
ds controle van boeren over de productie toegenomen zou zijn als gevolg van de 
markAervormingen. De controle over marktfuncties is in het algemeen afgenomen wat leidt tot 
een slechtere onderhandelingspositie en een stimulering van opportunistische 
handelspraktijken. De resultaten laten ook zien dat contracten verschuiven van overwegend 
vïrtikaal geïntegreerde contracten vóór de hervormingen naar contracten op lokale markten na 
do hervormingen. De verschuiving van de vertikaal geïntegreerde contracten is mogelijk niet in 
hpt voordeel van de kleine boer, speciaal niet voor diegenen die producten verbouwen als 
kpffie en thee die investeringen vergen en duidelijk kwaliteitskenmerken hebben. De 
contracten op lokale markten zijn eveneens niet ideaal voor het combineren van krediet en 
producten waardoor de kredietverlening beperkt wordt en daarmee de productie. 
B edrijfsproductiviteit 
Hoofdstuk zes geeft de resultaten van de economische, institutionele en huishoudfactoren die 
ds productiviteit beïnvloeden in een omgeving die gekenmerkt wordt door beperkingen in 
krediet en land. De resultaten geven aan dat zowel de bedrijfsproductiviteit als het gebruik van 
productiefactoren door kleine koffieboeren significant beïnvloed wordt door de individuele 
situatie betreffende de vraag naar krediet en land. De huishoudingen die beperkingen kennen in 
zpwel land als krediet hebben de neiging een groter deel van hun bedrijf te gebruiken voor 
voedselgewassen, hetgeen hun totale productiviteit doet afnemen. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat 
het risicogedrag van boeren met betrekking tot voedselzekerheid een belangrijke factor is bij de 
beslissing betreffende het gebruik van productiefactoren voor gewassen met een hoge waarde 
zoals koffie en thee. Van gelijk belang is het resultaat dat aangeeft dat de beschikbaarheid van 
kfediet de productiviteit significant verhoogt op bedrijven met een substantiële onbeantwoorde 
vraag naar land (merendeels kleine bedrijven), maar niet bij bedrijven die geen gebrek aan land 
hsbben. Vervolgens, en tegengesteld aan bevindingen in vergelijkbare situaties, heeft de 
bïdrijfsgrootte een positieve en significante invloed op de bedrijfsproductiviteit bij die 
b schijven die een gebrek hebben aan zowel land als kapitaal, maar niet bij bedrijven waar de 
kcndbeperkingen in mindere mate aanwezig zijn. Naast het benadrukken van het belang van 
krediet als ondersteuning voor de productiviteit op kleine bedrijven geven de resultaten ook 
weer dat imperfecties in de regionale rurale factor markten de productiviteitsvoordelen 
uithollen die kleine bedrijven gewoonlijk genieten. 
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Kostenefficiëntie 
Schattingen betreffende de kostenefficiëntie van kleine koffieboeren in centraal Kenia met 
behulp van het stochastic cost frontier model worden gegeven in hoofdstuk zeven. De 
resultaten geven weer dat de boeren in de regio kosten efficiënt zijn met een gemiddeld 
inefficiëntie niveau van 8%. Er zijn echter grote verschillen tussen de bedrijven met een 
inefficiëntie varieerend van 1% tot 66%. De niveaus van bedrijf specifieke inefficiënties 
worden significant beïnvloed door bedrijfsgrootte, grootte van het bedrijfsinkomen en de 
beschikbaarheid van krediet. Andere demografische factoren van de huishouding zoals leeftijd, 
omvang van de huihouding, en opleidingsniveau en institutionele en economische factoren als 
de aanwezigheid van een voorlichtingsdienst of externe werkgelegenheid beïnvloeden de 
inefficiëntie niet significant. De studie concludeert dat er weliswaar een mogelijkheid is tot 
efficiëntieverhoging bij kleine boeren door betere toedeling van productiefactoren, maar dat de 
grootste groei waarschijnlijk dient te komen van technologieontwikkeling die de 
productiemogelijkheden structureel verandert. In het algemeen geven de resultaten aan dat een 
landbouwontwikkelingsbeleid gericht op kleine boeren nog steeds zinvol is, omdat het een 
mogelijkheid biedt tot efficiënte organisatie van de productie in Kenia, zelfs na de ingrijpende 
institutionele en economische veranderingen als gevolg van de liberalisatie. 
Gevolgen voor het beleid 
In hoofdstuk acht worden de discussies en conclusies betreffende de resultaten van 
voorgaande hoofdstukken doorgetrokken naar de gevolgen voor het beleid ten aanzien van 
landbouw en kleine boeren zowel in Kenia als in de wijdere context van de regio ten zuiden 
van de Sahara. De studie identificeert een aantal beleidskwesties die aandacht vereisen omdat 
zij rechtstreeks betrekking hebben op de landbouwontwikkeling via kleine bedrijven in Kenia, 
en de Central Province in het bijzonder, binnen een geliberaliseerde economische omgeving. 
Deze kwesties zijn ondergebracht in zeven aandachtsvelden gerelateerd aan: de opeenvolging 
en uitvoering van markthervormingen; de rol van de overheid en het bedrijfsleven in de 
voorziening van publieke goederen; de opbouw van een institutioneel kader voor risico 
beheersing; verbetering van rurale financiële markten; ontwikkeling van landmarkten met 
verbindingen naar financiële markten; bevordering van de teelt van gewassen met hoge 
productiewaarde door aandacht te schenken aan voedselzekerheid. In de meeste van deze 
aandachtvelden gaat het om het ontwikkelen van institutionele kaders die noodzakelijk voor het 
reduceren van transactie- en productiekosten, en het verbeteren van de toegang tot 
productiemiddelen en productiefactoren door kleine boeren. Deze studie onderkent dit als de 
belangrijkste uitdaging voor landbouwontwikkeling en welvaart in Kenia in deze nieuwe eeuw. 
De overheid wordt aangewezen als een centrale partij in de uitvoering van het beleid 
ondanks de afgenomen rol van de overheid als deelnemer in markten in een geliberaliseerde 
economie. Daarnaast stellen we vast dat voor de uitvoering van het merendeel van de 
beleidsmaatregelen een verhoging van openbare uitgaven nodig is. Dit kan gerechtvaardigd 
worden door de voordelen op de lange termijn voor de nationale economie en de verbetering 
van de inkomens van de huishoudens. Bovendien dienen dergelijke uitgave gezien te worden 
als een onderdeel van een ontwikkelingsbeleid dat de nadruk legt op armoedebestrijding. 
203 
c urriculum Vitae 
Andrew Mwihia Karanja was born in April 26, 1962 in Kiambu, Kenya. After primary and 
high school, Andrew joined the University of Nairobi in 1984 and graduated in 1987 with a 
BJSc. degree (honors) in agriculture. He worked briefly with the Ministry of Agriculture before 
ret-joining the same University in 1987. He graduated with an Msc. in agricultural economics in 
1991. His MSc. thesis was entitled, 'The economics of dairy cattle breeding by small scale 
farmers: a case study of Kiambu District'. Between 1989 and 1991 he worked with the 
MJinistry of Agriculture as a planning officer before joining Coffee Research Foundation in 
September 1991 as a research officer. 
In January 1994, Andrew attended the International Course in Research in Agriculture 
(ICRA) at Wageningen, Netherlands. It was during this time that he developed a keen interest 
in joining Wageningen University to pursue a Ph.D. This was achieved in October, 1998 when 
he joined the Department of Development Economics to start his studies, which culminate to 
this dissertation. Andrew is married and has three children 

